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The purpose of this research was to examine the actions of an
organizational leader in initiating, carrying out, and stabilizing
organizational change. The assumption made was that the degree to
which a proposed change is initiated, implemented, and incorporated
is a function of a number of variables, many of which can be linked
to the role performance of the organizational leader.
Drawing on the literature in attitude and organizational change,
a set of propositions about leader behaviors that may be required for
the successful initiation, implementation, and incorporation of organiza-
tional change were proposed. These propositions were then used to critic-
ally examine and analyze the actions of one university president (Warren
Bennis at the University of Cincinnati) in developing a long range plan,
in carrying out a federal mandate for affirmative action, in implementing
a budget-review/resource allocation process, and in building an adminis-
trative team. The entire list of propositions represents an attempt to
generate a comprehensive list of areas that may need the leader's attention
if long term change which the leader has initiated is to be stably inte-
grated into the life of the organization. A second assumption made was that
the degree to which a proposed change is initiated, implemented, and
incorporated may depend upon the extent to which organizational members
perceive that the conditions described in these propositions have
been
created or eliminated during the periods of attempted initiation,
implementation, and incorporation.
The organizing framework chosen for this research was a model
proposed by Kurt Lewin in which he described three stages to the change
process: unfreezing (initiation), changing (implementation), and
refreezing (incorporation). In this research the university president’s
actions in each of the four cases were analyzed using this framework.
Methods of data collection included the study of documents, interviewing,
and observation. A case study format was then used to analyze the data.
Each of the four case studies of the role performance of the
university president established the need for the leader to think through
a strategy for organizational change which includes a leadership role
not only in setting new goals and initiating change but also in seeing
to it that certain organizational conditions, which are seen by members
as important for implementation and incorporation, are established and
maintained. In each of the four case analyses it was found that the
university president often acted in ways that unfroze existing attitudes,
expectancies, and behaviors on the part of organizational members. Un-
freezing usually succeeded because the organizational leader intervened
to overcome resistance and to heighten organizational members’ sensitivity
to problems in regards to the proDosed change, to create new needs on the
part of organizational members, to make the organization more open to its
environment, to change patterns of interaction and informat ion—sharing
,
to link parts of the system that shared common dissatisfactions in
regards to the proposed change, to create a sense of rising expectations,
to establish priorities for the organization, to involve informal as well
as formal leaders in decision-making, and to establish and maintain a
a climate of acceptance, support, and trust.
In each of the four cases however organizational members encount-
ered problems in attempting to implement the required behavioral changes.
The organizational leader’s implementation strategies often failed to:
1) overcome emergent resistance to the proposed change;
2) establish and use feedback mechanisms to uncover and
resolve problems as they arose;
3) establish a secure climate where members had the opportunity
to experiment with and test new behaviors;
4) change certain organizational arrangements so that they were
compatible with what was being proposed;
5) provide appropriate support, reinforcement, or rewards to
maintain subordinate willingness to carry out implementation;
and
6) establish and maintain workable relationships with those
individuals to whom certain aspects of implementation had
been delegated.
His incorporation strategies often failed 1) to monitor organiza-
tional members’ performance in coping with and integrating the proposed
change and 2) to insulate the organization from other demands during
the refreezing period.
These conclusions about the role performance of the organizational
leader are based on extensive documentation about what organizational
members said they needed or expected from the leader during
the change
process. Their practical research implications are explored in the
final chapter of the study.
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INTRODUCTION
Statement of Purpose
An examination of the sociological and social-psychological
literature on planned organizational change reveals that very little
is known about why actions taken by a change agent do or do not produce
the kinds of organizational change intended. One explanation attributes
the failure of the change effort to the inability of the change agent to
overcome organizational members’ initial resistance to the proposed change.
A second explanation is offered by Gross, Giacquinta and Bernstein (1971,
p. 7) who contend that one reason that organizational change strategies
do not yield their intended results is that they are inadequately imple-
mented, and that, in fact, the whole implementation phase of the process
of planned organizational change is not well understood. (They cite
Bennis
,
1966; Guba, 1966; Heathers, 1965; and Stufflebeam, 1966; as
authors who have noted the limited knowledge about this aspect of planned
organizational change.) Both explanations seem to postulate that condi-
tions exist in organizations which serve to block or facilitate the imple-
mentation of organizational change and that organizational leaders may
play a key role in creating or eliminating those conditions.
The purpose of this research is to examine the actions of an
organizational leader, in this case a university president, in initiating,
carrying out, and stabilizing organizational change. The assumption made
is that the degree to which a proposed change is initiated. Implemented
and incorporated is a function of a number of variables (environmental
constraints, job demands, the expectations of organizational members.
2etc.), many of which can be linked to the role performance of the organi-
zational leader. In other words the purpose of this research is to exam-
ine the consequences of the organizational leader's actions in creating
or not creating certain organizational conditions in each phase of the
change process.
The organizing framework chosen for this research is a model of
change proposed by Kurt Lewin in which he described three stages to a
process of change: unfreezing, moving (or changing), and refreezing.
Drawing on the literature on attitude and organizational change, a set
of propositions about leader behaviors that may be required for the
successful initiation (unfreezing), implementation (changing), and
incorporation (refreezing) of organizational change will be proposed.
These propositions will then be used to critically examine and analyze
the actions of one university president in developing a university long-
range plan, in carrying out a federal mandate for an affirmative action
program, in implementing a budget-review/resource allocation process,
and in building an administrative team. The author reasoned that case
analyses would reveal how and where the organizational leader's behavior
influences initiation, implementation, and incorporation and that the
results of this inquiry might lead to the development of a theory of the
organizational leader's role in the process of change.
The University President as the Focus for Analysis
A review of the literature on planned organizational change reveals
that most organizational theorists practically ignore the role of
the
organizational leader in the Implementation of organizational
innovations.
3Instead they advocate the use of third party change agents to insure
effective change implementation (Bennis, 1966; Bennis, et. al., 1968;
Lippitt, et. al.
,
1958; Leavitt, 1965). Gross, Giacquinta, and Bernstein
(1971, p. 29) however found that there was little research evidence in
support of the proposition that outside agents insure the successful
implementation of organizational innovations. In fact, they found, and
others have supported, that the role performance of the administrator was
critically important to the success or failure of implementation (Gross,
et. al., 1971, p. 212).
Further, it is important to look at the literature on higher edu-
cation and to note the expectations held both within and outside the
university for the university president’s role performance. The univer-
sity president is often the only spokesman for the university to the
community at a time of increasing interdependence between the university
and the community (Lunsford, 1970; Baldridge, 1971). Correspondingly,
given the situation where professors are primarily loyal to their depart-
ments or disciplines, the university president is often the only repre-
sentative of the institution as a whole for members of the university
community. The central function of the university president is to
mobilize a working consensus about a set of institutional goals and to
justify these decisions to critical publics, inside and outside the
university (Selznik, 1957). In doing so he is looked to initiate and
support new programs (Hodgkinson, 1971, p. 1970). However, changes
internally in the character of the university with greater faculty and
student activism and participation in governance corrode the university
Apresident's authority (or at least his perception of his authority) to
implement organizational change strategies. Constantine Simonides writes
that "virtually all of the pressures associated with (and contributing to)
the problems on campuses today converge on the president and his office"
(Simonides, 1971, p. 1).
In summary a review of higher education literature yields contra-
dictory expectations for the ability of the university president to effect
(both initiate and implement) organizational change. At the same time,
the literature on planned organizational change has neglected the role of
the university administrator in implementing organizational innovations.
It is hoped that this research will shed some light on both these dilemmas.
Implications of the Study
This study has been pursued with the expectation that many of its
concepts would be helpful to other organizations, since change projects
similar to the ones described in this study, encountering at least some
of the same problems, begin anew every day. Further, it is expected
that the major question of this study will be of interest both to
organizational theorists since it provides insights into the dynamics of
an organizational leader's relationship to a change effort, and to prac-
ticing administrators, since it describes and analyzes potentially
replicable change efforts and delineates a set of propositions about
the behavior of organizational leaders.
5Overview
On the basis of the purposes described above, this dissertation
is organized as follows:
Chapter I - reviews the theories of attitude and social change.
Their implications for this study are discussed and a general theoretical
framework for this paper is proposed.
Chapter II - sets forth a set of propositions about the role
performance of the organizational leader in initiating, implementing,
and incorporating change.
Chapter III - contains a description of the research setting and
research design. The major methodological problems encountered in the
investigation and the procedures for data collection are considered.
Chapter IV - contains an assessment of the university setting
just prior to the initiation of several proposals for change with
special reference on the relationships of both internal and external
environmental conditions to successful organizational change. The role
of the organizational leader as a "climate builder" is also discussed.
Chapter V - is a case analysis of the university president's role
in the development of a long-range plan.
Chapter VI - is a case analysis of the university president's
role in instituting an affirmative action program.
Chapter VII - is a case analysis of the university president's
actions in implementing a budget-review/resource allocation process.
6Chapter VIII - is a case analysis of the university president's
actions in building an administrative team.
Chapter IX - considers the major theoretical, practical, and
research implications of this study.
CHAPTER I
REVIEW OF THE THEORIES OF
ATTITUDE AND SOCIAL CHANGE
Introduction
Organizational change can be approached from the perspective of
change in the structures and conditions in which people find themselves
(economic and legal) or from the perspective that organizational change
comes through change in individuals' attitudes and behavior. The first
perspective represents the sociological or macro-approach to under-
standing change; the second represents the psychological or micro-level
approach.
"The understanding of change in complex organizations requires
both a knowledge of the influence process as applied to individuals and
a knowledge of how the structure of complex organizations might influ-
ence change" (Ingham, 1966, p. 4). In other words a social-psychological
perspective is needed in order to understand the processes and phenomena
of organizational change.
Social-psychologists have concluded that behavioral or institu-
tional change is sustained through changes in the beliefs and attitudes
of individuals (see Hersey and Blanchard, 1972; Kelman and Warwick, 1973)
and that in some programs of planned change the relationship between
individuals and the institution in the change process is interactive
(Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 42). For example, a recent study of
institutions of higher education found that changes in individual atti-
tudes accounted for most institutional changes which in turn caused
individuals' attitudes to change even more to support new social
behaviors (Hefferlin, 1969, pp. 158, 189).
a
This dissertation is based on the assumption that analyses of
micro-levels of change may be relevant to problems of change at the
institutional level; therefore it is based on the contributions of
social-psychologists toward understanding individual attitude change.
Their studies of 1) the processes of attitude and behavior change, i.e.
of a) conditions conducive to change, b) sources of resistance to
change, and c) of ways of overcoming resistance to change; and 2) of
the sequencing or phasing of social change—both as to how one aspect
of a change process leads into the next and as to how changes in one
area may have positive or negative consequences in another area will be
reviewed in this chapter. In this chapter the contributions of several
theorists in the fields of leadership and management will also be
reviewed. A model of change proposed by Kurt Lewin chosen as the
organizing framework for this research will be discussed.
Lewin' s Concepts of Change
Kurt Lewin was one of the great pioneers in the social-psychological
study of change. As a social psychologist he was concerned with individual
attitude change and with change in organizational settings. That perspec-
tive as well as the fact that Lewin 's model is essentially a social systems
model were important reasons for the choice of the Lewinian model in lieu
of other models for the purposes of this research. Furthermore, Lewin in
studying the process of change was concerned with the effects of a single
event on the balance of forces within an organizational setting.
That
9kind of approach to phenomena related especially well to the research
methodology chosen for this research which is essentially descriptive
and process-oriented (see Chapter III)
.
Lewin theorized that change was movement from one level of
equilibrium of social forces in a setting to another. Among these
social forces were both pressures toward change and forces resistant
to change. Lewin labelled these forces driving and restraining forces.
Quasi-stationary equilibrium is descriptive of a social state in which
there are equally strong opposing forces; this level is not static but
fluctuates around an average equilibrium. Finally, Lewin wrote that
the forces within a total force-field may also vary in strength, or
salience, which he called 'Valence.’'
In any organization then a polarity exists between forces for
conservation, continuity, and the maintenance of identity on the one
hand and forces toward change, adaptation, growth, and development on
the other . Lewin spoke of change in a level of equilibrium as involving
three stages: unfreezing (the present level of equilibrium), moving
(to a new level), and refreezing (assuring some permanence with regards
to the change) (Lewin, 1951, pp. 228-229). (Schein has elaborated on
these three stages, using the terms unfreezing, changing and refreezing
to designate them [Schein, 1969]). Unfreezing is a process of rearrang-
ing the forces acting on an individual or group so that the need to
change is perceived. Unfreezing "refers essentially to the processes
involved in overcoming resistance to change, that is in counteracting
those personal and social factors that help to stabilize existing
10
behaviors and beliefs" (Reiman and Warwick, 1973, p. 23). In terms of
force-field analysis unfreezing occurs when either the driving forces
are increased, the restraining forces resisting changes are reduced or
removed, or when a restraining force is converted into a driving force. 1
The second stage of Lewin's model, changing, "refers to processes
whereby new behavior is induced, that is, whereby the individual is led
to adopt new patterns of action, belief, and attitude" (Reiman and Warwick,
1973, p. 23). Refreezing "refers to the ways in which these new (behavior)
patterns become integrated into cognitive and social structures and thus,
to a degree stabilized" (Reiman and Warwick, 1973, p. 23).
These three stages are comparable to the stages termed "initiation",
"implementation", and "incorporation" in the literature on planned organi-
zational change. Since social scientists vary in their use of those terms,
the following definitions are offered for the purposes of this research.
Definitions of Terms
Initiation : "The period of time in which a particular change
strategy is selected and introduced into the organization" (Gross, et. al.
1971, p. 16), the stage in which an organizational problem is defined
and decisions are made on a process by which new organizational goals
can be articulated and reached. It includes those activities undertaken
^If the first strategy alone is adopted, tension in the system is
likely to increase. More tension usually means more instability and
more unpredictability and the likelihood of irrational rather than
rational responses to attempts to change.
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by the organizational leader to cause organizational members to perceive
a need to change. This stage corresponds to the unfreezing stage.
Implementa t ion : The period after the announcement that a particu-
lar change strategy is to be adopted in which actions are taken to make
changes in the behavior of organizational members as specified by the
goals of the change effort. These efforts include interventions made by
the organizational leader to monitor and to spur adoption and to estab-
lish and maintain those organizational conditions specified as necessary
for successful implementation. This stage corresponds to Lewin's changing
phase.
Incorporation : This term refers to the period in which change that
is implemented becomes an integral part of the operation of the organiza-
tion. It usually includes some form of assessment undertaken by the ini-
tiator of the change strategy to survey both intended and unintended
effects of the change effort on organizational members' behavior. This
stage corresponds to refreezing in Lewin's model.
The terms unfreezing-initiation, changing-implementation, and
refreezing-incorporation will be used interchangeably throughout this
research. Other frequently used terms include:
Organizational change : Behavioral change with reference to role
performance, the division of labor, decision-making, communication, or
power structure within an organization. Organizational change refers
to changing the behavior of individuals as members of an organization
and hence the functioning of the organization as an organization. (Note:
A change in the attitudes of organizational members or their knowledge
about a particular goal is not organizational change as defined here;
12
neither is change in the behavior of individuals independent of their
organizational roles.)
Planned organizational change : According to Gross, Giacquinta
and Bernstein two different uses of the term 'planned organizational
change' are found in the literature. "Some writers use the term to
refer to deliberate efforts to instigate a process of change in an
organization without reference to any specific innovation, or set of
ideas. The emphasis is on 'getting change going', that is, on identi-
fying organizational problems and setting forces in motion to cope with
them. Others view planned organizational change as deliberate efforts
to introduce specific organizational innovations into the organization,
in order to modify specific patterns of organizational behavior" (Gross, et.
al. f 1971, p. 16). In this research the term 'planned organizational
change' will be used in the former sense. (Note: The adjective 'planned'
does not refer to a normative process, in the sense of being participa-
tive.)
Intervention : Intentional goal-oriented actions taken by the
organizational leader to initiate, implement, or incorporate change into
the organization.
In this chapter the literature on attitude and social change will
be reviewed using these three stages of unfreezing, changing, and re-
freezing as an organizing framework, with special reference to the useful-
ness of the review in understanding the role performance of the organiza-
tional leader in affecting organizational change. The next section of
this chapter on unfreezing will include a discussion of the concept
of
13
resistance, of strategies for overcoming resistance, and of initial and
emergent forces toward change. In the following section various imple-
mentation strategies for accomplishing attitude and social change that
have been suggested in the literature will be reviewed. Finally,
strategies of incorporation and stabilization will be discussed. The
concerns that emerge from this review of the literature will be used to
develop a set of propositions about the organizational leader’s behavior
to be set out in Chapter II.
Unfreezing: Initiation
Resistance to Change
For change to occur, an individual has to abandon, or at least
modify existing attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. Even if a person’s
behavior seems irrational in the face of new information or in the con-
text of a person's own goals, various kinds of support exist that
strengthen the person’s motivation and ability to maintain a certain
behavior. One can distinguish between informational, motivational, and
social supports for existing patterns.
Informational Support
"A person’s attitudes perform a selective function with respect
to the kinds of information to which he will be exposed" (Kelman and
Warwick, 1973, p. 24). Information that seems counter to existing
attitudes will have little impact because of processes of selective
memory and perception. "People are more likely to notice and retain
information that conforms to their expectations and that can be readily
fitted into their cognitive structures" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 24).
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"The very functioning of attitudes as a way of organizing new informa-
tion increases the likelihood that supporting information will be
received and contradictory information will be screened out" (Kelman and
Warwick, 1973, p. 25). Attitudes effect a person's behavior, too, in that
they help to create a reality which confirms the behavior and inhibits
disconf irming behavior. The very functioning of attitudes—the way they
effect the person's exposure to new information, his perception and
memory, and his action toward the attitude object—tend to build and
maintain informational support for the attitude and, consequently,
resistance to change.
Motivational Support
Attitudes are also linked with the coping processes of individuals.
"Attitudes become part of a behavior system with functional significance
for the person. They become part of a pattern of instrumental relations,
a strategy for resolving inner conflict, an approach to actualizing identity
or a framework for relating to important others in a social environment"
(Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 25). In other words if existing attitudes
continue to provide for effective coping, the person will be motivated to
maintain them.
Reference Group or Social Support for Existing Behavior
As long as a person's behavior is supported by a group, he is
unlikely to sense a need to change, and insofar as changes threaten the
possible loss of social support, he is inclined to avoid them. "A person
depends on others to confirm his own perceptions of reality and evalua-
tion of events. Usually he shares the attitudes and values of others in
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his immediate surroundings and thus his own views are continually being
reinforced.
. .In agreeing with the group he can expect acceptance and
rewards.
. .Disagreement [generally] leads to rejection and other forms
of social disapproval" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 26). This source
of resistance to change can operate in persons aspiring for group approval
as well as to those seeking to maintain group membership.
Lewin was the first to identify this source of resistance to change
he described how group standards become a force acting on an individual,
depending on the social value of the group standard for the individual.
The greater the value a group standard has for the group, the greater
the resistance of individual group members to move away from this level.
Resistance to change is diminished if the strength of the group value is
diminished or if the level that is perceived as having social value is
changed. In addition the degree of resistance will vary with 1) the
strength of formal and informal sanctions, 2) the level of consensus in
the group about a particular issue, and 3) the value attached to group
membership. (If membership is highly valued, group members will have
internalized group norms and resistance to change will be encountered
even if there is no surveillance or expectation of punishment.)
Other Sources of Resistance to Change
These three sources of resistance to change, informational,
motivational and social, are based on the meaning a particular behavior
has for the individual in his interaction with his environment.
Other
sources of resistance would include:
1) Ecological factors in a social setting
which restricts a
person's encounters with discordant information (Janis
and
Smith, 1965, p. 196).
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2) Vested interests and the need to control whatever it is
that threatens. Often change in one part of a system
increases a sense of being threatened in other parts of
the system not directly effected by the change. Inter-
dependence among parts of a system is often associated
with fear that improvement of one part can only be gained
at the expense of other parts (see Lippitt, et. al., 1958,
p. 82; Watson, 1967, p. 20).
3) The price an individual would have to pay or the steps he
would have to take in order to change.
4) A general tendency or reluctance to accept influence from
others because it threatens independence or personal free-
dom. "In other words, if a threat to autonomy or self-
determination is perceived in an influence situation,
resistance can be expected, especially if the change agent
is an outsider" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, pp. 27-28).
5) A general tendency to resist influence if it is imposed
(Cartwright, 1965, p. 34).
6) A general tendency to resist influence when the basis of
power is perceived as illegitimate (Cartwright, 1965, p. 34).
7) General opposition out of fear or ignorance, lack of skill
or experience (Lippitt, et. al. , 1958, p. 84).
8) Low self-esteem (Watson, 1967, p. 17; Cartwright, 1965, p. 33).
9) Outright opposition to the change objective coupled with a
desire to preserve existing satisfactions. "If the change
17
objective is of doubtful value, attention becomes centered on
the possibilities of turning back as well as on the merit of
the proposal" (Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 84).
These nine additional sources of resistance to change operate in indivi-
duals and in organizations. A system, for example, as well as an indi-
vidual, having not experienced success in changing in the past may
approach a new idea for change skeptically and with low confidence in
its ability to adapt.
Resistance to change has been defined as a force directed away
from a change objective. Sometimes, however, the change process may
run into difficulty not because of opposing forces but because of com-
peting forces. These kinds of forces cannot be converted into driving
forces because they are not directly related to the change objective,
although they interfere with the implementation of the objective. Inter-
ference often takes the form of competitive ideas or demands on organiza-
tional members' time, energy, and resources.
A review of the literature reveals that greater attention is given
to the concept of initial resistance to change than to resistance that
emerges during attempted implementation. Lippitt, et. al. (1958) discusses
emergent resistance to change on pages 180-182 and 212-214 in The Dynamics
of Planned Change . Sources of emergent resistance to change include:
1) a reluctance to admit weaknesses ; 2) a fear of failure; 3) a fatalistic
expectation of failure instilled by previous attempts to change; 4) stress
experienced by having to give up accustomed patterns or current satisfac-
tions; 5) the lack of a frame of reference against which to judge progress;
6) frustration in trying to carry out the proposed change.
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Resistance is also experienced at the refreezing stage in the form
of 1) negative responses from other parts of the system; 2) problems in
adapting the new behaviors to real situations; and 3) a lack of feedback
that efforts are actually causing change (Lippitt, et. al.
, 1958, p. 243).
In view of these various sources of resistance, it is clear that
a crucial step in the induction of change involves the unfreezing of
existing patterns—the overcoming of resistances—so that the person
(or the group) will be open to the adoption of new patterns. There are
several strategies whereby this can be accomplished. A review of the
literature reveals that at least the first step in the process of change
is to overcome organizational members’ initial resistance to change and
that the use of such strategies more often than not is seen by members
of an organization as the responsibility of management or a change agent
(Gross, et. al.
,
1971, p. 39).
Overcoming Resistance to Change
There are two broad categories of strategies that can be used to
overcome resistance to change in individuals. The first involves
Challenging or undermining the supports for existing
patterns of attitudes and behaviors, thus forcing the
individual to reexamine them. The other involves
minimizing the arousal of anxiety or somehow reassuring
the individual that change would not threaten the
existing supports for his behavior as much as he
fears it would. In other words, the first type of
procedure is designed to overcome resistance by
creating a situation in which support for the existing
pattern of behavior no longer holds and in which the
person recognizes that it no longer holds; thus con—
tinuing the existing behavior would be tantamount to
losing support. The second type of procedure is
designed to overcome resistance to creating a situation
in which the person recognizes that changing the existing
pattern will not deprive him of the support he now enjoys
(Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 27).
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The first general strategy of overcoming resistance involves
depriving the individual of support—especially social support—for
his attitudes, values, and self-concept and may be accepted by putting
the individual in a new social setting in which the stability of the
person’s identity becomes undermined and he becomes open to new beliefs
and attitudes in his search for a new identity. Separating an individual
from normal social contacts and changing his work routines reduces the
amount of interpersonal confirmation he receives. Placing the individual
in a total institution (Goffman, 1961) or subjecting the individual to
experiences which are self degrading (Schein, 1971, p. 222) have the
same effect of cutting the individual off from sources of social support.
The disequilibrium that results requires some immediate change or new
learning. Another strategy involves "confronting the individual with
discrepant information which raises questions about the extent to which
current patterns of actions, beliefs, and attitudes are indeed conducive
to the achievement of his own goals and to the maintenance of social
support" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 28). Schein calls this "cognitive
redefinition" (Schein, 1971, p. 233). Anxiety or a feeling of inadequacy
or failure is induced when individuals are confronted with the fact that
personal attitudes and expectations are out of keeping with 1) evidence
about reality; 2) with their own actions; 3) with assumed obligations;
4) with the opinions of "experts"; or 5) with the attitudes and
expecta-
tions of significant others. The discrepant information would have an
unfreezing effect by setting into motion a process of reexamination
of
existing beliefs and attitudes.
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The second general type of strategy to overcome resistance to
change is designed to avoid or counteract the threatening implications
of change.
Resistance can be minimized by somehow reducing the
salience of the source of resistance—i.e. by diverting
the person’s attention from the major supports for his
existing behavior or belief. Thus the change agent
may use ’side attacks', focusing on minor or subsidiary
issues that do not arouse full blown resistance; he may
use a gradual step-by-step approach, so that the full
impact of the change will be less apparent; he may create
a context for the influence situation that removes it
from the reference group in which the existing behavior
is anchored; or he might create a series of minor excep-
tions to the existing pattern so that the attitude it-
self might eventually break down (Kelman and Warwick,
1973, p. 29).
The intent of this second type of strategy is to create a sense of
security and to reassure the individual that changing his behavior may
not have the threatening consequences he fears. The objectives of these
strategies would be 1) to demonstrate to the individual that new behaviors
are not disapproved by persons in relevant reference groups; 2) to try to
set a new group standard; and 3) to communicate that acceptance of change
is not tantamount to loss of autonomy or deprivation of status. These
kinds of considerations might lead the organizational leader interested
in change to build in ways for individuals to gain status in the
change
program rather than lose it, either by developing individuals' skills
in
order to reduce their dependency on him, by developing their
sense of
ownership in the program, or by creating opportunities for
reciprocation
or exchange.
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Overcoming resistance to change in social settings consists of
interventions into groups which have prescribed ways of coping and sur-
viving, common norms and values, and stable interpersonal relationships
similar to the supports that maintain an individual's attitudes and
behaviors. A review of the literature in organizational change indicated
a leader might approach unfreezing organizational patterns in several
2
ways
:
1) By providing a process of socialization in which a
new orientation to interpersonal relations and social
institutions and new social values are learned (Kelman
and Warwick, 1973, p. 23).
2) By attempting to create a climate in the organization
in which participants experience acceptance, support,
and trust in their relationships with one another
(Watson, 1967, p. 23) and in which the accepted standard
is to recognize the existence of problems and need for
change (Lippitt, et. al. , 1958, p. 155).
3) By stimulating new needs and levels of aspiration in the
organization (Lippitt, et . al. , 1958, p. 131; Katz, 1960,
p. 192).
A) By heightening sensitivity to specific problems through
data feedback or the presentation of discrepant informa-
tion (Katz, I960, p. 192; Lippitt, et . al., 1958, p. 151).
2For a general discussion of lessening resistance to change
see Goodwin
Watson, 1967, pp. 22-23.
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5) By changing certain environmental supports for old
values (Katz, 1960, p. 192).
shifting rewards and punishments so that rewards
are linked with motivation to change and punishments
with unwillingness to change (Katz, 1960, p. 192).
7) By using strategies that call attention to dissent
from a unanimous position (Janis and Smith, 1965,
p. 214).
8) By fostering ambiguity (knowing that individuals have
a need for consistency and for meaningful cognitive
organization and hence will be receptive to clarifying
information)
.
9) By attempting to convince the informal leaders and
marginal members of a group of the need to change on
the assumption that the group standard is less important
or salient for them (see Janis and Smith, 1965, p. 214).
10)
By linking parts of the organization which share the
same dissatisfaction and sense of powerlessness (Lippitt,
et. al.
,
1958, p. 104).
.
3 r
This summary reveals that there are a great many options for over-
coming resistance to change. A closer review of the literature, however,
reveals a lack of specificity as to who might carry out these unfreezing
strategies. Only a few studies (Katz, 1960 \ Janis and Smith, 1965)
designate the organizational leader. Others (Lippitt, et. al.
,
1958,
3There are probably countless other strategies in addition to the
ones listed above.
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Bennis, et. al.
,
1968) stress the importance of an outside agent and
subordinate participation. A greater number of indepth studies of the
initiation of change are needed which focus on the centrality of the
organizational leader's role in using the strategies delineated above.
Initial and Emergent Forces Toward Change
According to Lewin there are forces for change as well as forces
against change operating in a social setting. The organizational leader
may well be able to capitalize on some of these driving forces in initi-
ating change if he is aware of some of the negative consequences that
Lewin alluded to that may result from increasing the driving forces (see
Cartwright, 1965, p. 35).
Initial forces toward change include: "1) dissatisfaction in
some quarters with the present equilibrium; 2) a perceived discrepancy
between what is and what might be; 3) external forces for change
(external requiredness) ; and 4) internal requiredness or a natural drive
toward organizational health" (Lippitt, et. al. , 1958, p. 73).
Emergent forces for change include: "1) a desire to complete a
project already begun; 2) changes in one part of a system requiring
adaptation in another; 3) an early experience of success; 4) the expecta-
tions of significant others; 5) acceptance and approval from other
parts
of the system; 6) mutual support and commitment that comes
from shared
experiences; and 7) external cues that changes are producing
desired
effects" (Lippitt, et. al.
,
1958, p. 75).
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In addition, Matthew Miles has found that properties of educa-
4 <-tional systems as well as characteristics of the innovation5 and the
innovator have an effect on innovative attempts (Miles, 1967, p. 1).
Janis and Smith, for example, have found that a source of change that
is perceived as trustworthy and prestigeful will facilitate change
(Janis and Smith, 1965, p. 220). The success or failure at prior
attempts at innovation also effects the organization’s readiness to
change
.
Overall, a review of the literature of attitude and social change
reveals that there has been little concern for testing theories or
generating hypotheses about factors which positively influence initia-
tion. Secondly the question of whether organizational leaders might
control these factors has never been investigated.
Changing - Implementation
Once existing attitudes or behaviors have become unfrozen, there
is no assurance that the individual or group will actually adopt new
behaviors and that, ultimately, these new behaviors will be refrozen
or integrated. "In fact, certain ways of overcoming resistance to change
may decrease the likelihood that genuine movement will occur or that
changes that do occur will be stabilized and integrated (Kelman and
^For a dicussion of some of the properties of institutions of
higher education that block change, see Zigarmi and Zigarmi, 1973.
5For a discussion of the dimensions of an innovation that effect
implementation, see Lin and Zaltman, 1973, p. 101.
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Warwick, 1973, p. 30). The purpose of this part of this chapter is to
explore strategies for and conditions which influence "changing" with
special emphasis on the implications they have for the actions of the
organizational leader in implementing change. The literature on atti-
tude and organizational change is filled with all sorts of prescriptions
about what has to be done in this stage, but, as is the case of initiating
change, the organizational leader is not specifically designated as the
individual responsible for carrying out the behaviors the prescriptions
specify. In most cases no one is designated. They fall to the organiza-
tional leader only because organizational members perceive that he con-
trols the means of influence and has the power to create or maintain
conditions specified as important for successful Implementation. The
next section will include a discussion of some of the prescriptions or
considerations mentioned above, followed by a review of various models
of individual attitude change and strategies of social change and their
implications for the role performance of the organizational leader.
Conditions Required for Successful Implementation
Dalton, et. al.
,
in a book entitled, The Distribution of Authority
in Formal Organizations wrote
The initiation of change in an organization is essen-
tially an episode in influence. Typically someone
in the organization comes to view the organization's
relationship to its environment in terms which call
for different behavior on the part of organizational
members. He then seeks to influence others in the
organization to change their behavior. The estab-
lishment of new behavior patterns represents an
extension of this influence as the impetus for change
increasingly comes to reside in the individual assuming
new behavior (Dalton, et. al.
,
1968, p. 108).
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Two prior conditions are characteristic of successful attempts to initl-
ate change:
1) Individuals involved ate experiencing stress
(or the likelihood of change is low)
.
2) If organizational members see the authority,
power, and prestige of the person initiating
change positive, they will respond to influ-
ence positively.
Successful initiation of change however does not assure the con-
tinuation and persistence of new behavior patterns. "Four features
distinguish successful change efforts from failures. There is movement:
away from
generalized goals
former social ties
self doubt
an external motive
for change
increasingly specific objectives
supportive new relations
increased self-esteem
internalized motive for change"
(Dalton, et. al.
,
1968, p. 109).
^
In this study the organizational leader’s behavior was described
as facilitating movement on each dimension in order to create the con-
ditions described as important for implementation to occur.
In another study, Arensburg developed an operational definition
of "implementation" marked by ”1) an increase in managerial initiatives
assumed by subordinates; 2) an opportunity for increased interworker
contacts; 3) an increase in rewarding managerial responses to subordinates;
^Dalton, et. al.
,
conclusions were based on a case study of manage-
ment initiated organizational change in a research and development center
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4)
an increase in manager-subordinate contacts; and 5) the evolution
of ceremonies or rites of passage to facilitate the acceptance of
structural change” (Sayles
, 1964, p. 201). In this case the conditions
prescribed for successful implementation seemed to cluster around more
frequent manager-subordinate interaction and increased subordinate
participation in decision-making and problem-solving. In both of these
two studies implications for the organizational leader’s role in imple-
mentation are clearer than in some of the other studies reviewed in this
chapter.
For example, Zaltman identifies six principles of changing:
1) To change a subsystem or part of a subsystem,
relevant aspects of the environment must also
be changed.
2) To change behavior on any level of a hier-
archial organization, it is necessary to
achieve complementary and reinforcing changes
in organizational levels above and below that
level.
3) The place at which to begin change is at those
points (levels) in the system where some stress
and strain exist. Stress may give rise to dis-
satisfaction with the status quo and thus become
a motivating force for change in the system.
4) In diagnosing the possibility of change, it
is always necessary to assess the degree of
stress and strain at points where change is
sought. One should ordinarily avoid beginning
change at the points of greatest stress.
5) Both the formal and the informal organization
of the institution must be considered in planning
any process of change.
6) Effectiveness is often directly
related to the
degree to which members at all levels of an
institutional hierarchy take part in the fact-
finding and diagnosing of needed changes and
in
formulating goals and programs of change
(Zaltman, 1972, p. 330).
28
"Who" is to consider the six principles in implementing change
is never specified in Zaltman's work. One can assume that the organiza
tional leader may be the only person in the organizational hierarchy
who is in a position to insure they are followed since he occupies a
boundary position between the organization and its environment, has
access to the wide range of information that is needed, and has the
authority to involve others in planning. However, to the best of the
author's knowledge, no study has ever been done to test the validity
or effectiveness of these principles with the organizational leader
as the focal point.
In another example Greiner specified ten conditions for success
ful change.
Successful major change efforts follow a sequence
where:
1) The organization is under great pressures
for improvement both from within and outside
the organizational unit. These pressures
precede the change attempts.
2) The organization and its management experience
great difficulty in coping with the pressures.
3) A newcomer with experience and a reputation
for improving organizations enters the
picture.
4) The newcomer enters the organization at or
near the top and begins to work with top-
level managers.
5) An initial act of the newcomer is to
clarify
the working relationships he wishes to have
with the organization.
6) The head man of the organization
assumes a
direct and highly involved role in imple-
menting the changes.
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7) The newcomer engages many parts of the
organization in a collaborative, fact-
finding, problem-solving diagnosis of
organizational problems.
8) The newcomer provides new methods and
recommendations for solving problems
and taking actions.
9) The newcomer’s proposals are tested on a
small scale and found useful for problem-
solving before they are introduced to the
rest of the organization.
10)
The change effort is spread through a series
of successful experiences and absorbed into
other parts of the organization
(Greiner, 1965).
Although it is not specified, we could assume that Greiner's
"newcomer" comes from outside the organization and is not integrated
into the organization. The Greiner model is included only because it
represents an attempt to describe a sequencing of conditions for the
successful implementation of organizational change. In fact, Barnes
rephrased these steps so they fit the Lewinian change model of unfreezing,
changing, and refreezing (Barnes, 1967).
In the literature on planned organizational change that deals
with the period of implementation, several other prescriptions for
successful implementation are considered. Some of these include:
1) the importance of changing the flow of resources or information in
the organization; 7 2) the need for reinforcement of even tentative changes
7 Lewin wrote "Social changes in large measure are produced by
changing the constellation of forces within particular segments of a
channel. Channels in turn are controlled by gatekeepers (i.e.
,
informal
or formal leaders in the organization) , hence the importance of changing
the attitude of these gatekeepers in order to effect organizational
change" (Lewin, 1951, p. 176).
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in attitude or behavior as a result of the change process (Kelman and
Warwick, 1973, p. 35); and 3) the importance of changing organizational
arrangements such as the reward system in order to make individuals’
self-interests accord with the necessary changes (Maloney and Schonfeld,
1973, p. 203).
Other facilitators to successful implementation according to
Gross, et. al. include: 1) internal as well as external support for
the change; 2) adequate funding; 3) adequacy of plan for meeting
organizational members needs and the organizational problem under con-
sideration; 4) retraining of members for new tasks; 5) the presence of
a change agent to give needed support and advice (see Gross, et. al.
,
1971, p. 30).
Many of these conditions will be incorporated into the proposi-
tions about the role performance of the organizational leader set forth
in Chapter II. The implications of these factors for the organizational
leader may well be that he relate proposed changes to the important and
perceived needs of the individuals to be changed; that he make the
nature of the new behavior clear and clearly distinguished from other
alternatives in the context of the motivations that have been aroused;
and that he facilitate in as many ways as possible the performance of
the new behavior.
Models of Attitude and Social Change
Social-psychologists have also studied processes of attitude
change. For example Bandura wrote that attitude change could be
approached in three ways: by changing beliefs, or affect, or behaviors
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(see Bandura, 1972; Hersey and Blanchard, 1972, p. 160). "The greatest
attitude change will occur when there are minimal threats or coercive
inducements, when the person enjoys a high degree of choice, when there
is a high expenditure of effort, when the inducing agent is viewed
favorably, and when the person enjoys high esteem” (Bandura, 1972,
P. 51).
A model of attitude change has been proposed by Kelman (1961) in
which the three processes of social influence are called identification,
internalization, and compliance.
Identification is said to occur when an individual
accepts influence from another person or group in
order to establish or maintain a satisfying self-
defining relationship to the other. In contrast
to compliance, identification is not primarily
concerned with producing a particular effect in
the other; rather accepting influence through
identification is a way of establishing and main-
taining a desired relationship to the other as well
as the self -definition anchored in this relation-
ship. By accepting influence the person is able
to see himself as similar to the other or as enacting
a role reciprocal to that of the other (Kelman and
Warwick, 1973, p. 32).
Identification can occur through processes of socialization, modelling,
or conformity to the expectations of others. The basis of motivation is
the individual's concern with social acceptance; the source of the influ-
encing agent's power is his attractiveness.
"Internalization is said to occur when an individual accepts
influence in order to maintain the congruence of his actions and beliefs
with his value system. The content of the induced behavior and its
relation to the person's value system are intrinsically satisfying
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(Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 33). The basis of motivation is the
individual's concern with the congruence of his behavior with his
values; the source of the influencing agent's power is his credibility,
expertness, and trustworthiness. "Induction is designed to reorganize
the person's means-ends framework, his conception of the paths toward
maximization of his values" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 33).
"Compliance is said to occur when an individual or a person
accepts influence from another person or group in order to attain a
favorable reaction from the other, that is to gain a specific reward
or approval or to avoid a specific punishment or disapproval" (Kelman
and Warwick, 1973, p. 32). The basis of motivation is the individual's
concern with approval; the source of the influencing agent's power is
his ability to control material or psychological resources on which
the person's goal achievement depends. The manner of making the desired
behavior stand out in preference to other alternatives involves limiting
the choices an individual has.
Clearly, the organizational leader's selection of change strategies
depends on which of these processes of social change is being used. As
the individual's base of motivation varies, the source of the organiza-
tional leader's power changes, as does his choice of implementation
strategies
.
These three processes of attitude change have different
consequences
which are important for the role performance of the
organizational leader
in later phases of the change process. Behavior that is
changed through
compliance is often less permanent and requires the
leader's surveillance.
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Behavior changed through identification is designed to meet others;
expectations for a person's own role performance; hence it remains
isolated from the rest of a person's value system, tied to the external
source, and highly dependent on the original model for support. Inter-
nalized behavior, on the other hand, is manifested whenever the values
on which it is based are relevant since it is integrated into the
individual's existing values and is not just part of a system of social
role expectations. Internalized behavior is less dependent on an external
source for support.
Implementation as one social psychologist has put it is
The creation in a client system of an understanding
of a commitment to a particular change which can
solve problems and of devices whereby it can become
integral to the client system's operations similar
to the process of internalization. When it comes
to implementation most practitioners seem to over-
emphasize the importance of intellectual under-
standing or of information-sharing regarding the
intended change. Information and understanding
are necessary but not sufficient components for
inducing change. Change is bound up in self-image
and groupings which help define and give meaning
to an individual's existence. If intended change
is perceived to threaten or enhance self-image or
to threaten social groups for the individual. . .
the organizational leader must take new forms of
gratification into account in the planning of
change (Bennis, 1966, p. 175).
Models of social change are very similar to models of attitude
change perhaps because sociologists recognize that change in social
settings is accomplished by changing individuals' attitudes and beliefs.
One model of social change in which the type of change strategy used is
of central concern was proposed by Benne and Chin.
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Benne and Chin identify three strategies for changing; rational-
empirical, normative-reeducative and power-coercive. In the first case
"because the person (or group) is assumed to be rational and moved by
self-interest, it is assumed he (or they) will adopt the proposed change
if it can be shown by the proposer that he (or they) will gain by the
change" (Benne and Chin, 1968, p. 34). Whereas the rational-empirical
strategy seeks to effect change through the provision of information and
knowledge, normative-reeducative change is oriented toward changing the
norms people ascribe to. Changes in norms involve changes in values,
attitudes, and interpersonal relationships. The third strategy (power-
coercive) is based on the compliance of those with less power to the plans,
directions, and leadership of those with greater power.
The source of power for a rational -empirical change strategy is
control of information; the source for normative-reeducative change is
personal or referent group power. For power-coercive change the source
of power is the influencing agent's position or control of both positive
and negative sanctions. A power-coercive strategy may depend on force,
or the threat of force, to gain compliance; or on the threat or use of
noncooperation, mass demonstration or harassment, if the change agent
lacks authority or legitimate position power. With normative change
compliance results from re-education, training, or participation in
decision-making
.
In sum, social-psychological research has approached the imple-
mentation of change in social settings from many perspectives.
Conditions
described as facilitators to implementation have been
identified in the
literature on planned organizational change. Social
psychologists of
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attitude change have studied conditions under which change is more
likely to occur as well as processes by which attitude and behavior
change does occur. Finally, the nature of individual changes that
occur in a social setting have been linked to such factors as the
type of concern that mediates the change, the nature of change
strategies used, and the source of the influencing agent's power.
Although the role of the organizational leader has not been addressed
directly in a great deal of literature reviewed, implications for his
role performance in implementing change have been pointed out through-
out this section and will be incorporated into the model set forth in
Chapter II.
Refreezing - Incorporation
The discussion of different processes of influence leads directly
to the question of refreezing—the ways in which new behaviors become
integrated into personal and interpersonal systems. "The assumption is
that new behavior can gain continuity and stability only to the extent
that new supports have been built around it" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973,
p. 35).
"The process of internalization, discussed in the preceding section,
implies by definition that the new behavior has become integrated. . .To
the extent that internalization has taken place, the new behavior
auto-
matically becomes part of the person's value system. .
." and benefits
from the support of other cognitive and evaluative
components of personal
structure (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, pp. 35-36).
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'A second and at least equally important condition for stability
is the extent to which the new behavior is integrated into the person's
social relationships. New attitudes and beliefs will be maintained if
the person finds himself in a supportive social environment—if he inter-
acts closely with those who share and confirm his views" (Kelman and
Warwick, 1973, p. 35).
If change is coerced in the first place it is unlikely that new
attitudes and behaviors will be fully integrated since the individual is
deprived of personal supports and values around which to incorporate new
beliefs and attitudes. "There needs to be some continuity in terms of
earlier supports and existing values if refreezing/integration is to
occur" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 35).
An individual accepts influence because new ideas and prescribed
behaviors are intrinsically rewarding in coping with external and internal
stress or because a new behavior helps in problem-solving or is compatible
with existing attitudes and behaviors. Behavior is internalized however,
according to Dalton, et. al. (1968, p. 139) only if "the individual is
provided with new cognitive structures, has a chance to apply and impro-
vise the new behaviors and can verify them through experience." The
cognitive structure is a new way of ordering information about himself
and the environment.
The influencing agent provides a common language
and associative net by which an individual can relate
events of his own life to the new framework. Secondly
the individual must actively participate in trying to
understand and apply the new scheme to his problems.
He must be provided with opportunities to build up his
own ideas and to integrate new ideas. Thirdly the
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individual has to have the time and opportunity
to verify the new behaviors with personal experi-
ence (Dalton, et. al.
, 1968, p. 139).
In other words attitudes are not the only determinant of action.
Situational factors such as the opportunity to try out or experiment
with new behaviors or the skill level attained may be just as important
in determining if attitude change leads to integrated new behaviors.
In other words, changes in behavior may effectively precede
attitude change which in turn supports integration or refreezing.
Action may
1) expose the person to new experiences which lead
to reexamination of existing attitudes as the
individual gains direct experience and information;
2) provides the individual with new sources of social
support which would increase the individual's commit-
ment to the behavior and persuade him that the action
he has adopted is legitimate and enjoys a wider con-
sensus than he previously thought. (If anticipated
disapproval does not occur in a situation, likewise
the individual is motivated to reconsider existing
attitudes.); 3) lead to the reassessment of old
attitudes if the individual is forced to defend his
actions and develop a rationale in support of them;
4) lead to the development of social and attitudinal
support for behaviors that were before unacceptable
if the behaviors are officially sponsored and involve
large numbers of community people (Kelman and Warwick,
1973, p. 38).
In other words action may lead the individual to reexamine his
attitudes in light of their value and role implications. This trend of
integration is more likely to happen if the "individual perceives he
has some degree of choice and if elaboration or improvisation is required
by the induced action" (Kelman, 1962, p. 84). Action itself may be an
occasion for new experiences in relation to an object that in turn validate
the action. In this case attitude change is also likely to occur or action
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may lead to change in the forces acting on an individual's life space,
whereby restraining forces are converted into driving forces.
Knowledge of an action toward a particular object
will become an important datum in a person's evalu-
ation of the object and of himself to the extent
he regards the action as really part of himself,
as representing his own behavior. That in turn,
depends again on whether or not the person chose
to engage in the behavior or the degree to which
he is required to invest in order to carry the
action out, and to the degree the action is a part
of whole system of interrelated role behaviors in
a social system and not an isolated act (Kelman,
1962, pp. 106-107).
The higher the level of involvement the more likely the action will be
an important part of the person's self-evaluation. Therefore the
involvement itself becomes a force toward subsequent attitude change
and integration of behavior.
Statements like these have important implications for leadership
in this third phase of process of change, "refreezing." Integrating
change requires that the organizational leader provide opportunities
for new behaviors to be tried out. It may also require that he provide
socio-emotional support and resources in the way of continuing informa-
tion, knowledge or training for the changes he has proposed.
Kelman has written that if an action consists of a personal
decision—a self -commitment—and is followed by a public statement of
intention, "it creates a state of psychological irrevokability for the
person, reversal of which would lead to a loss of face or humiliation
(Kelman, 1962, pp. 102-103). Not only is the effectiveness of subsequent
counteracting communications less if a person is asked to make his position
on an issue public, but the action also ties the person to the object and
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implies probable continued association and action (see Lewin, 1951).
Being committed to further association with the
object, a person is likely to be open to and
search for new confirming information that will
make anticipated association more effective,
more comfortable, and more rewarding. The effect
is to bring attitudes into line with action and
future action that is anticipated. The hypothesis
that seems to be self-evident from these statements
is that induction of action is likely to lead to
attitude change and integration to the extent that
induced action represents a commitment to continued
association with the attitude object and future
action in support of it (Kelman, 1962, p. 104).
The implications of these statements for the organizational leader in
refreezing change in a social system are that he provide opportunities
for persons to actively choose to change, that he provide opportunities
for the continuation of new behaviors, and that he make confirming in-
formation available.
Other roles the organizational leader might play are found in
various sources in the literature on attitude and social change. They
include: 1) helping develop peer as well as authority expectations for
the new behavior (see Schein, 1971, p. 277); 2) maintaining a balance
between increases in aspiration and the expansion of opportunities
(Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 38); and 3) assuring that the adoption of
specific new practices and the introduction of new institutional arrange-
ments occur in a context that permits experiences of success, heightened
self-esteem, cognitive reorganization, and social support (Kelman and
Warwick, 1973, p. 58).
These roles for the organizational leader are affirmed by
Dalton,
et. al.,who wrote.
AO
That people are unlikely to maintain changed behavior
or attitudes unless:
a) the goals and objectives toward which they
are working become increasingly specific
and concrete;
b) the relationships which reinforce old
attitudes are altered and severed and
new relationships supportive of change
are established;
c) their sense of self-esteem is heightened
in the process of change; and
d) they internalize a motivation for change
(Dalton, et. al.
,
1968, p. 109).
Another role for the organizational leader in "refreezing"
receives support from several social-psychologists, for example, Lewin.
Lewin argued it was important to minimize further resistance to change
by isolation until new behaviors are refrozen. Changing group standards,
he wrote, will tend to change the force-field and to facilitate change
on the part of a group or individual. In order for change accomplished
in this way to stabilize, it is important to keep other group standards
out (Lewin, 1951). A contemporary social-psychologist, Warren Bennis,
similarly advised practitioners of organizational change to allow for
time to consolidate changes.
An important aspect of this phase in the process of planned change
is how change in one part of a system can cause or create dislocations in
another. Lippitt, et. al., devote a whole chapter in their book, The
Dynamics of Planned Change to the generalization and stabilization of
change. In the refreezing stage they contend that the organizational
leader/change agent needs 1) to give visibility and credibility to the
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changes; 2) to spread information on the consequences of the changes made
throughout the system; 3) to develop some sort of objective evaluation
of the changes; 4) to act as a liaison to still-resistant parts of the
system; and 5) to underscore the system's ability to change so that it
normatively comes to value change and to see that it has the ability to
change (Lippitt, et. al.
, 1958, p. 226).
Summary
In summary, these last sections on "unfreezing", "changing", and
"refreezing" have represented an attempt to cull relevant concepts for
each phase of the process of change from the literature on attitude and
social change. Several of these concepts will be incorporated in a set
of propositions about the role of the organizational leader in initiating,
implementing, and incorporating organizational change that is presented
in the next chapter. The context of these propositions is in part drawn
from the kinds of considerations as they have been identified in the
literature that have to be taken into account in each phase of the change
process.
What the author has tried to do in the first part of this chapter
is to describe conditions that block or facilitate the initiation, imple-
mentation, and incorporation of change as they have been identified in
the literature on attitude and social change. Essentially what has been
found is that the literature on change says very little about the role
of the organizational leader in managing change. There is, however, a
substantial body of literature on leadership, which may contribute to
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understanding the role of the leader. The rest of this chapter will be
concerned with a review of the literature in the field of management as
it relates to the topic of "leadership in the change process."
Leadership in the Management of Change
There is fairly wide consensus in the literature on leadership
and management as to what roles the leader plays in an organization and
the functions these roles serve (see Goble, 1972; Katz and Kahn, 1966).
Kotler and Zaltman's conceptualization is as representative as any.
They identified four management functions:
1) organizing - developing an administrative
structure to initiate and carry out the
tasks facing the organization, defining
authority, job responsibilities and linkages;
2) planning - deciding on a proper course of
action through fact-finding, defining objec-
tives, selecting strategies, developing
programs and budget and setting procedures
and policies;
3) implementing - carrying out plans and programs:
delegating, motivating, coordinating, selling,
innovating;
4) controlling - taking steps to insure the
organization's progress towards its objec-
tives by establishing reporting systems,
developing performance objectives, measuring
results, taking corrective actions, and ad-
ministering rewards and sanctions (Zaltman,
et. al., 1972, p. 466).
In an alternative model Mintzberg identified ten roles for the
organizational leader which he grouped under three functions.
A3
interpersonal figurehead
leader
liaison
informational monitor
disseminator
spokesman
decisional entrepreneurial
disturbance handler
resource allocator
negotiator
(Mintzberg, 1973, p. 59).
Mintzberg's entrepreneurial role is comparable to the direction-
setting role Sayles describes for the organizational leader (Sayles,
1964, p. 53). For Sayles redirection is integrally tied up in the
monitoring role the manager plays. From monitoring or assessing
subordinates' work a manager can identify recurring, time-consuming
problems, those points at which he might intervene to return the system
to a normal equilibrium. However, a manager needs to minimize the
frequency with which patterns of work and coordination are disturbed
(Sayles, 1964, p. 161) and to thereby develop predictable organizational
patterns that increase subordinates' morale and lessen stress. In other
words the manager needs to function as a buffer to many internal and
external interruptions and to insulate the organization "from other
initiations from other sources. The leader's initiatives also need to
be limited", Sayles cautions, "so that subordinates are not inhibited. . .
and the manager is intervening only when he has to, for problems that
require managerial action (Sayles, 1964, p. 147). "Excessively unbalanced
interaction patterns tend to be less stable. To maintain receptivity to
direction, a leader must be willing and able to accept initiations from
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subordinates’* (Sayles, 1964, p. 149). Subordinates are likely to
initiate contact with a manager in order to ask for organizational
aid (unravelling a complex bureaucracy knot or problem); for technical
aid—(expert advice, information or experience); or for personal aid
(assurance, approval, or understanding of how the system works so that
it will be more rational or predictable), according to Sayles. Managers
need to make it easy for subordinates to contact them and to gain a
sense of control over their work environment. A fourth function in
addition to those of monitoring, insulating the organization, and being
responsive to subordinates needs is for the leader to represent the
group’s interests both inside and outside the organization.
In addition, a leader must be able to assess the costs of con-
tinuing a course of action when problems arise (i.e. constant inter-
vention to resolve conflicts and haggling) vs. the costs of introducing
change. Once a manager has decided to initiate some change in order to
attain a kind of predictable equilibrium, he needs to persuade those who
must approve change and those who must change that it is worthwhile; he
also must develop procedures for implementing and validating the changes.
"Administration involves constantly modifying decisions in response to
monitoring the environment and trading of favorable responses from one
sector in exchange for (or in risk of) stress or hostility from another
source" (Sayles, 1964, p. 218).
Zaltman
,
et. al.
,
Mintzberg, and Sayles provide different, but
complimentary, descriptions of the roles and functions of management in
simply maintaining an organizational structure; other theorists have tried
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to specify, very speculatively, what management actions are required in
initiating and implementing organizational change.
Managing change requires the ability to identify
forces or variables surrounding a problem and to
develop consensus about the relevant forces and
about a strategy for manipulating these forces.
Organizational cultures must be changed to rein-
force and maintain changes achieved by individuals.
Administrators also need to cope with problems and
uncertainties generated by changes and to develop
feedback mechanisms by which problems in carrying
out the changes can be identified (Gross, et. al.,
1971, p. 212).
Watson described a range of roles for the organizational leader in the
process of change which ran from sensing problems and potentialities in
the organization, to keeping in touch with external trends and resources,
to developing interpersonal skills and resources in the organization:
from diagnosis and data gathering about the problem, to priority setting,
problem-solving, and the evaluation of solutions (Watson, 1967, pp. 110-
115). Although, Lippitt, Westley and Watson primarily focus on the role
of the outside change agent in organizational change they do specify a
few roles for the organizational leader. They include: 1) establishing
reference groups; 2) setting comparative standards; 3) creating a secure
climate"; 4) affirming a motivation to change and reaffirming success at
changing; and 5) setting priorities and cutting out interference (Lippitt,
et. al., 1958, pp. 253-264).
Theoreticians have most often studied change in an industrial
setting as observers or outside consultants. A practitioner, Robert
Guest, however, wrote a case study on his experiences as a leader
initiating and responding to change in a large automobile
manufacturing
firm. The conclusions he reached were:
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1) that when patterns of internal relationships are
similar to those linking the organization to
another organization, the latter must be changed
first
;
2) that a leader needs to reinforce internal changes
with knowledge of comparisons from the outside:
and
3) that a leader needs
a) to create feelings of interdependence with
subordinates
,
b) to establish shared goals,
c) to integrate subordinate needs in planning,
and
d) to represent and act as a spokesman for
group interests (Guest, 1962).
Educators have sought to verify these principles in educational
settings. One study of leadership in the implementation of organiza-
tional change in school systems identified six leadership functions
that included: 1) initiating innovations; 2) establishing a climate
receptive to change; 3) clearly delineating program objectives; 4) up-
grading the professional competence of the staff; 5) stimulating staff
participation in change; and 6) establishing methods of evaluation
(Kirkpatrick, 1971). Schmuck and Miles have also looked at the role
of the administrator in educational change (see Schmuck and Miles, 1971)
Again many of the roles for the organizational leader that these
leadership /management studies have identified will be incorporated in
the propositions for the role of the organizational leader in initiating
implementing, and incorporating change set forth in the next chapter.
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Summary and Prospectus
A review of the literature on attitude and social changes in
this chapter has been used to explain the conceptual and organizational
framework and social-psychological approach that was chosen for this
research. The basis of Lewin’s model of change is that there are phases
or sequences of participation in a process of social change. Lewin's
stages of unfreezing, changing, and refreezing will be used as a frame-
work for organizing the propositions to be offered in the next chapter
for the role of the organizational leader in affecting organizational
change and for analyzing the actions of the university president in each
of four case studies. Essentially it is being argued that there are
potentially identifiable leader behaviors in each stage of the change
process that are not addressed or dealt with consistently in the litera-
ture on attitude and organizational change. Although the recommendations
of a majority of the theorists that have been reviewed clustered nicely
around Lewin’s stages of unfreezing, changing, and refreezing, only a few
studies considered the implications of their recommendations for the role
performance of the organizational leader (Dalton, et. al., 1968; Arensburg,
1964 ).
In the next chapter a tentative set of propositions about the role
performance of the organizational leader in each of the three stages will
be set forth drawing on the literature that has been reviewed in this
chapter. These propositions will be used in retrospect to analyze and
compare the actions of one university president in unfreezing, changing,
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and refreezing the attitudes and behaviors of organizational members in
four attempts at change against the actions he might have taken, keeping
in mind the considerations raised in this chapter.
The focal points in the descriptions of events that occurred in
each of the change efforts, selected to be studied will be the university
president's actions in regard to a particular set of goals. His inter-
ventions it is assumed will cause the force-field operating to maintain
a given equilibrium in the organization to change
.
8
q
The three stages in the change process cannot really be separated
and do not represent a strictly temporal sequence. In this chapter they
were treated as if they were discrete and sequential, with clear beginnings
and endings and with little or no overlap between phases. Undoubtedly,
given the complex nature of any organization this is not true. The line
between the end of one phase and the beginning of another is very imprecise.
Overcoming resistance to change and the induction of new behavior may be
part of the same process. And, as has been seen, the way in which new
behavior is induced may influence the extent to which it is refrozen or
integrated. Likewise, the behaviors to be proposed in the next chapter
for the organizational leader are only as sequential as the model is.
CHAPTER I I
TOWARD A THEORY OF CHANGING:
THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEADER
Introduction
In this chapter a series of propositions concerning possible
goals of the organizational leader for each stage of the change
process will be outlined. The assumption is that the degree to
which organizational change strategies are successfully initiated,
implemented, and incorporated will be a function of the degree to
which organizational members perceive that the conditions outlined
in these propositions have been dealt with during the periods of
attempted initiation, implementation, and incorporation. A second
assumption is that the organizational leader’s role in establishing
and maintaining these conditions is critically important to success-
ful implementation. Both of these assumptions will be explored when
the propositions are applied in the case analyses in Chapters V-VIII.
Most of the conditions described in the propositions are drawn
from the findings of other studies, though for the most part, these
conditions were not linked to the role performance of the organiza-
tional leader in those studies. Depending on the leader’s assessment
of the setting and on his choice of change strategies, one proposition
or objective may be more important from his perspective than another.
The entire list represents an attempt to generate a comprehensive list
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of areas that may need the leader's attention if long-term change which
the leader has initiated is to be stably integrated into the life of the
organization. In that sense the author is not implying that the leader
needs to initiate strategies to accomplish all of the objectives that
have been outlined. Rather the propositions are more of a checklist
of areas he may wish to consider in creating conditions that facilitate
successful initiation, implementation, and incorporation.
The propositions themselves are stated in terms of expected out-
comes, which were drawn from the review of the literature in Chapter I.
The term 'expected outcomes' refers to the leader's objectives for using
certain strategies, given his assessment of the setting, and to members'
expectations for having certain conditions created during the periods of
attempted initiation, implementation and incorporation. The actions
of the organizational leader which are the focal point of this study
are his/her strategies for affecting the outcomes contained in the
propositions. It is important to note that any one action on the part
of the organizational leader may accomplish more than one outcome though
this will become more apparent in the case analyses that follow in
Chapters V-VIII.
Several of the studies from which the propositions are drawn are
reviewed in Chapter I. Support for each of the objectives will be found
in that chapter, in the references listed after each proposition, or in
the commentaries I have included after those propositions which seemed
to need further justification or explanation.
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Propositions for Unfreezing-Initiation
An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational
leader in this phase may be:
Proposition 1 - To assess the attitudes, beliefs, knowledge,
and values of organizational members and to anticipate the nature of
resistance to the proposed change (Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 166;
Zaltman, et. al., 1972, pp. 267-270).
Proposition 2 - To overcome the initial resistance of organiza-
tional members to the proposed change (Schein, 1961, p. 62; Watson,
1967, pp. 22-23).
Proposition 2a - By challenging underlying supports for
existing behavior.
Commentary: Strategies may include removing
individuals from accustomed social relations
that support old attitudes. In other words,
norms, expectations, and routines may act as
a constraint to change; placing individuals
in new situations with new norms and expecta-
tions may lessen resistance to change. Strate-
gies may also involve confronting individuals
with stressful discordant information inducing
guilt and creating humiliating or demeaning
experiences for organizational members thereby
causing them to reevaluate their own behavior
(Katz, 1960, p. 192; Schein, 1961, p. 66).
Proposition 2b - By reducing the amount of anxiety aroused
by the prospect of change.
Commentary: Strategies may include creating
feeling of security by reducing the threat the
prospect of change carries with it (Kelman and
Warwick, 1973, p. 29).
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Proposition 3 - To heighten organizational members’ sensitivity
to problems involving the intended change (Katz, 1960; Lippitt, et. al.,
1958, p. 151).
Proposition 4 — To stimulate new needs and levels of aspiration
in the system in regards to the proposed change (Dalton, et. al.
,
1968,
p. 109; Janis and Smith, 1965, pp. 198-208; Katz, 1960, p. 192; Kelman
and Warwick, 1973, p. 32; Lippitt, et. al., 1958, pp. 131-143).
Commentary: The effects of the leader pointing
out that in some ways the organization has not
reached its potential would be to get his dis-
satisfaction out in the open, to demonstrate
his investment in members’ capacity to change,
and, perhaps, to create some different expec-
tations for the future. A strategy to accom-
plish this may be to establish new reference
groups and standards against which organiza-
tional achievement could be measured.
Proposition 5 - To integrate new forces for change with existing
forces for change, external forces for change with internal forces for
change (Bennis, 1972; Clark, 1968;, Gross, et. al., 1971, p. 30;
Hefferlin, 1971; Katz and Kahn, 1966).
Commentary: The organization being open to
its environment might mean that the organiza-
tion becomes more open to competition (i.e.
new standards), to new members, and/or to new
ideas. By extending communication across inter-
institutional boundaries the leader may be able
to make use of external groups’ demands to create
change internally that might not otherwise be
possible. Pairing new, external forces for
change with existing internal forces for change
has the effect of avoiding the alienation of
people within the system idealogically committed
to the same goals, increasing a sense of security
and competency for those same people, and creating
a peer model for others in the system. Strategies
to accomplish these objectives may include using
"marginals" in the system who have contacts in
other institutions to import new ideas into the
organization (Clark, 1968, p. 15, Hefferlin, 1971,
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P. 41).
Proposition 6 - To change the constellation of forces, resources
or information converging on any one part of the organization (Lewin,
1951, p. 176; Kelman and Warwick, 1973).
Proposition 7 - To elicit support for the proposed organizational
change from informal as well as formal leaders in the organization (Janis
and Smith, 1965, p. 214).
Commentary: The literature suggests that
by eliciting the support of informal
leaders for change the organizational
leader may find natural leverage points
for implementing his objectives.
Proposition 8 - To link parts of the system that are sympathetic
to the intended change and share common dissatisfaction and a sense of
powerlessness (Lippitt, et. al.
,
1958, p. 104).
Commentary: To the extent these groups
share the leader's objectives for change,
he may wish to augment their resources
and hence their capability to implement
the proposed change.
Proposition 9 - To set priorities for the organization (Lippitt,
et. al.
,
1958, pp. 180-182, 253-264) and to clearly communicate these
priorities to organizational members whose behavior is to be changed.
Proposition 10 - To create a sense of rising expectations among
organizational members that they will benefit from the proposed change
in their organizational behavior (Dalton, et. al. , 1968, p. 109; Kelman
and Warwick, 1973, p. 29).
Commentary: Kelman and Warwick advise the
organizational leader to appeal to the felt
needs and motivational base of those being
asked to change. If the leader can convince
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organizational members that they will
benefit from the change in a practical
sense and that they will not lose existing
satisfactions, he will be more successful
in convincing them of the need to change
(see Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 29).
Proposition 11 - To involve as many of the individuals to be
affected by the proposed change as possible in planning and decision-
making (Watson, 1967; Bennis, 1972, p. 209; McMillan, 1972; Katz and
Kahn, 1966, p. 402).
Commentary: A review of the literature
suggests that by involving organizational
members in planning and decision making,
the leader builds collaborative under-
standing and shared responsibility for
the proposed change. A strategy may be
to make new policies explicit and open
to discussion, to explain what alternative
policies were considered and why they were
rejected, and to explain what consequences
will be taken at what point in time as
evidence of acceptance or opposition to
the policies, thereby building a collabora-
tive understanding between the organiza-
tional leader and members of what to change
and how to change it
.
The decision to change has to seem important
to the individuals involved for successful
implementation and incorporation to occur.
Katz and Kahn has emphasized the importance
of allowing individuals to express their
own ideas and to make significant decisions
(Katz and Kahn, 1966, p. 401, 419). The
theory is that resistance will be encountered
if change is imposed (Cartwright, 1965, p. 34)
and that participation leads to higher morale,
greater commitment, and greater clarity about
the change—all these conditions necessary for
successful implementation (Bennis, 1966, p.
209; Katz and Kahn, 1966, p. 402).
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Proposition 12 - To increase the amount and frequency of inter-
action between the organizational leader and members in regards to the
proposed changes (Guest, 1962; Rogers, 1972, no. 196, 201-202; Savles,
1964, p. 201).
Commentary: A review of the literature suggests
that for change to occur, it is important that
there be a feeling of interdependence between the
leader and organizational members (Guest, 1962:
Sayles, 1964).
Proposition 13 - To heighten organizational members’ self-esteem
and to encourage reciprocity in regards to the proposed change (Argyris,
1970, p. 89; Dalton, 1968, p. 109; Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 58;
Rogers, 1972; Sayles, 1964, p. 149).
Commentary: Argyris wrote that "free and
informed choice and internal commitment are
congruent with the development of conditions
such as psychological success, competence,
feelings of essentiality, confirmation, and
increased self acceptance conditions which
lead to the exchange of valid information"
(Argyris, 1970, p. 80). Dependency, on the
other hand, inhibits the exchange of valid
information. An objective of the strategies
used by the organizational leader in this
phase may be to encourage feelings of efficacy,
self-determination, and control on the part of
organizational members by providing opportuni-
ties in which real choices need to be made
and where individuals can reciprocate and
feel essential and competent (Argyris, 1970;
Rogers
,
1972) .
Proposition 14 - To establish and maintain a climate of acceptance,
support, and trust in interpersonal relationships in which change is
regarded positively (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 58; Watson, 1967, o.
23 ).
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Commentary: In order to establish this kind
of climate it is important for the leader to
model authenticity in his relationships with
organizational members, to develop socializa-
tion processes whereby new values can be
learned, and to create the symbols of change
and movement in the organization.
Proposition 15 - To effect and demonstrate changes in the
organization’s relationships with other systems (Guest, 1962; Sayles,
1964).
Commentary: Guest wrote "that when patterns
of internal relationships are similar to those
linking the organization to another organiza-
tion, the latter must be changed first" (Guest,
1962). Organizational members are more recep-
tive to change if they sense that their interests
are being effectively represented and if the
organizational leader is responsive to their
concerns in his dealings with other agencies
(Sayles, 1964, pp. 154-155).
Proposition 16 - To build the organizational leader’s expertise
and credibility with organizational members (Janis and Smith, 1965,
p. 220; Rogers, 1972; Thompson, 1967).
Commentary: A leader who is perceived as
prestigeful is more able to influence others
to change their behavior, since prestige
increases the leader’s power, his ability
to satisfy the needs of others, and his
control over the dependency of the system
on other systems (Thompson, 1967).
Proposition 17 — To extend the organizational leader s control
over varied kinds of resources and sources of power (Bennis, 1966;
Kelman and Warwick, 1973).
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Commentary: The literature suggests that
organizational members are more receptive
to changes initiated by a leader who con-
trols rewards and punishments as well as
environmental supports to organizational
members' behavior: recognition, respect,
a sense of accomplishment, information,
etc. (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 32).
Propositions for Changing-Implementation
An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational
leader in this phase may be:
Proposition 18 - To overcome emerging resistance to the proposed
change during the period of attempted implementation (Lippitt, et. al.,
1958, p. 212).
Proposition 19 - To provide opportunities for organizational
members to make their commitment to the proposed change public (Katz
and Kahn, 1966, p. 402; Lewin, 1951, p. 233; Kelman, 1962, pp. 83,
102-103).
Commentary: The literature suggests that
a public declaration of commitment to change
leads a person to look for information that
will support his actions and minimize the
importance of disconfirming information he
encounters. Public statements also tend to
change person’s perceptions of the social
acceptability of a particular behavior (see
the section on Refreezing in Chapter I).
Proposition 20 - To continually clarify and to provide mechanisms
by which organizational members can gain clarification of the behavioral
changes required (Bennis, 1972b; Dalton, et. al. , 1968; Gross, et. al.
,
1971, p. 30; Kelman, 1962, pp. 106-107; Lippitt, et. al. , 1958).
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Commentary: If change is to be imple-
mented, a clear understanding of how to
change as well as what to change needs
to be developed (Bennis, 1972b; Lippitt,
et. al.
, 1958, p. 166). Clarification
might be accomplished by the leader
making the goals of the change effort
increasingly specific and operational.
Dalton observed that movement in the
direction of greater specificity of
goals is required for successful imple-
mentation (Dalton, et. al.
, 1968, p. 109).
When the goals are clear and operational
there is a greater propensity for the
organization to engage in planning, to
commit resources towards the change,
and to innovate (Cartwright, 1965, p. 328).
Clarification of change may also involve
clarifying organizational members’ roles
and the distribution of power or authority
in the organization (Barnes, 1967) or
prioritizing a series of changes members
are going to need to make.
Proposition 21 - To provide mechanisms for feedback between the
leader and the people undergoing change (Gross, et. al.
,
1971, p. 212;
Katz and Kahn, 1966; Maloney and Schonfeld, 1973; Rogers, 1972).
Commentary: Feedback is needed so that
the leader can identify and resolve problems
organizational members encounter in attempting
to understand and implement change (Rogers,
1972, p. 210; Maloney and Schonfeld, 1972,
pp. 208-212). Feedback is also needed from
the leader to organization members on the
grounds that aspiration is higher if people
see the outcomes of their efforts (Katz and
Kahn, 1966, p. 421).
Proposition 22 - To provide organizational members with oppor-
tunities to test and verify new behaviors through personal experience
(Bandura, 1972, pp. 56-60; Dalton, et. al. , 1968, p. 139; Kelman and
Warwick, 1973, p. 38; Sayles, 1964, p. 201).
59
Commentary: A review of the literature
suggests that if organizational members
are given the opportunity to experiment
with new behaviors, it might facilitate
the processes of identification, inter-
nalization or cognitive redefinition.
Proposition 23 - To offer organizational members new meanings or
new ways of looking at their experiences in regards to the proposed
change (Dalton, et. al., 1968, p. 139; Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 33;
Lof land
, 1971, p. 31).
Commentary: "If a stable form of a new
behavior toward an object is to emerge,
a transformation of 'meanings’ must
occur, in which the person develops a
new conception of the nature of the
object. This happens out of a series
of communicative arts in which others
point out new aspects of experience to
him, present him with interpretations
of events, and help him to achieve a
new conceptual organization of his
world without which the new behavior
is not possible" (Becker, Lof land,
1971, p. 31). The organizational
leader in providing a common language
and associative network for members'
experience gives the organization member
a way of ordering information about him-
self and the environment.
Proposition 24 - To provide role models for new behavior patterns
(Bennis, 1966, 1973; Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 33).
Commentary: A review of the literature
suggests that other organizational members
and other organizations as well as the
organizational leader might serve as a
role model for an approach to problem-
solving, a new idea, a spirit of inquiry,
a tolerance for ambiguity, or a new value
system.
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Proposition 25 - To encourage experimentation and risk-taking
on the part of organizational members in regards to the proposed change
(Guetzkow, 1965; Dalton, et. al.
,
1968, p. 139; Lewin, 1951, pp. 222-227;
Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 38).
Proposition 26 - To redefine the leader’s role in relation to the
change processes initiated (Cartwright, 1965; Hefferlin, 1969; Kerr,
1963; Sayles
,
1964).
Commentary: The literature on higher education
and organizational change suggests that over
time the organizational leader may need to
change his relationship to the change idea
and to organizational members from one of
dependency to mutuality in order to give
them independence and room to carry out the
change. Others besides just the leader need
to come to feel responsible for sensing the
environment (Cartwright, 1965). The leader
needs to lose his sense of ownership in the
ideas (Kerr, 1963, p. 37) and organizational
members need to be encouraged to take greater
initiative in regards to maintaining the
changes the leader has initiated (Arensburg
in Sayles, 1964, p. 201; and Hefferlin, 1969,
p. 166). The leader himself would still
have responsibility for certain refreezing
roles to be described in the next section
of this chapter. One strategy to accomplish
these objectives may be to "assign an activity
to a definite, recognized operational unit
which will be responsible for and sensitive
to initiation in regards to this activity in
the future" (Cartwright, 1965).
Proposition 27 - To remove barriers to change and to provide
organizational members with necessary skills, knowledge, training and
resources in order to increase their capacity to implement the proposed
change (Gross, et. al.
,
1971, pp. 30, 212-213).
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Commentary: Strategies may include establishing
mechanisms by which organizational members can
be restrained and resocialized or which make
expert and financial resources available to
organizational members.
Proposition 28 - To change existing organizational arrangements
so that they are as compatible as possible with the behavioral changes
that are required e.g. the reward system, communications network,
decision-making process, networks of interdependence, organizational
policies or rules, etc. (Dalton, et. al., 1968; Kahn, et. al.
,
1964;
Katz, 1960, p. 192; Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 58; Lewin, 1951;
Maloney and Schonfeld, 1973).
Commentary: "When self-interest conflicts
with necessary change, often institutional
arrangements are necessary to make people's
self-interests accord with the necessary
change" (Maloney and Schonfeld, 1973, p. 203).
Strategies may involve changing patterns of
interdependence or communication so that all
levels of the organization become open to the
environment or changing the support or rewards
given for certain kinds of behavior. In other
words
,
in order to change behavior in any one
level of an organization it is often necessary
to achieve complementary or reinforcing changes
in other levels. New reference groups and
norms need to be established. "New patterns
of relationships appear to be essential in
rewarding and supporting new behavior" (Dalton,
1968, p. 109; Lewin, 1951). For change to
occur it is important that the new behaviors
become part of an interrelated role set for
the individual and that the new behaviors are
consistent or compatible with other behaviors
the person performs (Kahn, et. al. , 1964,
pp. 11-35).
Proposition 29 - To reinforce and reward even tentative changes
organizational members make in the direction of the intended outcome
(Dalton, et. al. , 1968; Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 35; Sayles, 1964).
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Commentary: The literature suggests that
for implementation to be successful, members
need feedback, and approval in order to gain
self-esteem and to experience some success
in changing (Dalton, 1968, p. 109; Sayles,
1964, pp. 154 and 159).
In addition to establishing and maintaining
the conditions specified in the propositions
under "changing" the organizational leader
may need to continue to use "unfreezing"
strategies (i.e. setting organizational
priorities and establishing opportunities
for reciprocity) for successful implementa-
tion to occur.
Propositions for Refreezing-Incorporation
An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational
leader in this phase may be:
Proposition 30 - To monitor organizational members' performance
in coping with and integrating the proposed change (Sayles, 1964).
Commentary: The main purpose of developing
a control or monitoring system is to detect
"non-response to directives to change"
(Sayles, 1964, p. 149). By monitoring
organizational members performance the
organizational leader is "seeking to
identify points of disorganization,
breakdown and disintegration in order
to devote his interventions to returning
the system as quickly as possible to a
normal, however changed, equilibrium"
(Sayles, 1964).
Proposition 31 - To objectively evaluate changes that have
occurred (Lippitt, et. al., 1958, pp. 229-230; Katz and Kahn, 1966,
pp. 433-435)
.
Proposition 32 - To maintain continuity at some levels of the
organization while change takes place at other levels (Kelman and
Warwick, 1973; Sayles, 1964).
63
Commentary: The literature suggests that
change must be reinforced or supported by
continuity of some parts of an individual’s
self-concept or identity or widespread
disintegration will occur (Kelman and
Warwick, 1973, pp. 35-36). Or as Sayles
puts it, Managers need to balance change
and stability in their organizations and
to minimize the frequency with which pat-
terns of work and coordination are
disturbed" (Sayles, 1964, p. 161).
Proposition 33 - To insulate the organization from conflicting or
competing ideas and to give organizational members time to assimilate
and integrate new behaviors (Sayles, 1964, p. 147; Lippitt, et. al.
,
1958; Bennis, 1972b; Lewin, 1951).
Commentary: According to this proposition
an organizational leader would seek to
monitor /screen others' overload in the
system and to cut down on interfering or
competing claims for their time, energy,
and resources. (Contrast this proposi-
tion to Proposition 7 under unfreezing
in which the objective is just the opposite.)
Proposition 34 - To link parts of the organization to individuals
whose behavior has been changed as well as to link processes of change
occurring simultaneously (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 35; Sayles, 1964;
Schein, 1971, p. 277).
Commentary: Strategies to accomplish this
first part of this objective may include
1) developing new channels of communication
between relevant parts of the system, 2)
developing peer as well as authority expecta-
tions for new behaviors, and 3) providing
opportunities for increased interworker
communication and collaboration (Arensburg,
in Sayles, 1964, p. 201).
Proposition 35 - To give emotional support and resources (in the
form of confirming information, training, etc.) to organizational members
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who demonstrate behaviors in the direction of the intended change (Sayles,
1964, p. 159; Guest, 1962; Lippitt, et. al.
, 1958, p. 226).
Commentary: A strategy may be to reinforce
organizational members behavior with know-
ledge of the way they compare with other
organizations (Guest, 1962).
Proposition 36 - To give visibility and credibility to the change
within the entire system and to spread information about the consequences
of the change to other parts of the organization, thereby diminishing a
negative response in other parts of the system and encouraging system-
wide support and adoption (Lippitt, et. al.
,
1958; Sayles, 1964).
Commentary: Strategies may include having
individuals whose behavior has been changed
to teach other parts of the organization
about the changes (Lippitt, et. al.
,
1958,
p. 231) or developing rituals around the
way in which a new behavior is acquired
which tend to validate the new behaviors
and facilitate its acceptance (Sayles, 1964,
p. 147).
Two propositions that have come from a review of the literature
relate to all three phases of change and suggest conditions that need
to be established and maintained in all three stages if change is to
be successfully initiated, implemented, and incorporated.
Proposition 37 - The organizational leader needs to be viewed as
personally involved and committed to the change throughout the change
process (Bennis, 1972b) (Hefferlin, 1969, p. 96).
Proposition 38 - The organizational leader and others advocating
the change need to be perceived as trustworthy throughout the change
process (Bennis, 1972b; Rogers, 1972, p. 205).
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Again, the stages of initiation, implementation and incorporation
seemingly are treated as if they were discrete and sequential when in
actuality most change processes extend over long periods of time and
require continual unfreezing and changing until stably integrated.
Incorporation is in itself gradually accomplished through a series of
successive approximations. The line between the end of one phase and
the beginning of the next can never be drawn; however, movement from
one stage to another is evidenced when organizational members perceive
that a majority of the conditions described in one phase have been dealt
with and when efforts are being taken to meet a majority of the objectives
specified in the next phase. When there seems to be no movement from one
stage to another, it can be assumed that a majority of the objectives in
that stage are not being met at all, or that the organizational leader's
efforts are too diffuse to establish and maintain the conditions neces-
sary for the successful completion of that stage.
The propositions for the role performance of the organizational
leader are summarized in the chart on the following page.
Summary and Prospectus
The propositions set forth in this chapter were compiled after
a review of the literature on attitude and organizational change. If
some of the propositions sound normative in that they imply the participa-
tion of organizational members, it is because of the emphasis on long
term, stably integrated change which the literature suggests requires
the understanding, involvement, and commitment of organizational
members
(Hersey and Blanchard, 1972, p. 161). It is not implied that the
leader
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needs to initiate strategies to accomplish all of the objectives that
have been outlined; rather the propositions as they are presented here
will be used as a framework to assess in retrospect the actual impact
of an organizational leader's actions in unfreezing, changing, and
refreezing the behavior of organizational members. The organizational
leader chosen for this study is the President of the University of
Cincinnati, Warren Bennis. The material used comes from observations,
interviews, and the study of documents relative to four attempts Bennis
made to institute major changes in the University during the spring and
fall of 1972 and the spring of 1973. The research methodology used to
carry out this research will be described in more detail in the next
chapter.
CHAPTER III
RESEARCH SETTING AND DESIGN
Selection of the Research Setting
The literature on higher education yields contradictory descrip-
tions about the ability of a university president to effect organizational
change (see Chapters I and IV) . It seems as if the ideal (what he is
often expected to do) and the real (what he is able to do given the
realities of his role and the university structure) have never been
adequately separated and explored. The university setting and the role
of the university administrator in implementing organizational change
has been neglected in the literature on planned organizational change
in favor of studies in industrial and business settings.
For these reasons, in order to contribute to the literature in
both these fields, the university environment was selected because its
President, Warren Bennis, is himself a renowned organizational theorist.
He had a strong interest in and a positive orientation toward the pro-
posed study from the outset. Several meetings were held with him and
his top assistants prior to the initiation of field work activities in
which a great deal of preliminary information was shared about the
University and the proposed study. A set of tentative agreements were
reached during these meetings. In August, 1972, a final decision was
made to conduct the study. Field observation began in September, 1972,
with the specific research questions to emerge from a month or two
of
preliminary observation and assessment.
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Research Design
Introduction
The intent of the rest of this chapter is to present the major
methodological problems encountered in designing and carrying out the
study and the reasons for the decisions made about them. A rationale
for the choice of the field research method will be given. The
aPProPriateness of the field research method as a method of inquiry
given the purposes of this research will be established through the
discussion that follows of the relative advantage and disadvantages
of other quantitative methodologies that were considered. An attempt
will be made to acknowledge some of the limitations of the study and
the steps taken to counteract these biases. Finally, the procedures
used in data collection and analysis and the nature of the conclusions
that can be made from the findings will be described.
Requirements of the Study and Rationale for Use of the Field Research Method
The objective of this study was to examine the consequences of the
role performance of the university president for the initiation, imple-
mentation, and incorporation phases of the process of change. Given this
objective, data needed to be collected from individuals in the university
involved in an effort to institute planned change that indicated their
attitudes, performance, and social relationships at different points in
time and the perceived effect of the president's actions in changing
existing attitudes, expectancies, relationships, and behaviors.
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A research design was desired that would 1) permit the author
to observe the performance and reactions of members to a proposed
organizational change as unobtrusively as possible; 2) permit the
author to develop rapport with participants in the setting that
could be maintained over a relatively long period of time; and
3) allow the author to use a variety of techniques for obtaining
data. These specifications resulted in the choice of a qualitative,
non-experimental research design, which for convenience will be
referred to as the field research method.
The term "field research" refers to a method of inquiry in a
social setting using the researcher’s observational skills and knowledge
of where to look in regards to the problem under investigation. The
method is designed to "utilize to the fullest the advantages of seeing
the situation as a whole and of attempting to grasp fundamental relation-
ships. From this. . .can come the insights which can furnish the hypo-
theses for later, more detailed, quantitative studies" (Katz, et . al.,
1953, p. 75). A general characteristic of field work is its temporary
developing character. The field worker usually does not enter the field
with specific hypotheses or a predetermined research design (Strauss,
et. al., 1969, p. 751). Lofland has described field observation "as
the most directly involving and most penetrating of all research strat-
gies, the most close and telling mode of gathering information" (Lofland,
1971, p. 93). Face-to-faceness has the irreplaceable character of non-
reflectivity and immediacy that furnishes the fullest possibility of
truly entering the life, mind, and definition of the other"
(Lofland,
1971, p. 2).
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The strength of the field research method is that it allows one
to understand the central issues of the individuals being observed in
their own terms. It allows one to see what in Goffman’s terms, is
meaningful, reasonable, and normal (Goffman, 1961, p. 1). The observer's
task is in fact to find out what is fundamental or central to the
individuals under observation (Lofland, 1971, p. 4). He usually
begins by using the participant's own assertions about phenomena
which leads to the identification of a set of patterns in a social
system, and over a span of time, to the identification of changes
in the relationships of individuals to each other. At the same time,
observation may lead to the identification of emerging conflicts,
coalitions, milestones, and imagery. "Attention is focused on a
succession of dependencies through time—upon ways in which prior
conditions may or may not develop into succeeding conditions of a
given outcome. Attention is focused upon ways in which alternatives
may or may not be present, upon ways in which, and the degree to which,
action may be constrained. . ." The study becomes "a cumulation of
factors, each factor being a condition of an outcome but not sufficient
for it, each factor making an outcome merely possible or more probable
(Lofland, 1971, p. 65).
The field research method was selected because it provided a
strategic way to explore the complex organizational problems the
study proposed to investigate. It allowed for in-depth observation of
several aspects of the dynamics of instituting change into an organization.
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In sum, the needs of this research and the special strengths of the
field research method seemed to coincide.
Alternative Quantitative Methodologies
Campbell and Stanley (1963, p. 36) argue that the choice of
any one research method is made more plausible if other methodologies
are ruled out as inappropriate, infeasible, or less effective. The
aim of this section is to defend my choice of the f ield—observation
method by ruling out alternative methodologies, specifically quanti-
tative, laboratory methodologies, given the purposes of my research.
In choosing the field study method certain tradeoffs of replicability,
control, predictability, and reliability, which are the strengths of
quantitative methodologies, were made for the advantages listed above.
In the paragraphs that follow the problems with quantitative studies
as an alternative methodology, given the purposes and requirements of
the research, are discussed.
Problems with Quantitative Methodologies for the Purposes of this Research
Robert Weiss and Martin Rein have written that there are method-
ological as well as administrative problems with quantitative evaluation
of many broad-aims change programs.^ When goals are difficult to specify,
when aims can be realized in alternative ways, or when the process estab-
lished is important, bef ore-and-after evaluation and the demonstration of
"''Broad -aims programs are those which hope to achieve non-specific
"forms of change for the better" and are of such magnitude that they
require large-scale interventions (Weiss and Rein, 1970, p. 97).
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cause-and
-effect relationships between a program and its outcomes are
not feasible (Weiss and Rein, 1970). University change projects can
be classified as broad-aims programs since goals are usually vague
and difficult to specify and rank order. Outcomes can be achieved
in a number of ways and the process that evolves jLs what is important
if one is not to accept any one explanation for why change processes
do or do not get implemented. Any attempt to evaluate the success of
efforts to institute organizational change in terms of narrowly defined
and controllable criteria misrepresents the actual aims of proposals
for change in the university and will inevitably encounter many of the
problems Weiss and Rein identify with experimentally-designed evaluations
of broad-aims programs. A partial list of those problems follows:
1) Some problems stem from overoptimistic judge-
ments regarding the potential impact of large
scale social programs.
2) Broad-aims programs often do not have opera-
tional goals and there is a tendency for
researchers to force operationalization for
the purpose of evaluation.
3) Change is difficult to measure. Variables
that seem to account for differences in
bef ore-and-af ter data may be only situational
and would have taken place without the program.
4) Pre-programmed criteria may not account for
the unintended consequences of a change effort
and therefore the assessment of a program may
be limited.
5) Variables are too many, too complex and often
cannot be predicted ahead of time.
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6) Experimental treatments are not standardized.
Because social settings differ in their needs,
potential realizations of any program may not
be possible. One important research function
should be the description of the forms the pro-
gram takes and of the forces shaping these forms.
Cause
-and-effect evaluation neglects such des-
cription entirely
,
being based on the assumption
that what took place was supposed to take place.
7) A quantitative evaluation design is limited in
the information it can produce. Usually negative
results are thrown out. Research cannot merely
document that the program failed and go on to
study a modification of the program; it must
identify the causes of failure. In this way
the experience can become the basis for designing
more effective programs.
8) There are always problems between program admin-
istrators and evaluators such as the operation-
alization of aims may cause these aims to take
on importance that before administrators didn’t
hold (Weiss and Rein, 1970, p. 101).
Weiss and Rein document other administrative difficulties with quantita-
tive research design for broad-aims programs on pages 104-105, in the
Evaluation of Broad Aims Programs
,
although these are less of a problem
with the research that has been undertaken here.
Most quantitative studies tend to measure outcomes (causes,
effects, and consequences); as described earlier the focus of this
research on the role performance of the university president is more
a study of "input" and "process". The concern was with forces that
shaped the change program, the nature of the opposition encountered
when it was introduced, the actions taken by the university president
in anticipation of resistance, the reasons for the program's outcome
(especially as they are linked to the role of the university president) ,
75
and with the program's unintended consequences (especially as they
effect receptivity or resistance to future attempts at organizational
change)
. Because of those interests this study takes the form that
it does.
However, there are also certain problems associated with the
field research which are important to acknowledge since they effect
the nature of the conclusions it is possible to make as a result of
the study.
Problems with Qualitative Research
Precisely because a field researcher is more interested in what
happens after a program is introduced than in "whether it works", he is
less likely to have systematic quantitative data available to specify
the causes and consequences of certain actions. The lack of comparative
data is often cited as a major disadvantage of the field research method.
Other disadvantages include the problems of replicability and of general-
izing from a single case which may not be representative of a larger
2
population. The acknowledgement of these limitations to the field
research method is not meant to diminish their validity or importance.
However in choosing a methodology, the advantages of a field research
2
In fact the necessary range of variation in a phenomenon may never
occur in a single social setting. This does not preclude the possibility
however that the single case can be representational. It is simply impos-
sible to know.
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design seemed to far outweigh the disadvantages, given the oblectives
of the research.^
In the next sections of this chapter some of the methodological
and ethical problems encountered in carrying out this research as well
as the efforts taken to overcome these problems are addressed.
Kelman and Hovland have identified what they call a "sleeper
effect. In other words an action may have delayed consequences or
it may produce overt compliance while bringing about other latent
changes so that an individual will respond to influence attempts in
the future in a different manner (Cartwright, 1965, p. 26). Since
none of the attempts to institute organizational change had reached
any degree of closure in the year spent at the University of Cincinnati,
it is possible that any assessment of change that was made might not
include "sleeper effects."
OJThe relative advantages and disadvantages of the field research
method are summarized in this quote by Kelman and Warwick, "Procedures
of field research lack control over independent variables provided by
experimental procedures and the control over the representativeness of
respondents provided by the sample survey. However, within limits set
by his status as an outsider and as an acknowledged social scientist,
[the field worker can] participate in the on-going activities of the
community and observe the processes of change and resistance to change
at first hand. Participant-observation studies generally do not permit
us to establish causal relationships and to isolate the variables
responsible for change, nor do they provide a systematic basis for
specifying the population to which findings can be generalized. On
the other hand they provide an unusually good opportunity to obtain
rich, varied, and detailed data on the processes of change at the time
and place at which these are unfolding. A participant-observer can
observe how individuals and institutions react when changes are intro-
duced and what kinds of personal and organizational processes are set
in motion by such changes" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, o. 17).
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In addition to this problem and to those described in preceding
sections, there are several other methodological problems with field
research which may be relevant for the findings of this study. Webb,
et. al., describe three methodological problems in field observation
which result from 1) errors that may be traced to those being studied;
2) errors that come from the researcher; and 3) errors associated with
sampling imperfections (Webb, et. al.
,
1966, p. 12).
The errors that result from those being studied include: 1) Those
being observed may be aware of being tested and thus respond differently;
2) respondents may select a stance or an image they would like to project
(role selection); 3) responses may be biased by rather natural inclina-
tions to respond in certain ways (response sets); 4) measurement itself,
or observation, may introduce the change, or the awareness of change,
the observer is seeking to measure; and 5) the observer may inadvertently
give cues as to appropriate responses through, for example, the way ques-
tions are phrased or by giving signals that a response is being evaluated
either positively or negatively. (Many of these problems are also associ-
ated with experimental-design research and are discussed in detail by Webb,
et. al.
,
1966, in their book on Unobtrusive Measures .)
A number of strategies were taken to overcome the problems of
response sets, role selection, and the awareness of being studied. One
strategy was to compare interview answers with actions observed in meetings
and with correspondence sent to and fron the president s office. In
addition, the president would ask those people with whom he was meeting
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if they had any objections to the meeting being observed. The procedure
of asking for access to meetings or for copies of documents gradually
became taken for granted as did the observer's behavior of jotting down
notes during a meeting.
In carrying out this research the author was especially aware of
"errors that result from the researcher" and of how she might be being
selective in what she chose to observe, in the questions she chose to
ask, and in the inf ormat ion she sought to confirm the hypotheses she held.^
Especially when accounts of the same event did not agree there was a
responsibility to try to understand the logic of each perspective without
taking sides.
A second type of error resulting from the researcher has to do
with the emotional involvement of the observer in the setting he/she is
studying and with larger questions of subjectivity versus objectivity.
For example, it was very difficult to remain a non-participant in the
setting. "The researcher's value system or his strong attachment to
people may lead him to do or say things that change the data. The
resulting disadvantage of this caring relationship is that the researcher
may lose an outsider’s perspective on what he sees. The loss of the out-
sider’s perspective means, in essence, that the observer is susceptible
to whatever subtle influences, moods, or assumptions pervade the system"
^Robert Rosenthal discusses experimentor outcome orientations in
The Psychology Bulletin, Volume 61, 1964. See also Louis Barnes,
1967,
p. 57.
^See Barnes, 1967, p. 88.
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(Zigarmi, Drea, 1974). In addition, the ambiguity of the field-worker's
role makes him/her vulnerable to all sorts of suspicion, fear, and dis-
trust that are projected by participants in the setting (transference).
Despite the amount of time and intense involvement, the field worker
experiences the sense of being marginal to the setting and the loneliness,
anxiety, and the fear, at one time or another, of not being accepted by
persons in the setting that Lofland describes in Analyzing Social Settings
(1971, p. 97). Often seeking acceptance and desiring to prove oneself
as trustworthy, it becomes easy to want to reciprocate or to volunteer
to aid one group or another. The imbalance in the observer's relationships
to participants becomes frustrating to the point of wanting to abandon the
observer's role. The times in which these feelings peaked caused the
author to redefine her approach to participants in the setting and to the
methodological and ethical problems encountered in the research effort.
However
,
If the researcher can sensitively draw back and
try to understand his own feelings and thoughts
he may have a valuable phenomenological insight
into the experiences of other members of the
system and into the forces working in that system.
Naturally this sort of data requires careful checks
through observation of others' behavior and through
interviewing members about their own reactions but
it remains true that as an [observer] the researcher
can often use his own emotions and reactions as a
clue in understanding phenomena in the system he
is studying (Karpel, 1973, p. 23).
Throughout the field study the author tried to become more aware
of subjective and affective responses to participants in the setting
and
to events that were being observed
6
and to acknowledge values or biases
^See Schwartz and Schwartz, 1955, p. 49.
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that may have resulted in selective distortion.
In this research errors in sampling included meetings that were
not observed, interviews not held, and documents not read that resulted
in an incomplete analysis of the problems encountered and of the role
performance of the university president in the implementation of organiza-
tional change. There were several meetings, phone calls, and documents
that were not possible to retrieve because the university president could
not be "shadowed" twenty-four hours a day. For the period studied, this
was not possible because of the constraints on the president as well as
I
on the researcher. In addition because of the researcher's relationships
with different members of groups within the university, there was dif-
ferential access to their meetings and their opinions. Also distortion
in sampling could come because of a natural inclination to accept what
respondents said at face value.
The policy of using more than one research technique such as
observation, interviews, and document analysis was used to reduce the
chances of not recording all of the president's actions.
Ethical Considerations
A strong realization a field worker comes to is that research is,
in itself, an intervention into the life of the organization. At a very
practical level, measurement may be socially descriptive (see Webb, et.
al., 1966; Lofland, 1971, p. 61). This realization led the author to
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to consider several ethical problems associated with this research study: 7
1) The issue of confidentiality and the need to protect persons’
careers and investments in the setting.
2) The issue of selecting what to study, what to ignore, and how
to investigate it.
3) The issue of selecting what to include in writing the disserta-
tion .
4) The issue of how the conclusions would be used in a value-free
way.
Since the strategies the author used to cope with ethical questions,
assumptions, and value preferences overlapped, these strategies will be
described once the author's personal values and assumptions about the
setting and leadership within the setting have been acknowledged in the
section that follows.
Values and Assumptions
Argyris has said that a researcher always has a hypotheses even if
the study is only exploratory (Argyris, 1970, p. 100). The intent of
this section is to set out the author's hypotheses (personal values and
assumptions) about the nature of the phenomena under observation that
might bias the choice of material to be presented and perception of the
major issues involved in the change efforts. First what are the assumptions
that the author started with?
7 in many ways the next two sections extend the discussion of
"errors
resulting from the researcher in this section.
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1) First, the author assumed that the setting was probably more
participative than authoritative in its decision-making, at
least that the choice of Warren Bennis as President was indica-
tive of a level of aspiration for participative decision-making.
Further, this assumption was underscored by another assumption:
that a field research study of the leader's behavior would not
have been allowed, lots less supported, in an authoritative
system.
2) The entire study is based on the assumption that the university
president can and does affect the process of change in the uni-
versity .
3) To some extent it was assumed that knowledge of the theories
of organizational change on the part of the organizational
leader would be synonymous with the ability to implement change.
Although attempts have been made to control the amount of subjectivity
with which events were recorded and analyzed (see the sections on errors
resulting from the researcher and on errors resulting from sampling above),
at times the reader may feel that the author's values are biasing both the
analysis and hence the conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis. In
that case it is better to acknowledge value preferences on the part of the
researcher from the outset. In the first place, it was felt that the
process of change, not the change idea itself, was most important to study
(see justification in the prceding sections). Secondly, as a model for
the organizational leader's actions during the process of change evolved.
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the author s thinking was probably influenced by a predilection for a
participative model of change.
To the extent that these assumptions and values remain unquestioned
during this study, they became limitations to the conclusions it may be
possible to make as a result of the study. However several steps were
taken (in addition to those described in the section on Problems with
Qualitative Research) to counteract these biases and to resolve the
ethical questions raised in the preceding section.
Steps Taken in Response to Ethical Considerations,
Assumptions, and Value Questions
1) The purposes of the research were explained to participants
in the setting prior to requesting to observe interactions
they were engaged in (see Argyris, 1970, p. 97).
2) As a researcher the author tried to engage feelings of
competence, self -acceptance , and essentiality on the part
of the participants (Ibid.).
3) With the exception of the president, the identity of
respondents has been protected by omitting names.
4) As much as possible events were described from all perspec-
tives so that actions taken seem plausible, however effective
or ineffective. In the course of the research the researcher
tried to validate personal perceptions of events by asking
questions of participants.
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5) A discussion of other factors that may effect the successful
or unsuccessful implementation of organizational change
besides the organizational leader's behavior will be included
in the section on Assessment of Setting, Chapter IV.
6) Some of the questions the author has come to have about
initial assumptions values is included in the analyses of
the cases and in the conclusions in Chapter IX.
The technique used in data collection and analysis are described
in the next section of this chapter.
Data Collection and Analysis
Within the field research framework it is possible to use a variety
of methods to gather data. In this research, these included non-participant
O
observation; interviewing; and the use of unobtrusive measures including
the study of documents and historical data. Written records included pub-
lications, minutes of various meetings, memoranda, policy statements,
press releases, correspondence from the university president's files,
and published articles and interviews. A journal was used to record descrip-
tions of events, notes from interviews, and general impressions.
A case study format was used to analyze the data that had been
collected. Each case includes a chronological summary of events and an
^Unobtrusive measures are defined as measures that do not require the
cooperation of the respondent and that do not themselves contaminate the
response. Such measures would include, for example, an analyses of corre-
spondence and calendars as to the range and frequency of contacts within
the system or study of the university's history through archival records.
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analysis of the role performance of the organizational leader in initi-
ating, implementing, and incorporating change. In each case an attempt
is made to relate the specific actions of the university president to
a nod el of the organizational leader's role performance proposed in
Chapter II.
The Problems of Generalizing from a Single Case
Although Watkins (1953, p. 727) contends that the character of
social systems can only be explained by studying an individual's behavior
and by depicting interrelationships of individuals, some attention needs
to be given in this chapter to the problems of generalizing from the study
of a single individual to individuals in other social setting. Overall,
generalizing in the social sciences is a much less definitive process than
in most of the physical sciences where variables can be controlled and
experimental conditions replicated. "Generalizations in case studies,
if they are good, will sharpen readers' abilities to observe and evaluate
tendencies and consequences and to make informal judgements; they will
not arrive at a set of uniform judgements or specific, fixed remedies for
specific administrative ailments" (Stern , 1952, p. 21). Conclusions in
this research will only serve to point out issues where an effort to
generalize might be fruitful and where further quantitative research
might be undertaken.
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Prospectus
The purpose of the next chapter is to assess conditions that
existed in the university just prior to the initiation of four attempts
at organizational change. Since conditions in the external environment
may also influence the extent to which change is successfully initiated
and implemented, some of the conditions that existed outside the organiza-
tion will be reviewed as part of the assessment of setting. In subsequent
chapters a university president's interventions in regards to developing
a university long-range plan, instituting an affirmative action program,
implementing a budget-review/resource allocation process and building an
administrative team. His interventions will then be analyzed by assessing
the extent to which they helped to create conditions specified in the
propositions above in each stage of the change process.
CHAPTER IV
ASSESSMENT OF SETTING
Introduction
If leadership is a function of the leader's personality and expec-
tations, follower's expectations and personalities, the task, and the
situation, (Fieldler, 1964 5 Hersey and Blanchard, 1972) then it is impor-
tant to look at the process of change in light of each of these variables.
Follower's expectations, and to a certain extent their personalities,
result from a complex interplay between conditioning (or the way things
have been done in the past) and the exigencies of present circumstances.
The term "situation" is used to describe the general organizational
setting and climate. The purpose of this chapter is to look at these
two determinants of leadership, members' expectations and setting as
the context for the university president's leadership in initiating,
implementing, and incorporating organizational change.
Specifically, one purpose of this chapter is to look at some of
the social and structural characteristics of academic organizations that
make them highly resistant to change. Since environmental factors can
have a tremendous Influence on members' expectations about change, both
external and internal environmental conditions will be studied. Externally,
the general social and economic conditions all public universities faced
in 1973 will be described. Internally, the ways in which the University
of Cincinnati in particular has expanded and changed in the last few years
within the context of how academic reform has generally been accomplished
in the past will be explored.
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A second purpose of this chapter will look at a "change in
leadership as an event which effects followers' expectations and
organizational climate. Because the University of Cincinnati had
recently selected a new President (Warren Bennis)
,
the contention
is made that there was greater disequilibrium in the system than
usual while new relationships and new "meanings" for the role of
president were being established.
The purpose of the third section of this chapter will be to
describe the traditions that were being broken and the precedents
that were being established during Bennis' first months in office
that contributed to an organizational setting and climate ripe for
change.
Change Resistant Characteristics of Universities
Miles has written that properties of educational systems have
an effect on innovative attempts (Miles, 1967 , p. 1).'*' Certainly,
1) characteristic ways of doing things and 2) the training and
socialization faculty members receive contribute to resistance to
change in the university. A third source of resistance in recent
years in the university has come from administrators' and faculty
members' reactions to the student movement. Let us look first at
some of the social and structural characteristics of universities
that make them resistant to change.
^See also Zigarmi and Zigarmi, "The Feasibility of Organiza-
tional Development Strategies in Higher Education", 1973.
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The Social and Structural Characteristics of Universities
One general set of restraining forces was described by J. B. Lon
Hefferlin. These are:
A. As an Institution/Organization
1) Organizations are inherently passive - they exist
for routinization of behavior.
2) Voluntary organizations attract members who agree
with their activities.
3) Organizations tend toward institutionalization
and ritualism.
4) The maintenance of institutional effectiveness
such as achievement (in this case, student learning)
is only one problem that organizations must face in
order to survive. Other problems often take prece-
dence over it.
B. As An Academic Organization
1) The purposes of the university and its sources of
support are generally conservative.
2) The educational system is vertically fragmented.
3) Within higher education, institutional reputation
is based not on innovation, but more on conformance
to an "ideal" model, often to the Ivy League college.
4) Faculty members have observed their vocation for
years as students before joining it (see section
in this chapter on the Training and Socialization
of Faculty Members).
5) The idealogy of the academic profession treats
professors as independent professionals.
6) Academics are skeptical about the idea of efficiency
in academic life.
7) Academic institutions are deliberately structured to
resist precipitant change (Hefferlin, 1971, pp. 13-15).
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Blau, in a paper, The University as a Distinctive Organization
,
described three other characteristics of universities as organizations
that would seem to imply resistance to change.
1) The usual relationship between line and staff is reversed.
Because of the highly professionalized nature of the
university, administrators perform auxiliary functions
although they hold line authority;
2) there are two competing purposes for the university:
teaching and research, such that the optimal environ-
ment for one is not the same as the optimal environment
for the other; and
3) students are both members of the university community
and its clients (Blau, 1966, p. 90).
The effect of these characteristics is to increase ambiguity both as to
who has the authority to decide what to change and as to whose interests
are to be served by the proposed change.
Corson identifies two additional obstacles to change in universi-
ties: 1) the independence of individual faculty members and 2) the
insularity of academic departments (Corson, 1966, p. 7). In the first
case, the individual faculty member is accorded a great deal of inde-
pendence as to what he will teach. His interest tends to be in his
subject matter or field and not in the total curriculum of which his
courses are a part. His future is more than likely in his discipline,
not in the institution; and his status and prestige in most cases comes
from sources outside the university. "The faculty's role in the process
of change has been more to accept or reject or to comment than to devise
and propose" (Kerr, 1963, p. 100).
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Finally a serious constraint on the implementation of new programs
in the university which is often ignored in the literature on organiza-
tional change is the discontinuity caused by the academic calendar. Change
is begun only to have participation and momentum interrupted by vacations
of two to four weeks at Christmas, a spring break, and a three-month
summer vacation (Hefferlin, 1971, pp. 13-15).
At the same time the university is highly differentiated into
departments, colleges, institutes, and divisions, etc. whose autonomy
is buttressed by traditions of academic freedom and specialization.
There is little sense of community or unity due to what Robert Oppen-
heimer calls "a thinning of common knowledge" (Kerr, 1963, p. 101).
The Training and Socialization of Faculty Members
The training and socialization of faculty members also contribute
to resistance to change in the university. Academic disciplines repre-
sent long traditions of custom and precedent. A faculty member is taught
to examine every issue from every angle. His resistance to change comes
from his training to always seek the truth and to think for himself, so
that, although we think of the university as a collegium, most faculty
members are unused to collaboration, to working in groups, or to collec-
tive decision-making. Even within one department or discipline wide-
spread acceptance of change is very often impossible because of the kinds
of expectations for independence faculty members hold.
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The Influence of the Student Protest Movement
These two sources of resistance to change: organizational
properties of universities and faculty members' expectations due to
their training are joined by a third, more general kind of resistance
to change which came about in universities in the late sixties with
the onslaught of student protests. In general faculty members felt
threatened by student activism. Their security was challenged when
knowledge for its own sake becomes unimportant. They perceived their
traditional right to make curriculum decisions eroded by student and
often community-group participation in decision-making and demands
for relevance in the curriculum. Hence their resistance to change
imposed from any source grew.
The Effect of these Factors on the University of Cincinnati
The effect of many of these factors has been to make univer-
sities in-grown, conservative, and resistant to change. A profile
of the University of Cincinnati in 1972-73 reveals that it is no
exception. The University is 43.2% tenured; most of those who have
tenure received it when they were young and have had it for a number
of years. Almost nineteen percent (18.99%) of the faculty received
their terminal degree at Cincinnati. There are ninety—six departments
in nineteen colleges at Cincinnati, signaling a high degree of special
ization. There are over sixty-three faculty and administrative com-
mittees which contribute to the slow adaptation of change in that they
are charged with reviewing and approving almost all actions taken in
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the University. Only with regard to the third factor, the impact of
the student protest movement, is Cincinnati an exception. Because a
majority of students at the University of Cincinnati commute, students
were never as organized or active at Cincinnati as they were in other
universities in the sixties, nor did the student movement have the
same direct impact in Cincinnati that it had on other campuses.
Initial resistance to change, whatever its source, is one factor
to consider in trying to effect organizational change. Conditions in
the social and economic environment constitute another.
External Environmental Conditions
Many of the changes in higher education in 1972 were externally
initiated, many in part stemming from Nixon’s domestic policies and a
redefinition of the federal government's role in post-secondary education.
The shape of Nixon's intended domestic program before the recent energy
crisis was clearly discernable, namely to control inflation and to make
government more efficient by trimming down its size and expenditures.
This would be done by decentralizing government to regional, state, and
local levels through a program of federal revenue sharing; by consolidating
governmental agencies and programs; and by developing more effective cost-
benefit criteria for federal programs and an increased sense of account-
ability at the local level.
The implications of this program for higher education have been:
1) Reduced support for basic research, direct health services,
and training programs in areas where there is a surplus of
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trained manpower.
2) Reduced support for construction as enrollment levels off.
3) Reduced support to programs in HEW which have been poorly
managed and unresponsive to national priorities.
4) Increased coordination, consolidation, and control of
federal funds for education at all levels of government.
5) A redirection of federal funds to programs seeking to apply
existing scientific and technological knowledge to urban and
environmental problems.
6) Increased support to programs that attempt to deliver
educational services to new and more diversified
constituencies
.
Furthermore research funds are no longer available to the extent
they were for graduate programs in science, engineering, and education.
Departmental autonomy is threatened by pressures to do interdisciplinary,
problem-oriented research. Additional pressure is being felt to implement
affirmative action policies for women and minorities.
In general the redefinition of the federal government's role in
higher education in combination with other environmental factors (such
as a decline in enrollment) has created a climate of tension and insecurity
in universities.
The Effect of these Factors on the University of Cincinnati
This pattern of federal support for higher education has led to
greater inter-institutional cooperation between universities and businesses
and between public and private educational institutions in the last year.
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For example, the University of Cincinnati became part of a University-
Police consortium and agreed to share facilities and resources with a
neighboring private college. A reduced level of federal support has led
universities to band together to lobby more vociferously for the alloca-
tion of resources at the state level. In addition, universities including
the University of Cincinnati have begun to recruit more women and part-
time students through adult and continuing education programs to offset
the current drop in enrollment and tuition revenues.
All of the factors described in this section have caused members
of the university and the community to disagree about what the university
should do and what the role of its president should be. Should he seek
changes internally in conforming to external demands or should he seek
new resources for the institution so that it can maintain its identity
and traditions in spite of social pressures? It might be instructive at
this point to look at how change in higher education has been accomplished
in the past and specifically at how change has occurred at the University
of Cincinnati during the sixties in order to set a context for the change
processes that will be described in this research.
The Nature of the Academic Reform in Universities
For the most part, the process of academic reform in universities
has occurred in response to external pressures or because new resources
or members have been added (Hefferlin, 1971, p. 18 and p. 44). In that
sense "the academic community is more changed than changing" (Kerr,
1963,
p. 102 ) .
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Since World War II the federal government and large foundations
have been the sources of additional resources for universities. The
impact of these grants on higher education has been significant and is
well documented (Baldridge, 1971, p. 133; Kerr, 1963, p. 53; Hefferlin,
1971, pp. 37-38).
One of the most common mechanisms to effect academic change has
been through the turnover of personnel: the selection, replacement,
retirement of members [faculty members and administrators] and the
recruitment of catalysts of change (Hefferlin, 1971, pp. 44-46) . New
members of an institution who come from other institutions or from out-
side the educational system will naturally alter the organization simply
because they disrupt traditions by being unaware of them and because
they bring new ideas with them.
Academic reform has also been accomplished when fluctuations in
student enrollments have caused new institutions to be created and existing
institutions to be radically transformed. New academic programs have been
added as the student population has grown and as new sources of external
support (tuition, subsidies, grants, etc.) have been found. The purpose
of the next section is to show how the University of Cincinnati grew in
all these ways during the sixties.
The University of Cincinnati in the Sixties
During the sixties the University of Cincinnati grew in both size
and complexity. Physical expansion continued: new buildings were
completed
on the main campus and four two-year community colleges were
opened as part
of the University. Seven of the new buildings were
residence halls which
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signaled a change in the size and complexion of the University's student
population. The size of the faculty also grew. In 1960 the University
faculty number 1,375; was predominantly male (there were 200 women of
whom 9 had reached the rank of professor) and white (there are no records
of minority members). By 1969 there were 2,698 faculty members although
the faculty remained predominantly white and male (there were 436 women
and 16 minority faculty members). The picture of the faculty, which
emerges from interviews is one of a majority reasonably competent, but
disinterested in innovation or advancing their own careers outside the
University, a few generally incompetent; a very few, ambitious and using
the University of Cincinnati as a stepping stone to more prestigious
universities. The faculty seemed to hold a generally low opinion of
itself and the University with the exception of a few departments and
2
colleges
.
Undergraduate enrollment climbed to a total of 21,384 (FTE) full-
time equivalent students in 1970. Graduate enrollment also increased
as twenty—one graduate level programs were added during the sixties.
In 1960 85.6% of the University of Cincinnati's students were residents
of Ohio; in 1970 that percentage was hardly changed - 86.3%.
In 1960 the University received approximately three million dollars
in outside funding, grants and contracts (unrestricted and restricted
funds). By 1970 the University had become state affiliated and
outside
2March and Simon have contended that as satisfaction with
the present
increases, the search for alternatives decreases, hence
program continuity
is facilitated (March & Simon, 1969, p. 328).
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funding had reached $4,000,000.00.
In sum, the University of Cincinnati followed the pattern of
rapid growth and expansion during the 60' s that Kerr identifies as
Climacteric II (see Bennis, 1972a). Change was generally accomplished
unsystematically by "adding to." By 1971, however, just prior to the
selection of a new president environmental conditions both inside and
outside the University began to change.
Universities began competing for fewer and fewer resources.
Some faculty members and students at the University were tired of a
patriarchal administration and sought a new president committed to
goals of change and relevance. Board members sought a man who could
consolidate all the changes that were a result of the University's
expansion in the sixties. In the next section events surrounding the
selection of a new president will be described.
A Change in Leadership
The Selection of a New President
The search for and selection of a new president represents a
phase or cycle in the life of an organizational setting. Events between
the announcement that one president is leaving and the inauguration of a
new person in that position predictably leave the organization in a state
of disequilibrium. Succession unfreezes the organization to the extent
that it disturbs traditional norms and promotes changes in informal and
formal relationships among members. Change continues to take place as
the new president is socialized into the organization and as he
begins
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to establish new interests, parameters, and "meanings" for his role
as president. After a period of time the setting becomes refrozen.
Walter Langsam became President of the University of Cincinnati
in 1955. In the spring of 1970 he announced his intention to resign
eighteen months later in September of 1971. A search committee of
faculty, students, and board members was chosen that spring. It met
infrequently, but by June 1970 had drafted a profile of the man it would
seek to be the president of the University in the nineteen seventies.
The search committee acknowledged in the introductory paragraphs of
that profile that the educational programs of the University would
inevitably change in the seventies. The committee documented the
problems that a new president would face in mediating student demands,
in integrating two-year programs into the University, and in meeting
the needs of the surrounding community. These problems they concluded
suggested that the new president should have creativity and flexibility
and that a person "whose mind is closed to change and who believes that
the enduring values in higher education have already been established"
would be unlikely to meet the challenges of the seventies (Profile of
the President of the University of Cincinnati in the Seventies, June 1,
1970, p. 6).
Three pages out of the twelve-page statement dealt with the causes
and concerns of recent student protests and campus disorders. In the
seventies it is anticipated that even greater participation by students
in the governance of the University will be sought. It is important to
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recognize that students who desire this are not unrealistic or destruc-
tive.
. .It is important that as promptly as possible, the appropriate
areas for participation of students be determined.
.
.
" (p. 7). Little
did the search committee know in mirroring campus sentiment at that point
that students would be as significantly involved as they were in the search
committee’s own decision about who was to be the new president.
The search committee broke into subgroups to screen candidates.
Because it was difficult to find applicants, they interviewed only a
few persons. By late fall three contenders had emerged as the strongest
candidates. One was an insider, the provost. The other two were outsiders,
both of them easterners. "It was becoming clearer that board and adminis-
tration members of the search committee had one concept of what kind of
university president they wanted and that student and faculty members on
the committee had another" (a member of the search committee). The
candidates were brought back for rounds of interviews in the spring of
1971. Because reservations were expressed about each of the three candidates
from one or more quarters, it looked as though the University Board of
Directors would dismiss the search committee, appoint an acting president,
and establish another search committee to look for new candidates. Late
in May one committee member leaked the names of the three candidates to
the newspapers in an attempt to get one of the candidates to pull out and
to discredit the search. The search committee would then be disbanded and
3Quotations throughout the text will be identified by position and
not by name. A list of the persons interviewed and their positions
during
the academic year of 1972-73 is included in the bibliography.
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an acting president appointed. At the same time some of the committee
members were lobbying with board members trying to convince them not to
appoint an acting president on the grounds "that the climate on campus
was polarized, things were at a standstill, and that the campus couldn't
take more than eighteen months of a lame duck administration" (a member
of the search committee). Just before school ended in June, 1971, a
student petition was organized and submitted to the University Board of
Directors with 5,000 signatures urging the Board to support the work of
the search committee and not to choose an acting president. The petition
was crucial in causing the Board to reach a decision. "The Board felt
it needed to listen to students in the late 60' s, early 70' s, and that it
could not afford to devalue faculty input in the selection process and
risk a potential alliance of students and faculty members" (a member of
the search committee). The inside candidate was out because of all the
politics that had ensued over the eighteen month search; one of the
outsiders was clearly seen as too liberal and radical for the campus.
That left Warren Bennis. He had only come to Cincinnati twice during
the search process and was not very well known. To a certain extent,
people were leary of his outspokenness at Buffalo and critical of his
expose on the Northwestern Presidential search. But his reputation and
work in organizational development nationwide and in Cincinnati made
him acceptable (a member of the search committee). Two days after the
student petition had been submitted, the Board, with minimal consulta-
tion with the search committee, announced that Bennis had accepted
their offer of the presidency.
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Langs&m announced his resignation a year and a
half before he would leave, so for eighteen months
the campus waited. The search became the symbol
of new expectations and a new role for students
and faculty members in decision-making. Ultimately
what became even more important than participation
in decision-making was that a new president was
chosen. The climax then for many people in this
phase was the Board’s choice of Bennis in lieu of
appointing an acting president. Bennis didn’t
need to say a thing when he came on campus a few
days later. The peak of his acceptance was before
he came (a member of the search committee)
.
The three months in the summertime before Bennis assumed office and
the first weeks in the fall were a period of transition. The high expec-
tations a majority of community members held for Bennis' performance as
president created a certain disequilibrium in the system. The student
petition and search had created a new awareness of. the presidency. Bennis'
personal style fed the excitement. The purpose of the next section of
this chapter is to look at what occurred between the time of Bennis'
appointment in June and his formal inauguration in November. How did
Warren Bennis differ from Walter Langsam and how did events in this transi-
tion period serve to exacerbate or ameliorate those differences?
The Transition
Several of the persons that were interviewed felt that there were
early signs that the transition would be difficult. Walter Langsam did
not invite Bennis to commencement in June even though Bennis had already
been selected as the new president and the occasion would have been a
good
opportunity for him to meet people. Langsam did not make office
space
available nor did he share any information with Bennis prior to
September
1st. On his part, "Bennis didn't capitalize on informers
he could have
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had. He didn’t answer letters, didn't do his homework, or learn the
details of the institutional terrain" (a member of Bennis' staff).
Newspaper accounts of interviews with Bennis left the impression that
he thought a lot needed to be done in the University "to make it a
better place" (a vice-president).^
Bennis did not build on his grassroot, on his
natural constituencies and on the natural leader-
ship in the faculty and student body. He de-
valued some proposals for change ('we tried it
and it didn't work at Buffalo') and ignored
other ideas. A report on undergraduate teaching
was on his desk when he came and he's never read
it. Bennis' attitude was that no change had
occurred before he came, when actually there
had been some significant changes in the last
few years. Bennis did not have to lose those
people who were his natural allies, but in the
long run he did (a member of Bennis' staff).
The Bennises moved to Cincinnati in July, two months before
Dr. Bennis was to assume office. During this time he met with as many
administrators, students, faculty members, and community leaders as
possible
.
^Excerpt from a letter from a dean to the President: "It is a mistake
to say that this University has never planned. . .your comment is perceived
by some of my faculty as abrasive and distortive" (6/20/72).
Excerpt from a letter from a vice provost to the President: "The
most disturbing aspect of the first months of your administration was your
failure to realize that many of the "innovative" things you were proposing
for the University had been initiated several years before your presidency,
especially in community services and public affairs. Those of us who had
been here during the days of Walter Langsam know of the tremendous progress
made in these two areas during his presidency. I doubt that anyone in
organizational management can argue convincingly that neglect to recognize
the work of predecessors and subordinates creates and develops a
lack of
motivation in the subordinates" (7/10/72).
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He made concessions to everyone; he never recog-
nized that there were people who would run him
out if they could, who were resistant to him,
, o ._. i.nci t are
riuge
differences in their backgrounds: Langsam is European-born,
an aristocrat
Prussian, authoritarian; Bennis grew up in Los Angeles,
lived on the east
coast most of his life, is Jewish, and liberal.
Bennis’ preferred leader-
ship style is more democratic than Langsam' s;
he works best when he can
involve others in decision-making, with
temporary systems, and with small
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groups. He has swelled his personal staff by using assistants. Langsatn
preferred formal settings where status and lines of authority were clearly
delineated and where he could make decisions after they had come up the
line, at the top, authoritatively and often paternalistically
. He related
especially well to the wealthy business community in Cincinnati. Langsam
himself felt he and Bennis contrasted sharply on the way they spent their
time (Langsam felt he met with faculty more, while Bennis was gone from
campus more) and on their ownership in ideas (Bennis having greater
personal investment in authorship and ownership) . Even the way the two
men arranged their offices reflected their differences: Langsam's desk
at the far end of the room faced the door; Bennis* desk is at your back
when you enter his office and in front of you is a seating arrangement
of over-stuffed chairs and couches which invite informality and small
group discussions.
As a result of these differences in style and personality, people
perceived differences in the ways they could relate to and influence the
two men. The relationships Bennis formed initially at the University of
Cincinnati were important in setting expectations especially in that they
were so different from those of the previous president in emphasis and
in tone. In the minds of faculty members the selection of Bennis as
president meant that the power of certain groups would be strengthened at
the expense of others (whether it would in actuality remained to be seen).
Early indications were, for example, that students would have greater
access
to and a voice in decision-making.
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Through his initial contacts with individuals and groups, Bennis
began to share his values and conceptual frameworks and to establish
"meanings" for phenomena in the setting in which he found himself.
More often than not Bennis purposefully chose to change traditions as
he encountered them. Deliberately he sought to create symbols or images
of the beginning of a new era. In Lewinian terms he sought to replace
the standards community members had perceived as having social value with
his vision of what the university might be. In talks during his first
months in Cincinnati, and especially in his inauguration speech, Bennis
concentrated on future possibilities, not on present realities and
problems. In sum, he confronted the sedentary tradition-bound quality
of the University of Cincinnati and offered a vision of what might be.
The purpose of the next section of this chapter is to look more closely
at 1) some of the actions Bennis took initially that modelled the atti-
tudes and behaviors he hoped others would adopt and 2) the implications
of his behavior for changing the climate of the organization and members
expectations about change.
Bennis* Style
There are five predominant themes to the meanings Bennis tried
to establish during his first months as president of the University of
Cincinnati: visibility, informality, immediacy, openness, and change.
Immediacy : A sense of immediacy is descriptive of a tone
that
emerged during the search and selection process. Instead of
trying to
stabilize the organization, Bennis* tack was to try to
fire members
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expectations by describing the changes he hoped to bring about and by
sharing his sense of impending and significant change in the environment
of higher education.
Visibility; The search process, and especially the student
petition, created widespread awareness of the role of the president.
The office became more visible as Bennis added personal assistants
and began recruiting new people. The University itself became more
visible nationally because of Bennis* own professional reputation.
Bennis' style also contributes to visibility. He is oriented toward
image-making through the use of graphics and the visual media. Very
early in his first year, he convinced a local television station to
develop a new program, The Bennis Show. One administrator commented
that "the faculty had seen him so much on TV and newspapers that they
didn't even bother to come to the first faculty meeting to hear what
he had to say." His very visually stimulating inauguration is another
example of his interest in visibility. Bennis' vision of the "best-
managed urban university" and frequent comparisons of Cincinnati to
Harvard and MIT suggests that national as well as community visibility
are important aspects of the directions in which he wants the University
to move.
Informality : A third standard Bennis tried to model was informality.
"His initial relationships to faculty were not respectful of protocol nor
of the city's German-Jewish heritage or of those cultures' respect for
formality and intellectuality" (a top administrator). He often did not
use the title of "Doctor" and preferred to be called by his first name
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and to call others by their first names. "During his first year it was
easier for a student to see Bennis at his house than for a faculty member
to get an office appointment" (a top administrator). Furthermore, "his
relationships with the community have been characterized by unpreparedness
and a sort of rambling informality" (a top administrator).
Openness : There are lots of examples available to substantiate
Bennis' valuing of openness. In the first place, he sought very clearly
to make the University more open to resources and responsive to problems
in its environment. The University entered into inter-institutional
consortia; and colleges were asked to designate "visiting committees" of
outsiders. Secondly, Bennis stimulated experimentation and risk taking.
"Bennis gives you the feeling things can be tried" (an English Department
faculty member) . He instituted "open hours" - when faculty members and
students could see the President without an appointment to discuss what
was on their minds. Fourthly, Bennis tried to establish a spirit of col-
laboration and consultation in decision-making, in his own words by setting
in motion processes like "more consultation, more openness of all data,
more open doors and open confidence, and a more serious review of policies
by key constituencies on our campus" (Bennis' letter to the Chairman of
the Faculty Senate, 4/26/73).
Change: In the final analysis Bennis’ values change over parti-
cipation5 and will evaluate his presidency on criteria of movement
and not stability. For example, in a speech to the University
faculty in
the spring of 1973, Bennis outlined nine priorities for the
University,
5 See his comments on the end of consensus management in Saturday
Review, December, 1972.
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seven of them contained direct references to change in the headings.
Change was the theme of his first address to the faculty on the occasion
of his inauguration, 11/5/71. A vice provost commented in the summer
of 1972, Throughout the institution there is [both] an important sense
of motion to replace the stuttering of last year under a lame duck
president and a persistent concern for the ’unknown' under a new president
and provost" (7/17/72).
The President's Role
Given these aspirations, Bennis was still very aware of the tenuous-
ness of his legitimate authority as a university president (see Kruytbosch
and Messinger, 1970, p. 89). His ability to influence people rested on
his ability to establish new meanings for his role, new norms (such as those
listed above) and a strikingly different socialization process for members
of the organization. His ability to implement his ideas depended on his
ability to establish an organizational climate in which there was a high
£
level of trust and people felt secure changing. That Bennis very clearly
perceived his role as a role model and as a climate builder is revealed
in the job description he wrote for himself as president this past spring:
1) Leadership:
a. orchestrating inside and outside
b. providing perspective of where we are, where
we're going
c. awareness of relevant external forces,
obstacles and opportunities which beat on
the university
6
See Bennis' article "An Organizational Development Expert in the
Cat Bird's Seat", Journal of Higher Education , Volume XLIV, Number 5,
May 1973, pp. 389-398.
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d. key personnel appointments and review
of all appointments of professional
staff
e. communications
f. raising fundamental questions
It is an act of explicating and calling forth in
others a consciousness of issues, principles, ideas,
directions, and objectives, and of moving others
to action in ways that reflect their increased
knowledge and heightened awareness.
2) Relate to external constituencies: alumni,
city, state, federal, the educational estab-
lishment, parents.
3) Fund raising
4) Overall planning
5) Ceremonials
6) Work closely with our Directors and Regents
7) Help facilitate new academic programs
8) Fiscal responsibility
9) Keep in relatively good touch with all major
internal constituencies
10) Keep learning
11) Careful evaluation and assessment of all
key administrative personnel.
Modelling
Having set out certain expectations for his own role, Bennis also
used his person power very consciously to influence the attitudes and
behaviors of those in the organization. "It is important for a leader
to understand the effect of his behavior and personality on the conduct
of others. Power accrues less from status and role and more from the
ability to inspire the participation of others in decision-making.
People who come to open hours have low expectations for solutions to
their problems; they have high expectations for me as a person" (Bennis,
Ill
10/1/72). Likewise, Bennis' informal behavior toward those in the
organization and his allowing of similar behavior toward himself was
a significant factor in the breakdown of status distinctions early
in his term. Bennis also modelled a spirit of inquiry—he referred
often to his own year of writing and reflection after leaving Buffalo
when he spoke about continuing education for the faculty. His impatience
for immediate results manifested itself in a sense of immediacy which
was felt in the organization. Several of the persons interviewed said
that they felt Bennis tried to do too many things and that those that
worked with him had to adjust to his energy level. One faculty member
said he always felt like an open cupboard, doors open, shelves bare
because of what was being asked of him and what was being taken from
him.
Modelling is only one way to create expectations about what is
acceptable, appropriate behavior. Bennis also made very effective use
of precedents to establish expectations. When he found a useful prece-
dent he used it; when he needed a precedent, he created one.
The Use of Precedents
The stage for Bennis' ability to manipulate precedent was set
during the search process. A temporary system, the search committee,
had worked together more or less collaboratively to select
Bennis as
the new president. Bennis expanded the use of temporary
systems and
participation in decision-making. He capitalized on the
visibility
of his office as a result of the search process and
on a widespread
expectation that there would be changes in the
administration by adding
112
assistants to the president’s office. The individuals he recruited
were young, and their youth in turn became a symbol of his adminis-
tration.
There are numerous other examples of times Bennis created new
traditions as he needed them: his own experience as a consultant led
him to call in outside consultants in solving internal problems; he
legitimized administrative retreats" as a means of focusing energy
around University problems; he did things to create pride in people
such as setting up tours of Cincinnati as part of new faculty orienta-
tion and creating awards for creativity in research and teaching.
Bennis also eliminated some traditions: namely, the formality in
relationships between faculty and administrators; the traditional
definition of behavior representative of faculty achievement (he added
teaching to research and publication) ; the traditional power of faculty
over certain areas such as self-evaluation; and the insularity of
academic departments by encouraging interdisciplinary programs.
Summary
Drawing from Warren Bennis’ own perceptions and from comments
others have made, what kind of climate did Bennis find at the University
of Cincinnati and what kind did he initially begin to build? The following
quote is taken from a letter a higher education consultant wrote to Bennis
in November, 1972:
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With all higher education in America in crisis,
with universities seeking new directions and new
roles, with the entire system insecure, it is not
surprising to find insecurity and uncertainty and
tension at the University of Cincinnati. There
the general malaise compounded by a critical
financial condition which having been covered
up by a prior administration to yield the appear-
ance of good health by borrowing from reserves
and endowment is further complicated by the
arrival of a new president whose goals, values,
attitudes, and style represent an abrupt break
with the previous administration. Add uncertainty
about roles, fuzziness in assigning responsibili-
ties, lack of clarity and precision about direction,
doubts about whether one is on the major team or
off it, and you have complexity, ambiguity, anxiety,
and tension. But underlying the problems is a
strong sense that the University has a great role
in the future if it can carefully select its direc-
tions, establish priorities, and systematically
move toward their realization. President Bennis
is seen as a leader who is capable of giving the
University a vision of itself greater than it ever
before dreamed possible. But he must be more
disciplined and directed in the application of
his enormous energies and talents than he has
been, he must conserve his energies and devote
more attention to the troublesome internal (opera-
tion) of his institution.
The organizational climate Bennis found when he arrived at the
University of Cincinnati was mixed. There had been some movement during
the selection process but the overall climate was one of general compla-
cency and low self-esteem. Bennis in his recommendations to the Board
for an administrative reorganization said that he could detect no overall
University of Cincinnati climate (February 15, 1973, p. 59). He character-
ized the problems of organizational climate at the University of
Cincinnati
as being little collaboration, problem denial, low initiative,
minimal
risk-taking, excessive caution, fear, etc. (pp. 63-68). Changes
in the
social and economic environment in higher education
though supportive of
114
change had created even more uncertainty, insecurity, and anxiety. In
addition, the forces tending to restrain change in academic organiza-
tions in particular described by Hefferlin and others (1971, pp. 13-15),
had had a strong conservative influence on the University of Cincinnati
that was difficult to undo.
The kind of climate Bennis sought to establish was characterized
by informality, immediacy, openness, visibility, and change. He capital-
ized on a spirit of rising expectations that had been built during the
search process (Proposition 10). As a result of the search process mem-
bers of the University community were sensitized to organizational prob-
lems (Proposition 3) . The selection of a new president challenged under-
lying supports for existing behaviors (Proposition 2a). In other words
many of the conditions postulated as necessary for unfreezing either
existed when Bennis arrived or were accomplished by what he did during
his first few months in office. In the behaviors he modelled and in the
actions he took, Bennis attempted to stimulate new needs and levels of
aspiration in the system (Proposition 4) ; to make the organization more
open to its environment (Proposition 5) ; to link parts of the system which
shared dissatisfactions (Proposition 8); to involve faculty members and
students in decision-making (Proposition 11); and to heighten the organiza-
tion's self-esteem (Proposition 13). In setting new norms of openness and
informality, he hoped to establish a climate of acceptance, support, and
trust in interpersonal relationships (Proposition 14)
.
Against this description of the University setting prior to the
introduction of change, Bennis' actions in regards to developing a long-
range plan, instituting an affirmative action program, implementing
a
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budget-review/resource allocation process, and building an administra-
tive team will be described in Chapters V-VIII.
CHAPTER V
CASE STUDY:
THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT IN LONG RANGE PLANNING
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyze the
president s role in the development of a long range plan for the
University of Cincinnati. First of all, what were the President's
interventions in regards to long range planning? To what extent did
the actions he took successfully unfreeze, change, and refreeze the
attitudes and behavior of organizational members in regards to long
range planning? The first part of this chapter is a summary of the
University President's interventions and participation in the long
range planning process. A chronological summary of all the events that
occurred in a two year period from September of 1971 until the summer
2
of 1973 in regards to long range planning is included in Appendix A.
The materials in this chapter and the next came from a study of
documents in the files of the Long Range Planning Task Force Coordinator
and the University President and from documents in the Long Range Plan-
ning Task Force Library. The author attended all the Task Force meetings
between September, 1972 and June, 1973, and meetings between the President
and Task Force Coordinator and co-chairmen. Notes from those meetings are
a second source of information. The author also listened to tape record-
ings of the Task Force's entire three-day marathon work session. Inter-
views with all the Task Force members (16), with the two co-chairmen, and
with the Long Range Planning Task Force Coordinator as well as with
Dr. Bennis, several presidential assistants, and with thirteen deans and
university administrators are a fourth source of information.
^The reader may wish to refer to the chronological summary of events
in Appendix A before reading the case analysis. References to specific
entries are contained throughout the discussion and analysis that follows.
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The second part of this chapter contains a description of a meeting
between the Long Range Planning Task Force and the President followed
by a description of the problems the Long Range Planning Task Force
encountered in implementing a long range planning process. The Presi-
dent’s change strategies will then be analyzed using the set of proposi-
tions set forth in Chapter II. Comments from interviews will be used
to substantiate that what might have taken place, many times did not.
Finally in the last part of this chapter the author shall attempt to
assess the impact long range planning has had on the University and
whether or not change, according to criteria the President himself
established, has taken place.
^
Presidential Interventions and Participation in Long Range Planning
Long range planning was initiated at the University of Cincinnati
in January of 1972 with the appointment of a Long Range Planning Task
Force. A Preliminary Report on All University Long Range Planning was
published in September, 1973, a year later than the deadline that had been
established when the Task Force was created. Since the case analysis
focuses on the role performance of the President in the development of
a University Long Range Plan, the purpose of this next section is to
summarize the President’s actions in initiating, implementing, and incor-
porating a long range planning process at the University of Cincinnati and
his interaction with the Long Range Planning Task Force.
^The conclusions reached in this chapter are of course only tenta
tive. Partially this is because of the research methodology that has been
chosen; partially it is due to the fact that a long range plan was not
written until September, 1973, two months after the completion of this
field study. Understandably statements about outcomes that were not
observed cannot be made. It is the author’s assumption however that
the
degree or extent of refreezing that does take place will depend upon
the
resolution of problems encountered in unfreezing and changing. (See
Appendix
B for the Task Force’s recommendations on the future of long
range planning.;
118
October, 1971
.Bennis' newsletter to the academic community (10/1/71).
.Bennis organizes an administrative retreat at French Lick where
the beginnings of a long range planning process are first
conceptualized (10/24/71).
.Bennis asks the Vice President for Research to develop a
rationale for long range planning (10/25/71).
.Bennis' speech to the University faculty sets out that
rationale (10/28/71).
December, 1971
.Bennis makes several proposals on the University's future to
Chancellor Millett (12/8/71).
.Bennis appoints the Long Range Planning coordinator (12/17/71).
January, 1972
.Bennis meets with the vice presidents and vice provosts on
long range planning. At least two criteria for evaluating
what the Task Force accomplishes are set out: 1) a clearer
decision-making process and 2) that those who will implement
the plans be involved in the planning (1/11/72).
•Bennis appoints the two academic vice presidents as co-chairmen
of the Long Range Planning Task Force (1/11/72).
.Bennis directs the PPBS committee to continue working on
a management -informat ion system (1/11/72).
.Bennis meets with the deans on long range planning (1/18/72).
.In an aide-memoire Bennis clarifies the questions long range
planning needs to consider (1/21/72)
.
.Bennis discusses long range planning with the Board of Directors
(1/22/72).
.Bennis issues a press release on long range planning developing
the need and rationale for long range planning and setting out
initial guidelines for the role of the Task Force (1/22/72).
April, 1972
.Bennis sends copies of a report on program evaluation to the deans
and Task Force members (4/25/72).
May, 1972
.Bennis meets with the Task Force leaders to discuss the progress
of long range planning and the coordination of PPBS with long range
planning (5/16/72).
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June, 1972
.Bennis suggests outside consultants be used in planning (6/9/72).
.Bennis writes his assistants about the associate deans' complaints
he s heard about long range planning (6/19/72).
.Bennis meets twice with the Task Force leaders to discuss his
interest and expectation that the Long Range Planning Task Force
work on program evaluation (6/24/72; 6/28/72).
July, 1972
.Bennis attends the July marathon (7/19/72).
September, 1972
.Bennis makes a speech on long range planning at Indiana University.
October, 1972
•Bennis sends out reprinted materials to the Task Force.
.Bennis instructs units to relate their long range plans to PPBS
(10/17/72).
.Bennis asks the Long Range Planning Task Force to develop priority
or goal statements for the University (10/20/72).
.Bennis' speech to the University Senate.
.Bennis meets with the deans; long range planning among other things
is discussed (10/27/72).
.Consultant draft on the future of higher education is not shared
with the Task Force (10/28/72).
.Bennis asks for a long range planning report for the University
faculty meeting-(10/31/72)
.
.Bennis meets with the Long Range Planning Task Force coordinator
to review the status of long range planning (10/30/72).
November, 1972
.Bennis brings in an outside consultant on long range planning
(11/15/72).
December, 1972
.Bennis writes the coordinator and co-chairmen requesting information
on long range planning. He again suggests outside consultants
(12/19/72)
.
January, 1973
.Bennis appoints a new Vice President for Management and Finance.
.Bennis asks for employment projections for the University of
Cincinnati graduates which he adds to a resource file on long range
planning (1/10/73).
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January, 1973 (Cont.)
.Bennis consults with an architect/consultant on a long range plan
or the College of Design, Art, and Architecture (1/16/73).
*l/17/73)
ratiVe retreat " l0ng range P lannin8 is discussed (1/16 -
February, 1973
. . .Bennis announces an administrative reorganization.
March, 1973
. . .Bennis makes several procedural and substantive recommendations
about long range planning in letter to the Provost (2/26/73).
He asks for a 3/13/73 publication date.
May, 1973
. . .Bennis announces a set of University priorities in a speech
to the University faculty (5/17/73).
June, 1973
. . .Bennis meets with the deans: long range planning is one of
several topics discussed (6/18/73).
August, 1973
. . .Bennis organizes an administrative retreat at which long range
planning is discussed (8/4/74).^
Listing a chronology of events is only one way to describe the
interaction that took place between the Task Force and the President.
The quality of interaction would seem equally important as the frequency
of interaction if one were interested in change. In the next part of
^This list includes only those actions that brought the President into
contact with the Task Force to whom he had delegated responsibility for
long range planning, actions which parallel Task Force efforts (such as
bringing in outside consultants or asking the co-chairmen what they would
do with a million dollars) and actions which indirectly facilitated the
long range planning process (such as administrative appointments , a
management-information system, etc.).
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this chapter, a meeting between the President and the Task Force as well
as the questions that were being asked on both sides, the climate of the
meeting and the quality of the interaction for all of the participants
will be described.
The Marathon ^
On July 17, 18, and 19, 1972, the Long Range Planning Task Force
held a marathon meeting to review unit plans that had been submitted a
month to six weeks before. On the last afternoon of the three-day session,
the President was asked to attend. It will be apparent in the description
that follows that neither the President nor the Task Force had any clear
or shared expectations about what would happen during their time together.
The President arrived very late. The Provost began the session by
reporting that the Task Force had reviewed all the unit plans over two
and a half days and would like to ask the President several questions
about how to proceed. For example, "Should the plan when submitted be
an in-house, confidential or a public document?" The President was also
asked if he expected a final draft by September 1st. Also, at what point
would unit heads, Task Force members, and the President review the plan,
“*The purpose of this chapter, or the others that follow, is not to
evaluate Bennis as a president overall. Any action he took and the energy
he had to take other actions were dependent on factors not necessarily
related to this case such as other decisions he was having to deal with
at any one point in time, role constraints, and character.
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and in what sequence? The President did not respond to the questions
as they were asked but said he preferred to hear all their questions
first. His tone of voice indicated he was tired and critical. He had
not expected to be asked questions he said later.
The Provost seemed to sense Bennis' frustration and offered to
present the Task Force's ideas of how things might precede. "The two
processes, writing and review, cannot be completed by September 1.
First the marathon session will be reviewed by someone to pull out a
number of recommendations that have been discussed. That will then
need to be edited and reviewed. Secondly, a feedback process has not
yet occurred in all the fifty units that submitted plans. That will
need to be done as part of a review process for the September 1st docu-
ment .
"
Commentary: ^ At this point, only minutes into
the meeting, the President has been led to believe
that all units had submitted plans which is not
true, A&S being a notable exception. He is also
apprised for the first time that a September
deadline date cannot be met; and he is faced
with a question of what kind of review process
a document might go through, probably a question
he has not considered, since very little of his
time since January has been spent on long range
planning.
The Provost then outlined two options: 1) Submit a draft to the
President only by September 1st, a draft subject to further review by
the Task Force and others in September after the President had reviewed
it
Commentaries are included throughout the description of this meeting
to give clarifying information or to share participants reactions
to an
event and to its implications for events that followed.
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2) submit a draft September 1 simultaneously to the President, deans,
and unit directors for review. Their comments would be forwarded
directly to the President. Then a series of Task Force subgroup meetings
could be held with the deans and unit directors to pull together recom-
mendations and revisions.
The President paused, and then said it was hard to answer these
questions in a vacuum, a word he emphasized. "I haven't seen a thing -
I haven't seen the material and depending on the finality of it and on
the way it is perceived, questions of confidentiality are critical."
Commentary: Throughout the spring and early
summer planning process materials had been
forwarded to the President's office. They
can be found in his files. He had not seen
the unit plans nor had he heard specific
recommendations from the Task Force which
seemed more and more clearly to be his expec-
tation for this meeting. He was obviously
irritated by being badgered by questions.
At the same time, the tone Task Force members
began to take revealed that they felt their
work was invalued and unrewarded.
Bennis continued "Long range planning is a process; is there ever a final
plan?" "Is there a mistake in our whole conceptualization - there will
never be a final 'solution to the University of Cincinnati's problems'."
"If planning is basically a focusing of consciousness then it's difficult
to get people to give time. If the plan is a way of getting at and con-
fronting problems in a unit, if people see a chance to refine it and to
see it's worthwhile to spend energy on it because those efforts will re-
direct their future, it's good. How it is used and implemented will
determine the effectiveness of the plan."
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Commentary: Bennis may not have understood the
questions of form and leadership the Task Force
had asked. Anyway, his answers confused a group
that had been working for months on a process.
To answer that people’s involvement in the plan
specifically is what is important does not resolve
the need to know what kind of form, what kinds of
statements and sections were needed, and what the
President expected.
The President then raised the question of the role of the Task
Force from then on (they saw themselves as having a lot of work to:
drafting a plan, reviewing unit plans with deans and unit directors,
etc.). He commented that he felt they should be involved somewhere in
the University of Cincinnati with their knowledge and expertise accumu-
lated through this Task Force experience.
Commentary: Several Task Force members indicated
that they felt Bennis had come to the marathon to
thank them for their efforts and to send them on
their way.
The President kept assuming by the references and the responses
he made that the Task Force had already written a plan. He said, "I've
come here to see what you've done. I don't want to get too involved in
these questions." Finally the President concedes that the September 1st
plan has to be preliminary. "People will have to feel they can make
input; we will have to have consultation on it."
Commentary: This statement was interpreted to
mean that the timetable had been eased. One of
the co-chairmen for example said, "if you say
'preliminary', the pressure I feel to do all
the review work before submitting it to you is
off - I feel a sense of relief .
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There was no comment from Task Force members on Bennis' idea that
he might review a unit's plans with the unit as a way to get to know a
unit or on his offer to outside consultants to review the plan-the final
University plan.
Instead one member pushed the President to state what he wanted
the way of a final plan - a final product. Bennis kept saying he
would come back to that. Another Task Force member tried to get the
President to decide on how and when deans would see their plans that had
been interpreted and modified by the Task Force after one discussion with
the unit. Bennis responded carelessly that the Task Force needed to check
with them first.
The coordinator then tried to describe what the Task Force had done
which was a) to try to identify, integrate, and catalogue issues for the
University that needed some kind of goal statement; and b) to try to
identify processes by which goal statements and resource allocation could
take place. Bennis' anger seems to peak at this point of the meeting and
he interrupted. "This meeting is not going the way I expected. I had
hoped to have you tell me what you're doing. I don't have the faintest
idea what you're doing. You keep asking me questions. I had in mind I'd
get a general summary of what you've learned."
In response there were some attempts to describe what the Task Force
had been doing; the President understood what they've done as an "auditing."
The coordinator spent quite a long time reviewing issues that had been
recorded on newsprint during the marathon - material that was probably
fairly inconsistent and unorganized. Bennis sat through this saying Umm,
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I see. At the end of the report he commented, "There's not a thing
you've come up with that's a surprise. I've heard it all before."
You lended high reliability to the fact that an issue is an issue."
I m bothered by the fact that the Task Force has only questions,
and no answers."
Commentary: The Task Force had basically out-
lined issues that needed consideration at this
point. They had not made specific recommenda-
tions. The Task Force saw that it had a lot of
work to do yet and was asking for guidance from
the President. The President understood the
marathon to be a closing session, a wrap up to
the Task Force's work and was openly disappointed
with the lack of specific recommendations.
The President then launched off on a speech. The discussion
reached a point where there was almost no dialogue. The President said
he would like to ask the Task Force a few questions since they had asked
him so many. "One: what are the two most important, pivotal things
you've learned about the University? Two: what academic areas have
the most redundancy - worst communications? Three: what have you liked
about the process you've been up to?"
Commentary: Bennis raised these questions quickly,
in succession, not necessarily wanting to hear
answers, not necessarily listening to answers when
they were given.
When one Task Force member said that he felt there was a danger
that every unit would have increased expectations as a result of the
planning process, the President answered that "a real test of this
administration will be how wisely and judiciously plans are implemented."
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The Provost tried to return the conversation to a description
of what the Task Force had been doing. He commented that the sub-
group review process really had had a profound impact on the units.
The President abruptly cut into this discussion by saying he
would like to mention a few things that had been on his mind before
coming to the marathon. He spoke from pencilled notes.
The President felt that the introduction to the plan had to
answer the questions of "What were the University of Cincinnati's
uniquenesses? What were the University's comparative advantages over
other universities?" In addition, whatever the Task Force had been
doing so far, it had to fit into a "framework of our best-educated
guesses on trends in higher education." "This is not a criticism of
what you have been doing so far," Bennis said, "but we clearly have to
know the choices we're making. The Long Range Planning Task Force
report must look at how these factors will effect higher education
and how they will influence our decisions."
"Secondly, the report needs to include criteria and indications
for program evaluation. Thirdly, the report must answer the question -
where do we go from here? What happens from here isn't just a September
1st report." [He seems to be still expecting a document September 1st.]
"It is important for the Task Force to continue to keep the process
visible and public." Bennis reported that there was a tremendous murki-
ness, fear, suspicion, and lack of communication between the units and
the Task Force.
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The President closed by saying he understood the need to meet
regularly with the co-chairmen and coordinator and by thanking Task
Force members for their time and energy.
Commentary: In sum the Task Force's questions
about the form and relationship of the plan
were not answered. Instead the President
matched their questions with questions of his
own. A preliminary plan was still expected
September 1 but there was no agreement as a
result of this meeting between the President
and the Task Force about what it would contain.
One Task Force Member commented in an inter-
view afterwards "I thought he was singularly
unaware of where we were or exactly how far
we had progressed."
Summary of Problems in the Implementation of a Long Range Planning Process
The chronology of events and the description of the marathon reveal
a number of problems that occurred in attempts to implement a long range
planning process at the University of Cincinnati. Excerpts from inter-
views with the Task Force co-chairmen and coordinator, with Task Force
members, and with the deans will be used to subtantiate seven major prob-
lems the deans and Task Force encountered in trying to do long range
planning. The seven problems included:
1) A lack of clarity about the goals of long range planning;
2) A lack of clarity about the role of the Task Force;
3) A lack of communication between the President and the
Task Force;
4) The pressures of other demands and a short timetable;
5) A lack of skill and inexperience in long range
planning;
6) A lack of resources; and
7) A lack of motivation on the part of the
deans and eventually
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on the part of the Task Force to do Ion* range planning.
Lack o f Clarity about the Goals of Long Range Planning
One of the major problems the Task Force encountered in imple-
menting a long range planning process was that there was little agree-
ment about what the goals of long range planning were. Task Force
members in response to questions about what their task had been dis-
agreed among themselves.
. . .To help the units realize that they can cooperate and
share without losing individual status and prestige.
. . .To set up an on-going process and to give feedback to
the units on their plans: secondarily to make advisory
recommendations to the President.
. . .To implement a grass-roots planning process.
. . .To find out what the University was doing, to identify
strengths and weaknesses, and to make recommendations to the
President on what could be done in problem areas to make the
University function better. "Our goal was to provide the
University with a sense of where we are going and of problem
areas in getting there. The Task Force would offer alternatives
as well as stimulate controversy and meaningful discussion."
Another Task Force member replied that after doing research on the
University and on general trends in higher education he saw that the Task
Force would write a plan and then go through a process of legitimizing it.
He had not envisioned going out and asking units for their plans.
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Deans and Task Force members were also asked about what the
goals of long range planning were. Some felt that the goal was to
create a process in which people in the University community could
see that they had a role (a Task Force member). Others felt that
the Task Force s goal was "to find out what the central problems of
the University were and to see how they could go about changing the
University (a Task Force member). One dean felt that a long range
planning process might serve as a method of data collection for the
President, and at the same time promote campus dialogue on the goals
of the University. Another dean felt that the purpose of long range
planning was "to develop a shared language system to describe our
experiences to outsiders, and more importantly, to ourselves." "From
a statement of University goals the Task Force would develop a common
understanding of why certain program budget decisions are made" (a dean)
.
Others felt that a long range planning document would serve as a state-
ment of goals for the Ohio Board of Regents (one of the two co-chairmen)
.
Wide discrepancy in the responses to interview questions indicated
that there was never any clarity about the goals of long range planning
or the role of the Task Force. Task Force members did not understand
what the President’s expectations were for long range planning, nor did
they understand specific tasks they would need to accomplish in order to
implement a long range planning process.
One of the chairmen of the Long Range Planning Task Force commented
that "there was never any clear statement to or by the Task Force as to
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what the objectives of long range planning were. What questions should
a long range plan consider? What items should a long range plan contain?
Implicitly the Task Force was to pull together a document, a single docu-
ment to describe the expected and desired direction of the whole University
in the next five to ten years." Task Force members themselves felt that
there was no consensus on the Task Force about what the Task Force should
be doing. "There was no agreement as to which of two tacks we were taking.
Bennis' sense of urgency of getting it done and having a clear sense of
direction is much stronger than that of some of the other people involved"
(a Task Force member). Other Task Force members commented "we never did
define the problem." "There was no way to clarify what Bennis expected"
I
(a Task Force member) . "It took us a long time to get going because the
leadership did not have clearly in mind the direction in which they would
like to go" (a Task Force member)
.
In addition to the lack of clarity about the goals and tasks of the
Task Force, there is also a lack of consistency in the questions the Presi-
dent hoped the Task Force would ask themselves and the units doing the
planning. A review of the chronology under the dates 1/21/72, 2/9/72,
3/1/72, 6/28/72, 7/19/72, 10/30/72 and 2/26/73 will substantiate this.
Bennis' tendency was to continually expand the number of issues the
Task
Force had to contend with. The intent of this might have been to
make
the goals of the Task Force increasingly specific; however the
effect his
actions had on the Task Force was to confuse and frustrate
them as indi-
cated in some of the comments above and in the following
remark by one ot
the co-chairmen, "The only time the President's
expectations were clear
to me was after the marathon and then it was
because he had raised so many
132
ideas that were beyond the scope of the Task Force."
A third concern both the deans and the Task Force members ex-
pressed in relation to the lack of clarity they felt was that they
were unsure about how long range planning related to budgeting, to
PPBS, and to program evaluation. There were other task forces working
in each of these areas but the links between them were not very clearly
established (see the chronology of events 3/30/72 and 10/20/72).
Why wasn't this lack of clarity about the goals and tasks of the
Task Force recognized until the marathon in July? And then why did it
persist throughout the fall and winter? In the first place, the Long
Range Planning Task Force did not communicate its lack of clarity about
its purposes to President Bennis. Secondly, at least some of the Task
Force members had the impression that the President did not know what h£
wanted, so that efforts to obtain clarification would not help. Besides
realizing that Bennis might not be able to clarify their questions, Task
Force members also assumed that a certain amount of ambiguity was healthy
especially if long range planning was to be a participative process (a
faculty member) i.e., that those involved, the deans and the Task Force
members, would participate in decision-making.
A fourth reason why the lack of clarity was never resolved has to
do with certain assumptions that had been made. Bennis in delegating
responsibility for long range planning to two of his vice presidents
probably thought that they could work out any problems that arose.
The fact that Bennis was perceived as not being totally committed
to the implementation of long range planning (a Task Force member, one of
the two co-chairmen) was probably an important factor in the Task Force's
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lack of effort to clarify what was expected of them. "Other tasks kept
getting in the way; the priority of long range planning fluctuated from
high to low relative to other tasks I was asked to perform" (one of the
co-chairmen)
.
Lack of Clarity about the Role of the Task Force
A second major obstacle to implementing a long range planning pro-
cess was the lack of clarity both the deans and Task Force members experi-
enced about the role of the Task Force in long range planning. In the
first place there was some resentment from the deans toward the use of a
task force, as a "temporary system skirting the permanent decision-making
structure" (a dean) . "A majority of the deans felt excluded from the
planning process" (another dean). Secondly, "The Task Force's unclear
role in implementation was a threat to some deans" (a dean) . "Knowing
how plans would be reviewed and by whom would have helped those writing
plans" (a dean)
.
Furthermore, the deans were led to expect in subgroup review sessions
that they would have some feedback from the Task Force by September 1, 197 2.
Several deans felt that it was impossible to participate in budget review
sessions without feedback (see the chronology of events 10/26/72, 2/20/73,
and 4/30/73)
.
From the deans' perspectives there seemed to be a general problem
of lack of communication and follow-through in the Task Force's
relation-
ship to the units. "The Task Force didn't know and never
answered the
question as to what would happen to unit plans after subgroup
review
sessions" (a dean). "Reservations about long range
planning were never
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elicited at meetings held in the spring and neither the President nor
the Task Force answered our questions" (a dean, a top administrator).
"Even though our reactions to the preliminary guidelines were solicited,
the problems we raised were never resolved" (a top administrator). When
the first draft of chapters of the Long Range Plan came out, the Task
Force asked for the deans’ comments, but they didn’t follow through and
get them (a dean)
. These problems were symptomatic of a general reluc-
tance on the part of the Task Force to face certain issues - such as
resistance in the College of Arts and Sciences or the consequences of not
meeting announced deadlines. "When we knew we would not meet the December
1st deadline we should have had an open meeting with the deans but instead
we went underground" (a dean who was also a Task Force member). 7
Why was this problem of the Task Force's relationship to the units
never resolved if it interfered with the implementation of long range
planning? Many of the reasons are probably similar to those having to do
with a lack of clarity about goals. In addition many of the Task Force
members probably shared the President's faith in temporary systems as
mechanisms of change and were unaware of the threat a task force posed to
the deans.
Lack of Communication Between the President and the Task Force
One of the things that is probably most clear from the description
of the marathon session between the Task Force and the President and from
7
The Task Force seemed similarly reluctant to follow up on some of
Bennis ’ suggestions or to confront him on certain matters including how
he learned about what the Task Force was doing (see 6/10/72 and 10/25/72
in the chronology)
.
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the chronological summary is the lack of communication between the
President and the Task Force about long range planning. The President
met with the Task Force only once and with the three Task Force leaders
only six times, between December 1971 and December 1972. (Of course
Bennis saw the two co-chairmen as frequently as every day or every week
in vice presidents' meetings and there were other group meetings at
which long range planning among other things was discussed with one or
more of the Task Force leaders present.) The two co-chairmen probably
would argue that planning was not discussed as much as it might have been
with the President for a successful long range planning process to occur.
By May 1972, the coordinator had realized that the President did not know
what was going on with long range planning (see the chronology of events
4/27/72 and the description of the marathon session).
One Task Force member said that he did not see communication between
the President and the Task Force going either way - "we were supposed to
be advisory to the President; so far as I can see we haven't given him any
advice." "The communication wasn't there - so pressure to meet deadlines
wasn't respected or acknowledged" (another Task Force member). No specific
guidelines which would have been clarifying were forthcoming. More inter-
action with the President all along would have been helpful because we would
have known earlier what he expected (a Task Force member)
.
In addition to a lack of communication with the President, the Task
Force leaders themselves met infrequently. "It didn't work out
too badly
at first but we didn't anticipate problems" (the coordinator).
One of the
problems that they didn’t work out was "who was to have
responsibility and
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authority over long range planning among the three of them" (the coordina-
tor) . As it turned out the coordinator saw the responsibility for report-
ing to the President as the co-chairmens'. One of the co-chairmen saw
the coordinator as a kind of executive secretary to the Task Force and
therefore responsible for a lot of coordination and communication. He
also never saw himself as the "real chairman" because "90% of the plan
would not relate to his area of knowledge or expertise." At least ini-
tially the President probably saw the coordinator as responsible for
planning since he addressed most of the long range planning correspondence
to him and because the co-chairmen had other major responsibilities.
With greater communication there might have been less inconsistency
in the direction the Task Force was moving and greater clarity about goals
between the Task Force and the President and among the Task Force leaders
themselves. Similarly, on occasions when the President had the opportunity
to talk to the University community about long range planning there might
have been less inaccuracy in the information that he communicated. Why
were changes not made in the patterns of communication between the Long
Range Planning Task Force and the President? In the first place there was
probably little recognition in the first five or six months of the need for
more communication. It is more difficult, given Bennis' writings, to say
that he was not aware that open communication was a prerequisite to the
successful implementation of a long range planning process, but he might
have failed to recognize the extent or importance of the problem. Thirdly,
the individuals involved in planning were all busy. They met infrequently,
and when they did meet discussion of long range planning was often
preempted
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by the need to talk about other, more Immediate problems. The fact that
the co-chairmens’ styles are different from the President’s partially
explains why problems of communication were never resolved. "It was not
the Provost's style to confront. He is rational and cautious", a Task
Force member commented. The President has a more open, personalized
leadership style. Informality is one of the President’s charms; at times
however it become debilitating. If you happen to meet him some place then
suddenly you get a lot of individual contact and a lot of data about what
he is planning to do. He asks you what you think about it. But if you
didn't happen to have gone down for a cup of coffee at that time you would
never have been used as a consultant" (a dean)
.
A fifth reason why the co-chairmen did not give the President feed-
back on long range planning was "because of Bennis’ need to know immed iate
answers to solve immediate problems. They feared that the President would
selectively hear what he wanted to hear from Long Range Planning as it
supplied the short-term answers he needed" (the coordinator).
Other Demands and a Short Timetable
The timing of the introduction of long range planning at Cincinnati
caused several problems that interfered with its implementation, as did
the timetable that was established when it was introduced. It was expected
that a plan would be completed by September 1, 1972, eight months after the
planning process was initiated. "Units resented the tight time frame and
the pressures being put on them to plan" (a Task Force member) . Secondly
,
planning was introduced in a year when deans were being asked to do a lot
of other things for the first time such as supply new kinds of personnel
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information for promotion and tenure which took a lot of work (a dean).
Other things interfered with planning that could have been pre-
dicted. The President could have been more circumspect about the times
he chose to send out information like the Illinois report, a week after
the planning guidelines had gone out. Secondly, a plan due on September
1st would need to be written over the summer when long vacations are
scheduled and things in a University generally come to a standstill.
"The Long Range Planning Task Force needed a more realistic timetable
specifying what needed to be accomplished in each phase" (a Task Force
member)
.
Resistance to planning could have been lessened if the problems
with the short timetable had been resolved. Interestingly, questions of
timing are one of the least studied factors in change and seemingly were
not considered in this case.
Inexperience and Lack of Skill in Planning
A fifth problem in implementing a long range planning process was
a lack of experience and skill in planning. Although the Task Force might
have been aware of the need for training (and in fact did hold one session
with the deans, 4/21/72), the provision of additional training was beyond
their resources (the coordinator) . Some deans might not have wanted to
gain more skills since "they would rather negotiate a long range plan one
to one with the President or Provost as had been the style of the previous
administration than attempt to write down goals and objectives", one Task
Force member explained.
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Lack of Resources
The Long Range Planning Task Force felt that it could have used
a lot of resources that were not available: for example, more staff
help, additional monies, released time, and a management-information
system among other things. Several Task Force members perceived the
need for a University-wide goal statement or set of priorities. "Some
of us had the feeling that there were priorities but that we weren't
told them. A clear statement of priorities would have helped and then
we would have responded as to how we would help implement those priorities"
(a dean). One Task Force member said that there was probably not enough
sharing of an institutional perspective with the units. Another Task Force
member said that he thought the President expected unit plans to be set in
a context of whatever was happening in higher education but that there
wasn't enough resources or information to do that.
One of the ways the Task Force could have resolved these problems
would have been to use human resources in the University other than the
Task Force members. "Most of the time the University does not use the
resources it has: people professionally involved in planning (a Task
Force member) . "Information on the external environment was not being
used" (another Task Force member). "Bennis' ideas, resources, and
interests - his contacts, cosmopolitanism, his knowledge and understanding
of social movements, his accessibility to people at the national levels,
his accessibility to people in other fields - were not used" (a consultant
on long range planning). Outside consultants were offered, but as one
Task
Force member explained, "Outside expertise was needed only
if the goal was
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differen t than what the Task Force thought it was."
Lack of Motivation
The seventh obstacle to implementing a long range planning process
was a lack of motivation on the part of the deans and eventually on the
part of Task Force members. Rewards and resources were not linked to long
range planning for deans or Task Force members. There were no incentives
to plan; and when there was a delay in publishing a long range plan, the
University community became more resistant to planning.
Initial resistance to long range planning is partially explained by
an impression the President gave when he introduced long range planning:
that the University had never planned before (a Task Force member and two
deans) . "Units had planned before but nothing had ever come of their work"
(a Task Force member). Secondly, the Task Force took a more or less laissez-
faire attitude toward Arts and Sciences: A&S did not meet the Task Force’s
deadlines and yet there did not seem to be any negative consequences (a dean)
.
Several deans cited this as one reason why their motivation was low for
planning. A third factor accounting for a lack of motivation is the Presi-
dent's style of delegating: he delegates everything to a few people.
"There were unending demands" (one of the co-chairmen). Task Force members,
especially the two co-chairmen and coordinator, were strained and fatigued
due to overload. Other tasks interfered with planning: the Long Range
Planning Task Force co-chairmen were also responsible for the implementation
of a participatory budget-review process, new personnel policies, and periodic
review processes in several colleges in addition to their regular responsi-
bilities. "Routine - answering Bennis' mail and phone calls, and meetings
in the President's office - kept gobbling up my planning time" (the coordinator).
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A worsening budget situation also contributed to a general lack
of motivation to do long range planning. ''All the plans were expansionary
- we were told there were no budgetary constraints but there were. There
must be a widespread feeling of being let down" (a Task Force member).
"People are reluctant to change anything in the climate we're in now"
(another Task Force member) . Finally an important reason in accounting
for the lack of motivation was personal insecurity and uncertainty about
the future. It was said before that resources and rewards were not linked
to long range planning: take the cases of the three Task Force leaders
themselves. The coordinator's Institute lost one staff position in 1973;
the Vice President of the Medical Center, one of the co-chairmen, had
announced his retirement; and the Provost was made Executive Vice Presi-
dent mid-way through the year (1973), a position in which it was unclear
if he would continue to be responsible for long range planning. Each of
them must have experienced a great deal of uncertainty about the future
that was shared across campus for whatever reasons.
Summary
Evidence from interviews and from an analysis of the marathon meeting
and chronology of events led to the identification of seven problems that
the Task Force and the deans encountered in trying to implement a long range
planning process and write a long range plan:
1) A lack of clarity about the goals of long range planning;
2) A lack of clarity about the role of the Task Force;
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3) A lack of communication between the President and the
Task Force;
4) The pressures of other demands and a short timetable;
5) A lack of skill and inexperience in long range planning;
6) A lack of resources; and
7) A lack of motivation.
Implicit in the descriptions of these problems are a number of actions
that the people undergoing change needed or expected the University
President to take. The purpose of the next section is to look more
closely at the actions the President took and at the functions they
served or failed to serve in unfreezing, changing and refreezing the
University community in regards to long range planning.
Unfreezing; Initiating the Long Range Planning Process
Proposition 1: An objective of the strategies employed
by the organizational leader in this stage may be to
assess the sources and nature of resistance to the
proposed change.
Proposition 2: To overcome the initial resistance to
organizational members to the proposed change.
In order to initiate a long range planning process at the Uni-
versity of Cincinnati the President had to unfreeze the attitudes of
prospective Task Force members and of the University community in
general toward long range planning. Propositions 1 and 2 indicate that
it may be important for him ”to anticipate the sources and nature of
resistance to change" and "to overcome initial resistance to change."
To what extent did the President intervene in the system to accomplish
these objectives? The coordinator's impression was the "actual decisions
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as to when and how to initiate a long range planning process were made
without great care probably by a presidential assistant and not by
Bennis himself." "When he introduced long range planning, the President
did not try to ascertain the feelings and opinions of those who would
have to implement it; and deans did not feel free enough to express their
honest reactions to him" (a dean). He also "did not try to find out about
other planning processes that had occurred in Cincinnati; in fact, he
gave the impression that there had never been any planning at the Uni-
versity" (a dean, a Task Force member). In the opinion of more than one
dean the President could have overcome initial resistance to long range
planning had he built on and continued processes that were already on-
going.
On the other hand, the choice not to build on on-going processes
clearly had advantages, too. A temporary system, such as a task force
tends to break down informational and social supports for existing
behavior. It brings together people who usually do not interact with
each other so that there is greater likelihood of a new perspective on
organizational problems. Through a task force arrangement Bennis could
make use of "marginals" or "role innovators" as he calls them: people
who are less integrated into established ways of doing things. Clearly,
the President’s three appointments to the Task Force were people he per-
ceived as change-oriented and who would serve as extensions of his
ideas
in Task Force meetings. In the case of this particular temporary
system,
most of the Task Force members identified with the President
and were
committed to many of his ideas (the coordinator).
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A second strategy to overcome resistance to change is to reduce
the amount of anxiety aroused by the prospect of change. The coordinator
saw the planning coordinator's job as "high risk - low reward" prior to
a decision on his tenure and promotion; ostensibly the President tried
to lessen his anxiety by recommending tenure and giving him the director-
ship of the Institute for Research and Teaching in Higher Education. The
President's decision not to tie long range planning to budgetary constraints
also seems like it was an attempt to reduce resistance to long range plan-
ning. Unfortunately, budget decisions had to be made before a long range
plan was completed and many deans perceived the budget to be a clearer
statement of institutional priorities than a yet-to-be-completed long
range plan. "In a University you have to commit resources for more than
a year if you want to demonstrate trust, create security and reduce
anxiety" (a vice president) . Given the constraints of a State biennium
budget and cutbacks in appropriations, commitments like that were impos-
sible at the time of long range planning. Bennis' statement on October
28
,
1971 (see the chronology of events), about long range planning and
program evaluation occurring in—tandem was ill-timed if not counter-
productive to faculty participation in planning. Possibly it increased,
rather than decreased, deans' feelings of insecurity and uncertainty.
"In general, people are reluctant to change anything in the climate we're
in now" (a Task Force member)
.
It was already mentioned in Chapter V how one of the problems that
the Task Force encountered in implementing the long range planning process
was that it was not perceived that institutional rewards were linked to
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participation in long range planning. One administrator commented,
"Implications aren't clear of what happens to you if you choose to
meet the President's demands and then he gets complaints about what
you're not doing on your own job" (a dean, a middle-level administra-
tor) . Although there ware probably advantages to the fact that the
new Provost had only been in office three days when he became a co-
chairman of the Long Range Planning Task Force, there were also nega-
tive consequences in a system used to a political model of decision-
making as far as a sense of security was concerned.
Proposition 3: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this stage
may be to heighten organizational members' sensi-
tivity to problems involving the intended change.
Proposition 4: To stimulate new needs and levels
of aspiration in the system in regards to the pro-
posed change.
Proposition 5: To integrate new forces for change
with existing forces for change, external forces
for change with internal forces for change.
The third, fourth, and fifth propositions about the behavior of
the organizational leader in initiating change state that he may need to
heighten organizational members sensitivity to problems, to stimulate new
needs and levels of aspiration in the system, and to integrate new
forces
for change with existing forces for change, external forces for
change
with internal forces for change. Most of the change strategies
the
President used effectively accomplished these objectives.
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Long range planning itself was a way to make change felt at the
faculty level" (a Task Force member). The whole collaborative, fact-
finding planning exercise might be viewed as unfreezing the system for
other Presidentially initiated change proposals. "Long range planning
has reminded us of the necessity for change behind the scenes" (a faculty
member). More specifically, the President made use of administrative
retreats such as French Lick 5 he shared information like the Newman Task
Force Report on Higher Education ; and he used consultants to make organiza-
tional members more aware of problems facing the University (11/15/72;
11/28/72). In other ways he effectively used external groups' demands
to create change internally that might not otherwise have been possible.
For example, he capitalized on The Board of Regents' request for an insti-
tutional plan for graduate education to make members more aware of changing
environmental conditions. In a speech to the local Chamber of Commerce he
created the expectation that under his administration the University would
be better managed and make better use of its resources. In turn that very
external expectation the President had created was used as a reason for
why the University had long range planning, i.e. accountability to external
publics. After appointing the Long Range Planning Task Force the President
met with the vice presidents (1/11/72), the deans (1/18/72), and with the
Board of Directors (1/22/72) to discuss the need he perceived for long range
planning. He issued a press release and had it reprinted in Candid Campus,
the University newsletter he had started (2/9/72) . He provided the Long
Range Planning Task Force and the deans with materials on the future of
higher education (two deans).
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Probably the most significant actions that the President took,
however, to create an expectation of change were the speeches he made,
drawing on his knowledge of alternative conceptual models for the
future of American public education. With tremendous energy and
intensity, Bennis shared his expectations for the future both within
and outside the University community. His speeches were loaded with
images of what the University could become: a well-managed urban uni-
versity, a center for continuing education, a center for administrative
training. . . He shared his visions of making the University of Cincinnati
an outstanding, exciting university. He created new paradigms for ways
things would work. He projected an image of a university that would
solve problems and be adaptable to community needs. He tried to estab-
lish new reference groups (see the chronology of events 1/18/72).
Bennis continually demonstrated his investment in the University's
capacity to change. Part of what he did to get groups in the University
interested in the problems facing higher education and in his ideas for
changing the University was to write letters to them suggesting how they
might get involved: for example, he had his assistant write to the Uni-
versity Senate as early as October 27, 1971, summarizing the roles the
Senate might play in the long range planning process that had been dis-
cussed at French Lick.
The President used multiple unfreezing strategies to make the Uni-
versity more open to its environment and hence more receptive to
change
(Proposition 5). He made speeches, used consultants, and appointed
people
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from outside the University to leadership positions. He skillfully
articulated external pressures on the University to plan. "Well I
think that the rationale that was given was to explain that with the
future being as bleak as it was going to be in terms of program cut-
backs, federal financing, and state appropriations that it was
absolutely essential for the University to plan and make changes
logically rather than in a reactionary way" (an administrator). Almost
everyone who was interviewed could outline the reasons the President
had given for why the University needed to plan. "The President had
a clear sense of external pressures on the University: that sense came
out in his writings and in his talks" (a governance group leader and
Task Force Member) . "In providing input on social indicators he tried
to de-intemalize the planning process" (a consultant on long range
planning)
.
A strategy the President used very consciously to make the Uni-
versity more open to its environment was to make promises to the com-
munity and then to use external expectations to create change internally.
He created a public expectation that "a new day had begun", that "a revolu-
tion was about to take place", and that "the University was going to put
its house in order" (phrases from a speech the President made to the
Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce) . He tried to pair external forces for
change with internal forces for change. He said that at some point in
time that he would like to have community representatives on the
Task
Force; at the outset, however, he appointed three individuals
inside the
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University who were change and community oriented. 8 Although some of
the deans felt excluded from planning because of the Task Force, over-
all the President managed "to create a fairly widespread sense of
’we're all in this together’" (a unit director).
Proposition 6: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this stage
may be to change the constellation of forces,
resources or information converging on any one
part of the organization.
Proposition 7 : To elicit support for the pro-
posed organizational change from informal as
well as formal leaders in the organization.
Proposition 8: To link parts of the system that
are sympathetic to the intended change and share
common dissatisfactions and a sense of powerless-
ness.
Through the use of outside consultants and the Task Force, the
President tried to change the flow of information in the University
(Proposition 6) and to link parts of the system which shared common
dissatisfactions and a sense of powerlessness in regards to the pro-
posed change (Proposition 8) . He encouraged the University Senate to
get involved in long range planning, 10/27/71, (Proposition 7). He
met regularly with leaders of the governance groups so that they were
kept informed of actions he had made or was contemplating in regards to
long range planning. The deans felt less well integrated into the
^Bennis appointed three Task Force members in addition to the Task
Force co-chairmen and coordinator : one was the head of the Department
of Graduate Community Planning; the second had just come to the University
from business; and the third was a black woman, an assistant dean in the
College of Arts and Sciences.
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decision-making process. For example, the Dean of Arts and Sciences
felt that the President could have involved the deans more system-
atically in long range planning and thereby gain their support. He
met with the deans as a group only six times between the time the Task
Force was announced and the time when a preliminary plan was published.
At those times long range planning was usually only one of several topics
on the agenda.
Proposition 9: An objective of the strategies employed
by the organizational leader in this stage may be to
set priorities for the organization and to clearly
communicate these priorities to organizational members
whose behavior is to be changed.
One problem that the Task Force and deans encountered in long range
planning was that other demands from the President and the Provost kept
cutting into the time they had to spend on long range planning. In his
first speech to the University community the President had emphasized the
need to plan (10/28/71). He reaffirmed the high priority of planning
almost every time he spoke, but never from the perspective of the Uni-
versity community, in relation to the other change processes he had
initiated which were competing for the deans’ and Task Force members’ time.
A second aspect to priority setting (Proposition 9) is to articu-
late the goals and program priorities of the University. Clearly, at
least some of the deans felt that that is important in creating movement
in the system. ”We had a sense that there were priorities but that we
just weren’t being told what they were” (a dean). The President, however,
outlined some of those goals on at least three occasions: at his inaugura-
tion, in his mid-year report (Six Plus) and later in May of 1973 in a
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speech to the faculty.
Proposition 10: An objective of the strategies employed
bY the or ganizational leader in this stage may be to create
a sense of rising expectations among organizational mem-
bers that they will benefit from proposed change in their
organizational behavior.
Proposition 13: To heighten organizational members’ self-
esteem and to encourage reciprocity in regards to the pro-
posed change.
Proposition 14: To establish and maintain a climate of
trust in interpersonal relationships in which change is
regarded positively.
Propositions 10, 13, and 14 state that it may be important to create
a sense of rising expectations about the prospect of change, to heighten
organizational members' self-esteem, and to establish and maintain a climate
of acceptance, support, and trust in order for unfreezing to occur. To what
extent did the President use change strategies to create these conditions?
Some members of the Task Force felt the President created expecta-
tions for change that were too high for the Task Force to meet (a Task
Force member) and that with the budget situation that existed it was a
mistake to have people plan without realistic budget constraints. Further,
"it was a mistake to ask people to invest their time in long range planning
and then not to give them anything back—e.g. a plan by the time it was
expected" (a unit director). 9 One of the things the President could have
done, which he did not, was to enforce the timetable he had established
^It is important to consider the relationship between attitudes toward
and expectations for change in the minds of a target population and the
actual availability of channels for action and change. Otherwise attitude
change without commensurate institutional change leads to goal gaps,
rela-
tive deprivation, stress, and revolutions of rising expectations
(Kelman
and Warwick, 1973).
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the Task Force
,
or if those deadlines could not be met to have
intervened to maintain the credibility of the planning process.
On the one hand there is evidence that the President did engage
in actions which heightened people's self-esteem and made them receptive
to change. He made the committee a "Presidential Task Force" which
carried a lot of prestige. He gave a charge which was open enough to
give them a great deal of responsibility in deciding how to approach
planning. He gave speeches in which he said he respected the uniqueness
of the University of Cincinnati (10/1/72) and "would work for an adminis-
trative structure that would give weight to the opinions and values of
the University of Cincinnati community." The President met at least
twice with the coordinator before his appointment to assure him of his
support and commitment.
On the other hand there is evidence to the contrary: that the
President did not build relationships with the Task Force or deans that
provided for support or reciprocity (see the chronology of events 6/19/72).
Several Task Force members had the impression that the President was dis-
appointed in what the Task Force was doing. "We all night just as well
continue to work diligently on blue ribbon "task force" committees.
Nothing assures the status quo so much as putting the best minds and best
talents on these task forces. For their reports continue to get better
as our problems get worse" (Bennis, 1972a). The deans shared the
Task
Force's feelings of not being supported if this one comment at
all is
representative of what other deans were feeling. "One of the
tasks of
leadership is to get a unit to take responsibility for
planning. One of
153
the ways to do that is to express confidence in the dean. I'm not
feeling that kind of confidence even though my college has planned"
(a dean)
.
Proposition 11: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to involve as many of the individuals
to be affected by the proposed change as possible
in planning and decision-making.
Proposition 11 states that in order to successfully initiate
change it may be important for the organizational leader to involve as
many of the individuals to be affected by the proposed changes as pos-
sible in planning and decision-making. The President's use of a Task
Force and choice of the two academic Vice-Presidents as co-chairmen are
two examples of actions he took to involve the University community in
planning. In a memorandum to the Vice Presidents on January 11, 1972 ,
just before the Long Range Planning Task Force was announced he wrote,
"that one of the criteria for successful planning is that there must be
a good deal of participation in the planning process by the people who
will have the task of implementing the plan." The decision to ask the
individual units to submit their own plans stemmed from that criterion.
Proposition 12: An objective of the strategies employed
by the organizational leader in this stage may be to
increase the amount and frequency of interaction between
the organizational leader and members in regards to the
proposed change.
According to Proposition 12 one of the objectives of the organiza-
tional leader during the unfreezing stage may be to increase the amount
and frequency of interaction between himself and organizational
members
in regards to the proposed change. When one faculty member was
asked if
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he ever saw the President, he replied that, "in contrast to the previous
President, a lot of people on campus have had a lot of contact with Bennis
in a number of ways. It seems as far as the University community in
general is concerned, Bennis is visible and his ideas are widely known.
From the perspective of Task Force members, communication with the Task
Force once long range planning was introduced was another story. "There
was no communication before the marathon" (one of the co-chairmen) . "I
did not see the President until the marathon" (a Task Force member).
Members of the Task Force felt that the President could have more actively
shown his interest and support for long range planning by communicating
personally with Task Force members initially and throughout the process.
Proposition 15: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to effect and demonstrate change in
the organization's relationship with other systems.
Proposition 15 states that if the organizational leader can effect
and demonstrate change in the organization's relationships with other
systems he can often motivate individuals in the organization to change
their attitudes and behaviors. Strategies designed to accomplish this
objective may have been extremely effective in overcoming initial resistance
to long range planning among members of the University community. In other
words if the President could have shown that he was effective in bringing
new money into the University, self-interests would not have been as
threatened and people might have been more willing to collaborate in
the
planning process. When the Task Force members and deans who were
inter-
viewed were asked whether Bennis was more or less effective than
the
previous president in his relationships with the legislature,
foundations,
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and federal agencies, most people replied that it was difficult to compare
them because social and financial environments were so different. "The
previous President had a lot of personal influence with the Chancellor.
What Bennis has done is to work more closely with the legislature and to
create a Washington office. More information is coming back on where grant
proposals are possible so that the system has been unfrozen in that way"
(a dean) . If the number of press releases and speeches he made about his
trips to Columbus to see legislators and the Governor are any indication,
the President very consciously tried to demonstrate change in the Univer-
sity’s relationships to the State.
Proposition 16: An objective of the strategies employed
by the organizational leader in this stage may be to increase
his expertise and credibility with organizational members.
Proposition 17 : To extend his control over varied kinds
of resources and sources of power.
The last two propositions state that strategies of unfreezing might
attempt to build the organizational leader’s expertise and credibility and
to extend his control over varied kinds of resources and sources of power.
Almost all of the Task Force members recognized the President's expertise
in planning and change. They were aware of his national reputation as an
organizational consultant and of his access to information and a wide
variety of resources. He also controlled rewards such as recognition
and access to the President. Task Force members were dependent on the
President to clarify his expectations of what he hoped the Long Range
Planning Task Force would accomplish; as long as he met with them infre-
quently he retained that power over them (though, on the other hand, not
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meeting with them was probably counter-productive to getting out a long
range plan). In relation to the deans, the President realized that he
lacked incentives for them to plan and that it was difficult to come up
with strategies to increase his control over resources or to change a
reward structure that does not encourage involvement in things like long
range planning.
Summary
After reviewing the ways in which the President initiated a long
range planning process two questions come to mind: 1) To what extent
did the President successfully unfreeze the University community in
regards to long range planning? and 2) How would one summarize the
strategies he used? Clearly, the President did not choose strategies
which lessened resistance to planning, rather his actions tended to
augment "forces for change." In retrospect it seems as if he used
three strategies in initiating long range planning: 1) he used every
occasion possible to spin images of what the University could become:
2) he tried to involve faculty and students in planning: and 3) he
chose people whom he trusted, who shared his visions and orientation
toward change, and gave them the responsibility for developing a long
range plan. These strategies created many of the conditions which the
organization may need to consider in order for successful initiation to
occur without addressing the problem of resistance to long range planning
,
which as environmental conditions changed or as long range planning got
underway, the President would have to deal with or risk successful
implementation .
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Changing: Implementing the Long Range Planning Process
Proposition 18: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to overcome emerging resistance
to the proposed change during the period of
attempted implementation.
Proposition 22: To provide organizational
members with opportunities to test and verify
new behaviors through personal experience.
The President’s unfreezing strategies were not designed to
overcome resistance to long range planning. In addition he had to
contend with emerging resistance (Proposition 18) to the short
timetable and delay in getting out a plan (see the section on a
Lack of Motivation, Chapter V). Even amont Task Force members
resistance grew as they tried to implement the planning process.
"When reasons for decisions aren’t shared, there is frustration.
When solutions are reached and then rejected, there's a sense of
futility. Bennis lost the Task Force's commitment when he didn't
share what he was thinking" (a Task Force member)
.
It is difficult to identify specific change strategies
the President used to overcome an emerging sense of futility or
resistance to long range planning (Proposition 18) . Nor can
strategies he used to build a public commitment to planning
(Proposition 19) or to provide organizational members with
behaviors through personal experienceopportunities to test new
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(Proposition 22) be cited. In fact several deans interpreted the
President s decisions to appoint a new graduate dean and to reorganize
the social science institutes to be at cross-purposes with the objec-
tives of long range planning. "Regardless of what kinds of final plans
we have, they are going to have to fit in an administrative structure
that might not necessarily be the best one for the programs we choose
unless we choose programs to fit a plan already conceptualized" (a dean).
Proposition 20: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to continually clarify and provide
opportunities by which organizational members
can gain clarification of the behavioral changes
required
.
Were there ways for the deans or Task Force members to share their
concerns with the President as they tried to implement the planning pro-
cess? Proposition 20 states that it may be important for the organiza-
tional leader to provide mechanisms by which organizational members can
gain clarification of the changes that are required. With the Task Force
at least the President did attempt several times to clarify his goals for
long range planning (see the chronology of events 6/28/72, 7/19/72, and
10/20/72). The problem seemed to be that the Task Force did not under-
stand which goals were most important for them to accomplish, nor what
specific steps they would need to take in order to accomplish any one
objective. "There was a lot of confusion as to how long range planning
would be linked to PPBS" (the coordinator). "It was not clear until the
fall that the President wanted us to plan with a budget constraint of ten
percent" (one of the co-chairmen). "The task specification was ambiguous
from the beginning. The Task Force in August clearly needed guidance on
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how to prepare a document and an administrative mandate with Arts and
Sciences" (a Task Force member). It was probably important in at least
two other cases for the President to intervene to clarify what he
expected from the Task Force, when he did not. By not intervening he
allowed the Task Force to miss the September 1 deadline and subsequently
for chapters to be distributed piecemeal as they were completed. Both
the delay and the piecemeal distribution undermined the President’s
credibility and that of the planning effort (a dean). "Things float in
the system, without clarity as to what is expected when. If something
is going to be late or not completed, the President doesn't find out about
it. There is a need for him to be more specific about what he expects
when" (an external consultant). There was probably also a need for him to
be specific about the authority and roles of the Task Force given the prob
lems described earlier in this chapter.
Proposition 23: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to offer organizational members
new meanings or new ways of looking at their
experiences in regards to the proposed change.
A proposition related to the need of the organizational leader to
clarify what changes are required states that the organizational leader
may need to offer organizational members new ways of looking at their
experiences and at organizational problems if successful implementation
is to occur (Proposition 23). One of the behaviors Bennis is an expert
at is asking questions and expanding the meanings of things.
The speeche
that have been mentioned before are good examples of this
skill. Simply
by introducing the kind of participatory long range
planning that he did,
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he had offered an alternative to past planning efforts at the University
of Cincinnati. Part of the problem however was that the Task Force
members themselves were not developing these new meanings. They acknow-
ledged that the long range plan they were working on did not take into
account changing environmental conditions, nor did it deal with areas like
continuing education, an external degree program, interdisciplinary studies,
etc. Then, when the Task Force became confused as to which direction it
should be moving in, the President was not close enough to the process to
be able to offer them new ways of looking at their experiences. Because
he had delegated planning to the Task Force he also was not available to
interact with deans and faculty members when they encountered problems
in planning.
Proposition 21: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to provide mechanisms for feedback
between himself and the people undergoing change.
One of the weaknesses of the President’s implementation strategy
that was identified earlier in this chapter was that he failed to establish
mechanisms for feedback (Proposition 21) . The result was that there was
a lack of communication on both sides. The President did not know what was
going on with long range planning and the Task Force had no way to resolve
problems that it encountered in trying to implement the planning process.
Possibly because these kinds of links were not established between the Task
Force and the President, the Task Force did not establish strong
links
between themselves and the units. Consequently, the units did
not see any
outcomes of their efforts for over a year, until a preliminary
plan was
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published. The units had not gotten feedback on the acceptability of
their plans or on how their unit plans would be integrated into a University—
wide plan" (one of the co-chairmen). Since the President was not in com-
munication with the Task Force, he did not know the objectives the deans
had raised about planning as early as 3/30/72 or on 4/21/72 at a Task
Force meeting with the deans. When he did hear about problems from the
assistant and associate deans in June he only indirectly followed up on
them (see the chronology of events 6/19/72). In mid-October or -November,
1972, when a statement from the President would have helped to salvage the
credibility of the long range planning process, he still was using his
meetings with the deans to seek their perceptions about the planning
process
.
Six or seven information-sharing meetings between the President and
the Task Force did occur between January, 1972, and June, 1973. It is not
within the scope of this paper to analyze why information was or was not
shared. However when Task Force leaders did meet with the President they
seemed reluctant to ask him some of the hard questions they had been
wrestling with (see the chronology of events 5/16/72). At the same time
the President seemed reluctant to confront the Task Force leaders head-on.
The President gave feedback by putting considerable, though subtle pressure
on the two co-chairmen—sending notes and minutes from speeches he gave—
not direct feedback at all, but very purposeful (the coordinator).
The Task
Force got feedback through remarks the President made at the
marathon or
to other groups (see the chronology of events 10/25/72).
Arts and Sciences
got what the dean described as "cloakroom feedback":
"It came in the way
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of appendices to letters from the President or the Provost." In sum,
it was difficult for the Task Force members or deans to get feedback
about their efforts to implement a long range planning process.
Proposition 24: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to provide role models for new
behavior patterns.
Proposition 24 states that successful implementation may depend on
the availability of role models for new behavior patterns. What kinds of
things did Bennis model in his own behavior in regards to long range planning?
Certainly, he modelled a spirit of inquiry and adaptability to change as
well as a high tolerance for ambiguity that he reinforced in others. Through
the use of administrative retreats and temporary systems he modelled an
approach to problem-solving. In attempting to make his office more visible,
he modelled another kind of behavior he hoped departments in the University
would follow. Unfortunately, the President also modelled some behaviors
that were counter-productive to the implementation of long range planning:
he didn't confront; he didn't enforce the timetables he had set up; and he
made some very important, unilateral decisions without knowing how they
would fit into a consensually-agreed upon University Long Range Plan (such
as his administrative reorganization, etc.).
Proposition 26: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to redefine his role in relation
to the change processes initiated.
Proposition 27: To remove barriers to change and
to provide organizational members with necessary
skills, knowledge, training and resources in order
to increase their capacity to implement the proposed
change
.
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Proposition 26 states that it may be important for the organiza-
tional leader over time to redefine his relationship to the change
processes he has initiated and to have less ownership in the ideas.
Part of the dilemma in this case was that the President wanted to be
seen as the expert and to be used as a resource; when the Task Force
did not come to him, he took less interest in what they were doing
a time when the Task Force was still dependent on him for leadership.
When he did not provide the direction the Task Force needed, long range
planning sort of came to a standstill (see the chronology of events from
August to December, 1972).
Another example of the way in which the President changed his
relationship to the long range planning process is illustrated by the
kinds of resources he provided the Task Force (Proposition 27) . At
first there were lots of resources pledged and delivered. When the Task
Force coordinator was appointed, he was given resources for additional
staff. The President also asked the PPBS committee to continue developing
profile data on departments in the University knowing that that kind of
information would be invaluable to the Task Force. He asked the co-
ordinator to sit in on vice presidents’ meetings so that he would be part
of the information and decision-making network in the President's office.
Bennis offered to bring in outside consultants for the Task Force. From
ten percent to fifty percent of each presidential assistant’s time was to
be given to planning.
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But planning was always an extra commitment on top of other
responsibilities, and resources were limited. Presidential assistants
did not give the time they were supposed to give to long range planning;
they were instead bogged down in other projects the President had asked
them to do. Similarly, the two co-chairmen were overcommitted
. When
the deans identified a need for training (4/21/72) there weren't resources
in time, staff, or money to do it. It is the author’s impression that the
Task Force never asked the President for more resources or in fact used
the one resource he offered (outside consultants); consequently, certain
barriers to change, such as a lack of skill in planning were never removed
(Proposition 27)
.
Proposition 28: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to change existing organizational
arrangements so they are as compatible as possible
with the behavioral changes required.
Proposition 28 states that in order for successful implementation
to occur the organization has to function in ways that are compatible with
the proposed changes. In other words the organizational leadership may
need to make changes in the policies, rewards, communication or decision-
making structures of the organization so that they support the changes he
hopes to make. It has already been shown how the amount and frequency of
communication between the Task Force and the President and between the
President and the deans did not contribute to the successful implementa-
tion of the long range planning process. As far as I could tell the
President did not intervene in ways that would have promoted new relation-
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ships to support new behaviors. (Only on the Task Force did mutually
supportive relationships develop.) It has also been documented how
the need for immediate solutions to problems, a circumstance only
partially under the President's control, undermined the long range
planning effort. Other Task Force members identified the discrepancy
between the timetable that had been set up and the need for widespread
participation in long range planning as a problem that was never resolved.
On the other hand, when the President appointed a new Vice Presi-
dent for Management and Finance and charged him with developing a manage-
ment information system and when he created the Executive Vice Presidency
for the Provost, he clearly made changes in the organization that would
be compatible with, in fact, facilitate long range planning.
Proposition 29: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to reinforce and reward even
tentative changes organizational members make
in the direction of the intended outcome.
Proposition 25: To encourage experimentation
and risk-taking on the part of organizational
members in regards to the proposed change.
The President's attitude toward long range planning was that he
had to do everything himself. "What every dean asks me to do he hasn t
done himself—to make choices and evaluate programs" (the President).
Given that attitude it was difficult for the President to see, lots less
reward, changes some units in the University were making in the way
they
approached planning (Proposition 29). Part of the idea behind rewarding
even tentative changes in behavior is that once people experience
some
success they are willing to risk and to make further changes
in their
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behavior (Proposition 25). But many of the deans never saw any benefits
from doing long range planning (a dean) and they did not see any negative
consequences from not doing a plan (another dean). Furthermore, the
President’s consideration of an administration reorganization while long
range planning was still going on created feelings of personal insecurity
for both deans and Task Force Members.
Summary
During this second stage, implementation, the President continued
to expand the parameters of the Long Range Planning Task Force’s task,
but failed to provide mechanisms through which the Task Force or the units
could gain clarification of what was expected of them. By expanding the
parameters of the Task Force’s task, the President created a condition
in which it was difficult for the Task Force to succeed and for long range
planning to become stably integrated. Bennis’ own high need for achieve-
ment evidenced by his expanding the objectives of long range planning and
by his high expectations for the staff and for the Task Force leaders led
him to set unrealistic deadlines, interfered with his providing support
and reinforcement, and prevented him from encouraging risk-taking and
experimentation on the part of organizational members. We have seen how
the deans and Task Force members felt that there were no ways for them to
clarify what was expected from them in regards to long range planning.
It may have been that Bennis' own high tolerance for ambiguity prevented
him from taking certain actions that the deans and Task Force members had
expected and from intervening in ways that could have influenced a wide
acceptance of and compliance with the goals of long range planning.
Finally,
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because of the need to respond to so many demands on his role it is diffi-
cu lt f°r Bennis to close options, to follow through, or to establish
conditions of stability and continuity, in order for successful implementa-
tion and incorporation to occur.
In sum, the President's strategy failed 1) to anticipate, or to
bring out into the open, difficulties that would be encountered in trying
to implement a participatory long range planning process; 2) to establish
and use feedback mechanisms to uncover and resolve problems that arose
during the period of attempted implementation; and 3) to provide the
appropriate supports and rewards to maintain subordinate willingness to
carry out implementation.
Refreezing: The Incorporation of Long Range Planning
The propositions for the leader's behavior in refreezing change
have to do with the ways in which "new behavior patterns become integrated
into cognitive and social structures, and thus, to a degree stabilized"
(Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 23). In the case of long range planning,
refreezing would mean the incorporation of a long range planning process
at the unit level or the implementation of Task Force recommendations.
When the study in Cincinnati was completed in July of 1973 neither of
these steps had occurred. In fact, a Long Range Planning document inte-
grating unit plans that had been written in May and June of 1972 was not
published until September of 1973. The purpose of this section however
is to describe a number of presidential interventions that were
observed
that would have implications for the successful incorporation of
long
range planning.
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Proposition 30: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to monitor organizational members'
performance in coping with and integrating the
change.
Proposition 30 states that an objective of the strategies used by
the organizational leader to incorporate change may be to monitor the
performance of organizational members in coping with and integrating
change. It has already been documented how the President did not monitor
the planning process: he, in fact, did not find out until January, 197 3,
that the College of Arts and Sciences had only submitted a bare-bones plan.
"The people who could have enforced accountability, did not" (one dean
said
.
Proposition 31: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to objectively evaluate changes that
have occurred.
Proposition 34: To link parts of the organization
or individuals whose behavior has been changed as
well as to link processes of change occurring
simultaneously.
A second proposition states that it may be important for the
organizational leader to objectively evaluate the changes he has initi-
ated (Proposition 31) . "It was very unclear to me how the Task Force
would be evaluated or what a final plan would look like” (one of the co-
chairmen) . Several Task Force members did not see how long range planning
would fit into other administrative structures (Proposition 34).
"One
of the things that the President could have done is to
have given the
units information on social indicators such as birth rates,
enrollment
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trends, etc. and have asked them to analyze this information in terms
of their own objectives and then provided criticism of their analyses"
( a consultant on long range planning)
.
Proposition 32: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to maintain continuity at some
levels of the organization while change takes
place at other levels.
Proposition 33: To insulate the organization from
conflicting or competing ideas and to give organiza-
tional members time to assimilate and integrate new
behaviors.
Propositions 32 and 33 postulate the need to maintain continuity
at some levels of the organization while change takes place at other
levels. Those conditions are in contradiction to Bennis* ambitious
approach to change which is to initiate a lot of new ideas in a short
amount of time. For example, he asked the units to project budget cuts
of 3-6-9% at the same time they were doing long range planning with no
budgetary constraints. He asked the chairmen of the Long Range Planning
Task Force to chair another committee on program evaluation before the
long range plan was written. Those are two of countless examples of other
tasks that interfered with the incorporation of a long range planning
process at the University of Cincinnati. "Bennis' greatest shortcoming
is keeping too many things going at once; he has instead to lay good
groundwork for one or two things" (an external consultant).
^"Managers need to balance change and stability in their organizations.
Presumably this can be done in two ways: changing a few things at a time
while holding all others constant or by alternating intense periods of change
with periods of consolidation and stability (Sayles, 1964).
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Proposition 35: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to give emotional support and
resources to organizational members who demon-
strate behaviors in the direction of the
intended change.
Proposition 36: To give visibility and credibility
to the change within the entire system and to spread
information about the consequences of the change to
other parts of the organization, thereby diminishing
a negative response in other parts of the system and
encourage system-wide support and adoption.
The last two propositions under refreezing have to do with the
need to provide support and credibility to change. It is not clear from
a sample of responses in interviews that the President has initiated
strategies that provide support or visibility to planning. "I doubt
that the University has begun what will be a continuous process. That
requires enforcement, getting back to individuals, and reinforcing their
meaningful participation" (an administrator) . "Planning will not be taken
seriously until people see actions implemented as a result of planning"
(a dean). "I don’t think that the level of importance we talked about
for planning was in fact backed up by our behavior and expenditure of
resources" (a Task Force member)
.
The Impact of Long Range Planning
There is no unanimity among Task Force members regarding an assess-
ment of Task Force efforts. The variety of views on assessment is perhaps
best shown by the following comments. One Task Force member stated, "I
feel it’s been more valuable than people suspect because the two Vice
Presidents sat on the committee." Another Task Force member stated.
The
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long range planning process has not gone bad If everybody is serious
about making it a participatory scheme and making sure that everybody
buys into it before you go ahead with a long range plan. If that's the
case then it seems that our failure to meet various deadlines is not a
problem at all—it is a matter of pushing it and keeping it alive. On
the other hand if that really wasn't the objective, but it was to have
a clear notion of what the University is and where it wants to go and to
do that on a crash basis, then I think it was a failure."
When deans and Task Force members were asked what impact long
range planning had had on the University, both groups responded that it
had had little or no impact. "If it affects the President's or the
Provost's assessment of priorities and that is translated into budget,
it will have an effect" (a dean). But "at this point, long range planning
has not led the University to understand any better the external forces
acting on it and it has not been incorporated into budget or personnel
decisions" (another dean)
.
To the extent that the long range planning process has not led to
a clearer understanding of externalities or future prospects, the Task
Force did not accomplish what the President said he expected (see the
chronology of events 1/21/72 and 7/19/72). The President established
the criteria by which long range planning would be evaluated by the
questions he asked and the premises he outlined when he introduced long
range planning. It is against those criteria that the President as the
organizational leader has to evaluate the success or failure of the Task
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Force and of long range planning. In June of 1973 Bennis wrote,
We are now two years behind my original deadline and
I have shaky confidence that the long range plan will
be of the quality or specificity to help provide the
guidelines upon which to make our important decisions
regarding the future allocation of resources. In that
case I will have to act, not unilaterally, but without
the contribution of a thoughtful long range plan (Bennis
to the University of Cincinnati Board of Directors,
June 5, 1973).
Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter seven problems that the Long Range Planning Task
Force members and the deans said they encountered in trying to implement
long range planning were identified. Both groups held the expectation
that the University President would help them solve these problems. For
example they expected him to clarify what it was he expected from the
Task Force, which in their perception did not occur. As a result, long
range planning did not have the impact on the University community that
might have been expected.
When the President's actions were compared to a set of propositions
about what the organizational leader may need to do to affect organiza-
tional change, it was found that what he could have done (but did not)
corresponded to what the deans and Task Force members said they needed
(i.e. recognition, goal clarity, resources, etc.). On the other hand when
actions on his part corresponded to actions described in the propositions,
conditions were created in the University to which the people undergoing
change responded positively.
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There are many reasons why some actions were taken and others
were not. Other tasks as well as a lack of information, belief in
another model of change, external demands, or other constraints
associated with the university president’s role may have prevented
him from following up on long range planning. For the purposes of
this chapter it is not important why the President did not meet more
frequently with the Task Force leaders, or intervene in ways to over-
come emerging resistance to long range planning, only that he did not,
and that if conditions described in the propositions for changing-
implementation had been created, chances are that the problems that
the Task Force and deans encountered in implementing long range
planning would have been resolved and the impact of long range planning
on the University would have been greater.
Even from the President's perspective there was a discrepancy
between what he expected from the Task Force and long range planning in
general and what he got. Although he might not attribute its failure
to his own failure to take certain actions there are reasons to believe
that there are other things he could have done to facilitate the long
range planning process in light of the model proposed in this research
for the role performance of the organizational leader and in light of
what the Task Force members and deans said they needed or expected.
In sum, it can be shown 1) that the propositions set forth in
Chapter II may be a helpful model for the organizational leader in the
process of change; 2) that, in fact, people undergoing change perceived
leader behaviors described in the propositions are needed.that many of the
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and 3) that when those behaviors on the part of the organizational leader
are not present, the group is left to cope with problems for themselves
or risk failure. It also can be shown that the organizational leader
needs to have a sense of what is going to happen to whatever it is that
he's initiated. Without a set of benchmarks, the organizational leader
loses control of the process. He cannot determine when to make inter-
ventions that redirect, clarify, or stabilize.
The model that is proposed in this research is very leader-oriented.
It does not say what the group needs to do if their expectations for the
role performance of the organizational leader are not met. For example,
there are times when the group may have to take the initiative and confront
the organizational leader with their needs if the leader has not provided
the behaviors the group expects. In this case the Long Range Planning
Task Force did not communicate important decisions they had made to the
President (see the chronological summary 2/7/72, 3/1/72, and 6/27/72) nor
did they effectively confront the President with what it was they needed
(see the description of the marathon as well as 10/25/72 and 11/6/72 in
the chronology of events). Rather, the co-chairmen and coordinator pulled
together a plan that lacked the relevance and specificity it might have
had if the President had acted to provide what was needed (i.e. goal
clarity, role clarity, resources, adequate communication, etc.).
There are probably other cases in which the President's perception
was that he did do what was expected, i.e. to make the goals for
Long Range
Planning increasingly specific and operational, etc. while it
was the
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consensus of the Task Force that he did not.
The model that is proposed in this research for the role of the
organizational leader in affecting organizational change is only one
way of looking at the change process. There are others. However, it
seems as if this is a model that leaders trying to effect change may
want to consider. At least in this case, it accounted for both what
the President did and for what he did not do that Task Force members
and deans said they needed and expected.
CHAPTER VI
CASE STUDY: THE ROLE OF THE
ORGANIZATIONAL LEADER IN THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAM
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to document and understand the
role of the organizational leader in another change process, in this
case the President’s role in initiating, implementing and incorporating
an affirmative action program at the University. From the analysis that
follows the author hopes to be able to show how the set of propositions
that has been proposed about the role of the organizational leader is
descriptive of the actions that were required in each stage of the change
process
.
Affirmative action was chosen as a second example of several change
processes the President initiated at the University of Cincinnati for two
reasons. First, affirmative action may represent an important mechanism
for institutional change in the seventies. "An affirmative action program
is a set of specific and result-oriented procedures to which a contractor
[the University] commits itself to apply every good faith effort in order
to insure non-discrimination against women and minorities. The obiective
of such procedures and efforts is equal employment opportunity. . .An
acceptable affirmative action program must include
a. An analysis of areas within which the contractor is
deficient
in the utilization of minority groups and women, and
further,
b. goals and timetables to which the contractor's good
faith
efforts must be directed to correct the deficiencies,
and
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thus to increase materially the utilization of minorities and women,
at all levels and in all segments of his work force where deficiencies
exist" [Section 60-2.10, Revised Order #41 Department of Labor]. As a
contractor of the federal government the University is required to file
an acceptable affirmative action program with the Office of Civil Rights,
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
Furthermore, higher education institutions must abide by the
guidelines set by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
October 4, 1972, based on Executive Order 11246 as amended, which states:
The contractor will not discriminate against any
employee or applicant for employment because of
race, creed, color, national origin, or sex.
The contractor will take affirmative action to
ensure that applicants are employed, and that
employees are treated during employment, with-
out regard to their race, creed, color, national
origin or sex.
As a strategy designed to implement Federal laws and guidelines,
affirmative action programs often include reviews of institutional practices
and policies in both academic and non-academic areas affecting recruitment,
hiring, job classification, promotion, retirement, termination, child care,
salaries, grievance procedures, maternity leave, nepotism, and other
personnel concerns. In sum, affirmative action is a potentially powerful
mechanism of organizational change, affecting almost every aspect of an
organization’s functioning, and enforceable through investigations by HEW
or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
^At at least two major universities, Columbia and Michigan, federal con-
tracts to the Universities have been held up as a result of on-site
investigation.
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The second reason for choosing affirmative action is that it is
similar to long range planning in enough ways to offer opportunities for
comparison and yet strikingly different from long range planning in
other ways. The way in which affirmative action was implemented at the
University of Cincinnati presented different problems to the organization
and consequently required the President to intervene in ways that were
different from what he did or might have done in regards to long range
planning. For example, he relied on the Director of the Office of Resource
Development to carry out certain functions, which she did very effectively.
One of the purposes for this chapter is to explore the ways in which the
model that has been proposed for the role performance of the organizational
leader accomodates delegation.
There are certain limitations to the material in this chapter which
are important to acknowledge from the outset.
1) Although many of the same sources of information - documents,
observations, interviews - were used for both case studies, long range
planning and affirmative action, fewer interviews were conducted on
affirmative action than on long range planning. Consequently there is
not the range of comments from participants about what they needed or
expected as they encountered problems in implementing affirmative action
procedures to draw on as there was an analysis of long range planning;
2) In some cases - such as personnel decisions
- information was under-
standably withheld from the researcher that might have helped
to explain
certain events; 3) At the time at which the field study was
completed
in July, 1973 - it was difficult to assess the impact
affirmative action
had had on the University, for several reasons: a)
a plan was due at HEW
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July 1, 1973, but was not submitted; b) as of June 30th no analysis has
been done of changes in recruitment or hiring patterns for September 30,
1972; in fact forms on which to monitor recruitment and hiring had only
been introduced at the department and college level in May; and c) in
early June, the Director of the Office of Resource Development was asked
to leave the University and a new director for affirmative action was
chosen, a major intervention, the effects of which were impossible to
observe or incorporate in the case analysis.
In spite of these three limitations the information that was
collected accurately documents the President's role and the change
strategies of the former Director until June of 1973.
In the first part of this chapter some of the problems encountered
in the implementation of an affirmative action program at the University
of Cincinnati and the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation
strategies used by the Director of the Office of Resource Development
will be identified. It is important to review the strengths and weak-
nesses of her strategies for two reasons:
1) The development of an affirmative action program is a new
process in all universities. Consequently, a description
of what occurred and what worked or didn't work may be
helpful to universities who are just starting to develop
a plan and a program.
2) In the case of affirmative action at the University of
Cincinnati, many of the objectives or conditions specified
as important for the successful initiation, implementation,
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and incorporation of change were accomplished by the change
strategies of the Director of the Office of Resource Develop-
ment. After reviewing what she did, the implications of her
actions for the role performance of the organizational leader
will be explored.
The purpose of the next section of this chapter will be to analyze the role
of the University President in initiating, implementing, and incorporating
an affirmative action program at the University of Cincinnati. Finally,
an assessment of the progress and impact of an affirmative action plan/
program at the University of Cincinnati will be made in the last section
of this chapter. Some sort of an evaluation is needed in order to make
statements about the effectiveness of the strategies the Director and the
President used in unfreezing, changing, and refreezing organizational
members' behavior, (although, in this case this is difficult given the
major changes that took place in the Office of Resource Development after
2
June 30, 1973 just as a plan for affirmative action was being developed).
Problems Encountered in Implementing Affirmative Action
When deans and other administrators were asked what problems they
had encountered or anticipated with the implementation of an affirmative
action program, they identified two problems having to do with the Director
of the Office of Resource Development's relationships with themselves and
with groups they considered important to implementation. The two problems
they identified were:
2A chronological summary of events in regards to affirmative
action
from January, 1972, until June, 1973, is included in Appendix
C. The
reader may wish to refer to it first before reading the case
analysis that
follows
.
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1) "She didn't communicate often enough or follow-up on
what she said she would do."
2) She didn t make use of what would seem logical or natural
groups to create peer expectations for change or to build
informational and social support for new behaviors.
The American Association of University Professors' (AAUP's)
criticisms of how affirmative action was being implemented at the Uni-
versity are one way to substantiate the lack of follow-up on the
Director's part that others had identified. "The December 5th Policy
statement was essentially the same as what the University Senate had
recommended in May. [The Director] should have reaffirmed the University
Senate document of the previous spring and gone on from there." The
President and the vice presidents had however essentially decided to
delay the statement until the fall in order to give the deans and unit
directors a chance to make some input (see 7/15/72). The Director con-
tacted the Provost in September and asked him to get responses back from
the deans by October 15, 1972. In the meantime, between June and September
while the Director worked on the development of a management-information
system there was almost no communication between her office and the deans
or department heads. "When there was not much communication in the fall ,
she lost ground" (a dean). The Director herself acknowledged in February
that only nineteen out of fifty-one affirmative action coordinators had
been appointed since July when she had asked that they be appointed.
^The statement was then scheduled to come out October 27, 1972 but
was delayed, for some reason, until December 4, 1973, when it appeared
in Candid Campus.
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"A list of the names of organizations to contact for minority and female
candidates was not put out until early March which was too late to he
of use" (though a case could probably be made on the other side of this
argument given the 1973-74 budget constraints on hiring anvwav)
. Tn anv
case there was some feeling among the people who were interviewed that
the Director’s forms to monitor recruitment and hiring came out too late
in 1973 to be effective at the departmental level. Workshops in affirm-
ative action were not held until March for the most part and when the
College of Arts and Sciences was not represented in one of her workshops,
the Director did not follow up. The head of one women’s group remarked
that the Director of Resource Development came to their initial meeting
but did not come back. There was no follow-up to a workshop on insitutional
racism for the President’s assistants though that had been discussed
(an assistant). The Director did not reply to a reauest from the ^resident’s
office to prepare a packet of information for the Chancellow's office or
for a State Senator until after having been reminded several times (a
Presidential assistant) . Finally timetables were set up that were never
adhered to (see 3/30/73) which caused there to be a widely held impression
of a lack of follow-up.
There are several aspects to the second problem respondents identi
fied—a strategic mistake in not making use of informal and formal groups
in the University to promote and legitmize the implementation of affirma-
tive action. [The Director] "played too much of an advocacy role and missed
opportunities for potential allies - the AAUP, the Faculty Senate, women’s
groups" (an administrator). ’’She didn’t meet with informal groups
such as
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NOW (the National Organization of Women) or the Women's Coalition" (a
women's group representative). "She built external contacts with the
Women's City Club and the community councils but not with internal
people to insure what she needed done. She needed close working relation-
ships with those with responsibility for implementing an affirmative action
program" (an assistant dean). Several respondents said "that the Director
was not working with the department heads as much as she needed" (a women's
group representative). The use of affirmative action coordinators did not
work out very well since the deans did not build on an interest or know-
ledge of affirmative action in their choices. "The affirmative action
coordinators were chosen so as to be ineffective since the selections did
not take into consideration the size and flexibility of the unit" (an
assistant dean)
.
The formal and informal groups the Director could have taken advantage
of included both the deans and department heads in several of the colleges
and groups like the women's coalition and the AAUP. In the latter case,
the Director could have used her relationships with them in such a way as
to have made them forces for rather than against change. "Had she worked
with the department heads earlier than April she might have been able to
build some informational and social support for making changes in their
attitudes and actions toward women and minorities" (a dean).
Two other problems identified in interviews were 1) that budgetary
constraints interfered with the implementation of affirmative action, for
example, in moving toward salary equity for women; and 2) that the central
administration was not a good model in terms of affirmative action. For
example, affirmative action procedures were not followed in the search for
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a new provost or in the appointments of two assistants to the Vice Presi-
dent for Metropolitan Affairs.^
Given that there are statements about problems encountered in
implementation, what were the strengths and weaknesses of the change
strategies used by the Office of Resource Development between March,
1972, and June, 1973?
The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Director
of Resource Development’s Change Strategies
The strengths of the Director of Resource Development’s change
strategies in the area of affirmative action lie in the second stage of
the change process, changing/implementation and not in unfreezing. Un-
freezing was essentially left to the President and the University Senate
and occurred before the Director took office, while the Director turned
her early attention once she had taken office to developing a management-
information system that would reveal areas of under-utilization of
minorities and women in the University.
There was essentially agreement between the Director and the Presi-
dent on some premises though as to how affirmative action would be
approached: clearly, the whole philosophy of affirmative action is based
on a strategy of working with parts of the system which share common
^This point may or may not be true in that a case can be presented on
either side; however a majority of the persons who were interviewed felt
that because the affirmative action process had not been visible in
these
appointments, that the central administration’s credibility in the area
of
affirmative action was damaged.
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dissatisfactions and a sense of powerlessness (Proposition 8). A second
premise is that the development of an affirmative action plan at the
University of Cincinnati would involve women and minorities through the
University Senate as well as deans, department heads, governance leaders,
and the President's office (Proposition 11). For example, the Director's
strategy was to get every unit to set its own affirmative action "goals
and timetables." She extended University/coramunity involvement to include
affirmative action coordinators and departmental secretaries who attended
workshops and seminars along with the vice presidents, deans and depart-
ment heads on federal laws and regulations and on the use of affirmative
action forms. A third premise was that everyone - the President, the
Director of Resource Development, the AAUP, and women's groups - believed
that a commitment to future action was important in this case to change
individual attitudes and institutional patterns (Proposition 19) . Both
the Provost's strategy of asking units to include a salary equity review
in their budget decisions and the Director's strategy of having units write
their own goals and timetables contributed to this end.
Weaknesses
The problems identified above by the persons who were interviewed
show where the Director failed to build a base on which to change people's
attitudes and behavior (Propositions 16 and 17). For the most part, she
did not build the kinds of relationships she needed with department heads
or informal groups (Propositions 5, 7, and 8). She met with deans but
interacted infrequently with department heads or women’s groups (Proposi-
tion 12); and, therefore, she did not significantly change the
flow of
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information to important "gate-keepers" (Proposition 6). She did not
work through or in conjunction with other offices that had been working
for affirmative action - i.e. the Personnel Office (Proposition 7).
Often her abrasiveness and assertiveness alienated the very people she
needed (a women's group representative). "All of her information made
people feel inept" (an assistant dean) [Proposition 13].
When resistance continued to build over her role in the United
Black Faculty Association (UBFA) investigations and over what the AAUP
saw as non-compliance and delay, the Director countered their arguments
with other arguments and did not effectively make the AAUP, the deans,
or women's groups, etc., forces acting for her rather than against her
(Proposition 18). Possibly, the AAUP committee members and the Dean of
the College of Education were philosophically her closest allies and most
clearly committed to affirmative action, but from about mid-February, 1973,
on they did not offer the Director the kind of support they might have.
Another aspect of resistance to the Office of Resource Development is
indicated by some of the comments in interviews about a lack of clarity
about the Director's role. "Ostensibly she wanted the deans to take
responsibility for affirmative action and yet she maintained the right
to audit their hiring, etc." (an assistant dean).
Although the intent of the network of affirmative action coordina-
tors was to provide support to the deans and department heads in imple-
menting affirmative action (Proposition 27), the network skirted decision-
L
making at the unit level, so that for the most part information was
not
getting back to the deans and department heads who had responsibility
for
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implementation through that route. Supportive relationships were probably
needed more among the deans and department heads who were involved in long
range planning, periodic-review procedures, personnel decisions, and a
gruelling budget-review process. There were some factors in the later
phases of change that interfered with the implementation of affirmative
action that the Director was not in control of. For example, she was not
in control of other demands on the deans and department heads (such as
those listed above) that competed for their time and resources (Proposition
33) . Nor did she have control over resource allocation in a year of a
budget crisis so that she could not reinforce those units that made a
commitment to affirmative action for women and minorities (Propositions 29
and 35) .
Strengths
The strengths of the Director’s change strategies were in the imple-
mentation phase. There were opportunities for deans to clarify what was
expected of them and to ask questions about the new forms, about recruiting
blacks and women, etc., in the meetings the Director had with them (Proposi-
tion 20). The use of affirmative action coordinators who had received the
information and attended workshops was intended to be another way for deans
to clarify the new behaviors that were expected from them. The
Director's
auditing of the records the deans kept for affirmative action
provided
another way to get feedback as to what was and was not required
by compliance
what was reasonable good faith efforts and what were not
(Proposition 21).
The forms to report applicant flow and promotions, training,
and termination,
etc. were also a way for organizational members to
test out new behaviors
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(Proposition 22). The constant flow of information from the Office of
Resource Development to the vice presidents and deans gave participants
new meanings for and ways of looking at their experiences in relation
to what was happening nationally in the area of affirmative action
(Proposition 23). The Director also used external sources to reinforce
internal changes (Proposition 29)
,
when she brought in outside speakers
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Office of Civil
Rights (see chronological summary 3/5/73, 5/17/73, 6/18/73). In asking
units to be accountable and responsible for developing their own affirma-
tive action plans, the Director provided opportunities for organizational
members to make a public commitment to affirmative action (Proposition 19).
The management information system the Director worked to develop,
which made computer print-outs on salaries and rank by department and
college available, was one way to establish compatible organizational
arrangements (Proposition 28), as well as to monitor the University's
progress toward affirmative action (Proposition 30) . Other examples of
the Director’s efforts to make organizational arrangements more compatible
with proposed changes and to raise the general level of awareness about
affirmative action (Proposition 3) were her work on child care, career
counselling, contract compliance (just beginning as of June, 1973), and
on a job-classification review (again just beginning in June, 1973).
A factor that is important to ensure change and is another strength
of the Director's design is movement from general to more specific goals
as change is undertaken (Dalton, et. al., 1968, p. 109). A review
of the
and of the material the Director distributed showschronology of events
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that over time the goals of affirmative action and the actions required
by deans and department heads became increasingly specific (see the
chronology of events 1/22/72, 9/29/72, 12/4/72, 2/16/73, 2/27/73,
3/20/73, 4/12/73, etc.). [Dalton, et. al., also said that for successful
change to occur, the motivation to change has to become internalized.
Possibly because the emotional resistance to affirmative action was never
dealt with, this was never accomplished.]
Summary
Holding up what the Director did and didn't do against the set of
propositions set forth in Chapter II, one finds that many of the conditions
postulated as necessary for successful implementation were created by the
actions the Director took, especially in the "changing" phase. In con-
trast many of the conditions in the unfreezing stage were not accomplished
by what she did, though possibly by what the University Senate or President
did (see the section in this chapter on the role of the University Presi-
dent in the implementation of affirmative action). In all three stages of
the change process in regards to affirmative action, the Director tended
to rely on a strategy of providing information about changes that were
required. She also seemed to believe that the most effective strategy to
achieve change was through compliance, by monitoring and enforcing affirma
tive action in processes of recruitment, hiring, promotions, terminations,
etc. rather than by identification with a model or by internalization of
a need to change.
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The Role of the University President
in Affirmative Action
The purpose of this part of this chapter is to retrospectively
analyze the role of the President in the development (initiation, imple-
mentation, and incorporation) of an affirmative action program at the
University of Cincinnati in light of the propositions set forth in
Chapter II. The first section will review the actions the President
took to unfreeze attitudes of members of the University community towards
affirmative action.
Unf reezing-Initiation
Proposition 1: An objective of the strategies employed
by the organizational leader in this stage may be to
assess the source and nature of resistance to the pro-
posed change.
Proposition 2: To overcome the initial resistance
of organizational members to the proposed change.
Proposition 3: To heighten organizational members'
sensitivity to problems involving the intended change.
Proposition 4: To stimulate new needs and levels of
aspiration in the system in regards to the proposed
change
.
Proposition 6: To change the constellation of forces,
resources, or information converging on any one part
of the organization.
Bennis appointed the Director of the Office of Resource
Development
on January 22, 1972, three months after the need
for an affirmative action
plan had been discussed at an administrative retreat,
two months after he
had brought in the woman who was later named as
the Director as a consultant
on the Status of Women and Minorities at the
University. In his speech
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announcing the Director's appointment and in the actions he took through-
out the spring and summer (see chronological summary 10/25/72, 6/29/73,
and 7/15/73) Bennis demonstrated that he had aseessed and anticipated
resistance to affirmative action (Proposition 1). He used several
strategies, in fact, to overcome resistance (Proposition 2). In the
first place he tried to reduce the amount of anxiety aroused by affirma-
tive action and to reassure faculty members that change would not have
the threatening consequences they feared. For example, affirmative
action was to be approached gradually: on June 7, 1972, Bennis moved
back the University Senate's proposed timetable by two months. He
suggested that the release of the University's policy statement on
affirmative action "since it is far more subject to distortion and
apprehension" be held up until the deans had had a chance to discuss it
(7/15/72). In his speeches and correspondence Bennis tried to assure
governance leaders and others in the University community that affirmative
action would not jeopardize the principles of academic freedom and pro-
fessional competence (see chronological summary 7/31/72). On other occa-
sions, Bennis tried to relate the need for an affirmative action program
to the acknowledged goals of faculty members and administrators. When he
appointed the Director and the Associate Vice President for Community
Relations, January 22, 1972, he wrote,
If colleges and universities are truly to provide
education that will prepare their students for the
diverse and complex world beyond the campus, then
faculties and student bodies must reflect some of
that diversity of the real world. Moreover it is
clear that federal and state law requires us to
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achieve greater balance and diversity in our faculties.
Even if it were not right that we do so, which it is,
it has now become mandatory as a matter of law
(Propositions 2 and 3).
A fourth strategy Bennis used effectively to overcome the resistance
he sensed to affirmative action was to try to undermine informational and
motivational support for existing attitudes and behavior. Not only did he
confront individuals with discordant information about the utilization of
women and minorities in the University, but he also encouraged the Director
to run national conferences on the Status of Women and Minorities at the
University. Part of the reasoning underlying that request was that if
people can see themselves differently (i.e. as at the forefront of a
commitment to affirmative action) and change their actions (i.e. by hosting
a national conference), resistant attitudes often change in turn.
Once people were assured that they "wouldn't lose their present
satisfactions", they become more receptive to the information the Director
was circulating on the need to change in order to comply with federal laws
(Propositions 3 and 6). Again, through his speeches Bennis heightened the
University community's sensitivity to problems in regards to affirmative
action (Proposition 3). Metaphors like "a truly urban university" and the
"more effective utilization of all our resources" built on the external
requiredness of change (i.e. federal laws) to create new levels of
aspira-
tion in the system (Proposition 4).
Proposition 5: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizatonal leader in this stage
may be to integrate new forces for change with
existing forces for change, external forces for
change with internal forces for change.
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Proposition 7 : To elicit support for the proposed
organizational change from informal as well as
formal leaders in the organization.
There are several examples of how Bennis built on internal forces
for change (Proposition 5) . In the first place he asked the University
Senate to study and develop an affirmative action plan for the University
(January, 1972). Senate reports became the basis of the University Policy
Statements on Affirmative Action. On July 31, he asked the Faculty Council
on Jewish Affairs to continue to collaborate and comment on the University’s
progress in the area of affirmative action. On June 7, 1972, Bennis asked
the Provost to include some of the members of the Senate subcommittee who
had written the University Senate’s recommendations in the areas of student
assistance and women’s studies in his planning.
Bennis tried to elicit support for affirmative action from both
informal and formal leaders in the organization (Proposition 7) by asking
governance groups to develop affirmative action plans for committee repre-
senation (6/12/72) and by asking that deans be included in discussions
reviewing the University Policy Statement on Affirmative Action.
Proposition 9: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to set priorities for the organiza-
tion and to clearly communicate these priorities
to organizational members whose behavior is to
be changed
.
Proposition 16: To build the organizational
leader’s credibility and expertise with
organizational members.
Proposition 37: The organizational leader needs
to be viewed as personally involved and committed
to the change throughout the change process.
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Proposition 9 under unfreezing states that it may be important
for the organizational leader to set priorities for the organization.
Both in what he said (speeches, policy statements, discussions with the
Board of Directors) and in what he did, Bennis communicated a high
priority for affirmative action (Propositions 9 and 16). For example,
he directed the Provost to work with the Director to implement the
University Senate's recommendation on child care (6/7/72) and to study
and recommend anti-discrimination procedures for the University (6/7/72) .
He got Ford Foundation funding for an administrative intern program and
hired a black man and white woman in the two positions. He invited
Bernice Sandler from the American Association of Colleges' Project on
the Status and Education of Women to be one of the first speakers in a
series of lectures he had initiated called "Current Perspectives in Higher
Education" (October 1972). Most importantly he committed the University's
resources to affirmative action when he created the Office of Resource
Development
.
Proposition 8: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to link parts of the system that are
sympathetic to the intended change and share common
dissatisfactions and a sense of powerlessness.
Proposition 10: To create a sense of rising expec-
tations among organizational members that they will
benefit from the proposed change in their organiza-
tional behavior.
Proposition 11: To involve as many of the individuals
to be affected by the proposed change as possible in
planning and decision-making.
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Proposition 12: To increase the amount and frequency
of interaction between the organizational leader and
members in regards to the proposed change.
Proposition 13: To heighten organizational members'
self-esteem and to encourage reciprocity in regards
to the proposed change.
Proposition 14: To establish and maintain a climate
of acceptance, support, and trust in interpersonal
relationships in which change is regarded positively.
Proposition 15: To effect and demonstrate change
in the organization's relationships with other systems.
Proposition 17: To extend the organizational leader's
control over varied kinds of resources and sources of
power
.
It is not possible to cite specific actions that the President took
to accomplish these objectives, although, as we have seen, some of the
Director's implementation strategies, which were summarized above, did
create the conditions described in the propositions, especially in regards
to involving people to be affected by the proposed change in planning and
decision-making; in setting their own goals and timetables (Proposition 11).
The actions described so far demonstrate Bennis' commitment to
affirmative action (Proposition 37) and apparent effectiveness in un-
freezing the University community toward affirmative action. That is
not to say that as a result of Bennis' leadership there was no resistance
in the community to affirmative action. A great deal of initial resistance
to affirmative action was never overcome; other resistance emerged when
expectations and timetables were not met.
Changing / Imp lement ation
Proposition 27 : An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to remove barriers to change and
to provide organizational members with necessary
skills, knowledge, training, and resources in
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order to increase their capacity to implement the
proposed change.
Proposition 27 states that it may be important for the organiza-
tional leader in this phase to redefine his role vis-a-vis the change
processes he has initiated - to have less ownership in the change ideas
and to be more responsive to subordinates' initiatives. Especially in
the three months between January and March, and actually until July,
Bennis was a visible spokesman for affirmative action; his actions
effectively changed the balance of forces in the system toward affirma-
tive action. Once the Director came and began to take responsibility
for affirmative action, the nature and frequency of Bennis' interventions
in regards to affirmative action began to change. The Director, as we
have seen, provided the leadership for "changing", much as Bennis had
done for "unfreezing."
Perhaps the most visible action Bennis took during this second
stage, "changing", were to make resources available to the Office of
Resource Development (Proposition 27). He allowed the Office of
Resource Development to overspend its budget. He made computer time
available. He paid for printing and for xeroxing. The Commission on
Affirmative Action was funded from the President's discretionary fund.
The Ford intern in the Provost's office was asked to research anti-
discrimination processes at other universities. Bennis appointed a
committee to draft the charge, role, organizational structure, and
membership etc., of the Affirmative Action Commission and later of
the
Anti-Discrimination Tribunal. Both of these last two interventions
provided staff assistance to the Office of Resource
Development.
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Proposition 24: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to provide role models for new
behavior patterns.
In other ways the President acted as a model for affirmative
action (Proposition 24) . He made his committee appointments with
affirmative action in mind (though he balked at using every appoint-
ment he had to make to balance the representation of women and blacks
on committees). He appointed women and blacks in his own office.
Black candidates were recruited and considered in the search for a
new provost. ^ He put pressure on the Provost to implement affirmative
action/salary equity in the budget-review process and asked all of the
vice presidents as early as April, 1972,(4/11/72), to keep records of
recruitment and appointment procedures in their own offices. Others
who were interviewed said Bennis could have used the budget even more
effectively than he did to set University priorities. For example,
he could have required documentation of an affirmative action/salary
equity review before he approved any new positions for a unit or acted
favorably on a unit's personnel decisions.
Proposition 18: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to overcome emerging resistance to
the proposed change during the period of attempted
implementation
.
Proposition 20: To continually clarify and to
provide mechanisms by which organizational members
can gain clarification of the behavioral changes
required
.
5On the other hand Bennis has been criticized for not
following affirma
tive action in the search processes he chaired.
Positions were advertised
but the ad in at last one case appeared after the
selection and appointment
had n l There is probably some validity to the charge that Bennis
could tave us;,! the search processes he chaired
as an opportune to more
visibly model affirmative action for the University
community.
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There is some evidence that Bennis intervened in this stage to
clarify the role of the Office of Resource Development (especially in
regards to the appointment activity forms) which was causing some
resistance in the University (Proposition 20) [see chronological summary
A/23/73]. In February, 1973, when the AAUP criticized the implementation
of affirmative action, Bennis had the Provost, the University's Legal
Counsel and the Director meet with AAUP representatives (Proposition 18).
Later he apologized to the Director for the resistance he had caused about
bhe role of the Affirmative Action Commission (see chronological summary
3/22/73)
.
Proposition 28: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to change existing organizational
arrangements so that they are as compatible as
possible with the behavioral changes that are
required.
Bennis also intervened in this stage to try to make departmental
changes towards affirmative action part of an "interrelated system of
role behaviors" (Proposition 28). He envisioned that the unit's affirma-
tive action goals and timetables would be incorporated in the unit's next
long range plan and he supported the Director's efforts to develop a
management-information system when he appointed a new Vice President for
Management and Finance and when he urged the PPBS committee to continue
working on departmental profiles which he knew would be helpful to the
Director of Resource Development (Proposition 28). The appointment of an
Affirmative Action Commission is still another attempt to provide support
to the Office of Resource Development. A review of the University's
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grievance procedures in cases of alleged discrimination and the estab-
lishment of a day care cooperative are two additional objectives the
President worked for in order to establish compatible organizational
arrangements for affirmative action goals (Proposition 28).
Proposition 29: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to reinforce and reward even tenta-
tive changes organizational members make in the
direction of the intended income.
Comparative standard setting is one way the organizational leader
can reinforce even tentative behavioral changes on the part of organiza-
tional members (Proposition 29). In an interview with the Cincinnati Post
Times Star in March, 1973, that was later published, Bennis said that the
University of Cincinnati was far ahead of any other university in Ohio
in terms of affirmative action. He used Bernice Sandler's letter to the
Director (3/5/73) to demonstrate internally that the University's plan
for affirmative action looked good from an outsider's perspective. Bennis
also tried to create a condition in which the "expectations of significant
others" would be an important factor in a unit's planning by appointing
influential Cincinnatians to the Affirmative Action Commission charged with
reviewing units' affirmative action plans.
Proposition 19: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to provide opportunities for organiza-
tional members to make their commitment to the
proposed change public
.
Proposition 21: To provide mechanisms for feed
back between the leader and the people undergoing
change.
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Proposition 22: To provide organizational members
with opportunities to test and verify new behaviors
through personal experience.
Proposition 23: To offer organizational members
new meanings or new ways of looking at their
experiences in regards to the proposed change.
Proposition 25: To encourage experimentation and
risk-taking on the part of organizational members
in regards to the proposed change.
Proposition 26: To redefine the leader's role in
relation to the change processes initiated.
In regards to Proposition 26 the President did redefine his role in
relation to the proposed change: as the Director of Resource Development
assumed responsibility for the implementation of affirmative action, the
President became less involved. Again the Director's implementation
strategies created many of the conditions described in Propositions 19,
22, 23, and 25. In regards to Proposition 21, in the next section it will
be shown how the President failed to establish a procedure for giving feed-
back to the Director, much as the Director failed to establish feedback
mechanisms with the units.
Finally, there are several ways in which the President tried to
demonstrate his personal interest and commitment to affirmative action
(proposition 37). As already mentioned, he hired blacks and women and he
made committee appointments in the spirit of affirmative action. He
intervened in at least one personnel decision to block the appointment
of an individual who had been charged by the United Black Faculty
Association
as being racist. 6 Finally, when black students presented a list
of
6In this case the individual also had a quest ionnable
publication
record. Bennis might have intervened for either reason.
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thirty-three grievances/demands in the fall he created a task force
that spent hundreds of hours from November until March investigating
the charges and making recommendations to the President.
Refreezing-Incorporation
Proposition 30: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to monitor organizational members'
performance in coping with and integrating the
proposed change.
Proposition 31: To objectively evaluate changes
that have occurred.
One of the factors that jeopardized refreezing was an increasing
number of problems between the President and the Director over issues
unrelated to affirmative action and more related to their interpersonal
relationship. When persons who were interviewed were asked what the
President could have done differently in regards to affirmative action,
one person replied, among other things, "he could have given the Director
open feedback" (an assistant dean) [Proposition 21] . Throughout the
chronology of events there is evidence that the Director felt a need to
meet more with the President (for example, see the chronological summary
11/29/72, 2/8/73, 5/1/73).
7
The Office of Resource Development was not
well integrated into the President's office (Proposition 26 re: reciprocity
in decision-making) . The Director did not attend assistants meetings
although she had the title of "Special Assistant to the President." The
7The effect the President had on the Director by not meeting with her
was to create ambiguity for her about how she would be evaluated to the
point where she openly admitted she did not feel supported by the
President
(Proposition 27), did not feel like risk-taking was rewarded (Proposition
25) or reciprocated (Proposition 26)
.
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Office of Resource Development was left off the President's Advisory
Council, though the Director on her own initiative attended the meetings.
A lack of trust on both sides perpetuated an adversarial relationship
between the Director and the President. The Director accused the Presi-
dent of not working with his own office in the areas of affirmative
action and institutionalized reacism. She felt that women’s and minorities
perspectives were not included in top-level decision-making. On the one
hand, not having an open relationship (open communication) with the
Director of Resource Development prevented Bennis from monitoring her
way of operating (Proposition 30). Rather, he was dependent on second-
hand information (which ranged from his assistants' opinions to those of
the Parking Office). Although he asked the Director for a long range
pain for her office and a status report on affirmative action it was
difficult for him to objectively evaluate her accomplishments based on
his own knowledge (Proposition 31)
.
Bennis never did overcome initial resistance in the University to
the Director's appointment (her high salary, car, expensive office) nor
growing resistance in the system to her style. When he got signals from
deans and department heads that they did not like her role (see summary
February, 1973), those reports confirmed his feelings that she was
alienating the very people she needed to work with in order for affirmative
action to be implemented. "The Director's power to intervene had to be
worked out," one department head said. "A lack of definition in
her job
led to conflict between her and the President" (an assistant
dean) . In
June, 1973, the President asked the Director to leave her
nosition as
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Director of the Office of Resource Development and appointed another
black woman to take her place. 8 Bennis had anticipated potential
black and community (Cincinnati) resistance to the Director's forced
resignation and consulted with them extensively prior to taking any
g
action.
By mid-May Bennis knew that he was going to ask the Director to
resign. At that point Bennis felt like he could not afford to spotlight
efforts toward the development of an affirmative action plan without
dredging up a lot of smouldering resistance to affirmative action and
laying himself open to a lot of criticism when he did announce his
decision, so that when he gave his speech to the University faculty on
5/17/73 the President never mentioned affirmative action as a priority
of the University. There are other examples of cross pressures on his
role as president that constrained Bennis from taking other action
he might have taken in this stage of the change process, refreezing.
g
As of July 1, 1973, the Director had not resigned but she had left
her office. Interestingly, this intervention on the part of the President
might have caused more movement in the direction of affirmative action
in the system than any other action he had taken. As a result of this
action several class action suits were filed with the Equal Opportunity
Commission and with HEW. An HEW team conducted an on-site investigation
of the University of Cincinnati in December, 1973. Their report is just
being filed as this chapter is being written. In the meantime the President
has made a commitment to spend whatever it takes in the 1974-75 budget to
achieve salary equity.
^The President did not consult with the women's coalition however,
until after he had made his decision. The women's coalition has since
filed an injunction to prevent the new Director from taking office
(which she has) on the grounds that she was not qualified and a class
action suit with HEW on the grounds that affirmative action was not
followed in naming the first Director's successor.
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Proposition 32: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to maintain continuity at some levels
of the organization while change takes place at
other levels.
Proposition 33: To insulate the organization
from conflicting or competing ideas and to give
organizational members time to assimilate and
integrate new behaviors.
Proposition 35: To give emotional support and
resources to organizational members who demonstrate
behaviors in the direction of the intended change.
Proposition 36: To give visibility and credibility
to the change within the entire system and to
spread information about the consequences of the
change to other parts of the organization, thereby
diminishing a negative response in other parts
of the system and encouraging system-wide support
and adoption.
One of the propositions in refreezing states that it may be important
for the organizational leader to give resources and emotional support to
organizational members who demonstrate change in their behavior (Proposi-
tion 35) . The Dean of the College of Education at the University of
Cincinnati had announced that he would strive for salary equity through
his budget promotion and tenure decisions. If Bennis had not had informa-
tion that enrollments in Education were sharply declining, he might have
given the College enough money to achieve that goal and then let the College
of Education stand as a model for affirmative action in the University
(Proposition 36).
The budget interfered in other ways with "refreezing". The vice
presidents recommended in April that the proposal for a child care council
not be brought up that spring "with all the problems yet to be solved with
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respect to the budget" (5/11/73) . Not being able to fund day care centers
interfered with Bennis
'
goal of involving new constituent groups in the
University and with an important aspect of affirmative action. The late-
ness of the budget (approved early summer) undermined affirmative action
since recruitment of women for open positions was made more difficult.
Proposition 34: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to link parts of the organization
or individuals whose behavior has been changed
as well as to link processes of change occurring
simultaneously
.
Proposition 34 states that one objective of the organizational
leader’s actions in incorporating change may be to link on-going,
simultaneous change processes. In this case, the President envisioned
that each unit’s affirmative action goals and timetables would be
incorporated in its long range plan. Another process that might have
been linked to affirmative action was admissions. However, the President
would have come under tremendous political backlash had he intervened in
admissions (traditionally a faculty prerogative) to give preferential
treatment to women and blacks. Finally, in trying to link budget decisions
to affirmative action, Bennis was caught between the University Senate's
recommendation for merit (pro affirmative action) salary increases and the
Faculty Senate’s recommendation for across-the-board cost of living increases
which maintain the status quo and undermine movement in the direction of
affirmative action.
All of these forces acted as constraints on Bennis’ ability to take
actions as the organizational leader to reinforce and support change in the
direction of affirmative action. It has also been shown how a lack of
communication with the Director prevented the President from being as
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involved in affirmati-e action as he might have been during the imple-
mentation stage and how it prevented him from monitoring her role
performance except through second-hand sources, during the "refreezing"
stage.
The purpose of the next section is to attempt to assess the
impact an affirmative action program has had on the University of
Cincinnati in order to explore the implications of the Director's
actions for the role performance of the University President. Could
it be that some of the roles that have been proposed for the organiza-
tional leader can be delegated?
Accomplishments/Impact
One of the problems with change in higher education isthat it is
difficult to measure progress or outcomes. Specifying criteria for the
evaluation of change thus becomes one of the most important roles for the
organizational leader. What criteria did the President establish for
evaluating the Office of Resource Development? How did he apply those
criteria? How did accomplishments in the area of affirmative action
measure up to what he had expected?
When he appointed the Director of the Office of Resource Development,
Bennis outlined five responsibilities for the Office in developing an
affirmative action plan for the University (see the chronological summary,
1/22/72). Several of these responsiblities were externally oriented -
i.e. fund-raising for special programs, organizing programs between the
University and the community, etc. The indicators that the President would use
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for each task were never specified. Although Bennis did ask the
Director to submit a summary or report of her first fifteen months,
most of the information he got about affirmative action was second-hand,
either from the deans, through the AAUP
,
or through his assistants.
Unfortunately, [the Director’s] profile was high on things
that irritated the President (parking, her budget, her feud with
the student government), and low on substantive accomplishments in
the area of affirmative action," one dean commented. A few times
Bennis intervened to redefine the Director's role, generally to reaffirm
its taff rather than line function (see 11/19/72 and 4/23/73). He met
with her only four times between September, 1972, and June, 1973, when he
asked her to resign (10/30/72, 11/29/72, 3/26/73, and one other time
in late spring) . He did not meet with her when the AAUP was making
charges of delay and non-compliance. The other indications of the way
the President was evaluating the Director in particular and affirmative
action in general are seen in comments he made in assistants' and vice
presidents' meetings along the line of "She doesn't know what she does to
bring on all of her problems," and "She is alienating the very people she
will need to implement affirmative action" (5/4/73).
A second way in which to assess progress in the area of affirmative
action is to look at the statistical information that is available on the
number of blacks and women who were hired for open positions in September,
1972, and in September, 1973; who were appointed to committee positions:
who were getting salaries comparative to those given to white males in the
same position with the same qualifications, etc. In other words to what
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extent does statistical information show that units were taking
affirmative action to recruit, hire, promote, and train minorities
and women as of June 30, 1973? 10
Statistical information is available and was included in the
Director’s 7/1/73 report to HEW (see Appendix E) . Data compiled in
October, 1973, for September, 1973, show that
60 females were hired for 136 open positions.
14 while minority candidates were hired but
there is no statistical information available
to show that equity was established for women's
and minorities’ salaries in any college.
By June 1973 forms to record and monitor all appointments were
being used in the Medical College and provostial area. Statistically
there is evidence to show that affirmative action was being taken at
most levels of the University."^
^Available statistical information, however, cannot be used to show
a_ lack of effectiveness on the part of the Office of Resource Development
since the phenomena might be due to a number of other factors such as a
lack of open positions, or a lack of qualified minority or female appli-
cants, etc. Nor can it be used to establish the effectiveness of the
Office since the phenomena might result from a number of other factors -
increased societal consciousness, open positions, and qualified minority
and female applicants, the requirements of federal grants or contracts
held by the department, etc.
H
,rAf f irmative Action is not just a hiring program, but a systematic
intervention that affects program review, retention, transfers, promotion,
interaction with the surrounding community, involvement in governance
mechanisms, special committee assignments and the inclusion of women and
minorities in all aspects of the University" (7/1/73 Report to HEW, p. 5).
Statistical data on all these aspects of affirmative action will not be
available until the University of Cincinnati submits its plan for affirma-
tive action to HEW and complies with the recommendations of an HEW investi-
gation in December, 1973, if then.
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A third way to measure the impact of affirmative action on the
University is to compare the goals the Director established for herself
with what she accomplished. The goals the Director established for
herself included the development of a management-information system
(a data-based reporting and monitoring system to show inequities and
the under-utilization of minorities and women), building trustful
relationships with the deans and department heads, the appointment of
affirmative action coordinators, a review of the University’s policies
and procedures for compliance with federal laws and regulations, and a
review of University grievance procedures. A review of the Director's
May 1, 1973, report indicates that in her opinion most of these goals
were being accomplished. She wrote
This has been a productive year and four months; very
trying, full of tension surrounding the establishment
of a non-conforming enclave (Etzioni). There has been
too much work to do and too much expected with the
resources available. Yet much more has been done than
one could reasonably expect under the circumstances.
The primary objective of this Office will remain [emphasis
mine] as follows: to establish a communications network
with colleges, departments, and their administrators and
personnel, to work with them in undertaking workshops
and educational seminars to increase their ability to
understand and interpret the laws, regulations, and
guidelines, and to maintain a position that firmly supports
the belief of this Office that affirmative action must be
implemented at every level of the University, and decisions
made, to the extent possible, at the lowest possible
decision-making level, depending on the nature of the
issue
.
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Two months later in her report to HEW the Director of Resource
Development wrote.
The University of Cincinnati is the first major
university or college, perhaps the first higher
education institution, to develop its overall
affirmative action plan from the departmental
level through the college level, with each unit
of the institution developing its own plan,
involving its own personnel, academic and non-
academic, establishing via this approach, the
importance of committing every level of the
institution to affirmative action, developing
the importance of accepting responsibility at
each decision-making level for its effective
implementation and accepting accountability for
future results.
Of two other criteria the Director proposed for evaluating the
implementation of affirmative action, one was involvement (5/1/73).
She never compromised her strategy to get every unit to set its own
goals and timetables for the more effective use of minorities and women.
By June 1st applicant flow forms were being used in every unit as well
as other forms she had introduced to monitor a unit’s relationship to
its employees, in training, promotion, transfer, and termination. Each
unit was also expected to develop its own affirmative action plan by
April 30, 1973 (see 3/3/73). The Director would also cite the number
of people who were informed of affirmative action laws and guidelines as
a measure of her effectiveness in involving the University Community in
affirmative action. The other criteria the Director proposed was observ-
ability . By that she meant the extent to which an affirmative action
perspective was included in the decisions and policies of the University.
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A review of the chronological summary shows that she felt deliberately
excluded from decision-making in the President’s office, even though
she saw herself as the spokesman for an affirmative action perspective.
In sum, the Director probably saw herself as effective with the units
in implementing affirmative action and unsuccessful in gaining access
to or support from the President.
A fourth way to assess the impact of affirmative action on the
University would be to assume that an effective affirmative action
program would intensify the visibility and pressure of special interest
groups and then to question whether or not this has occurred. There is
some evidence to show that it did: black students presented a list of
thirty-three grievance /demands to the University in November; the United
Black Faculty Association conducted its first investigation into insti-
tutionalized racism in the College of Education; the AAUP badgered the
President throughout February about delays in implementing an affirmative
action plan; a coalition of women’s groups presented the University with
a list of its concerns in April and filed a class action suit with HEW
early in July. On the other hand there was some backlash to administrative
proposals in the area of affirmative action: for example, the Faculty
Senate recommended that money for salary increases be used for across-the-
board, cost-of-living supplements instead of for salary equity for women.
Looking at affirmative action in these four ways it becomes almost
impossible to make one statement about the impact of affirmative action
on the University. By June, 1973, some progress had been made at the
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college level but not at the departmental level toward understanding
what affirmative action means to higher education. A reporting and
monitoring system had been introduced. By October, 1973, the com-
munity would have had comparative data over a three-year period on
the utilization of women and minorities. None of the goals the units
had set for themselves in draft plans had been reviewed, however, by
June of 1973. Nor had a comprehensive plan for the University been
written by that date. Furthermore, there are some strong indications
that the Director had not built the kinds of workable relationships
she would need with the President’s office, with the Personnel office,
with women's groups, or with the deans and department heads in order
to implement an affirmative action plan. There are also strong indica-
tions that the President would not be able to build on whatever the
Director had accomplished, once he had made a decision to ask her to
resign.
Summary and Conclusions
It was shown in this case study that the behaviors that the people
undergoing change said they needed from the organizational leader again
corresponded to the actions the set of propositions set forth in Chapter II
propose for the leader, even though the problems people encountered in
trying to implement affirmative action were different from the ones
they
encountered in long range planning. In this case, implementation
would
have been facilitated if there had been follow-up and if
workable relation-
ships had been established between the Office of Resource
Development and
213
relevant individuals and groups in the University, i.e. department
heads, the Personnel Office, women's groups, etc. One conclusion
that it is possible to reach after reviewing the case is that the
organizational leader needs to monitor the change processes that
I O
he has initiated in order to insure their success whether or not
he's delegated responsibility for the change to someone else. With-
out monitoring change, the organizational leader cannot control,
support, reward, or redirect the way things are going. In this case
if the President had been monitoring the development of an affirmative
action program more closely he could have given the Director the kind
of support she felt she needed and he could have intervened where her
strategy of implementation was "weak", i.e. drawing on his knowledge
of the University's structure and culture by advising her to pay more
attention to her relationships with the Personnel Office and with
department heads. Having failed to establish a workable (open) relation-
ship with the Director himself during the implementation stage, it was
impossible for Bennis to perform some of the roles postulated as necessary
for incorporating change - objective evaluation, for example. It has also
been shown in this chapter how certain role constraints or cross pressures
interfered with the President's role performance during refreezing, such
as the budget.
^The word "monitoring" here includes steps taken to establish
reporting systems, develop performance objectives, measure results,
to take corrective actions, and to administer rewards and
sanctions
(see Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work, 1973).
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A
Finally, in this case a significant number of the conditions
specified as important for the successful initiation, implementation,
and incorporation of change have been created by actions by someone
other than the organizational leader, the Director of Resource Develop-
ment. Correspondingly, one would think that the change process would
be further along and more successful. There is evidence to show that
this was not the case with affirmative action at the University of
Cincinnati (see the section on impact earlier in this chapter and the
postscript that follows). The case study of affirmative action lends
some support to the assumption made in the initial stages of this
research that "the degree to which a proposed change is initiated,
implemented, and incorporated is a function of a number of variables,
many of which can be linked to the role performance of the organiza-
tional leader" see page 3). This case raises some questions about the
extent to which responsibility for initiation, implementation, and
incorporation can be delegated, especially to someone outside the
perceived power structure without the acknowledged, legitimate authority
of the leader himself. It seems as if organizational members are un-
willing to accord someone other than the organizational leader legitimate
authority to influence their actions and that even if this were to occur
that they would still expect the leader to intervene to clarify roles and
to set limits on that person's authority.
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Postscript
In June of 1973, Bennis appointed another woman to be the
Director of the Office of Resource Development renamed the Office
of University Commitment to Human Resources. A plan was not sub-
mitted to HEW on July 31, 1973 because the goals and timetables
outlined by the units in their plans had not been reviewed by any-
one in the University to see if they were reasonable and attainable.
Instead January 31, 1974, was set as the time by which the University
would have to submit an affirmative action plan to HEW. In the mean-
time the unit plans have been reviewed and the former Director's
record-keeping forms have been modified.
In July of 1973 the Director filed several complaints with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and with the Office of Civil
Rights, HEW, on essentially three grounds: racial and sexual discrim-
ination and arbitrary dismissal with fear of retribution. Her complaints
13
were interpreted by HEW to be class-action suits. As a result of these
charges HEW conducted an on-site investigation at the University of
Cincinnati in the fall of 1973. They recommended among other things
that the University make the salaries of equally qualified men and women
in comparable positions equitable which the University has pledged to do
in the 1974-75 budget.
13rhat is that there might be a group of women, of which the Director
is only one, that are being discriminated against on these same grounds
and who are keeping quiet because they fear retribution.
CHAPTER VII
CASE STUDY: THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL
LEADER IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BUDGET
REVIEW/RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS 1
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the role of the
University President in the development and implementation of a
budget-review and resource allocation process. The entire budget-
making process is far more extensive than description in this
chapter will show. This chapter will focus on the University Presi-
dent's role only as it relates to internal decision-making about
resource allocation and not to external resource procurement. In
other words it will not be concerned for the most part with the
organizational leader's role as a fund-raiser or lobbyist. Only
those external activities of the leader that influence the initiation,
implementation, and incorporation of a new way of arriving at budgetary
decisions will be included in the description and analysis that follows.
A case analysis of the President's role in the internal budget-
making process was done for several reasons. In the first place, the
amount of resources in an organization and the process by which they
are allocated, directly effect the implementation of any kind of change
1Material for this chapter came from a study of documents in the
office of the University President, from observation of budget hearings
and meetings, and from interviews with fifteen individuals who were
highly involved in one or more phases of the budget-review process.
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in the organization. If for no other reason than that, the budget-
making process is important to study. It is probably more important
to study given the changing economic and social conditions facing
higher education: rising costs and decreasing support. "Universities
will be faced with no substantial increases in total support from present
sources in the foreseeable future. Such increases as may come to the
University will barely match inflationary pressures, if that. Any funds
for new programs, different emphasis, or expanding needs must therefore
come either from new external sources or from internal reallocation"
(the Provost, 2/2/73). In other words, change in universities in the
future will more than likely result from the reallocation of resources
than from the addition of new resources as has been the case in the past.
The way in which resources are reallocated will influence the fate of
other changes introduced in the University.
Given that in years of severe financial stingency, the budgetary
decision-making process may be qyalitatively different from what it has
been in the sixties - involving more participation, consultation, and
information-sharing than in years past, it is possible that the role
performance of the organizational leader in initiating, implementing,
and incorporating change may be far more important than in other circum-
stances. The prospect of deficit budgets may lead organizational
members
to need or expect certain actions from the organizational leader
that may
or may not be included in the propositions presented in
Chapter II. An
interest in exploring that possibility is a second reason for
choosing
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to do a case analysis of the President's role in the budget review/
resource allocation process.
The third reason for choosing to do this chapter relates to
what was mentioned above. Decision-making about resource allocation
was the only internal change process observed in which the University
President had an extensive external role - in lobbying with other state
university presidents for more money for higher education and in trying
to locate new sources of income for the University. This case offered
an opportunity to understand what effects a leader* s external activities
might have on his actions in initiating, implementing, and incorporating
change within the organization.
As in the other cases, a chronological summary of events that
occurred in the academic year from September, 1972 to June, 1973 is
2included in Appendix F. In the first part of this chapter some of
the problems, as well as the values and benefits, that participants,
including the University President, encountered in implementing the
budget-making process will be described. The purpose of the rest of
the chapter will be to retrospectively analyze the University President's
leadership in the development and implementation of a participative
budget-review process. What were the President's interventions in
regards to the internal budget-making process? Secondly, what actions
could he have taken, given what the propositions say about the role
^The reader may wish to review the chronological summary in Appendix F
before reading the case analysis that follows.
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performance of the organizational leader? And thirdly, to what extent
did the actions he took successfully unfreeze, change, and refreeze
the attitudes, expectancies, and behaviors of organizational members
in regards to resource allocation? Responses in interviews will be
used to discuss the answers to each of those questions in the final
section of this chapter.
Problems Encountered in Trying to Implement the
1973-74 Budget Review/Resource Allocation Process
The chronological summary of events included in the Appendix
reveals that there were a number of problems encountered in attempting
to implement the 1973-74 budget review/resource allocation process.
Excerpts from interviews with members of the Faculty and University
Senates' Budget and Priorities Committees and the Budget Review Com-
missions, with the deans, and with the vice presidents will be used to
substantiate what these major problems were. Several recommendations
these persons made for improving the 1974-75 budget-making process are
also included in this section. Implicit in the description of the
problems and in the recommendations are a number of actions that the
people undergoing change said they needed or expected the University
President (or in some cases the vice presidents) to take in regards to
the 1973-74 budget review process. The major problems may be grouped
under several headings.
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Cred ibility
Several Senate committee and budget review commission members
questionned skeptically whether the Senates' or commissions' recom-
mendations would make any difference in final budget allocations.
Several individuals shared perceptions of the vice presidents that
ran from highly committed to an open participative process to highly
resistant to such a process. A majority of the persons interviewed
that the President should have shared his ideas on resource allo-
cation and program evaluation earlier in the budget-review process
giving greater credibility to its openness. It was felt that the
President's criteria for assessing programs were unknown throughout
this entire process (see chronological summary 5/22/73). One vice
presidential budget was cited that did not reflect review commission
recommendations. In another case it was felt that the criteria that
had been laid out for the budget-review process in one vice presidential
area - effective management of resources, quality of instructional pro-
grams, commitment to urban-related programs - were ultimately not followed
in coming to decisions about resource allocations. Rather cuts that were
expedient, that represented the course of least resistance were made (a
unit director). Others felt there was a problem with credibility when the
real deficit the University faced turned out to be 1.5% lower than the
projected deficit and when it was discovered that the University actually
had not had to borrow 1/2 million dollars on its reserves in 1972-73.
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Assumptions Underlying Budget Allocations
More than one person who was interviewed felt that the budget
was predicated on some assumptions that were not explicit and that had
not been widely discussed (see chronological summary, 11/11/72, 3/14/73
and 3/28/73). They felt that these assumptions locked the budget in
before the governance groups’ reviews. In this regard they suggested
that a clearly articulated and agreed-upon set of University priorities
would have helped community discussion as would a long range plan for
the University. Even the Provost felt that one of the problems with the
1973-74 budget review process was that there was no University-wide
framework within which to make decisions. "Only the President can make
certain decisions on allocations between vice presidential areas" (the
Provost) .
Timing
There were several concerns about timing. Students felt that the
budget—review came at times when it was difficult for them to participate,
at the end of quarters. Almost all of those interviewed objected to the
condensed amount of time governance groups were given to review the budget.
They similarly felt that deadlines were set up which they adhered to and
then were not met at other levels. Representatives from both Senate com-
mittees felt that it was late in the academic year, February/March, before
the governance groups came to understand the input they would have
in the
budget-review process; until then they never new what document they'd
review,
when, or for how long. Given that they had only a week to
complete a
review of the budget, most of the persons interviewed felt
that they had
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to spend too much time just getting responses and requesting informa-
tion that was not readily available. Several of the deans felt that
the entire budget review/resource allocation process took too long
and that decisions that needed to be made in November and December -
such as whether or not to recruit for open positions - were not being
made until May or June (see chronological summary 2/26/73).
Lack of Feedback
Although the President acted on two of the University Senate's
recommendations - merit salary raises and no student fee increases -
many of the persons interviewed cited a lack of feedback to the docu-
ments the Senates submitted as a problem. Others felt that no rationales
had been given for changes in budgetary allocations that had gone from
the review commissions to the Council of Vice Presidents and from the
Council to the President. Several review commission members felt that
the individual vice presidential reports should be circulated to review
commission members for review and comment before going to the Council of
Vice Presidents. Others would have liked to have seen the insert from
the Provost's report detailing specific unit allocations in that they
felt that the rationales for those allocations were indicative of
priorities being set implicitly, if not explicitly.
Information
In interviews several questions about the information provided and
the kinds of information Committee and Commission members felt they needed
were asked. There was disagreement over whether line item budgets
should
or should not be provided. The Faculty Senate report contains
the following
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statement. "We were unable to obtain line item budgets for various
units; we were given no detailed breakdown of how cuts would be
achieved in most areas; and there was virtually no information which
would put spending and income patterns in an historical perspective."
Information was more easily bootlegged into the University Senate
because several committee members had had access to information at
ear ffer stages of the budget review process. There was a fairly high
degree of concurrence that profile data on colleges and departments
should be made readily available as well as information in usable
form on student enrollment, faculty /student ratios, Ohio Board of
Regents’ models, etc. Obviously program evaluation materials would
have been helpful if available. This year the first document that was
made available was the Council of Vice Presidents’ recommendations which
was described as distilled and uncorroborated by some of the persons who
were interviewed. One recommendation that several committee members
made was that uniform kinds of information be made available across
colleges and vice presidential areas as much as possible. Generally
the respondents leaned in favor of more information, not less. They
specifically requested two kinds of information not available this year
be available next year: a reconciliation between the Senates’ recom-
mendations of the previous year and the continuation budget and a recon-
ciliation between the continuation budget in the fall and the spring
budget figures which were discrepant in many cases. The reconciliations
should also include adequate explanations for any increases or decreases,
they felt.
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Role of the Governance Groups in the Review Process
There was considerable disagreement among governance group
members' perceptions of the role the Senates should play in the budget-
review process, or in fact did play. Apparently there were also incon-
sistent expectations among the vice presidents for the Senates' participa-
tion in the process. One vice president wanted reactions to the Council
of Vice Presidents' recommendations and not a statement of priorities;
another advised the committees to state priorities since they represented
the entire University community. There seems to be in retrospect several
alternative roles for the governance groups to play in the budget-review
process including: 1) institutional priority setting; 2 ) addressing of
inequities; 3) advocate for special interest groups; or 4) program evalua-
tion. (All of the persons who were interviewed agreed that without more
time and information and explicit criteria the last would not be within
the purview of the Senates' Budget and Priorities Committees.) Whichever
role the Senate committees played, it was agreed that their recommendations
would only be advisory to the President.
Role of the Advisory Budget Review Commissions
The lack of uniformity among the roles the commissions played in
the various vice presidential area was cited as a problem. Most of the
persons interviewed felt that review commission recommendations should be
reflected in the vice presidents' report, and that in some cases they
were not during the 1973-74 budget-review process. It was also felt that
the opportunity to compare the way advisory commissions operated
(perhaps
through overlapping memberships) in the various vice presidential areas
would have been helpful.
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The Role of the Deans In the Budget Rev lew/Resource Allocation Process
Several persons recommended that the deans as a group be more
meaningfully involved in budgetary decisions, and perhaps be asked as
a group to review the Council of Vice Presidents’ document. With the
deans more fully involved, it was assumed that the faculty could become
more fully involved at the grassroots departmental and college level.
It was felt that the deans needed to share total budgets with each other
and not just the parts of budgets they had identified for cuts in order
to get away from the competetiveness that was at times evident in the
1973-74 budget review process. Some of the deans themselves felt that
the vice presidents also needed to reject the budget presentations of
those deans who did not identify programmatic implications of 3%, 6%,
and 9% cuts. Finally the Faculty Senate’s Report on the budget stated
that deans in general needed to play much broader role in evaluating
the non-academic service and support areas of the University, in recom-
mending budget allocations, and in determining University priorities.
Lack of Expertise to Ask the Right Questions and
Unfamiliarity with Accounting
Finally, the last problem identified by the persons who were
interviewed was inexperience and a lack of expertise in accounting and
budget -making that interfered with their meaningful participation in
the budget-review process. Although this was a problem the only sug-
gestion made was to provide more information and explanations to governance
groups and review commissions at an earlier date.
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Values and Benefits
In addition to the problem areas described above, there were
also certain benefits or values to governance group and review com-
mission participation in the budget-review/resource allocation process
that deserve mentioning. In many cases these values were a result of
actions the President took to create the conditions described in the
propositions for the successful initiation, implementation, and incor-
poration of change. The strengths of the budget review/allocation
process included introspection, sharing of information, widespread
participation, the ordering of priorities, increased visibility and
accountability, the clarification of issues, and a perception of in-
creased credibility in some quarters.
Introspection
"Perhaps at no time - certainly not in recent years - have the
academic units of the University examined so critically their resources
and the utilization of those resources. While the preparation of long
range plans some six months earlier had begun the process of introspection,
it was the prospect of budget reductions that caused many units to look
critically at realities and possibilities as never before" (the Provost’s
recommendations to the President, 2/2/73).
Sharing of Information
"Not only did the budget-review process develop data of
new and
useful sorts for each unit administrator's own use,
perhaps equally
important, the budget presentations were the occasion
for sharing kinds
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of fiscal information among deans and unit directors that had never
been shared before" (the Provost's recommendations to the President,
2/2/73). Several college deans and governance group members identified
this as an important benefit of the budget-review process.
Participation
Each person who was interviewed felt that the degree of participa-
tion in decision-making was better in the 1973-74 budget review than it
had ever been. "In some, but not all units, the preparation of preliminary
budget estimates widely involved members of the faculty and staff. The
involvement may well have been more extensive and more meaningful than
that of long range planning—suggesting that austerity may be a stronger
cohesive force than affluence" (the Provost's recommendations to the
President, 2/2/73).
Ordering of Priorities
In all good faith, Bennis' intention was to use the budget in such
a way that it reflected University priorities and so that faculty members
especially could see the results of their efforts. "In many units the
budget review process has been responsible for facing issues and problems
that ought to have been faced anyway - but undoubtedly would not have been
faced without some such catalyst. Choices have now been made among options
beyond those choices that the current exigency requires. Some units will
undoubtedly reduce current expenditure levels below the mandatory reductions
in order to permit the reordering of priorities and the support
of essential
new directions and options" (the Provost's recommendations to
the President,
2/2/73).
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Increased Accountability and Visibility
First, the fiscal problem we face has been publicized and
people have become far more aware of the University's plight to a
far higher degree than would have occurred if the solutions had been
solely administrative. Second, the review process has measurably
increased the accountability of line administrative offices to share
information, to explain decisions and choices, to justify activities
and services, etc." (see chronological summary 4/2/73). "Traditionally,
the allocation of resources has been an almost totally closed process. . .
but this year, for the first time, openness and candor to a very high
degree have been required" (the Provost's recommendations to the Presi-
dent, 2/2/73).
Clarification of Issues
Certain issues were clarified as a result of 1973-74 budget-
review processes that might not otherwise have come to light. For
example as a result of governance groups' and review commission recom-
mendations allocations to the college Conservatory of Music will be
reviewed. As a result of discussions between the Vice President for
Management and Finance and faculty members on the Senates' Budget and
Priorities Committees, the University's policy on the return of over-
head on grants and contracts will be reviewed.
Credibility
A seventh benefit some respondents identified as a result of the
budget-review process is increased administrative credibility (a benefit
which could be debated since it appears on both sides of the ledger
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as both a benefit and a problem). However, at least some of the persons
who were interviewed felt that sincere efforts were taken by administra-
tors throughout the budget-review process to effectively involve non-
administrators in decision-making.
Although there were several criticisms of the budget-making pro-
cess, the persons who were interviewed were fairly non-specific in sug-
gesting what else the President might have done in regards to the 1973-74
budget-review/resource allocation process. Simply starting from what he
did do one finds that he intervened a great deal in managing the review
process. The purpose of the next section of this chapter is to describe
the actions he took in light of the propositions set forth in Chapter II
for the role performance of the organizational leader in initiating,
implementing, and incorporating change.
The Role Performance of the University President
ih Developing and Implementing the
Budget-Review/Resource Allocation Process
Unfreezing-Initiation
Proposition Is An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to assess the sources and nature
of resistance to the proposed change.
Proposition 2; To overcome the initial resistance
of organizational members to the proposed change.
In order to initiate a participative budget review process that
would extensively involve members of the University community and
that
would culminate in recommendations for specific allocations to
specific
units, Bennis had to convince members of the University
community of the
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severity of the budget situation facing higher education and of the
need to reallocate existing resources rather than to depend on
expanding resources. Propositions 1 and 2 indicate that it may have
been important for him "to anticipate the nature and sources of
resistance as well as to overcome initial resistance toward the
review process." To what extent did Bennis intervene in the system
to accomplish these objectives?
There is evidence that he was aware of organizational members'
resistance to changes in the available amount of resources when he
wrote "given the drastic changes in the financial future of the
University, I suppose it would be unrealistic not to expect a decline
in faculty morale." Comments Bennis made in interviews with the author
suggested that he was aware of the resistance of some of the deans to
a more open decision-making process, when they had managed quite well
negotiating budgets under "the old style, highly personal and highly
paternalistic administration" (a dean). Clearly Bennis knew that
indiscriminate, across-the-board cutting would anger many faculty
members and department heads when he reassured the University community
that he would not accept across-the-board cuts (10/9/72, 10/31/72,
11/21/72). The Provost's preparation of "Budget Questions and Answers"
and Bennis' pencilled in additions reflect a further shared awareness
of the kinds of objections and criticisms faculty and students would
raise about the process of allocating resources (see chronological
summary 11/20/72). Part of the President’s budget strategy seemed to
be to try to overcome resistance by sharing information.
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Sharing information about the budget situation (undermining
informational supports for existing attitudes and behaviors) was one
objective of Bennis ' October 31st speech to the University, as well
as of the "Budget Questions and Answers" (12/6/72, 12/8/72) mentioned
above, and of the media presentations on the budget November 21 and
22, 1972. In his 10/31/72 speech Bennis forthrightly said that "what
was a bad budget situation, could get worse, but that all institutions
of higher education were essentially in the same boat." He assured
them that decisions would be made rationally in any case and that
somehow "through efforts to develop new sources of income, by studying
expenditures in order to find more effective ways of allocating resources,
and by reevaluating programs and priorities that "what was a bad situa-
tion could be managed and controlled without compromising the core
values of the University." On the one hand, he assured the faculty
that everything was not lost; on the other hand, he tried to undermine
a sense of complacency and belief that things were not really any dif-
ferent then they had ever been. Finally, Bennis tried to mitigate
anxiety by assuring the faculty and deans that non—academic areas would
be reviewed and cut first before instructional areas and that faculty
members would be involved from the beginning in the decision-making
process (see 10/27/72, 10/31/72, 12/1/72).
Proposition 3i An objective of the strategics
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to heighten organizational members
sensitivity to problems involving the intended
change.
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If sharing information was one of the strategies Bennis used to
overcome organizational members' resistance to a long and painful
process of self-evaluation, it was also the main strategy he used to
heighten organizational members sensitivity to problems in regards to
the proposed changes (Proposition 3) . There were numerous meetings
with the Board (11/1/72, 11/21/72, 11/22/72), with the deans and faculty
members (5/17/72, 9/20/72, 10/3/72, 10/27/72); speeches (10/31/72,
11/8/72); and presentations (11/21-11/22/72) that gave the President
opportunities to describe the factors that had contributed to the
present budget situation and the implications those constraints would
have for the University. Stories in Candid Campus served the same
function (see chronological summary 11/1/72, 11/29/72, 12/6/72, 12/8/72,
2/7/73, 2/14/73, 3/14/73, 4/25/73). On November 15, 1972, Bennis is
quoted in Candid Campus as saying, "I think this is perhaps the most
vital thing we have to discuss in the weeks ahead given the present
financial circumstances. The next two to three years will be most
significant for our own and all universities. . ." (Proposition 3).
Every person who was interviewed felt that the seriousness of the
problems facing the University had been emphasized through the media,
through Bennis' speeches, and through the almost uninterrupted focus
it received from every administrative officer from October, 1972, until
June, 1973 (see chronological summary 2/26/73, 2/29/73, 3/2/73, 3/22/73).
Proposition 4: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to stimulate new needs and levels
of aspiration in the system in regards to the
proposed change.
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Bennis also used his speeches and articles in Candid Campus to
stimulate new needs and levels of aspiration among organizational
members (Proposition 4) though the effect of this might have been
lost on those who saw resource allocation as an administrative
responsibility. In the fall he wrote, "we can use the period ahead to
improve our educational and research programs" (11/15/72) and for
"creative retraction" i.e. program evaluation, reducation, or elimina-
tion (10/31/72) . Even within a shrinking budget Bennis saw possibilites
for funding new programs in graduate education (see 3/31/73) and the
applied behavioral sciences.
Proposition 5: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to integrate new forces for change
with existing forces for change, external forces
for change with internal forces for change.
Proposition 5 in Chapter II states that it may be important for the
leader in initiating organizational change to make the organization
more open to its environment, joining new external with existing internal
forces for change. Especially in a speech to the Board (although also
in the October faculty speech)
,
Bennis effectively related the projected
deficit budget and the need for the reallocation of resources to external
environmental conditions such as inflation, enrollment trends, and legis-
lative action and to internal forces such uncritical budget allocations in
the late sixties at the University and to the need for a new library
(5/17/72). On several occasions Bennis reprinted articles from the
Chronicle of Higher Education (see 5/17/72, "New Dollars from Old
234
Budgets ) or reports that he felt would influence the internal decision-
making process (see 10/31/72 - The Illinois Report on Program Evaluation,
The AAUP Guidelines on Financial Stringency). On Bennis ' initiative
Candid Campus did a story on the implications of Nixon's budget on
higher education (1/31/73) which again demonstrated that external
pressures were causing the austere conditions in higher education which
required some sort of internal response. Another intervention Bennis
made in light of Proposition 5 was to raise a series of questions,
problems, and issues linking external and internal factors in a letter
to the vice presidents on October 31, 1973, on "program evaluation and
budgetary reductions." For example, he asked "Will decreases in enroll-
ment and loss of institutional prestige offset the financial savings
resulted from major program reductions? Will accreditation be affected?
Will it be possible to make program reductions and eliminations which
seem appropriate to the needs, strengths, and goals of the University
and at the same time satisfy the demands of the Board of Regents' Master
Plan?"
Proposition 6: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to change the constellation of
forces, resources, or information converging
on any one part of the organization.
There is ample evidence in the literature on attitude change to
suggest that perceptions and values can be changed by changing the infor-
mation a person receives or the people he interacts with (Proposition 6)
.
What strategies did Bennis undertake to change the flow of information
or resources in the University in regards to the budget? In
addition
to the strategies listed in the paragraphs above (speeches, the
distribution
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of reprinted materials, etc.)
,
Bennis also asked the vice presidents
on numerous occasions (1/9/73, 3/14/73) to make certain information
available although it was never completely clear whether or not he
requested this information for his own use or for wider use. (The
Faculty Senate Budget and Priorities Committee for one, in any case,
felt that not enough information was widely shared.) (See problem
description above.) The intercollegiate athletic program was one of
the areas of the budget where there was a lot of misunderstanding in
the University community. In order to make more information about
the real costs of the intercollegiate athletic program, especially
football, available, Bennis appointed an Athletic Commission on
October 25, 1972, "to evaluate the intercollegiate athletic program
at the University of Cincinnati in light of institutional priorities
and resources." The decision to appoint an academic dean to each of
the non—academic vice presidential budget review commissions from the
perception of the deans is another example of an action Bennis took to
change the flow of resources and information in the University (1/9/73).
Over and over again Bennis reiterated that control of administrative
services needed to be decentralized. Finally two interventions in the
January 30th, 1973, vice presidents' meeting represent a commitment on
the President's part to broaden communication: he appointed an ad
hoc
advisory review group to evaluate programs in selected departments
(the
information was then to be shared and used in making budget
reductions)
and he directed the vice presidents to publish a timetable
of the budget
narrative description of each step in Candid Campus.
The
process with a
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effect of these two actions, if implemented, would be to make more
information available to the vice presidents and the President in their
deliberations and to make the University review process more under-
standable and visible.
Proposition 7: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to elicit support for the proposed
organizational change from informal as well as
formal leaders in the organization.
Proposition 11: To involve as many of the indi-
viduals to be affected by the proposed change as
possible in planning and decision-making.
The whole question of organizational members participation in
the budget review process is complex and problemmatic (Proposition 11)
.
The Provost in his recommendations to the President (4/2/73) commented
on how the extensive involvement of faculty members and students had
contributed to greater awareness of the problems on their part and to
greater accountability on the part of administrators. On the other hand
the persons who were interviewed identified a lack of clarity about the
role of the governance groups in the budget-making process, the incon-
sistent use of review commissions in vice presidential areas, and the
need for deans to be more involved in decision-making, as problems in
the 1973-74 budget-review process.
Clearly Bennis was concerned with questions of participation in
and legitimization of the budget review process (Proposition 7, 11).
In a letter to the vice presidents on 10/31/72 Bennis asked, "How can
faculty, students, administrators, alumni, and community leaders be
involved in evaluations and how can their support for the decision
process be developed?" Although other factors such as the length
of
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the process, the complexity of the problems and of budget materials,
the availability of information, and the varying level commitment of
the vice presidents to a participative process, etc. often influence
the effectiveness of Bennis ' interventions, it is fairly easy to
identify actions he took that were intended to increase community
support and involvement. He sought to secure the support of Board
members by making frequent reports to them at monthly meetings about
not only his activities in Columbus with the legislature, the Regents,
and the Governor, but also about the actions he and the vice presi-
dents were taking to evaluate and prioritize programs (see chrono-
logical summary 9/20/72, 11/3/72, 11/8/72). He met frequently with
his vice presidents and assistants and to a large degree depended on
them to implement the internal budget-making process. For example,
he instructed the vice presidents to involve middle-level managers
and faculty members in the earliest stages of the budget review pro-
cess (10/31/72). Bennis met less frequently with the deans (10/27/72,
1/9/73) but still took certain actions to insure their involvement in
the process. For example, he directed the vice presidents to work
with deans and unit directors to identify options within their areas
for 6-9% cuts. On 12/19/72 and again on 1/9/73 he asked the vice
presidents in non-academic areas to appoint an academic dean to their
review commissions. 3 In late May Bennis tried to rekindle the deans
involvement by scheduling individual meetings with each dean. (To a
certain extent the two academic vice presidents felt undercut by
these meetings fearing that promises would be made and information
shared from which they were excluded (5/22/72).)
At the next level down in the administrative hierarchy, depart-
ment chairmen, one department chairman wrote
I am somewhat puzzled by the general process of
budget development and budget decisions. I recog-
nize that enormous amounts of efforts and thought
have been given to the University budget as a whole
. . .Unfortunately with respect to the College of
Medicine, the heads of departments who really know
most about the current and future budget needs of
their departmental units were essentially uninvolved
except at the preliminary planning stage last fall.
After the recent decisions were announced, these
same department chairmen were required to implement
these decisions within a few days - in my case, to
find sufficient monies for making the salary in-
creases which had already been announced and sub-
sequently to come up with ways of sustaining general
funds losses - also within a few days (5/29/73)
.
JBetween the time when most review commission reports were written
(early February) and the time when the deans received their unit allo-
cations (late May) the deans’ involvement in the review process consisted
occasionally of conferences with the Provost or Vice President of the
Medical Center and of listening to cursory progress reports on the budget
process at Friday afternoon deans' meetings. Only two of the deans were
involved in the governance groups' reviews. The Provost's concern in
early April when Bennis announced that he intended to make program cuts
in 1973-74 and to present a two-year biennium budget by June, 1973, was
that whatever participation and sort of self-assumed responsibility for
identifying cuts that he had worked for from the deans would be under-
mined (4/5/73). However neither the two-year budget nor program cuts
materialized much to Bennis' chagrin and the Provost's relief.
4Whether or not the organizational leader can be held responsible for
departmental chairmen's participation in the budget review process is
debatable. However his interventions, in this case, required the participa-
tion (and support) of individuals who had, for the most part, been excluded
from decision-making about what they were now being asked to implement.
In regards to the informal leaders in the University, the Presi-
dent sought to involve them too in the budget-making process. He met
with the entire Faculty Senate on 11/9/72 and again on 1/11/73. He
met often with governance group leaders to keep them informed about
Legislative actions in Columbus that affected the University budget.
On March 1st the ad hoc budget advisory group asked the President to
ask the University Senate to develop a list of program evaluation
criteria and thereby extend their participation. Despite frequent
meetings between the governance groups and the President and vice
presidents, the perception of a lack of clarity about the role of the
Senates’ Budget and Priorities Committees in the review process persisted.
Bennis used speeches and letters to encourage what he considered
to be essential faculty participation in the budget process (see chrono-
logical summary 10/31/72, 12/1/72). On 11/15/72 he wrote "The outcome
will be partly dependent on the commitment of the faculty and the
administration to work together." Faculty members would supposedly
be able to participate in departmental and college reviews, as review
commission members and as governance group representatives. The effect
of all this participation was disruptive, and frustrating; however,
according to one department head. He wrote, "We do not need a new
budget commission, or yet more participation in the decision-making
process. Nor do we need more long range uncertainty and short term
chaos." Instead, "I have asked for some assurance about the budgetary
future of this department. Apparently this cannot be given"
(11/15/72).
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Proposition 14: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to establish and maintain a climate
of acceptance, support, and trust in interpersonal
relationships in which change is regarded positively.
Uncertainty about the budget was due to a combination of factors,
some of them external, some of them internal. Externally the State
subsidy could not be predicted. We have seen how that led to lack
of information on which to base decisions about resource allocation
at every level of the organization. Internally, Bennis kept holding
on to a belief that budget reductions in 1973-74 could be based on
program evaluation long after it was realistic or feasible. These
factors led to a postponement of other decisions such as whether or
not to recruit for or fill open positions - which had a negative effect
on organizational climate (Proposition 14) (see chronological summary
11/15/72, 2/26/73, 2/29/73, 3/2/73). Bennis clearly was aware of the
problem of declining faculty morale when, in a report to the Board of
Directors, he wrote, "What we must avoid however is any form of malaise
that might immobilize and seek instead a positive adaptation to changing
conditions" (the Spring of 1973). Through speeches and discussions with
faculty members, the President tried to build a sense of positive
identification with change (see discussion of Proposition 4 above).
In the long run however the decision of the vice presidents not to share
information about the lack of a deficit and about the decision not to
borrow against the reserves would undermine any trust that existed
between
the administration and the University community in general;
faculty members,
heads in particular (see chronological summary 2/13/73).deans, and department
241
Proposition 10: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to create a sense of rising expec-
tations among organizational members that they
will benefit from the proposed change in their
organizational behavior.
Proposition 13: To heighten organizational
members' self-esteem and to encourage reciprocity
in regards to the proposed change.
Proposition 10 states that it may be important for the organiza-
tional leader to create a sense of rising expectations about the prospect
of change among organizational members. The President intervened on
numerous occasions to build a sense of rising expectation - about
different aspects of the budget-review/resource allocation process.
On October 27 he promised the deans that non-academic budgets would be
cut before academic budgets and that there would be no indiscriminate
across-the-board cutting. On October 31, 1972, and again on January 24,
1973, Bennis pledged that his Office and those of the vice presidents
would be the first cut. (Faculty members grew skeptical about those
pledges when the appointment of a new vice president was announced in
November and when the administrative reorganization was announced in
March.) Looking at events described in the chronological summary, there
are other occasions later in the budget-review process at which Bennis
created expectations that for one reason or another, usually a lack of
time or resources, were not met. On March 31, 19 73, Bennis hosted
a
seminar for faculty members on the future of graduate education
at the
University of Cincinnati at a time when there was tremendous
insecurity
about salary Increases and hiring for open positions.
On April 4th and
again on April 25th Bennis shared his plan to
announce a two-year budget
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in June of 1973, but by April there was little or no hope that decisions
for more than one year could be made. Finally, on May 17th in a speech
to the University faculty, Bennis announced a set of priorities for
the University. Again the priorities he listed may have created a
dis functional sense of rising expectations - a sense that all of those
things would be nice to do if there were additional resources, but im-
possible to do with fewer and fewer resources available in higher educa-
tion. In general it was difficult to make people feel secure and
essential when you had to talk about program evaluation, reduction,
and elimination (Proposition 13) . We have already seen how some depart-
ment heads felt virtually excluded from decision-making about the budget
and hence, non-essential. As the organizational leader Bennis on the
one hand tried to build a sense of self-esteem on the part of faculty
members; on the other hand, he was forced to argue most strongly against
continuing weak, expensive programs. In regards to the vice presidents
and his own staff, there is only one instance where Bennis verbally
expressed his dependence on others’ roles in the process and that is in
a letter on February 14, 1973, when he said he was counting on the ad
hoc group, especially on the Vice President for Management and Finance,
to help him with the decisions he was going to have to make.
Proposition 12: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to increase the amount of frequency
of interaction between himself and members in
regards to the proposed change.
5The only way some of Bennis’ ten priorities for the University would
be achievable would be if faculty members accepted the need to reallocate
resources among programs and departments within the University a need
which Bennis had been trumpeting but which only a few faculty members
recognized or welcomed (see the section on how Universities have changed
in the past in Chapter IV, Assessment of Setting).
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Proposition 12 has to do with increasing interaction between the
organizational leader and members in order to break down existing atti-
tudes, behaviors, and expectations. A review of the chronology of
events shows that a large portion of the President’s time was spent
on developing the 1973-74 budget and on sharing information about the
process of review that was evolving. A review of the chronology also
shows that there was a great deal of repetition concerning certain
budgetary decisions, especially those involving program evaluation
(see chronological summary 10/31/72, 11/22/72, 1/31/73, 2/15/73, 2/21/73,
3/1/73, 3/14/73) etc. From observation of most of the meetings that
although there was a disproportionately high percentage of time spent
on the budget in vice presidents’ and assistants' meetings with the
President, the result of the increased interaction was not increased
security, responsibility, authority, initiative, or knowledge on the
part of subordinates.
Proposition 9: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to set priorities for the organiza-
tion and to clearly communicate these priorities
to organizational members whose behavior is to
be changed.
Despite increased interaction Bennis still retained authority
to define the urgency and importance the resource allocation process
(Proposition 9) . Numerous references in speeches and articles in
Bennis' lobbying activities in Columbus indicated the relative
importance of the budget-making process in terms of the way the
President allocated his own time. He also controlled the
amount of
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time others - especially the vice presidents and assistants - would
spend on the budget by delegating responsibility for the internal
decision-making process to them. In other ways Bennis’ actions con-
trolled the timing and hence the priority of the budget review/resource
allocation process in relation to other change processes in the Uni-
versity. His trip to Mexico in April delayed the announcement of
unit allocations and consequently the announcement of promotion,
tenure, and merit-increase decisions. His decision to investigate the
feasibility of a biennium, instead of a one-year, budget crippled depart
mental and college efforts to recruit new members for open positions
and once more delayed the announcement of unit allocations. From
January to early March the administrative reorganization (see Chapter
VIII) preemted a great deal of Bennis' time. In sum, although there
is plenty of evidence to suggest that Bennis felt that the budget-
making process had the highest priority of all issues facing the
University in 1973-74, some of the actions he took interfered with
completion of the review process.
Proposition 8: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to link parts of the system that
are sympathetic to the intended change and
share common dissatisfactions and a sense of
powerlessness
.
Proposition 8 states that it may be important for the organiza-
tional leader to link parts of the system which share common dissatis-
factions in order for successful change to occur. The
Provost's idea
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to hold open budget hearings at which each dean would share his proposed
cuts in front of the other deans and an advisory budget review commission
is one example of a strategy designed to accomplish this objective. In
turn, the University President encouraged the Faculty Senate to continue
lobbying state legislators as the administration was doing, thereby
aligning the faculty and administration in the cause for more money
for higher education from the State. It was through his relationships
with the Legislature and the Governor that Bennis most actively sought
to demonstrate to the University community that he was doing his part
to reduce the projected deficit. In turn, he hoped that existing atti-
tudes on the part of the Faculty would change and that they would begin
to contribute to the budget review process by identifying areas where
the budget could be cut and/or programs eliminated. Specifically what
interventions did the President make to demonstrate his effectiveness
in the University's external relationships (Proposition 15).
Proposition 15: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to effect and demonstrate changes
in the organization's relationship with other
sys terns
.
Part of the President's overall strategy in regards to Proposition
15 was to show that his actions in Columbus were part of a planned
strategy to reduce the proposed budget deficit by developing new sources
of income (see the chronological summary in Appendix F, 10/3/72, 10/31/72).
Often the purpose of the President's interventions internally in
regards
to the budget-review process was simply to document his
activities externally.
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He used Candid Campus and his speech to the University faculty to share
information on what he had been doing in Columbus (see 10/31/72; 3/5/73;
5/3/73). When he met the Faculty Senate, he reported on the effective-
ness of his lobbying in Columbus (see 1/11/73) . He tried to make
favorably comparative costs of affirmative action programs and
administrative services between the University of Cincinnati and other
universities available (see 11/9/72, 3/26/73). In order to improve the
University's relationships with federal-funding agencies Bennis opened
an office in Washington, D.C. In order to demonstrate increased effec-
tiveness with businesses, Bennis launched a new corporate fund drive in
November, 1972. In order to make more effective use of library and
faculty resources, he signed a consortium agreement with a neighboring
private college in November, 1972. (Indirectly that agreement might
have enhanced the University's position with the Governor who was
advocating more inter-institutional cooperation between private and
public educational sectors.) Externally, Bennis saw that his role with
the legislature and the Regents was to compare how cuts achieved at
the University of Cincinnati and at other state universities (4/30/73)
in order to gain an advantage in the competition for scarce resources
and then to show internally how worthwhile the long participative budget-
review process had been.
Proposition 16: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage is to build the organizational leader's
expertise and credibility with organizational
members .
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Proposition 17: To extend the organizational leader's
control over varied kinds of resources and sources of
power.
The last two propositions under unfreezing having to do with
increasing the organizational leader's sources of power and his
credibility in regards to the proposed change (Propositions 16 and
17) are similar to the two propositions that apply to all three
phases of the change processes: that organizational members perceive
the leader to be personally involved (Proposition 37) and trustworthy
(Proposition 38) throughout the entire change process. These four
propositions will be discussed together in the next section of this
chapter.
A majority of the persons who were interviewed felt that the
President should have shared his ideas on how the budget could be
reduced earlier than March when they perceived that he did get involved
(Proposition 37) . Some of the faculty members who were interviewed
also felt Bennis had exaggerated his external role in regards to the
budget when he described his activities in a Candid Campus story as
"wearing ruts in the road to Columbus" (Proposition 38) . In the
internal review process by reviewing the Council of Vice Presidents'
and the Senates' recommendations it was felt that the President's
criteria for assessing programs and indicators of quality were unknown
throughout the entire 1973-74 budget review process.
With other groups however Bennis did build credibility through
his interventions into the budget-review/resource allocation process.
After meeting with the deans, he asked the vice presidents to appoint
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an academic dean to each of their budget review commissions which was
done in January. On 3/22/73 he promised the Faculty Senate that he
and the vice presidents would continue to look for money in the budget
for salary increases; on May 1st he announced a 4.5% merit-salary
increase (Propositions 16 and 38) . However, that one action may have
had negative consequences for other objectives Bennis might have hoped
to accomplish with a participative budget review process. "The cavalier
announcement of University-wide salary increases was difficult for some
deans. It created a morale problem in those colleges where money for
4.5% increases cannot be found. Although it might have increased
Bennis’ credibility or power it was detrimental to the deans taking
greater leadership in deciding how cuts would be distributed in their
own colleges. His last minute intervention girds the hope that more
money will be found for other programs" (the Provost, a dean). Similarly,
on the one hand, Bennis' individual meetings with the deans in late May,
1973, demonstrated his personal involvement in the budget-review process
and potentially increased his power to intervene in a unit's budget
decisions. On the other hand, some deans questioned whether such
meetings were necessary if the extensive budget-review/ resource alloca-
tion process had been valid. Essentially what Bennis was asking the
deans to do in preparation for his meetings with them - to project how
they would distribute 3, 6 and 9% units - was what the majority of the
deans had done in January before the Provost's advisory review com-
mission.
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It is evident that Bennis himself was worried about his credibility
when he discovered that the actual budget deficit was much less than what
had been projected in October and that the University had not borrowed
on its reserves (see chronological summary 5/7/73). These facts led
him to become more involved in the budget—making process in several
different ways. On May 17th in a speech to the University faculty he
announced a set of University priorities, although by this date it was
probably impossible for his priorities to be incorporated in final budget
allocations for 1973-74. On May 7th and May 20th Bennis met with the
Vice President for Management and Finance to personally identify per-
centage cuts in certain areas, which were reflected in later budget
documents. He also scheduled the individual meetings with the deans
that have been mentioned before.
That expectations for program evaluation and a biennium budget
were created and then not met contributed to Bennis' credibility prob-
lems. Two deans commented in response to several written questions
following their individual meetings with the President, that, "Bennis
has to be extraordinarily careful about differences between what he
promises and what he delivers . Right now the deans are not listening
(a dean). "My observation is that initially the President affected the
climate of the University very positively. However as a result of some
of his actions and the financial crisis I think the climate is now one
of decreasing morale. It is my impression and this impression has
been
supported by others that the President tends to overcommit himself
and
the University and makes promises which he alternately is
unable to keep.
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In my opinion this kind of behavior is bringing about a deterioration
in the trust level between the President and his constituents" (another
dean) .
Summary
A review of the President's role performance in light of the
propositions for unfreezing shows that although there were negative
reactions to some of his interventions, actions were taken to fulfill
all the conditions described in the first seventeen propositions for
initiating change. Faced with having to convince the University com-
munity of the severity of the budget situation facing higher education
and of the need to reallocate existing resources, Bennis seemed to depend
on a strategy of information sharing to unfreeze existing attitudes and
expectancies and to gain community support for the behavioral changes
required
.
A second strategy Bennis used in initiating the budget-review/
resource allocation process was to try to demonstrate the effectiveness
of his efforts in representing the University’s interests in its external
relationships. Finally although attempts were made to involve deans,
the faculty, and governance groups in the review process, a lack of
clarity about what was expected from this participation had a negative
effect on organizational climate. This case illustrates perhaps more
clearly than the other case how the University President engaged in
unfreezing behaviors throughout the year-long process in order to
prevent
members' attitudes from returning to accustomed expectancies
of more
money and continuing growth.
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Changing-Imp lenient at ion
Proposition 18: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to overcome emerging resistance
to the proposed change during the period of
attempted implementation.
Initial resistance to the budget-review process involved
resistance to having to do things differently than the way they had
been done in the past (i.e. a more open, participative decision-making
process) and to having to identify program reductions instead of addi-
tional programs. Other kinds of resistance emerged as a result of the
problems encountered in trying to implement the budget-review/resource
allocation process: problems in timing (2/16/73), delay (2/16/73), the
absence of a long range plan (11/11/72, 3/14/73), the need for more
information (3/28/73)
,
the lack of clarity about the roles of the
review commissions, the faculty, governance groups, and the deans in
the review process. The resistance (Proposition 18) manifested itself
in such ways that it produced cross-pressures on the role of the uni-
versity president. For example, the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) demanded more extensive faculty involvement in the
budget— review/ resource allocation process (12/1/72), while some deans
and department heads complained about too much participation and deteri-
orating faculty morale (11/15/72). In another example the Faculty Senate
voted for an automatic cost-of-living salary increase at the same time
that the University Senate recommended merit-salary increases.
There
was also emergent resistance from part of the faculty to
the late date
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at which the Athletic Commission Bennis had appointed would report on
the costs of the intercollegiate athletic program and to the hiring
of a new football coach on a three-year contract. At the same time
the Development Office predicted a loss of income from alumni and donors
if football was dropped. What actions did Bennis take to thread his
way through these counter-pressures and build acceptance for whatever
recommendations came out of the review process?
In the first place he did not abolish football, instead he said
he would wait until the Commission submitted its report in May: in the
interim, he recommended a 10% decrease in general funds support for
football in each of the next three years. In a letter to the Faculty
Senate he said he would continue to try to identify money for faculty
salary increases (see 3/22/73), which he later announced on May 1, 1973.
Bennis tried to diffuse resistance in the colleges by being honest,
"what we do next year (1973-74) may not totally reflect our priorities"
(3/30/73) yet, hopefully, "the greatly expanded range of participation
makes it partially worth the pains, troubles, and delays. The data-
gathering and evaluation we have done in the last several months will
make it easier to project the 1974-75 budget" (4/11/73). In other
words he identified with participants’ problems but reaffirmed the
review process.
Bennis tried to diffuse the adversarial relationship he saw
growing between the faculty and the administration by proposing
to
establish a Faculty Advisory Committee. "I do believe that
there are
special interests in our academic community and inherent
differences
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of viewpoint.
. .At the same time, I think it is terribly important
to make certain that the faculty and the administration must eventually
see themselves as being in the same boat, as having similar interests,
as being on the "same side" (Bennis to the chairmen of the Faculty
Senate 4/26/73). On March 9, 1973, Bennis met with department heads
in the College of Arts and Sciences to reassure them of the University's
commitment to the College. On June 19, 1973, Bennis met with department
heads in the Medical College who had been critical of the length and
manner in which the budget-review process had been implemented. Finally,
the President argued strongly for a two-year budget in anticipation of
even greater resistance from the University community if non-programmatic
,
non-priority budget decisions made in 1973-74 might have to be reversed
in the 1974-75 budget.
Proposition 19: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to provide opportunities for
organizational members to make their commitment
to the proposed change public.
Proposition 20: To continually clarify and to
provide mechanisms by which organizational
members can gain clarification of the behavioral
changes required.
Proposition 21: To provide mechanisms for feed-
back between the leader and the people undergoing
change.
Proposition 22: To provide organizational
members with opportunities to test and verify
new behaviors through personal experience.
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The organizational leader can often overcome resistance to
change by providing opportunities for members to make a public commit-
ment in the direction of the proposed change (Proposition 19)
,
by
providing opportunities for members to test new behaviors prior to
making the changes required (Proposition 22)
,
or by providing channels
for feedback and clarification of the proposed changes (Propositions 20
and 21). Although the deans were asked to share information openly with
each other at the Provost's budget hearings in January (Propositions 19
and 22)
,
the deans felt that there were lots of risks and no rewards for
identifying "real" cuts at that stage in the budget-review process.
Later on in the budget-review process as negotiations became more and
more private between the individual dean and the appropriate vice presi-
dent, there were few opportunities to demonstrate a public commitment
to a certain percentage cut or to an open process.
The President's Advisory Council, the small ad hoc advisory budget
group appointed by Bennis, and meetings with the vice presidents, assist-
ants, and governance group leaders, all served to open communication
between the President and the community at various stages of the budget-
review process. The assistants who attended the vice presidents' meetings
without the President reported on the vice presidents' decisions to
the
President (for example, see 10/20/72). The ad hoc group asked the
President to ask the Provost to detail certain line item expenditures
in his area which the ad hoc group had not been able to
get directly from
the Provost (3/1/73). In turn the President asked the
ad hoc advisory
and the vice presidents for certain kinds of
information on which
group
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to base his budget decisions (see chronological summary 10/31/72,
2/21/73, 3/26/73). The President discussed the need for program
evaluation and for the decentralization of administrative services
with the President’s Advisory Council. He had the timetable for the
budget review process published in Candid Campus along with stories
on the progress that was being made both internally and externally
in budget negotiations. In an article in the 3/26/73 edition of
Candid Campus Bennis reiterated the fact that there would be no
across-the-board cuts and clarified that the vice presidents' and
governance groups' recommendations were only advisory to the President.
A review of the chronological summary reveals that individual deans and
vice provosts on numerous occasions wrote the President to ask for a
rationale for proposed reductions or to protest additional cuts (see
3/15/73, 4/5/73, 6/15/73). Finally a portion of almost every vice
presidents' meeting between October and June concerned the budget-
making process.
There was a need, however, for further clarification given some
of the problems encountered in implementation and some of the criticisms
voiced about the review process. (See the section on problem descrip-
tion earlier in this chapter.) "Participation has not led to greater
clarity about how budget decisions will be made because the raised
expectation for program evaluation has not been delivered upon (a vice
provost). "The criteria for decision-making have not been shared by
the Provost nor the President" (a dean).
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Furthermore, the President and the vice presidents apparently never
agreed on whether or not program evaluation would be possible in 1973-74.
As early as 11/22/72, the Provost wrote the President that program evalu-
ation would not be possible in 1973-74; as late as the end of April
(4/25/73) however, the President was still bent on program evaluation.
On 3/26/73 Bennis outlined the four components of program evaluation as
he envisioned it. (Despite the vice presidents' protests that there was
not enough qualitative information to do program evaluation, Bennis said
that he wanted program evaluation prior to making decisions on the 1973-
74 budget on at least eight separate occasions: 10/31/72, 1/23/73,
2/21/73, 3/1/73, 3/14/73, 3/27/73, 4/3/73, and 4/13/73.)
There are other examples of occasions when clarification of some
part of the budget process was requested, but not forthcoming. In
January, the vice presidents urged the President to clarify whether he
would review the vice presidents' recommendations before or after the
governance groups' reviews. The President exacerbated the conflict
that at least the Provost felt about both presenting recommendations
to the Senates as an advocate and reviewing Senate recommendations as
a non-partisan advisor to the President. On April 13th the budget
advisory group presented two options about when to release the 1973-74
unit budget allocations to the President. A choice between those two
options was not made at that meeting. The course of action that was
decided upon - to evaluate a few "weak" departments over the next week
-
only postponed a decision about when to release the 1973-74 allocations
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(the delay causing more resistance to the budget-making process to
form). Finally, correspondence from the Provost to the President on
May 21, 1973, indicates that differences between them on the role of
the deans in the budget-review/ resource allocation process were never
resolved. Actually there was never any clarity as to what the goals
of participation in the budget review process were because as long as
the deans kept adding or subtracting expenditures incrementally as
they had always done, the President would never reinforce their
responsibility and participation in decision-making. Since most of
Bennis ' information about how the budget review process was being
implemented came second-hand from the vice presidents and his assist-
ants, and not from his own observations, it was difficult for him to
reinforce those deans /units who were moving in the direction he wanted
them to go, i.e. toward resource allocation based on systematic program
evaluation. The individual meetings were scheduled with the deans in
May partially so that the President could learn first-hand how cuts
would be distributed within each college. In turn, the vice presidents
worried about how they would learn about the promises made in those
meetings which they would have to implement (see chronological summary
5/22/73) .
Proposition 23: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to offer organizational members
new meanings or new ways of looking at their
experiences in regards to the proposed change.
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Throughout the budget process the President tried to establish
new meanings for what resource allocation would mean in higher educa-
tion in the seventies (Proposition 23). "The budget has given us an
opportunity to reexamine our institutional priorities," he said in a
speech to the University faculty (10/31/72). He prodded the vice presi-
dents to look at the budget-review process in different ways by giving
them lists of questions and problems to address (see chronological sum-
mary, 10/31/72 and 2/21/73 for examples).
Proposition 24: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to provide role models for new
behavior patterns.
Proposition 24 states that it may be important for the organiza-
tional leader to model the changes he has proposed. Although additional
cuts of up to ten percent were made in the President's office budget
on 2/21/73, one dean commented in an interview that "the President was
very visible about the way he spent money." The Faculty Senate report
on 3/28/73 was similarly critical.
Proposition 25: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to encourage experimentation and
risk-taking on the part of organizational
members in regards to the proposed change.
Proposition 26: To redefine the leader's role
in relation to the change processes initiated.
Proposition 25 states that it may be important for the organiza-
tional leader to encourage risk-taking and experimentation in order for
successful implementation to occur. We have already seen in this section
how the announcement of salary raises and the President's individual
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meetings with the deans undermined the deans', and to a certain extent
the vice presidents', autonomy. "I expected that the President would
ask me how I would manage the budget reduction recommended by the
Provost's budget review advisory group. Since I accepted the pro-
posed reduction I obviously considered the budget-review process
credible. However, now that I have learned that some deans negotiated
sizeable reductions in the cuts recommended, I have serious reservations
about the implementation, not about the process" (a dean) . Several of
the deans indicated a lack of support for changes they had initiated
in their colleges and on some occasions the ad hoc advisory group must
have felt the same, when their advice went unheeded. When the President
scheduled meetings with each of the deans to discuss how proposed reduc-
tions would be distributed, he clearly perceived a need to influence
decision-making and to keep a strong hand on the budget-review/resource
allocation process (Proposition 26). In fact, the President often said
that he would have to intervene in the review process to make the cuts
that the deans themselves were unwilling to make. In fact, earlier in
the review process, he had deliberately not wanted to get involved
"because he might get locked into something he would not later want to
support (i.e. others' recommendations) and because he saw himself as
the only intemperate force against all the temperate forces. (See
chronological summary 1/23/73 and 4/13/73.) Consequently there was
less reciprocity or risk-taking in the budget review process than
what
might have been expected (a dean)
.
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Proposition 27: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to remove barriers to change and
to provide organizational members with necessary
skills* knowledge, training, and resources in
order to increase their capacity to implement
the proposed change.
Proposition 29: To reinforce and reward even
tentative changes organizational members in the
direction of the intended outcome.
Propositions 27 and 29 state that it may be important for the
organizational leader to reinforce even tentative changes on the part
of organizational members through comparisons with other organizations
(Proposition 29) or by providing increased resources and/or socio-
emotional support (Proposition 27). In other words people may need to
see the benefits of their work, in this case, of their participation in
the budget-review process. Reinforcement might have come in the form
of an increased competitive edge vis-a-vis other State universities for
students or for money from the Regents. The President actively lobbied
for a Medical College supplement and for additional subsidy money from
the State. He urged the vice presidents to make comparative costs
available wherever possible (for example, see 3/26/73). He supported
the Evening College's recruitment of part-time students and urged other
departments and colleges to recruit part-time students.
Certain actions the President took did provide important resources
and reinforcement to members of the University community. For example,
he opened a Washington office as a liaison to the federal funding agencies.
He reinforced the Provost's decision to form an advisory review
commission
by asking each vice president to develop some sort of review
mechanism in
their own area. He also asked each of the vice presidents
to project cuts
i
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of 3, 6, and 9/a in their areas following the Provost's example. Although
Bennis met with governance group leaders to review their recommendations,
other resources that the deans and governance groups in particular were
asking for were not provided such as certain information, a statement of
University priorities, and an explicit explanation of the assumptions
underlying the vice presidents' and the President's budget decisions
(see an earlier section of this chapter describing problems encountered
in implementing the budget review process) . In other cases the President
missed opportunities to reinforce others' suggestions even though they
coincided with his own ideas. For example, although the ad hoc budget
advisory group first recommended that the President ask the University
Senate to develop criteria for program evaluation on March 1, 1973,
their recommendation was not acted upon until early summer for the 1974-
75 budget. Other Presidential interventions were, in the author's opinion,
counter-productive to his staff's, the vice presidents', and to some
extent governance groups' participation in the budget-review process.
At the end of March, the President asked the Provost and the Vice Presi-
dent of the Medical Center to project what they would do with an extra
million dollars to cut or spend—a request that must have seemed whimsical
and irrelevant to the very real pressures they faced in making hiring,
promotion and tenure, and budget decisions. On April 13, 1973, Bennis
expressed his disappointment in his advisory group's recommendations,
even though they had been meeting on the budget almost non-stop
for weeks.
On 4/30/73 the President asked the Provost and Executive Vice
President
to serve as the "acting president" at a point in
the budget process at
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which no decision had been made as to when to announce unit allocations
and at a point at which the Provost was engaged in a series of individual
conferences with the deans. Finally, although the vice presidents and
assistants knew that the projected deficit would not be as bad as the
President had announced in October due to an increased subsidy from the
State in December, this information was not shared with the governance
groups prior to their marathon sessions in March nor with the President,
in fact, until May, at which time he still did not choose to share it.
Proposition 28: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to change existing organizational
arrangements so that they are as compatible as
possible with the behavioral changes that are
required.
A number of specific recommendations appended to the Provost’s
advisory commission’s recommendations in February would have created the
"compatible organizational arrangements" described in Proposition 28.
They included the need for a management-information system, the need for
a mechanism for program evaluation, the need for incentives for savings
and cost reductions, the need for greater control by instructional units
over non-instructional services, and the need for a long range plan among
other things. The deans shared the President’s awareness that "under the
present budgeting system there were no rewards to cut costs since there
was no carry-over of unspent funds from one year to the next" (a dean) .
At one point or another, participants in the budget review process identi-
fied the need for policy statements on early retirement, increased faculty
teaching leads, larger class sizes, the use of graduate assistants for
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undergraduate teaching, and the need for a way to approve the filling
of open positions before final unit allocations were made, which were
never articulated. The Provost felt that allocations between vice
presidential areas were crucial and that a fixed amount needed to be
allocated to each Vice President before intra-unit allocations could
be identified, which also was not done. Finally, one dean felt that
independent consideration of the 1973—74 and 1974—75 budgets was
impossible given what kinds of program cuts the deans were being
asked to make even though that is essentially what occurred.
On the other hand the President did intervene in several ways to
change existing organizational conditions. He appointed a new Vice
President for Management and Finance. On several occasions he requested
information be made available that would be the beginning of a supporting
management -informat ion system (see chronological summary 10/13/72, 1/9/73,
3/14/73, etc.). The President requested that the Research Council and
the Vice President for Management and Finance review the University's
policy on the return of overhead; he and the vice presidents also studied
the University's policy on the remission of fees to certain groups (although
no decisions were made on either case during the course of the year). On
January 30, 1973, Bennis appointed an ad hoc budget advisory group to
begin reviewing selected departments in the University. Finally, near
the end of the 1973-74 budget review process, Bennis described his
priorities for the University in the seventies, in an effort to make
certain conditions in the University compatible with the changes members
were being asked to make as a result of their participation in the
budget
-
review process.
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Summary
A review of the President’s actions in implementing the budget-
review process in light of the propositions set forth in Chapter II
shows that his actions did not create the conditions described in the
propositions and that in some cases, they were, in fact counter-
productive to the successful implementation of the budget -review/
resource allocation process. For example, organizational members
encountered problems of delay, the need for more information, a lack
of clarity about the goals of participation in the review process
which were never resolved. In another example, the President's insistance
on a two-year biennium budget and on program evaluation long after it
was realistic or feasible ostensibly interfered with the goals of a
participant budget-review/resource allocation process he had articulated.
There is extensive documentation in interviews to conclude that the
President did not intervene in ways that encouraged risk-taking or even
compliance on the part of deans or department chairmen.
It could be argued that although specific budget allocations were
announced in early June, those decisions only in part resulted from the
budget—review process, and then more as a result of the vice presidents
actions than the President’s actions. In the final section of this chapter
the President's leadership in the third stage of the change process,
refreezing, will be described.
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Refreeztrig-incorporation
Proposition 30: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to monitor organizational members’
performance in coping with And integrating the
proposed change.
Proposition 30 says that it may be important for the organiza-
tional leader to monitor the change processes he has initiated. On
numerous occasions the President requested information that would have
enabled him to monitor the budget-review process which he never received
or received too late. For example, in early October Bennis asked each
of the vice presidents to prioritize programs within their areas. On
October 13, 1972, the vice presidents met without the President to share
priority rankings of their commitments
,
not programs. Further, the
"program evaluation" criteria the Provost circulated to the deans and
his review commission were more criteria for making decisions between
programs than for evaluating any one program, as Bennis had requested
(10/31/72) . One of the problems that the persons who were interviewed
identified was that timetables were not adhered to which led to problems
of credibility. For example, the Athletic Commission Report on the
costs of intercollegiate athletics was submitted after unit allocations
were announced in June although it had been done in the middle of May.
In another example, Bennis tried to get the vice presidents to agree on
a timetable for the budget review process in January, 1973. He asked
about it again in a letter to the Vice President for Management and
Finance (2/14/73) and in a vice presidents’ meeting (2/20/73), but
m
each case his monitoring behavior lacked follow-through and
did not
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produce the kinds of responses he had intended.
Proposition 31: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to objectively evaluate changes
that have occurred.
Proposition 31 states that the organizational leader may need
to develop strategies to evaluate the extent to which change is
incorporated into the life of the organization. All the information
the President requested (see the chronological summary 2/21/73, 3/1/73,
3/14/73, 3/26/73, and 5/7/73) contributed to his evaluation of the
way the budget review process had been implemented. His individual
meetings with the deans helped him evaluate whether or not the budget
recommendations of the vice presidents’ should be implemented.
Proposition 34: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to link parts of the organization
or individuals whose behavior has been changed
as well as to link processes of change occurring
simultaneously.
Very early in the 1973-74 budget review/resource allocation pro-
cess Bennis tried to link program evaluation, long range planning, the
administrative reorganization, and promotion and tenure decisions with
the budget review process (Proposition 34) (see 5/17/72). For example,
he had expected the University’s long range plan due September, 1972,
to be an important factor in program review for the 1973-74 budget.
When it was not received in September he still expected the vice
presidents
to review programs within their areas along criteria that he
outlined at
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various times during the year (see the chronological summary 9/16/72,
10/31/72 and 3/26/73). In September of 1972 Bennis recommended to the
Board that policies on non-reappointment, early-retirement
,
and increased
faculty teaching loads be developed (see 9/16/72). Even the consortia
arrangement with a neighboring private college was linked to a need for
greater inter—institutional cooperation in a time of scarce resources
for higher education (see 11/18/72).
Proposition 32: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to maintain continuity at some
levels of the organization while change takes
place at other levels.
Proposition 33: To insulate the organization
from conflicting or competing ideas and to give
organizational members time to assimilate and
integrate new behaviors.
Proposition 35: To give emotional support and
resources to organizational members who demon-
strate behaviors in the direction of the intended
change.
Proposition 36: To give visibility and credibility
to the change within the entire system and to spread
information about the consequences of the change to
other parts of the organization, thereby diminishing
a negative response in other parts of the system and
encouraging system-wide support and adoption.
Propositions 32 and 33 concern the role performance of the organiza-
tional leader in stabilizing the changes he has introduced into the organ-
ization. In general, circumstances (timing) conspired against extensive
consultation and assimilation of the budget reductions agreed upon in the
meetings between the deans and the President. Additionally, the imple-
mentation of program evaluation which had been postponed until the second
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year of the biennium budget interfered with the processes of incomora-
tion and legitimization (Proposition 36). Finally, given that the
President had almost no leaway in allocating resources in the 1973-74
budget there is no evidence of actions he took to provide additional
resources to organizational units which identified reductions after a
systematic review of programs that were consistent with the priorities
of the University (Proposition 35). Paradoxically, in fact, the Presi-
dent had to increase the recommended budget reduction for the College
of Education because of a projected loss in enrollment, even though it
had complied with the goals of the budget-review/resource allocation
process perhaps more than many other colleges which received proportion-
ately smaller cuts.
Summary and Conclusions
In the first section of this chapter nine problems that the
persons who were interviewed (vice presidents, deans, budget advisory
review commission members, governance group leaders, and presidential
assistants) said they encountered in trying to implement the budget-
review/resource allocation process were identified. Then the actions
that the University President had taken were reviewed and it was shown
how in some cases his actions matched what the people undergoing
change
said they needed or expected from the organizational leader
(especially
in the unfreezing-initiation stage) , and how in other cases
what the
set of propositions said about what the organizational
leader needs to
do in order to effect change matched participants’
expectations but
not the University President’s actions.
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One of the objectives of this chapter was to see if the prospect
of a deficit budget may have led organizational members to need or
expect certain actions from the organizational leader that are in any
way different from the expectations they held for his role performance
in regards to the long range planning or affirmative action cases that
have been described in this research. It does seem as if their needs
were different in this case or, at least, that the President’s actions
in some ways pre-dated members’ perceived needs. In implementing a
budget-review/resource allocation process the University President runs
squarely up against many of the organizational constraints described in
Chapter IV on the Assessment of Setting: a tendency toward conservatism
and the preservation of the status quo; a tendency away from inter-
dependence, collaboration, and innovation; and skepticism about efficiency
and savings. The basic problem is that change (budget-cutting) is not
regarded as positive. In this case when the President said that the
prospect of cutting 3-9% or more of the budget presented the University
with an opportunity to reexamine its commitments and priorities most of
the faculty were skeptical and felt that it was an excuse for the Presi-
dent to intervene into their affairs. When, as in this case, the
organizational leader provides the bulk of the information on the need
to change, researchers have found that the target of change often becomes
preoccupied with the leader’s position, status, his manner of speaking,
his real intentions, and so forth to the detriment of learning
the specific
information being communicated (Walton, 1969, p. 167; Janis and
Brewster,
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1965, p. 212. It could be argued that this was the case with the
budget review process: that very few members of the faculty were
aware of the seriousness of the problem until late winter when open
positions were not being filled and when the possibility of no salary
increases became more widely known through governance group participa-
tion in the review process. It could also be argued that along with
this awareness there was probably only a hazy rememberance of a lot
of talk in the fall about a budget crisis. (The meetings in the fall
themselves on October 31 and November 21 were not well attended.) If
these contentions are true, then the fact that a majority of the
President’s interventions throughout the entire budget review process
were designed to unfreeze existing attitudes, expectancies and behaviors
on the part of faculty members becomes more explainable and to an extent
more justifiable.
The question then becomes how might the time in the fall have
been used differently? It seems that almost all of the persons even-
tually involved in the budget review/resource allocation process
agreed that there was a need for more adequate, usable information.
Possibly, more could have been done in the fall months to develop
compatible organizational arrangments such as a management information
system (Proposition 28). The organizational leader in this case perhaps
6See the Faculty Senate’s Budget and Priorities Committee's Recom-
mendations on the Budget (3/28/73) in which a great deal of hostility
toward the President's life style was expressed.
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more profitably might have engaged in "changing" or "refreezing"
behaviors until organizational members came to feel the "squeeze"
themselves and thereby the need to change. Based on the assumption
that new programs and new needs will have to be met through a re-
allocation of existing resources, rather than through the addition
of new external resources, the President might more effectively have
spent some of his time in the fall trying to implement the necessary
support systems to a broad-based participative process that would
come later, given that what he actually did in this case did not lead
to any substantial reallocation of resources.
One reaction to the budget-review process that occurred over
and over again among faculty members was that "administrators, not
faculty members, should concern themselves with the budget," while
from the perspective of the administration the legitimization of what
might, in fact, be very drastic reductions in program support demanded
extensive consultation and information-sharing with the faculty. The
faculty's reaction might have resulted from the complexity of the
issues that were being considered and from the long time over which
budget problems were discussed which led to increased security and
uncertainty, and to low faculty morale. At some point there may have
been a need for the President to involve faculty members and other
groups in decision-making about the budget; however, a shorter span
of time in which fewer groups (especially fewer ad hoc groups) would
be asked to participate with more information and a clear definition
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of what would be expected from the various groups when they were asked
to participate, might have avoided some of the problems that occurred.
The second purpose for doing this case analysis was to observe
how external demands on the organizational leader affected his internal
role performance. Clearly, external factors made the internal budget-
making process far more complex if for no other reason than that they
kept changing. For example, it was almost impossible to predict how
much money would be received from the State or from any other external
source for that matter given changing enrollment and funding patterns
and given the politics involved. Secondly, the problems in the Univer-
sity with timing and delay in the budget review process were largely
externally determined. Often the unpredictability itself constrained
the President from acting in ways which would have been more consistent
with his goals and effective in the long run. For example, without the
windfall subsidy from the State in December there would have been more
impetus in the University for program evaluation and less skepticism
on the part of faculty members about the administration "crying wolf
too soon. With less unpredictability there probably would have been
greater clarity about what needed to be done in the long run and in
the interim to get there.
The problems of sheer overload as well as the conflict between
external and internal demands on the President's time explain why
certain actions were never taken in response to the problem
encountered
in implementing the internal budget-review/resource allocation
process
and why there was no follow-up to recognized needs
for the development
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of a management information system, program evaluation criteria, or
certain policy statements.
On the other hand when the University President was effective
in his external relationships, he was able to use his external effective-
ness to create some of the conditions described in the propositions in
Chapter II (such as Propositions 5, 15, 17, 27, 29, 35, 36). There is
some evidence to suggest that the President in this case effectively
used his sense of changing environmental conditions to change existing
attitudes and behavior (Proposition 5) and his good relationships with
the Fund to Improve Postsecondary Education, with the United States
Department of Labor, and with State legislators (among others) to secure
contracts and additional monies for the University (Proposition 15).
^
Finally the case analysis of the budget review process raised
some questions about the propositions that the other cases that have been
reviewed in this research have not. In the first place, it seems as if
the propositions about the role performance of the organizational leader
are based on the assumption that there is a need for a majority, if not
all of the conditions, to be met in each stage of the change process for
successful initiation, implementation, and incorporation to occur. But,
are there cases when, for example, meeting the conditions in one proposi-
tion has an adverse effect on the organizational leader’s ability to
meet the requirements of another proposition? In this case, did attempts
to share information and heighten organizational members sensitivity to
7For further reading on a related point see Rensis Likert’s discus-
sion of the leader’s linking-pin role in Hersey and Blanchard, 1972,
pp. 146-147
.
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problems have an adverse effect on organizational climate (Proposi-
tion 14) and create conditions of low morale, high insecurity, and
uncertainty? Or were attempts to link program evaluation and budgeting
(Proposition 34) detrimental to building feelings of essentiality
(Proposition 13) and encouraging risk-taking (Proposition 25)? Is it
simply a question of effectively sequencing the leader’s behaviors?
It is beyond the scope of this research to provide answers to these
questions. It is hoped that further research toward developing a
theory of the organizational leader’s role in effecting organizational
change might explore the question of linkages between propositions.
The second question this case raised has to do with the inclusive-
ness of the propositions. As a result of doing this case analysis the
author is aware that certain actions on the part of the organizational
leader may be taken for entirely different reasons than the objectives
identified in the propositions and that there may be a need to account
for those actions somewhere in the model that has been proposed. The
propositions that have been formulated deal with members' perceptions of
the leader's actions and with the leader's effectiveness in creating
conditions that allow members to change their attitudes and behaviors.
After this case was reviewed the author was aware that certain actions
the leader took—such as requests for information—may have been taken
for his own benefit or education and not because they facilitated anv
kind of organizational change. Again this point might indicate a
direction for further research on the role of the organizational leader
in effecting change.
]
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In the next chapter the fourth case on the role of the
organizational leader in the development of an administrative
team will be analyzed.
CHAPTER VIII
CASE STUDY: THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL
LEADER IN DEVELOPING AN ADMINISTRATIVE TEAM
The most common mechanism of academic change
appears to be that of the turnover of personnel -
the replacement of institutional leaders and
members by newcomers from other institutions
and from outside the educational system.
. .
the process of academic reform occurs through
change of_ persons - the replacement and rota-
tion of individuals - rather than through
change in persons, such as changes in their
attitudes and skills (Hefferlin, 1971, p. 41
and 46)
.
Introduction
The set of interventions that will be analyzed in this chapter
includes changes in organizational structure and new appointments as
well as attempts by the organizational leader to change the norms,
values, attitudes, and behavior of organizational members. The develop-
ment of an administrative team at the University of Cincinnati has
involved a series of interventions, all very leader -centered
,
in the
sense that the President spent a great deal of time on the interventions
and has a high investment in their successful outcome. Some of his inter-
ventions represent attempted solutions to problems encountered in imple-
mentiitg change processes such as those described in the other three cases.
This case is different from the other three cases that have been analyzed
in that 1) external consultants are being used in implementation and
2) the group of individuals whose behavior is to be changed is much smaller
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than was the case with the budget, affirmative action, or long range
planning. Finally, the development of an administrative team is a
natural change strategy to study given the organizational theory and
behavioral science background of Warren Bennis. Partly these inter-
ventions were chosen to study because of the interest they have for
people interested in the field of organizational development.
The purpose of this chapter is to document and understand the
role of the organizational leader, in this case the University Presi-
dent, in building an administrative team. In the first part of this
chapter a chronological summary of events between August, 1971, and
August, 1973, that are related to Bennis’ efforts to develop an
administrative team will be presented. In the second part of this
chapter, the actions of the University President will be analyzed in
light of the propositions about the role performance of the organiza-
tional leader set forth in Chapter II. Finally, in summary, some of
the role problems of a university president - stress, conflict, over-
load - that have led Bennis to redefine and restructure the role of
the President at the University of Cincinnati and the implications
these actions have for the implementation of other changes he has
initiated will be discussed.
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Chronological Summary^
Summer, 1971
,
, , ?
ennis conducts a series of interviews with all of the tooministrators and with many faculty members prior to taking officeSeptember 1, 1971. Assistants are also added to the President’s
’
office during that summer.
.
November 8, 1971
Confidential memorandum to the President from his assistants
on the coordination of Institutional Studies, Computer Services, and
The memorandum recommends that Bennis appoint a coordinatorfor long range planning as soon as possible and that the integration
of various planning and budgeting offices wait until the new provost
can be included in discussions of the changes. A restructuring of
the President’s office by creating a chancellor or executive vice
president s position is also considered in this memorandum.
February 1, 1972
The Office of Vice President for Metropolitan Affairs is created.
The chief task of the Vice President for Metropolitan Affairs will be
to link the wide range of urban expertise available at the University
to the metropolis, etc."
March 28, 1972
Report of the Academic Affairs Committee of the Board of Directors
recommending changes in the University by-laws on the selection and
appointment of administrators (vice presidents, deans, and department
heads) and term appointments for administrative officers. The University
Senate had recommended term appointments a month earlier. The Board
approves the changes April 4, 1972.
May 3, 1972
Confidential memorandum, a Presidential assistant to the President
re: an administrative reorganization. Recommendations on the role of the
President and the roles of the Executive Vice President and Vice Presi-
dent of the Medical Center, on the relationship between the Medical Center
and the rest of the University, on the Office of Public Affairs and the
Office of Research and Development, on the Provostial structure and on
faculty participation in University affairs, among other things are con-
sidered .
-^Unlike the other cases the chronological summary of events is included
in this case because it is shorter and because it is more important for the
reader to review before reading the case analysis that follows.
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May 26, 1972
Confidential memorandum, a Presidential assistant to thePresident summarizing "Emerging Concepts of the Presidency" anT 'le i fr°m Journal of Higher Education ; a second memorandumol the day reviews another Journal of Higher Education article.
May 30, 1972
Confidential memorandum, a Presidential assistant to the
President on the organization of the President's office. The
concept of office of" is developed in this memorandum.
June 30, 1972
The President asks the vice presidents and the vice provosts
to draw up a critique of the last year as far as general University
administration and their own ideas are concerned and to list signifi-
cant unresolved issues in both areas. (On 12/22/71 Bennis had asked
these same individuals to write a "real" job description in objective
or performance terms and an "ideal" role description. He also had
asked them to have their staffs complete the same task toward the
end of coming up with some recommendations in the area of staff re-
organization.)
July 12, 1972
Confidential memorandum, a Presidential assistant to the
President re: a proposed organization and the amalgamation of
existing planning groups. He recommends that various planning
groups be brought together under an executive vice president and
that there needs to be a group responsible for Policy Analysis
(or projecting the long range implications of certain issues).
July 7 - July 20, 1972
The President meets individually with the vice presidents and
the vice provosts on their job descriptions and lists of unresolved
issues
.
July 25, 1972
Confidential memorandum, from the President's assistants to
the President re: a proposed reorganization. Recommendations for
action steps hinge on the appointment of an executive vice president.
July, 1972
The President, in retrospect, sees that his own goal to date
has been to build a new style and team.
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August 15, 1972
f
Bennis 3SkS the Vice Presldents (and eventually the deans) toform administrative advisory groups to further the team approach toproblem-solving in their own areas. The objectives of administrative
advisory groups are to assure the involvement of those with special
expertise, information, and responsibility in decision-making and toprovide the perspective of intermediate level administrators in de-
liberations at the top level. "The advisory groups will only supple-
ment the line organization with the thinking and perspectives of othersfrom different areas."
August 31, 1972
The President to the vice presidents, vice provosts and presi-
dential assistants re: Administrative Management Seminars. "These
seminars I am organizing will involve outside speakers, case discussions,
some readings every other week for the academic year."
September, 1972
Ford Foundation Administrative interns in the President’s and
Provost’s offices are appointed.
September 20, 1972
Administrative Management Seminar with Shel Davis, Vice President
of TRW Systems in California, as the guest speaker. Bennis hands out
some readings. He introduces the seminars by saying that he hopes they
will foster greater interdependence and contribute toward building an
administrative team. Davis shows a film on "team-building."
September 27, 1972
Current Perspectives in Higher Education Seminar with Nevitt
Sanford of the Wright Institute in Berkeley. (The Current Perspectives
lectures are a second set of seminars Bennis initated in the fall of
1973 for the same group of people that attend the Administrative
Management Seminars plus the academic deans and governance group leaders.)
October 6, 1972
The President meets with his assistants to discuss the role of
the assistants in the President’s office.
October 10, 1972
Two outside consultants meet with the presidential assistants to
discuss administrative problems.
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October 16, 1972
Current Perspectives in Higher Education Seminar with Bernice
Sandler from the American Association of Colleges Proiect on the
Status and Education of Women, Washington, D.C.
October 17, 1972
Category II meeting - The President meets with the vice presi-
dents, vice provosts, some of the academic deans, associate vice
presidents and governance group leaders "to share information and
discuss concerns, issues and priorities within the University."
October 22, 1972
Bennis hosts a dinner and discussion for a group of assistants
and faculty members with a friend and consultant he had brought in to
give him some advice on restructuring the administration.
October 23, 1972
Feedback session between the consultant and Bennis.
October 24, 1972
Administrative Management Seminar with Cornelius Sprangers,
Director of Training, the Volvo Corporation, Sweden.
November 3, 1972
Memorandum from the Presidential staff to the President on
office procedures and work flow.
November 6, 1972
Administrative Management Seminar with Richard Beckhard of
Richard Beckhard Associates, New York City.
November 7, 1972
Bennis meets with the Faculty Senate. Much of the discussion
focuses on the ambiguity in decision making that faculty members
sense
Bennis says that he feels the ambiguity is functional.
November 15, 1972
Bennis meets with an architectural planning consultant
who had
been used in the College of Design, Art and
Architecture.
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November 15, 16, 1972
An outside consultant is brought in "to help me [Bennis] in a
number of areas where I believe outside advice can be extremely bene-ficial. The key areas I am concerned with and that will be looked
into are the institutional arrangements and goals of the University
of Cincinnati and their relationship to the long range plan. He willdevelop a proposal for me following his visit which I will share with
you at some later time." Most of the vice presidents, vice provosts,
and long range planning coordinator, and the Presidential assistants
are interviewed during the two days the consultant is at the University
he also meets twice with Bennis.
November 20, 21, 1972
The report of two consultants that had been used to study the
organizational structure of the Medical Center and its relationship
to the city is given to the President.
November 28, 1972
Administrative Management Seminar with Thomas Fletcher, the
Director of the National Training and Development Service for State
and Local Governments, Washington, D.C.
November 30, 1972
Correspondence consultant to Bennis (see 11/15 - 11/16/72).
He shares his impressions of Bennis' relationships with the business
community, students, faculty, and to the University in general. In
regards to a "management team", he writes, "this group is emerging
but is not yet a team. There seems to be good rapport, no polariza-
tion, no feuding, no cliques, no enmity, as good a meshing of the old
and the new as might be expected in the time available, but still a
pretty disparate group. The President seems to be experimenting with
alternative modes of encouraging his top staff to define their own
jobs, of 'grabbing the ball and running with it', of attempting to see
how individuals act in different situations, and of intentionally not
giving anyone any instructions on what he expects or what he wants
them to do. Many of the top administrators at the University of
Cincinnati need a broadening of perspectives on how different institu-
tions do similar things but in different ways." The report is not
shared with the individuals who were interviewed.
December 5, 1972
Category II meeting (see 10/17/72).
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December 6, 1972
Bennis' Administrative Management Seminar. Bennis asks the
vice presidents and Presidential assistants in small grouns to
identify some of the major issues that have not been resolved at
the University. The assistants identify a lack of clarity about
their role and a general lack of trust, openness, and confrontation.
The vice presidents discuss the need to communicate decisions so as
to maximize support, trust, and involvement; the lack of a clear
decision-making process and problems in relationshios between the
faculty and the administration.
December 7, 12, 1972
The President meets with four vice presidents individually on
their administrative advisory groups.
December 13, 1972
Administrative Management Seminar with Richard Snyder from the
Ohio State University.
December 14, 1972
Bennis meets with the consultant (see 11/30/72).
December 16, 1972
"Kitchen Cabinet Meeting" - a year-end meeting to identify some
of the major issues that have not been resolved at the University of
Cincinnati. Problems identified included communication, directionless-
ness, a lack of faculty involvement in decision-making, and the absence
of a feeling of community. The Kitchen Cabinet Group included some of
the Presidential assistants and also faculty members whose advice Bennis
respected and often solicited.
January 5, 1973
Bennis outlines the criteria he would use in assessing and
justifying a reorganization in the Provostial area: criteria such
as a clearer decision-making process, more effective
communication,
closer cooperation, increased responsiveness of the office
to
external and internal demands, etc.
January 8, 1973
Graduate Fellows Dinner - the President mentions
publicly for
the first time the new "Graduate Dean" position he
is considerina.
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January 9, 1973
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lt meets with the deans to discuss unresolved problemsi t e administrative organization of the University.
January 11, 1973
Administrative Management Seminar with Chris Argvris, JamesConant Bryant, Professor of Education and Organizational Behavior at
the Harvard Business School.
January 16, 17, 1973
Administrative Retreat for the purposes of team-building and
discussion of unresolved administrative problems. (Two outside con
sultants are used.)
January 18, 1973
Speech by the President to the graduate faculty nroposing that
the "University Dean" position he created.
January 19, 1973
Post-mortem of the January 16-17 retreat between the President
and his assistants.
January 23, 1973
Current Perspectives Seminar with Russell Edgerton, the Assistant
Director of the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondarv Education,
Washington, D.C.
January 24, 1973
Correspondence, from the President to the Dean of Engineering,
"I don’t believe as yet I have created the right atmosphere for real
dialogue on these issues [the role and leadership of the dean] with
some few exceptions." "These are particularly critical times when
most of us, quite understandably, feel that constraints [to change]
are overwhelming."
January 26, 1973
Correspondence, the consultant to the President: a rationale
for the need to change is presented as well as a plan for what and who
should be included in the "office of the President". Bennis draws
heavily on this memorandum in his own rationalization for the reorganiza
tion.
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January 27, 1973
Bennis describes the role and duties of the President, theExecutive Vice President, and the Deputy President structure he is
considering. They are only notes to himself and are not shared
January 27. 1973
A second "Kitchen Cabinet" meeting is held.
January 29, 1973
Administrative Management Seminar with Doug Williams of Douglas
Williams Associates, New York City. Following the seminar Bennis meets
with his assistants and the Vice Provost for Student Affairs to discuss
the concept of University Affairs" as part of the reorganization.
[Discussion between the Vice Provost, Provost, and President on the
rationale for an office of 'University Affairs" had been going on
since mid-January.]
January 31, 1973
Bennis meets with Shel Davis (see September 20, 1972).
February 5, 6, 1973
The President meets again with the consultants on the Medical
College (see 11/20/72).
February 6, 1973
The first meeting of the President's Advisory Council (PAC) is
held. The purposes of the council are 1) to make recommendations to
the President's office for decisions on major policy and operational
matters; 2) to serve in a review and resource capacity; 3) to serve
as a group to review and give advice on major academic and administrative
decisions, especially on those which cut across academic and administra-
tive lines; 4) to serve as a final recommending locus for certain decisions:
5) to serve as a forum for ideas, communication, and information: and
6) to serve as a reaction and pulse-reading group. Bennis exnlains that
the Council resulted from feedback he had received from consultants and
the Faculty Senate on the need to define a decision making processes
and from a need he has felt for more education among members of the
University community on problems the University is facing.
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February 12, 1973
The President asks his team to attend a retreat March 7th and
8th with Shel Davis - MWe will be talking about the ways in which we
conduct the affairs of administration, the administrative and human
difficulties that seem to throw roadblocks in our effectiveness and
to try to develop more understanding than we presently have on what
seems to be the major ways we can improve our efforts in building a
well^-functioning management team. I suppose the outcome is an ini-
tial step toward our own team development. This may be the simplest,
yet the vaguest way of putting it. The only way I have ever known to
feel good about a retreat is to set expectations low enough so that
I can leave feeling that some achievement has been made." Bennis
asks them to read the first chapter of his primer on organizational
development. [This retreat is later cancelled, rescheduled, and
cancelled again.]
February 15, 1973
Bennis' recommendations for an administrative reorganization
are sent to the Board of Directors of the University of Cincinnati.
They are to be discussed and made public at a March 6th meeting of the
Board of Directors. [The content and rationale for these recommenda-
tions will be discussed in the section in this chapter analyzing the
role performance of the organizational leader.]
February 20, 1973
Administrative Management Seminar with Pat and Drea Zigarmi.
March 2, 1973
The President meets with the vice presidents to explain the
proposed administrative reorganization. The reorganization he says
is to develop the "office of" concept; later that day Bennis meets
with the academic deans on the reorganization. He encloses a working
statement on the role of the "College Dean" along with his recommenda-
tions for an administrative reorganization.
March 5, 1973
The President meets with governance group leaders on the re-
organization.
March 5, 1973
Correspondence, the President to the Fellows of the
Graduate School
acknowledging their support for his proposal for a Graduate
Dean (2/28/73).
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March 6, 1973
The President meets with the vice provosts to explain the
reorganization; later, the reorganization plan is announced and
approved at a meeting of the Board of Directors. At that meeting
the President explains that the reorganization is to make the
administration "less ambiguous, more responsive." The faculty
representatives to the Board raise some objections about the
process of consultation prior to the announcement. [By the time
the reorganization plan is announced to the Board and to the
academic deans it has been modified to include two Executive
Vice Presidents in the Office of the President. Role descriptions
for those two positions and for the Provost and new university dean
are included in Appendix G.]
March 6, 1973
Current Perspectives Seminar with Ray Bisplinghoff
,
Director
of the National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C.
March 20, 1973
Administrative Management Seminar with Samuel Culbert, Professor
at the Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
March 22, 1973
The President in a letter to black student leaders explains
the rationale for the reorganization and its importance to black
student groups: "I have frequently felt that the external demands
on my time have not allowed enough attention to be paid to the needs
and concerns of the students and faculty. I hope the reorganization
will allow the Office of the President to maintain closer contact
with both students and faculty members."
March 22, 1973
Current Perspectives Seminar with Dwight Allen, Dean of the
School of Education, The University of Massachusetts.
March 26, 1973
Correspondence the President to the Provost. Several problems
Bennis has lately encountered underscore the need for more clarity in
the decision-making process between the President's office and the Provost.
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March 27, 1973
Current Perspectives in Higher Education Seminar with Gus Tyler -
ssistant President, International Ladies Garment Workers Union, NewYork City.
March 29, 1973
Administrative Management Seminar with James Hayes, President of
the American Management Association, New York City.
April 2, 1973
Current Perspectives Seminar with Dr. J. Herbert Hollomon -
Director of the Center for Policy Alternatives within the School of
Engineering at MIT.
April 2, 1973
Correspondence, the Vice Provost for Student Affairs to the
President on the University Affairs concept.
April 2, 1973
Memorandum to the President from his assistants summarizing their
reactions to the University Affairs concept.
April 23, 1973
Correspondence another Vice Provost to the President on his
role in the administrative reorganization.
April 10, 1973
President's Advisory Council meeting (see 2/6/73).
April 10, 1973
Administrative Management Seminar with James Miller, President
Elect of the University of Louisville.
April 26, 1973
Administrative Management Seminar with Floyd Mann - Director
of the Environmental Council and Visiting Professor in Business and
Sociology at the University of Colorado.
289
May 2, 1973
Shel Davis interviews individuals in the President's office
and the vice presidents on their perceptions of Bennis' strengths
and weaknesses and about the University's problems and priorities
in the upcoming year
.
May 3, 1973
Davis meets with the President to give him feedback on what he
has learned in the interviews - feedback primarily on Bennis' strengths
and weaknesses.
May 4, 1973
Correspondence the President to a vice provost - in the context
of other concerns in the letter, Bennis says that he really personally
enjoyed all the Management Seminars and Current Perspectives Seminars.
"I thought they were extremely worthwhile. . .from the point of view
of getting to know some of my colleagues in another setting."
May 8, 1973
Correspondence Bennis to his administrative team re: scheduling
a team-building session June 2nd. "The phrase team-building is an
essential aspect of organizational development as Shel Davis conceives
of it. The phrase simply means what it says: opportunities for us to
get together and confront issues which are day-to-day makes it impossible
for us to connect with and which if not confronted over too long a period
of time may lead to serious administrative and organizational difficulties.
As a first step in our team-building program, Shel would like to discuss
his impressions gained from interviews he had with many of you in the top
administrative group. He felt very enthusiastic about our prospects and
felt that in every interview he conducted there was an openness, a strong
willingness, and an excitement about committing yourselves to this
activity." (The administrative team included all of the vice presidents,
the Presidential assistants, the Ombudsman, Bennis, Shel Davis, and a
second outside consultant (RW)
.
May 17, 1973
Administrative Management Seminar with Edgar Schein - Professor
,
School of Industrial Management, MIT.
May 23, 1973
Current Perspectives Seminar with Tony Weiner of the Hudson
Institute, New York.
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June 2. 1973
Administrative Team building session with ShelVernon Manor (a residential hotel in Cincinnati).
Davis at the
June 8, 1973
Administrative Team building session in New York City in
conjunction with a luncheon for the Heads of foundations.
June 18, 1973
Bennis in a postscript to another letter asks each person he
writes to list those areas or dimensions in which they would like togrow.
July 20, 1973
An Administrative Retreat is scheduled for August 2nd and 3rd
at Kings Island. Bennis would like answers to two questions in time
for the retreat: "1) In what ways can the University indicate or
demonstrate its own movement or progress or lack of movement or progress?
What criteria, dimensions, factors or indicators must we look for in
1973-74? 2) What factors within the faculty led to the choice of [LLl
as Faculty Representative to the University of Cincinnati Board of
Directors this past spring?"
July 25, 1973
Correspondence, the President to his team expressing gratitude
for everyone’s help and resourcefulness while he was at Aspen for the
summer as a scholar in residence. "The past several weeks have provided
a test of the reorganization."
August 2, 3, 1973
Administrative Retreat with Shel Davis at Kings Island. The
Provost had prepared a series of position papers on the various topics
that were discussed. The group of participants included eleven more
people than the June 2nd meeting.
September 26, 1973
Correspondence the President to Kings Island participants - "Kings
Island was an outstanding success in terms of developing more effective
methods of problem-solving." Another retreat is scheduled for mid -November
,
which is later cancelled.
The organizational structure of the University’s Central Administra-
tion before and after Bennis’ reorganization is shown on the charts on the
following pages.
UC
CENTRAL
ADMINISTRATION:
1972-73
STRUCTURE
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.
College
Deans
(except
Medicine,
Nursing
and
Health
and
Pharmacy)
report
directly
to
the
Provost
for
Academic
Affairs.
!.
Vice
Provost
for
Academic
Affairs
serves
in
a
staff
role
in
the
Office
of
the
Provost
for
Academic
Affairs.
I.
This
office
will
exist
only
until
the
present
incumbent
retires.
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Of the Organ i MHnnti
Leader in Building an Administrate T,,m 2
Introduction
efor6 be8inning an analysis of the University President's
actions in building an administrative team, it might be helpful to
look at what the components of this change strategy were. Clearly
one part of the development of an administrative team at the Uni-
versity of Cincinnati was "team-building." Bennis defined "team-
building" in a letter to his administrative team on May 8
,
1973 to
be "opportunities for us to get together and confront issues which
our day-to-day work often makes it impossible for us to connect with
and which if not confronted over too long a period of time may lead
to serious administrative and organizational difficulties." His goals
for these efforts were to develop more trust, caring, and open communica-
tion among members of his administrative team. 3 The Administrative
Since each of the clusters of interventions in Bennis' efforts
to build an administrative team had reached a different stage in the
change process as of July, 1973, when field observations were completed,
the impact of these interventions on the University will not be dis-
cussed. Instead an assessment of the effectiveness of the strategies
used and a discussion of the problems encountered in implementation will
be made by incorporating the reactions of participants to the interventions
as they occurred.
3See the Journal of Higher Education 's special issue on "Organizational
Development in Higher Education", Volume XLIV, Number 5, May, 1973.
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Management Seminars and administrative retreats were the primary
strategies Bennis used to change the attitudes and interpersonal
behavior of his administrative team. By the fall of 1973, three
team building sessions" had been held with varying numbers of
participants (June 2, 1973; June 9, 1973; August 2 - August 3,
1973) . This fall has been a clear beginning of more focused team-
building efforts - several of the vice presidents have gone to
National Training Laboratories (NTL) workshops and another team-
building session with Shel Davis was held in December, 1973, in
which just the vice presidents and the President participated.
A second component of Bennis* efforts to build an administra-
tive team was the administrative reorganization (3/7/73). The re-
organization included redefining the administrative structure,
creating new positions, bringing in some new people, moving other
people from one position to another, and implementing the "Office
of the President" concept. Here Bennis' goals were to make the
"administration more responsive and less ambiguous" (see the chrono-
logical summary 3/6/73 and 3/22/73). "The idea of the Office of the
President is to emphasize the need for collaboration and staff assist-
ance to the President." As of July, 1973, one of the new positions
created by the reorganization was not filled and a search process
was still underway for a new Vice President of the Medical Center.
There has not been adequate time to test "the office of" concept since
it did not evolve until mid-June, early July.
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Various interventions Bennis made to change the values and
attitudes of a larger group of University administrators constitute
the third aspect of the development of an administrative team. The
strategies he used in this regard were chosen to change the normative^
outlooks of these administrators. The strategies which included the
term appointment/periodic review process, new processes of socializa-
tion, and a series of seminars on "Current Perspectives in Higher
Education" were designed to re-educate the participants and to offer
them alternative ways of looking at their own careers and at the
problems facing institutions of higher education. The group toward
these interventions were directed included the academic deans as well
as the vice presidents, vice provosts, and Presidential assistants.
Again the impact and effectiveness of these interventions well depend
upon the ways in which they are followed up and built uoon.
Taken together these three components of team development -
team-building, the reorganization, and career-development represent
a strategy of organizational development. Sherwood (1970) defines
organizational development as
an educational process by which human resources
are continuously identified, allocated, and
expanded in ways to make these resources more
available to the organization, and therefore
improve the organization’s problem-solving
capabilities. The most general objective of
organizational development is to develop self-
renewing, self -correcting systems of people
who learn to organize themselves in a variety of
ways according to the nature of their tasks and
who continue to cope with the changing demands
the environment makes on the organization.
^Norm is defined as a prescribed or accustomed way of
looking at
or doing things.
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In the rest of this chapter the role of the President in
developing an administrative team at the University of Cincinnati
in light of the propositions set forth in Chapter II will be
analyzed. The purpose of the next section will be to look at the
unfreezing strategies he used in "team-building."
Team Building
Unfreezing-Initiation
Proposition 1: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to assess the nature and sources
of resistance to the proposed change.
Almost all of the strategies the President used in team-building
were designed to assess the nature and source of resistance to change
(Proposition 1). In his first year as President, Bennis asked his
assistants to propose and study the various pros and cons to plans for
restructuring the President’s office to determine if people were open
and ready to confront certain issues (see the chronological summary
11/8/71, 5/3/72, 5/26/72, 5/30/72, 7/12/72, and 7/25/73). On other
occasions he used administrative retreats (1/16/73) or meetings with
his assistants (10/6/72) in the same way. There is also evidence
to show that Bennis was cautious in initiating a team-building inter-
vention. He did not begin the Administrative Management Seminars until
his second year, after he had had a chance to build staff relationships
and to make some changes in his staff. When Shel Davis (9/20/72) first
came to Cincinnati to give an Administrative Management Seminar, Bennis
"felt people were not ready for team-building; that the group wasn't a
team yet; and that people weren’t used to talking to each other."
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Proposition 2: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to overcome the initial resistance
of organizational members to the proposed change.
Proposition 6: To change the constellation of
forces, resources and information converging on
any one part of the organization.
Proposition 10: To create a sense of rising
expectations among organizational members that
they will benefit from the proposed change in
their organizational behavior.
Bennis used several strategies to overcome the resistance to
team building that he fully anticipated (Proposition 2). In order
to undermine informational experts (management consultants) who, in
a series of seminars, looked at different aspects of management from
"Management by Objectives" (Sprangers, 10/24/72) to the "Profile of
a Perfect Executive" (Beckhard
,
11/6/72). The Administrative Manage-
ment Seminars were opportunities for University administrators to
confront new information - in this case the validity and importance
of looking at managerial and administrative problems. In order to
break down motivational and social supports, Bennis arranged for the
seminars to be held in an informal setting away from work in the
evening with dinner and cocktails. In his own behavior he stressed
the need for interdependence, collaboration, and a better under-
standing of the complex demands on University administrators. For
example, he appointed assistants in the President s office (8/11/71).
He talked about faculty members taking two-vear internships in
Administration. (During the academic year, 1972-73, three of his
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assistants were full-time faculty members.) Bennis also, over time,
tried to reduce the threat and anxiety associated with the prospect
of team-building (Proposition 2) . His language when he talked about
what team-building was, purposefully non-threatening. "We will be
talking about the ways in which we conduct the affairs of administra-
tion. . . ' (2/12/73). "It is an opportunity for us to get together
and confront issues which our day-to-day work makes it impossible for
us to confront. . ." (5/8/73). Similarly when you compare the agendas
for the January 2, 1973, administrative retreat and the June 2, 1973,
team-building session you can see a progression from issue-oriented
discussions to more open confrontations of those aspects of the team's
interpersonal relations which blocked problem-solving.
Agenda 1/16/73 Agenda 6/2/73
The Proposed Administrative Shel Davis' feedback on
Reorganization what the assistants and
Long Range Planning the Vice Presidents saw
Metropolitan Affairs Bennis' strengths and
Continuing Education weaknesses to be.
A slow and gradual apnroach to change, which is potentially less
threatening, is also apparent when one considers the fact that fourteen
Administrative Management Seminars were held over eight months. The
Seminars gradually expanded people's awareness of what team-building meant
(Proposition 6). When participants in the Administrative Management
Seminars were interviewed, none of them said they felt threatened and
that, although they were unsure about the relevance of some of the
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seminars to the University’s problems, they enjoyed the comraderie and
chance to get to know each other in another setting. Bennis provided
the opportunity through consultant interviews and question-and-answer
periods after each seminar for people to raise questions about the
values of openness, participation, and collaboration in administrative
decision-making (Proposition 2). Although he asked the vice presidents,
vice provosts, and Presidential assistants to attend the seminars, there
was no apparent retribution for not attending. People came voluntarily,
and Bennis tried to build on their interests. Very slowly he built a
sense of rising expectations in the same ways he reduced anxiety
(Proposition 10)
.
Proposition 3: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage is to heighten organization members’
sensitivity to problems involving the intended
change.
Proposition 4: To stimulate new needs and levels
of aspiration in the system in regards to the
proposed change.
Proposition 8: To link parts of the system that
are sympathetic to the intended change and share
common dissatisfactions and a sense of powerless-
ness .
Bennis also used consultants (1/22/72, 11/15/72, 11/20/72, 1/16/73,
2/5/73) to heighten organizational members' sensitivity to problems
(Proposition 3) and to link parts of the system that shared common
dissatisfactions in regards to the proposed change (Proposition 8).
Through public speeches and interaction in staff meetings
(once a week
with the vice presidents: more frequently with members
of his personal
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staff), Bennis heightened the community's sensitivity to problems of
managing a large complex University and tried to set new standards
of responsiveness to student and external demands for his administra-
tion (Proposition A) . All of the rationale for the Executive Vice
Presidency and office of concept, which will be discussed in greater
detail in the next section of this chapter, is grounded in the need
to be more responsive to students, to new constituent groups, to the
immediate community, and to changing environmental conditions.
Proposition 5: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to integrate new forces for change
with existing forces for change, external forces
for change with internal forces for change.
Proposition 5 states that an objective of the strategies used by
the organizational leader in initiating change may be to make the
organization more open to its environment, joining new, external forces
for change with existing, internal forces for change. Bennis recruited
an outsider for the open provost position for the very reason that he
thought that the person he chose was very much in tune with the changes
facing all institutions of higher education. He hired an outsider for
the Vice President for Metropolitan Affairs, a position he had created.
Bennis built on newness and on the qualities of youth and futurism in
developing his administrative team: three of the vice presidents he
hired were under 38.
Proposition 9: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to set priorities for the organization
and to clearly communicate these priorities to organi-
zational members whose behavior is to be changed.
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Clearly the development of an administrative team was a high
priority for Bennis if the amount of time he spent on the seminars
(both in arranging and in hosting them), at retreats, and on con-
sidering the reorganization is any indication (Proposition 9).^
(One would assume that the team-building intervention would be
important for Bennis given his background and training.) He used
money from his discretionary fund to sponsor the Administrative
Management Seminars. Money was also vailable for retreats (1/16/73,
6/2/73, 6/9/73, 8/2 - 8/3/73). In this way new resources, as well
as information, were channeled to "team" members (Proposition 6).
Proposition 11: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to involve as many of the individuals
to be affected by the proposed change as possible
in planning and decision-making.
Proposition 11 states that it may be important for the organiza-
tional leader to encourage the participation of those who will be
involved in the changes in planning and decision-making. Again most
of the participants felt that thev had some choice as to whether or
not they wanted to attend the seminars although the decision to have
the seminars was pretty much Bennis* alone. At the August (1973) Kings
Island conference Bennis asked the participants to critique the Manage-
ment Seminars and to make some recommendations about how they would like
^It is impossible to calculate an exact number of hours from Bennis*
calendar. As an observer I would estimate that the majority of his time
from December, 1972, until March, 1973, when the administrative reorganiza-
tion was announced was spent on some aspect of team development.
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to see them changed in the future. (Likewise Rennis had solicited the
opinions of his staff in 1971-72 about the reorganization of the admin-
istration he was considering.) Later his assistants were involved in
strategizing how the reorganization would be carried out. Finally the
outside consultant in the team-building session themselves insured the
participation of those who attended in deciding which issues should be
discussed
.
One of the criticisms, however, that was raised toward the way
team-building was implemented has to do with the question of participa-
tion and Bennis' tendency to involve lots of people in whatever he is
doing. For example, the group that attended the Administration Manage-
ment Seminars was never constant - faculty members or persons Rennis
either felt would be interested in the topic or who knew the speaker were
invited. (Likewise the group that attended Category II meetings [10/17/72,
12/5/72] was different from the group of individuals who were included
in the President’s Advisory Council [2/6/73, 4/10/73].) Participants
in the team-building sessions and Administrative Management Seminars
commented, ’’Bennis keeps shifting who is on the team - there is no
continuity. You get invited to two or three meetings and then you don’t
get invited to the next one” (a top administrator). At some point,
Bennis is going to have to stick with one group of people. He likes
people in and out but then community building doesn’t occur" (another
administrator). "Some meetings are so large that information is never
shared with the President" (a Presidential assistant). One of Rennis'
assistants commented that "Bennis is constantly overextendins
himself
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and his staff" and that he becomes fragmented as a result. "He tries
to attend too many things, to too many people at one time." If there
was a tendency to include miscellaneous and extraneous people in meetings,
there was also a tendency to try to cover too many items in any one
meeting. Bennis himself remarked at the 12/5/72 Category II meeting,
"that the agenda was so overwhelming that it didn’t allow for discussion."
In sum, the strategies Bennis used to overcome resistance to team building
might have been offset by the uncertainty created by the constantly
changing membership of the team.
Proposition 12: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to increase the amount and frequency
of interaction between himself and members in
regards to the proposed change.
Proposition 12 states that it may be important for the organiza-
tional leader to increase the amount of interaction he has with sub-
ordinates if unfreezing and changing in regards to the proposed change
is to occur. Bennis interacted frequently with the individuals who were
part of his team between September, 1972, and June, 1973 when the ground-
work for team-building was being laid. There were freauent meetings with
the vice presidents - at least once a week. For two months Bennis often
had most of the staff together in the mornings to discuss the mail. There
were also the Category II and President’s Advisory Council meetings, eight
"Current Perspectives in Higher Education" Seminars, and fourteen Adminis-
trative Management Seminars which most "team" members attended. The team-
building sessions in June, on June 2nd and 9th, also allowed for increased
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interaction between the President and members of his evolving admin-
istrative team. Let me quote from a letter Bennis received from one
of his vice presidents after the New York City session, June 9.
The personal character of the outing is what
pleased me most - or at the moment is what
lingers strongest in my mind. When you called
me to your office this morning to sit in on
your meeting with [the State legislators], I
had the impression I knew you much better than
ever before, and appreciated vou more. Perhaps
it resulted from a confrontation at the Vernon
Manor retreat (which I value, but did not like
as much as the New York visit) and our soiourn
to New York City. An important element for me
was the time we took for giving recognition to
'our looking at one another.' It's funny how
one must 'take time' for something like that.
It is also fascinating to observe how the chemis-
try of our relationships is so affected by 'taking
time to look' - which is really like taking time
to allow for love (whatever that is) . As you
well know, our professional relationships are
almost dominated by this time - or lack of it -
that we take."
At times, the quantity of interaction between Bennis and his administra-
tive team and among members of the team reflected the quality of caring
and trust that that letter describes.
Proposition 13: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to heighten organizational members'
self-esteem and to encourage reciprocity in
regards to the proposed change.
Proposition 14: To establish and maintain a
climate of acceptance, support, and trust in
interpersonal relationships in which change is
regarded positively.
At other times Bennis' impatience, his high standards and his own
competency interfered with those caring and trustful relationships
forming.
Bennis often criticized his staff for lacking imagination or
taking risks.
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The staff, in turn, criticized Bennis for often not reading the
material they had prepared in advance of meetings. Bennis missed some
small opportunities to build others’ sense of competency and self-
esteem (Proposition 13) by not appreciating work his staff had done.
In an interview in October, 1972, Bennis said that what he may
have done in his first year as a University President was "to have
created an atmosphere where confrontation, feedback, and some openness
are possible" (The Journal of Higher Education, May, 1973) (Proposition
14) . Some of the members of the administrative team who were inter-
viewed felt that Bennis' observation was true: others perceived that
often when Bennis said he wanted feedback, his immediate reactions to
what was being said often did not allow others to say exactly what they
wanted to say (a Presidential assistant). In other words, Bennis was
able to control other people's ways of participating and giving feedback
so they weren't sure how open a climate had actually been created
(another assistant). On January 19, 1973, in a meeting with his assist-
ants Bennis said that part of the problem was "that he kept knowing too
much what was wrong with the system and that nobody else ever took any
initiative." One person said in response that he had to see his recom-
mendations being acted upon in order to be encouraged to take more risks,
which was not happening.
Proposition 16: An obiective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to build his expertise and credibility
with organizational members.
Proposition 17: To extend the organizational
leader's control over varied kinds of resources
and sources of power.
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Propositions 7 (eliciting support from informal as well as
formal leaders) or 15 (demonstrating a change in the organization's
relationship to other organizations) are probably not relevant in
this case. Propositions 16 and 17 state that it may be important
for the organizational leader to be seen as credible and to build
on as many sources of power as he can in order for successful initia-
tion and implementation to occur. Bennis is seen as attractive,
charismatic, and knowledgeable by many of his colleagues in the
University. He is respected as an expert in organizational theory
inside as well as outside the university. He is perceived as being
consistently committed to changes in the direction of greater collabora-
tion, trust, and openness. As the organizational leader he made
resources available for team-building and committed his own, his
staff's and the vice presidents' time to it. Finally, organizational
members recognize that Bennis' style, his informality, and his willing-
ness to risk have all built up his personal power.
Although there is some evidence of leader behaviors in the
"changing " stage, the majority of the actions Bennis took in his
second year as President in regard to team-building were designed to
unfreeze (and get people ready to change). In fact, it has been
possible to cite specific strategies Bennis used in order to create
in almost all of the conditions described in the propositions for
"unfreezing". In the next section, the actions Bennis was beginning
to take in order to implement his team-building intervention will
be
described
.
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Changing-Implementation
Proposition 22: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to provide organizational members
with opportunities to test and verify new
behaviors through personal experience.
The team-building sessions Bennis scheduled in June, 1973, gave
the members of his administrative team an opportunity to try out new
behaviors (Proposition 22). For example, one of the vice presidents
commented in an interview that he was learning "you can say things to
Bennis - he takes them in good humor." The outside consultant for
team-building encouraged the participants to clarify the feedback he
was sharing with the President that had come from interviews with them
(6/2/73). "She! was there and he wouldn't let you not answer a question"
(a vice president). This past fall, several of the vice presidents
have had the opportunity to go to NTL for a week at a time to learn
about themselves and team-building in a non-work setting (Proposition
22). At least for some of the vice presidents the behavioral changes
required of them are becoming clearer from continuing work with Shel
Davis and from practical experience at collaborative problem-solving
in the Office of the President.
Proposition 24: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in imple-
menting change may be to provide role models for
new behavior patterns.
Proposition 30: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in incornora-
^
ting change may be to monitor organizational members
performance in coping with and integrating the
proposed change.
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It was mentioned before how Bennis has served as a role model in
team-building given his willingness to take feedback (Proposition 24)
(see chronological summary 5/3/73 and 6/2/73). For the most part he
has also encouraged a degree of risk-taking on the part of organizational
members (Proposition 25). When Bennis doesn’t encourage risk-taking is
when he solicits feedback and does not act on it or when neople feel that
there are NO rewards — reciprocity, inclusion, etc. — associated with
opening up) . The two letters Bennis wrote to his administrative team
(7/25/73 and 9/26/73) are examples of his reinforcing even tentative
changes on the part of organizational members (Pronosition 30)
.
Proposition 26: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to redefine the leader's role in
relation to the change processes initiated.
At this point Bennis has not changed his relationship to the
team-building intervention he has initiated (Proposition 26) . His
relationships with team members continue to be the focal point of most
team-building discussions. Sarason wrote in The Creation of Settings
that "the setting is the leader's in the most personal and pervasive
way and his feelings of worth are perceived by him to be depending on
the success of the setting" (Sarason, 1972, p. 213). Bennis continues
to have a high personal investment in making the team-building inter-
vention work.
It is not possible to cite actions Bennis has taken in regards to
the other propositions for "changing" and at this point it is still too
early to assess the degree of incorporation-refreezing or success of the
team-building intervention.
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The Reorganization
An important key to understanding Bennis’ second intervention
to develop an administrative team, the reorganization, is his writings
about the need for an administrative reorganization. Let me quote
extensively from his recommendations to the Board of Directors,
February 15, 1973.
I am convinced that we have some serious problems
resulting from our organizational structure. And
I say this with full recognition that at times it
is necessary to avoid the costs of confrontation
and settle for what will work. Here what we face
is. . .fragmentation, proliferation, territorial
imperatives, a lack of real sharing and collegi-
ality among and between units, and an undue amount
of energy and time spent solely in protecting
one's "turf" and resources - all of which taken
together alienates the faculty from one another,
helps to make our students feel cynical about
the avowed goals of what a university really is,
and undoubtedly hampers the prospects for our
capacity to work together (p. 20).
There are also structural voids.
There is no central information system. There is
no systematic way to develop or examine new ideas
and programs. There is no systematic way to review,
coordinate, and employ new technologies of communica-
tion. There is no University-wide mechanism for
reviewing, coordinating, and carefully implementing
new programs in continuing education to a variety of
new populations. There is no central coordinating
point or academic focus for facilitating and developing
the nucleus of faculty or core curricula for an urban
university (p. 32).
Secondly, in addition to structural problems, "there are problems
with people in the organization being miscast, myopic, and untrained
for
what they are doing" (p. 50).
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Thirdly, Bennis characterizes the organizational climate of
the University by what he perceives to be highly individualistic
behavior, problem denial, low initiative and risk-taking, excessive
caution, fear and almost no collaboration or confrontation. These
norms, values and beliefs, he says, govern the mood, attitudes,
competence and people’s feelings of people in the University.
I am convinced that the single most important
change to the integrity of institutions of
higher education is our dependence on external
forces and our tragic failure to recognize and
confront the consequences of this (p. 26).
After summarizing the problems of structure, personnel, and
climate, Bennis enumerates the consequences of these problems with
the Board
:
1) There has been a diffusion and blurring of
goals about the true nature of a university:
along with this and possibly because of it
there is a lack of coherent, unified leader-
ship .
2) There has been no rational planning process,
development of priorities, or deliberateness
about decisions related to priorities or goals.
3) There is widespread demoralization and feelings
of powerlessness (p. 70).
The reorganization of Bennis advocates in response to these
problems includes:
1) The creation of a new position: a University
Dean for Graduate Education and Research.
2) The creation of Presidential Advisory Councils
for improving and making the decision-making
process more visible.
3) Changes in the Office of the Provost.
4) The development of a management -inf ormat ion
system.
|f
5) The implementation of the concept of the
Office of the President."
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A description of the principal functions of the Office of the
President are included in Appendix G. The "Office of the President"
Bennis proposed included two Executive Vice Presidents:
The Executive Vice President and Secretary of
the Board of Directors - "who will provide
general advice and council on all University
matters, especially on questions of budgeting
and community relations. He will work closely
with the President on all external financial
matters. . .He will be responsible for the
relationships between the General Hospital and
the resources of the Medical Center. He and
the Executive Vice President for Academic
Affairs will have responsibility within the
Office of the President for all issues that
relate to the management of the budget of
the University [Emphasis mine] . The major
responsibility of the Executive Vice President
for Academic Affairs will be to coordinate and
orchestrate all internal affairs of the Uni-
versity with the President. He will be respons-
ible for responding to the initiatives of the
colleges, interacting with their proposals,
and relating institutional aspirations to
external realities, assuring in the process
the primacy of external concerns as we struggle
purposefully to manage change within scarce
resources. He will implement the budget review
process and have special responsibilities for
planning policy and decision making for academic
programs .
"
Essentially what Bennis was saying in implementing the "office
of" concept was that one man cannot do it all. The overload of this
office has reached staggering proportions. Under the reorganization
plan the two Executive Vice Presidents, the President, and the Presi-
dential assistants will work as a composite ’Office of the President.
This will make the President more personally accessible as needs
arise
than has been possible up to now" (Candid Campus, 3/7/73).
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The functions Bennls outlined for himself were functions of
leadership, not management, to use his own distinction.
The most important functions of leadership are
infusing new values and goals, planning for
the future and anticipating coming things,
raising the fundamental questions most of us
take for granted, heightening awareness of
external problems that may pose important
changes for the organization, providing
perspectives about where the institution is,
has come from and where it expects to go,
creating the right social architecture and
climate, and identifying the people who can
propel the organization (p. 72).
6
Proposition 3: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in initiating
change may be to heighten organizational members'
sensitivity to problems involving the intended
change.
Proposition 4: To stimulate new needs and levels
of aspiration in the system.
Proposition 23: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in imple-
menting change may be to offer organizational
members new meanings or ways of looking at their
experiences in regards to the proposed change.
Clearly the conditions described in Propositions 3, 4, and 23
were met by the reasons Bennis shared for the proposed reorganization.
Through what he wrote he heightened organizational members sensitivity
to certain problems of organizational structure, personnel, and climate
(Proposition 3); he stimulated new needs and levels of aspiration
(such as the need for greater clarity and more effectiveness) (Proposi-
tion 4); and he provided a new conceptualization for the
Office of the
President (Proposition 23)
.
What other actions did Bennis take and what
functions did they serve in regards to the reorganization?
^These functions essentially parallel
tional leader outlined under unfreezing
the functions for the organiza-
in the propositions presented.
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The interventions he took are listed below:
August, 1971
.Appointed assistants to the Office of the President.
February, 1972
•Created the position, Vice President for Metropolitan Affairs.
June, 1972 - (December, 1971)
.Job description exercise.
August, 1972
.Administrative advisory groups recommended.
September, 1972
.Ford Foundation Administrative Interns chosen.
October, 1972
.Outside consultant used. Category II Meeting.
November, 1972
.Assistants analyze office procedures and work flow. Another outside
consultant used.
December, 1972
.Conferences with the vice presidents on administrative advisory groups
Category II meeting. Kitchen Cabinet Meeting.
January, 1973
."Unresolved problems" discussions (12/6/72, 12/16/72, 1/9/72, 1/16/73)
.Administrative retreat.
.University Dean for Graduate Education and Research position announced
.Kitchen Cabinet Meeting.
February, 1973
.President's Advisory Group Council meeting. Reorganization recom-
mended to Board of Directors.
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March, 1973
. . .Reorganization discussed with the deans, vice presidents, and
vice provosts. Reorganization announced 3/6/73.
Spring, 1973
. . .Reorganization implemented.
. . .Search committees appointed for a new provost, University Dean,
and Vice President for the Medical Center.
Proposition 2: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to o v ercome the initial resistance
of organizational members to the proposed change.
Proposition 3: To heighten organizational members'
sensitivity to problems involving the intended change.
Proposition 4: To stimulate new needs and levels
of aspiration in the system in regards to the proposed
change.
Again, as in team-building, Bennis' early strategies were designed
to heighten organizational members' sensitivity to organizational problems
(Proposition 3) , to create new needs (Proposition 4) and to overcome
resistance to the changes he was proposing (Proposition 2) . Consultants
were used to identify organizational problems (10/22/72, 11/15/73). In
the job description exercise (12/71, 6/72) Bennis asked the vice presi-
dents and vice provosts to list unresolved issues in their areas and in
the University in general. Those problems were then discussed in
individual conferences between Bennis and each administrator. Bennis
attempted to change informational support for existing attitudes and
behavior by emphasizing through his speeches the changing economic and
social conditions for higher education and his goal to make the University
of Cincinnati the greatest metropolitan university in the country. He
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reinforced his commitment to his goal to involve the University
in community affairs by creating of Office of the Vice President
for Metropolitan Affairs in February, 1972. That Bennis was not
totally changing patterns of motivational or social support for
existing attitudes and behavior is evident from a consultant’s
description of enclaves of faculty members who disagreed with
Bennis' definition for the role of the University. "Given his
convictions about moving the University in more open, community-
related ways, Bennis was certain to inherit ready-made opposition
in that portion of the faculty concerned with the classical purposes
of the University. . .It is a matter to be dealt with by the Presi-
dent spending more time with the faculty to convey to them his vision
of what they might do together’.’ (consultant, 11/30/72). Although
Bennis verbally assured faculty members that their present satis-
factions would not be lost, his assurances were not heard by those
faculty members, especially in Arts and Sciences, who were skeptical
of Bennis’ social science background (a Presidential assistant).
The implementation of the reorganization changes was approached
gradually almost fifteen months after Bennis first mentioned he was
considering a ma/jor administrative reorganization, which on the one
hand may have diminished anxiety in the system as a whole (Proposition
2) and on the other hand may have heightened anxiety for individuals
who were uncertain about their future in the new structure (Proposi-
tion 4). One of the individuals whose career was involved
described
the situation as one of low trust, high insecurity.
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Proposition 22: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in imple-
menting change may be to provide organizational
members with opportunities to test and verify
new behaviors through personal experience.
Proposition 24: To provide role models for new
behavior patterns.
As in team-building, Bennis provided models and opportunities to
test new behaviors prior to full-scale implementation (Propositions 22
and 24). His own office with assistants and an administrative intern
was a model. The Category II meetings were a model for the evolving
advisory councils. Thirdly, the rationale given for administrative
advisory groups - a team-approach to problem solving - foreshadowed the
rationale for the March reorganization itself.
Proposition 7: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in initi-
ating change may be to elicit support for the
proposed organizational change from informal as
well as formal organizational leaders.
Proposition 11: To involve as many of the
individuals to be affected by the proposed
change as possible in planning and decision-
making.
There are numerous examples of strategies Bennis used to elicit
support for the reorganization from both formal and informal organiza
tional leaders (Proposition 7) . He held discussions on unresolved
issues” with his assistants and with the vice presidents (12/10/72),
with the deans (1/9/72), and again with the vice presidents and assist-
ants at the administrative retreat (1/16/72). He consulted with his
Kitchen Cabinet of faculty members twice - once on December 16, 1972,
and again on January 27, 1973. He initially proposed the
position for
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a University Dean for Graduate Education and Research at a dinner for
the Fellows of the Graduate School (1/8/73) before announcing the
position January 18th at the graduate faculty meeting. He consulted
the Board of Directors in February before a public announcement
of the reorganization was made in March. Bennis also fulfilled the
conditions of Proposition 11 for the most part - involving at least
those individuals whose careers would be directly affected by the
proposed changes in discussion (see the chronological summary 1/16/73
and 1/29/73). He scheduled individual meetings with all of the
persons whose positions were affected by the reorganization.
Although it is possible to cite actions Bennis took to consult
with formal and informal leaders and to gain their support (Proposi-
tion 7), the principal criticisms of the reorganization plan arose over
the issue of "consultation”. Governance leaders and the Faculty Repre-
sentative to the Board of Directors charged that Bennis consulted with
them at the last minute and that by March 4th when they were consulted
the reorganization was already a "fait accompli". One governance groun
leader commented, "No faculty member would challenge the President’s
prerogative to reorganize his administration, but the reorganization
contained a number of recommendations which substantially affect the
academic life of the institution. He came up with a plan that could
have been more precise and less ambiguous with faculty consultation.
He's always claiming a pool of expertise here - but his actions show
an underestimation of faculty intelligence and a lack of confidence
in their ability."
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Proposition 13: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in initiating
change may be to heighten organizational members
self-esteem and to encourage reciprocity in regards
to the proposed change.
Proposition 16: To build the organizational
leader’s expertise and credibility with organiza-
tional members.
Proposition 18: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in imple-
menting change may be to overcome emerging
resistance to the proposed change during the
period of attempted implementation.
Proposition 20: To continually clarify and provide
mechanisms by which organizational members can gain
clarification of the behavioral changes required.
Proposition 21: To provide mechanisms for feedback
between the leader and the people undergoing change.
Proposition 25: To encourage experimentation and
risk-taking on the part of organizational members
in regards to the proposed change.
Proposition 38: The organizational leader and others
advocating the change need to be perceived as trust-
worthy throughout the change process.
Bennis and the chairman of the Faculty Senate sparred over "what
it means to consult" for weeks following the announcement of .the reorganiza-
tion as Bennis tried to overcome emerging resistance more to the way he
had implemented the reorganization than to the substance of the recom-
mendations themselves (Proposition 18). Essentially, Bennis felt that
he had consulted with governance leaders since they were a part of his
Kitchen Cabinet discussions. Faculty members, on the other hand, and
to
some extent the academic deans, felt that they had not had
sufficient
opportunity to clarify certain aspects of the reorganization
(Proposition
20) or to give Bennis feedback on what they felt
might need to be changed
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or at least made more precise (Proposition 21). They felt that Bennis’
credibility with the faculty was lessened as a result of the way he had
implemented the reorganization (Propositions 16, 38). Several of the
deans felt that they had not been consulted on the role of the University
Dean or on the changes in the Provost’s office which would affect them.
"Bennis pulls a group together to consult with them, gives a long intro-
duction, takes a few stabs in the direction of his expectations and then
goes off on tangents. There is little soliciting of opinion and no
summarizing" (a dean). The deans, in meeting with the Provost after
the announcement of the reorganization, said they felt that Bennis had
not asked for their opinions (Proposition 13) and that there was too
much of a risk involved in giving unsolicited advice (Proposition 25)
.
Clark Kerr wrote that "innovation works best if there is no
author." Bennis, in this case, had a high investment in his ideas being
implemented (Proposition 37) since he had considered them for a long
time and since he considered his Presidency to be visible only if certain
personnel and structural changes were made. Unfortunately, the way in
which he implemented the reorganization, from the perception of one
governance group leader, may interfere with faculty members’ receptivity
to other ideas he proposes in the future.^
^Kahn and Wolfe define style as the outstanding tendencies in the
behavior of the focal person irrespective of the particular activities
he is engaged in. People’s expectations about the organizational leader’s
style, which have resulted from interactions with him in the past, may
prevent them from seeing him take certain actions which may be for the
successful initiation, implementation, and incorporation of change. In
other words, the leader's style can, over time, shape the way in which
his interventions are perceived and the effectiveness with which he can
implement change.
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Proposition 13: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in initia-
ting change may be to heighten organizational
members self-esteem and to encourage reciprocity
in regards to the proposed change.
Proposition 19: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organization leader in implementing
change may be to provide opportunities for organiza-
tional members to make their commitment to the
proposed change public.
Proposition 26: To redefine the leader's role in
relation to the change processes initiated.
Proposition 30: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in incor-
porating change may be to monitor organizational
members' performance in coping with and integrating
change.
Proposition 33 : To insulate the organization from
conflicting or competing ideas and to give organiza-
tional members time to assimilate and integrate new
behaviors
.
Proposition 35: To give emotional support and re-
sources to organizational members who demonstrate
behaviors in the direction of the intended change.
In spite of the criticism to the way in which the administrative
reorganization was announced, it was still implemented and to a degree
refrozen. There are some examples of actions the President took which
correspond to the leader behaviors that have been proposed for refreezing.
For example, Bennis chaired the search processes for the new provost and
for a vice president for the Medical Center (Proposition 30) . A new
provost was appointed in June. At the same time the two Executive Vice
Presidents became part of the Office of the President. In mid -June
Bennis left for Aspen for six weeks to be a scholar in residence giving
the Executive Vice Presidents the responsibility to manage the University
(Proposition 26), as well as time to assimilate the changes that had been
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made (Proposition 33) . Finally he has been very reinforcing of their
resourcefulness and accomplishments (Propositions 13, 29, and 35).
In terms of the goals Bennis identified when he presented the
reorganization plan to the University community in March, it is still
too early to objectively evaluate whether or not they will be met.
Having reviewed two of Bennis* interventions in developing an
administrative team, the next section of this chapter will be used
to look at the third part of his overall organizational development
strategy.
Career Development
The goals of Bennis’ career development strategies, which are
described as normative-reeducation, have been to change the normative
orientation of University administrators toward their own careers and
tenure as administrators. Although he has talked about a center for
administrative training at the University of Cincinnati and has appointed
a Task Force on Continuing Education to explore the possibilities of a
center for advanced study, Bennis* actions in this aspect of team
development have been more limited than in the other two aspects of
team development. The principal interventions he has taken are: 1) to
support an administrative term appointment /periodic review process;
2) to sponsor Administrative Management Seminars and a lecture series
on Current Perspectives in Higher Education; and 3) to intentionally NOT
structure his office or his relationships with the vice presidents.
This last intervention, or non-intervention as it might be called, is
an important part, however of the career-development effort.
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The term socialization" is used to describe a process by which
individuals acquire the knowledge, motives, feelings, skills, or other
characteristics expected in the groups in which they are or seek to
become members. For a long time (perhaps a year or more) Bennis did not
specify what he ex pected from his assistants or the vice presidents nor
what behaviors would be effective in meeting his expectations. Rather
he appeared "to be experimenting with alternate modes of encouraging
top staff to define their own jobs, of 'grabbing the ball and running
with it', of attempting to see how individuals act in different situa-
tions, and of intentionally not giving anyone any instructions on what
he expects or what he wants them to do. Some have a much lesser tolerance
for ambiguity than the President who appears to thrive on it. Some find
it difficult to handle after long years of authoritarian, disciplined
rule" (an outside consultant, 11/30/72). The effects of this kind of
socialization process have been to create new needs and levels of aspira-
tion among organizational members (Proposition 4) ; to make the adminis-
tration more open to its environment, to new people and new ideas (Proposi-
tion 5) ; to create a general sense of rising expectations (Proposition 9)
;
to establish new meanings and ways of looking at experiences (Proposition
23) ; and to create a climate of security (Proposition 14) (depending
on
whether or not one was able to handle the ambiguity). Finally, this kind
of socialization process increased members’ dependency on the President to
define responsibilities and a decision-making process, and hence his power
over them (Proposition 17).
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The second intervention Bennis made in the direction of career
development was to support a term-appointment /periodic review process
for University administrators which the Board of Directors approved
April 4, 1972. The term-appointment idea means that all administrators,
department heads, deans, vice-provosts, and vice presidents are subject
to regular review by their colleagues.
In my opinion, the chief value of the term appoint-
ment [procedure] is that it provides the opportunity
for change. . .It gives administrators the chance to
return to the faculty for research and teaching.
The term appointment procedure never implies that
an individual cannot continue as an administrator
for an indefinite period; it merely sets specific
times at which the appointment is reviewed. This
is a good procedure because it gives colleagues
the privilege of evaluating their leaders. When
people have the chance to re-elect or reject leader-
ship, they feel much more a sense of commitment to
their administrative leaders. A specified term also
gives an administrator the opportunity to use a full
term without having to be unduly concerned about being
dismissed. Thus, the administrator under this process
feels free to take certain risks. It gives leaders
more chance to really lead (Bennis, 4/6/72).
The term appointment procedure had been recommended by the University
Senate and reviewed by the University of Cincinnati Chanter of the
American Association of University Professors before Bennis took his
recommendation to the Board of Directors. By building on the support of
governance leaders for the proposal (Proposition 7), Bennis avoided the
resistance that the procedure might have encountered when it was intro-
duced (Proposition 2). As a mechanism of institutional change, a term
appointment/periodic review process forces the organization to look at
its goals and to involve constituents in decision-making and
priority
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setting (a dean) (Propositions 23 and 11) . It also creates a need for
administrators not favorably reviewed to consider alternatives to
returning to teaching and hence dovetails nicely with Bennis' other
proposals for career development and retraining (Proposition 34).
The University began implementing the term appointment /periodic
review process in the academic year 1972-73. Colleges were asked to
incorporate the procedure in their revised by-laws (Proposition 11) even
though some of the arrangements had not yet been worked out - such as
whether or not an administrator's salary would be cut when he returned
to teaching (Proposition 28) . A comment one vice provost made that
"those who proposed term appointments may find it somewhat more difficult
to compose the criteria and process of evaluation," may indicate that
Bennis' credibility will be jeopardized if the process is not clarified
soon or if certain details are not worked out (Propositions 20 and 28).
In addition there is some resistance building to the fact that a term
appointment has not been set for the President, (at least publicly),
though that was promised when the procedure was announced. (On October
31, the faculty passed a resolution calling for the public announcement
of a term appointment for the President by January 1, 1973.) It seems
as if Bennis will need to intervene soon and to model the process (Proposi-
tion 24) and to support those colleges which have undertaken periodic
reviews of their administrators, if successful implementation of the
process is to occur.
The Administrative Management and Current Perspectives Seminars
are the third intervention Bennis made in regards to career development.
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The seminars were designed to provide administrative training experi-
ences for the participants. Through these he hoped to make the
University's administrators more aware of changes in the economic and
social conditions facing higher education (Propositions 3, 4, and 5)
and to establish a climate in the University in which change was regarded
positively (Proposition 14) . The seminars increased his interaction with
the deans, vice provosts, and vice presidents (Proposition 12) and con-
tributed in that way to his overall efforts to build an administrative
team. The seminars also served to link parts of the system which were
experiencing the same insecurity and fears in regards to career prospects
in particular and change in general (Proposition 8).
Summary and Conclusions
The extent to which any of the interventions discussed in this
chapter will contribute to the development of an administrative team
at the University of Cincinnati will depend on whether or not the Presi-
dent acts to refreeze the changes he has been making. For example,
whether or not he continues to evaluate and make changes as needed in
the team-building process he has initiated or whether or not he will
provide the necessary career opportunities for administrators who show
an ability to adapt to new environmental pressures and changing job
descriptions. The success for example of the team-building intervention
will depend on the extent to which the "team" becomes important for
members
.
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It depends on what one considers to be a desirable
outcome and what costs in terms of other values
one is prepared to bear. The choice of goals for
intervention is determined by the value perspec—
tive, cultural and ideological biases of the
chooser. The question of who decides on the goals
often has implications for who ultimately benefits
from the outcome of the intervention. To what
extent do those who are affected by the inter-
vention participate in the choice of goals? What
efforts are being made to have their interests
represented in setting priorities and to bring
their perspectives to bear on the definition of
the problem and the range of choices entertained?
To what extent does the process enhance the power
of the target population and provide them with
countervailing mechanisms of protection against
arbitrary and self-serving uses of power by the
change agent? (Zaltman, 1973, p. 391).
Those questions are probably harsh ones to ask in evaluating a
team-building or team development effort but the answers to those ques-
tions a year from now will reveal the extent to which the changes that
have been initiated in the regard have been incorporated.
All that it has been possible to do in this chapter is to cite
examples of leader behaviors that correspond to those actions that the
model that has been proposed says may need to be done in each phase of
the change process. Except in a few instances it has not been possible
to corroborate the propositions for the role performance of the organiza-
tional leader with statements from organizational members about what they
needed or expected from the University President as they tried to imple
ment the changes he had proposed. Still, for a number of reasons, this
to write given the purposes of this research.chapter was an important one
327
In the first place process observation is important irrespec-
tive of knowing what will come of some changes that have been initiated
(see Weiss and Rein, 1971). Secondly, this case substantiates what
others have written, that external consultants are valuable, probably
necessary, in initiating and implementing certain kinds of organiza-
tional changes (Lippitt, Watson, West ley, 1958; Bennis, 1965). For
example, in the development of an administrative team at the University
of Cincinnati, external consultants were used to assess the amount of
resistance to the proposed change, to overcome resistance to change, to
heighten organizational members' sensitivity to problems, to change
the flow of information among members, to link parts of the system,
to make the organization more open to its environment, to build the
organizational leader's credibility, and to provide support to members
undergoing change.
Thirdly, the nature of the interventions themselves in regards to
building an administrative team may have important future implications
for the role of the University President in the implementation of change.
It was Bennis' perception that certain role constraints and demands on
his time prevented him from being an effective manager and spending time
with faculty members and students (see Bennis' recommendations to the
University of Cincinnati Board of Directors, 2/15/73, and his article in
Saturday Review, 12/9/72). With the reorganization and the implementation
of an "office of" concept what he was essentially saying was
that one
person cannot be responsible for everything that's demanded
of a University
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President in the 1970’s. For the purposes of this research what he said
was that perhaps one person cannot be responsible for all the actions
that the propositions say may be necessary for the successful initiation,
implementation, and incorporation of change. Actually the model only
says that certain conditions may need to be present as a result of
certain actions taken by the organizational leader. It does not say
that those conditions cannot be accomplished by a group acting as the
organizational leader instead of by a single individual. In other words
the propositions might equally well be applied to the "Office of the
President" i.e. the President and the two Executive Vice Presidents.
The crux of the matter will be whether or not organizational members
perceive the three to be one, whether they perceive all three to share
i
Presidential authority so that an action by any one of them would con-
stitute an act by the organizational leader.
The explanation Bennis gave for the reorganization is not clear
as to whether or not he intended all three to have equal power , though
simply different functions. ^ The clearest indication of the fact that
he did intend for all three of them to have equal power was that he
delegated responsibility "for all issues that relate to the management
and budget of the University to the Executive Vice President and Secre-
tary to the Board of Directors and the Executive Vice Presidents for
8Bennis describes the office as "a creature of interdependent parts.
While for cultural and essentially bureaucratic reasons, each of us
has
a special title, it is not my intention to create several layers
of aut on y
which one must penetrate in order to get a decision. Rather my
intention
is that the Office of the President should act in a c
°^erted way so that
the President is not involved in every decision (Candid
Campus 3/7/73).
329
Academic Affairs" (Candid Campus, 3/7/73). In any case the way in
which the reorganization is operationalized and the "Office of the
President" functions will influence the perceptions and hence the
expectations of organizational members for the role performance of
the organizational leader or leaders in the future. Paradoxically,
Bennis is still having to perform the roles for the organizational
leader that have proposed in this research in order to establish
(incorporate) a reorganization in which he might not have to perform
these roles.
CHAPTER I X
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Introduction
The purpose of this research was to examine the actions of a
University President in initiating, implementing, and incorporating
long-term organizational change, taking into account the literature
on leadership and organizational change and the research in social
psychology on attitude change. Each of the four case studies of the
role performance of the organizational leader that have described
establishes the need for the organizational leader to think through
a strategy for organizational change which includes a leadership role
not only in setting new goals and initiating change but also in seeing
to it that certain organizational conditions which are seen by others
as necessary for implementation and incorporation are established and
maintained. In each of the four cases reviewed organizational members
encountered problems in attempting to implement the required behavioral
changes. In each case members held the expectation that the organiza-
tional leader would help them solve those problems since he had initiated
the change, ostensibly was committed to it, and was perceived to be in
a position of power to control the forces influencing its implementation.
For example, in the case of the development of an administrative team
the organizational leader had anticipated several problems and took
actions to minimize or overcome them. In the development of a long range
plan, the lack of effective feedback mechanisms prevented the organizational
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leader from knowing, the difficulties and uncertainties the Task Force
and the deans were encountering in trying to implement the long range
planning process and consequently from acting in ways that would have
facilitated the implementation of the planning process. Or, for example,
in the case of the budget-review/resource allocation process the need
for the President to change existing organizational arrangements in
order for members to be able to effectively participate in decision
making was especially clear.
The rest of this chapter is divided into three parts. In the
first part conclusions from each of the four case analyses in terms
of their theoretical implications for the role performance of the
organizational leader in the management of organizational change will
be reviewed. The possible practical implications of this study for
the role of the university president will then be considered. Finally,
the purpose of the last section of this chapter will be to discuss some
of the research implications of this study and how further studies might
contribute to the development of a theory of the organizational leader’s
role in initiating, implementing, and incorporating organizational change.
Theoretical Implications of the Study
An assumption made at the beginning of this field study was that
the degree to which a proposed change initiated by the organizational
leader was implemented and incorporated was a function of a number of
variables many of which could be linked to the role performance of the
organizational leader. It was reasoned that if those actions that persons
undergoing change said they needed or expected from the organizational
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leader were compared with what he actually did, it would be possible
to learn about how and where an organizational leader's actions influ-
ences the initiation, implementation, and incorporation of organiza-
tional change. In the first part of this section observations and
conclusions from extensive documentation of four case studies of the
role performance of the University President in effecting organiza-
tional change will be reviewed.^
Long Range Planning (Chapter V)
From a case analysis of the organizational leader's role in the
development of Long Range Planning it was shown:
1) That, in general, the organizational leader's actions tended
to augment forces for change by heightening organizational
members' awareness of external pressures on the University
to plan, by stimulating new needs and levels of aspiration
in the system in regards to planning, and by integrating
external and internal forces for the planning effort.
2) That the organizational leader effectively changed the flow
of information in the organization and involved informal,
as well as formal, leaders in the planning process.
3) That the organizational leader did not build relationships
with the Long Range Planning Task Force or the deans that
provided for support or reciprocity.
•^The reader is referred to Chapter III on Research Method and
Design in which some of the limitations to the nature and kinds of
conclusions that can be made from this kind of study are explored
.
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4) That the organizational leader’s implementation strategy
failed to anticipate or bring out into the open diffi-
culties that would be encountered in trying to implement
a participatory long range planning process.
5) That the organizational leader’s implementation strategy
failed to establish and use feedback mechanisms to uncover
and resolve problems that arose during attempted implementation.
6) That the organizational leader tried to clarify what changes
were expected by expanding the range of outcomes he expected,
and thereby the parameters of the Long Range Planning Task
Force’s task.
7) That too many expectations for what a long range plan would
mean and for what the Task Force could do interfered with
the implementation of the planning process.
8) That too many demands on the time of formal leaders to whom
planning was delegated interfered with successful imple-
mentation and incorporation.
9) That the organizational leader did not make changes in the
policies, rewards, communication or decision-making structures
of the organization so that they supported the long range
planning process.
10)
That the organizational leader’s implementation strategy
failed to provide the appropriate supports and rewards
to
maintain subordinate willingness to carry out
implementation.
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11) That because of Infrequent interaction with the Long Range
Planning Task Force the organizational leader was not in a
position to objectively evaluate the long range planning
process
.
12) That the organizational leader's ambitious approach to change
interfered with the incorporation of long range planning in
the organization.
Affirmative Action (Chapter VI)
From a case analysis of the organizational leader's role in the
development of an affirmative action plan and program it can be shown:
1) That the organizational leader's actions showed that he had
anticipated and assessed resistance to affirmative action
and had used several strategies to overcome resistance.
2) That the organizational leader built on the external required-
ness of the change and on several internal forces for change
in initiating the affirmative action program.
3) That the organizational leader as well as the Director of
the Office of Resource Development intervened to establish
compatible organizational arrangements and to make departmental
changes toward affirmative action part of an interrelated
system of role behaviors.
4) That a public commitment to some future action is an effective
way to stabilize change.
5) That the organizational leader failed to establish a
workable
relationship with the Director so that it was difficult for
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him to monitor her role performance or evaluate her
accomplishments objectively.
6) That the Director of the Office of Resource Development
tended to rely on strategies of providing information
about affirmative action and on achieving change through
compliance, i.e. by monitoring and enforcing affirmative
action in processes of recruitment, hiring, promotions,
terminations, etc. for which records are kept.
7) That the Director of Resource Development did not build
workable or supportive relationships with persons who had
institutional responsibility for affirmative action nor
at times did she follow-up on what she said she would do.
8) That the organizational leader's as well as the Director's
implementation strategies were effective in providing
organization members with new meanings and new ways of
looking at their behavior in regards to affirmative action.
9) That several cross pressures acted as constraints on the
organizational leader's ability to reinforce and support
change in the direction of affirmative action and prevented
him from taking certain actions that might have facilitated
the process of refreezing/incorporation.
The Budget-Review Resource Allocation Process (Chapter Vll)
From a case analysis of the organizational leader's role in the
implementation of a participative budget-review/resource allocation
process it can be shown:
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1) That the organizational leader had to convince members of
the University community of the severity of the budget
situation facing higher education and of the need to
reallocate existing resources (rather than depend on
expanding resources) without creating panic, demoraliza-
tion, or low self-esteem, in order to initiate the review
process
.
2) That the organizational leader intervened in multiple ways
to unfreeze existing attitudes, expectancies, and behaviors
toward the budget but that he relied mainly on a strategy
of information-sharing to overcome resistance and heighten
members' sensitivity to problems in regards to the proposed
changes.
3) That in addition the organizational leader sought to demon-
strate his effectiveness in external relationships in initi-
ating and implementing the budget-review process.
A) That although there were attempts to involve members of the
University community in the budget review/resource alloca-
tion process some organizational members perceived extended
participation in the budget-review resource allocation
process to be detrimental to a healthy organizational
climate
.
5) That the organizational leader may have more effectively
spent his time in the fall trying to implement the necessary
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support systems to a broad-based participative process
that would have been initiated once those supports were
established.
6) That often there was a great deal of repetition in con-
sidering certain budget decisions despite frequent inter-
action between the organizational leader and other formal
leaders
.
7) That certain actions on the part of the organizational
leader - such as the announcement of salary increases and
individual meetings with the deans - inadvertently under-
mined the participative process and, to a degree, the
deans’ autonomy and sense of importance.
8) That the organizational leader’s implementation strategy
failed to provide organizational members with new meanings
and new ways of looking at their behavior.
9) That although there is evidence to support the fact that
the organizational leader did intervene in the budget review
process to reinforce organizational members and to establish
compatible organizational arrangements, there is also evidence
to suggest that other actions on his part were counter-
productive to successful implementation and incorporation
and undermined members’ contributions.
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Administrative Team Development (Chapter VIII)
From a case analysis of the organizational leader's role in
the development of an administrative team it can be shown:
1) That almost all of the strategies used by the organiza-
tional leader were designed to assess the nature and
source of resistance to the proposed changes: to over-
come resistance to change, and to create new needs on
the part of organizational members.
2) That outside consultants can be effectively used to
assess the amount of resistance to change, to overcome
resistance to change, to heighten organizational members'
sensitivity to problems and to link parts of the system
that share common dissatisfactions in regards to the
proposed change; to make the organization more open to
its environment, to build the organizational leader's
credibility, and to provide support to members undergoing
change
.
3) That the constantly changing membership of the administra-
tive team may have interfered with the strategies the
organizational leader used to build the team.
4) That the organizational leader effectively provided several
opportunities for organizational members to try out new
behaviors in work as well as non—work settings.
5) That the organizational leader served in many ways as an
effective role model.
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6) That the success of this change strategy to date has in
part depended on the organizational leader's building
others' sense of competence and self-esteem.
7) That the extent to which any of the interventions that
have been taken will contribute to the development of
an administrative team will depend on whether the organiza-
tional leader is able to elicit support from both formal
and informal organizational leaders and to establish
compatible organizational arrangements (including role
descriptions)
.
8) That the extent to which any of the interventions that have
been taken will contribute to the development of an adminis-
trative team will depend on whether the organizational
leader acts to refreeze the changes he's been making.
9) That perhaps one person as organizational leader cannot be
responsible for all the actions the propositions say are
necessary for the successful initiation, implementation,
and incorporation of change.
Discussion
It can be shown that in each of the four cases the organizational
leader intervened most effectively in unfreezing existing attitudes and
behaviors within the University community but that even in unfreezing
not every action the President took had the same effect on members who
were resistant to what was being proposed. It can also be shown that
the failure to implement and incorporate the changes was usually
attribut
able to the organizational leader's failure to create the
conditions
3A0
that from the perspective of organizational members would facilitate
implementation. Unfreezing usually succeeded because the organizational
leader intervened to overcome resistance in regards to the proposed
change, to heighten organizational members’ sensitivity to problems
and self-esteem in regards to the proposed change, to create new needs
on the part of organizational members, to make the organization more
open to its environment, to change patterns of interaction and informa-
tion sharing, to link parts of the system that shared common dissatis-
factions in regards to the proposed change, to create a sense of rising
expectations, to establish priorities for the organization, to involve
informal as well as formal leaders in decision-making, and to establish
and maintain a climate of acceptance, support and trust.
In turn analysis and observation would lead the author to conclude
that the organizational leader’s implementation strategies often failed:
1) to overcome emergent resistance to the proposed changes;
2) to establish and use feedback mechanisms to uncover and
resolve problems as they arose;
3) to establish a secure climate where members had the
opportunity to experiment with and test new behaviors;
4) to change certain organizational arrangements so that
they were compatible with what was being proposed.
5) ’ to provide appropriate support, reinforcement, or rewards
to maintain subordinate willingness to carry oug imple-
mentation; and
6) to establish and maintain workable relationships
with those
individuals to whom certain aspects of implementation
had
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been delegated.
Often it seemed as if the organizational leader tended to rely
on his personal power in initiating and implementing the changes he
desired, whereas organizational members expected him to use his posi-
tion power as the leader. For example, in each of the four cases it
can be shown how members expected the President to give them directions
on what to do and on what he expected. In each case it seemed as if
the President did not acknowledge those expectations on the part of
organizational members; instead he relied on a model of change which
presumed widespread participation, consensus and information-sharing.
Finally, the organizational leader’s incorporation strategies
often failed:
1) to monitor organizational members’ performance in coping
with and integrating the proposed change; and
2) to insulate the organization from other demands during
the refreezing period.
These conclusions are based on the observation that organiza-
tional members needed or expected the organizational leader to take
certain actions in order for successful implementation and incorpora-
tion to occur and on extensive documentation of these needs in inter-
views and documents. Often they expected the organizational leader
to provide leadership in implementing, as well as initiating
change
because they assumed that he was in the best position to
control the
forces influencing its implementation.
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In sum, what can be learned from the four case analyses is:
1) that the set of propositions in Chapter III is a helpful model
for analyzing the behavior or role performance of the organizational
leader in the process of change; 2) that, in fact, people undergoing
change perceive that those behaviors are needed; and 3) that when those
behaviors are not provided change may not be implemented or incorporated.
There are undoubtedly ways in which the model that has been proposed
could be improved: it has certainly not been empirically tested in
any way in this research. It has been used more as a conceptual frame-
work for observing what it was that the organizational leader neglected
2in initiating, implementing and incorporating organizational change.
In the last section of this chapter directions for future research on
the role performance of the organizational leader are suggested; in the
next section possible reasons for the organizational leader's failure
to take certain actions are explored.
In part the failure of the organizational leader's implementation
strategy may be due: 1) to other demands on the leader s time, energy,
and resources; 2) to internal environmental constraints such as conflicting
organizational pressures or to a lack of institutional resources; and
3) to constraints inherent in his role that may prevent him from acting
2In his paper on "The Bearing of Empirical Research on Social
Theory" Merton (1957) points out that one of the ways in
which empirical
inquiry invites the extension of theory is through observation
of neg-
lected facts (Gross, et. al. 1971, p. 195).
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in ways that would facilitate implementation and incorporation.^ These
factors will be discussed as they apply to the university president in
particular in the section. Practical Implications of the Study . In part
the failure may be less a failure and more the result of a view of the
organizational leader as a catalyst and not as the implementor of change.
This explanation is examined briefly in the next sections of the chapter
"The Sources of the Organizational Leader’s Power"; "A Special Case:
The Charismatic Leader as Unfreezer"; and "Extensions of the Leader's
Power .
"
Sources of the Organizational Leader's Power in Initiating, Implementing,
and Incorporating Change
Proposition 16: An objective of the strategies employed by
the organizational leader in initiating change may be to build the
leader's expertise and credibility with organizational members.
Proposition 17: An objective of the strategies employed by
the organizational leader in initiating change may be to extend the
leader's control over various kinds of resources and sources of power.
Proposition 38: The organizational leader and others advocating
the change need to be perceived as trustworthy throughout the change
process
.
In retrospect it seems that the case analysis neglected a discus-
sion of these three propositions and yet we have seen how important the
organizational leader's power is in each of the three stages of the
change process. For example, in initiating change the organizational
leader's power rests on his credibility, expertness, or attractiveness
*For an excellent discussion of role constraints on the University
Presidency see Kruytbosch and Messinger, The State of the
University,
1970 pp. 87-107 , see also Zigarmi , D., "The University
President as a
Boundary Person: A Case Study." Ed.D. dissertation.
University of
Massachusetts, 1974.
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(personal power) and on his ability to convince organizational members
of the need to change. In implementing change the organizational
leader s power rests on his ability to change the organization in ways
that support the particular changes he is proposing, while in incorporating
change his power rests on his ability (position power) to monitor and
reward organizational member's performance in coping with and integrating
change. Before a special source of power for some organizational leaders
in initiating change is discussed, a model of social influence that has
been proposed by Kelman (1962) will be reviewed, using examples from
the case analyses wherever appropriate as illustrations.
Power is defined as the ability to induce or influence behavior.
"An individual who is able to influence the behavior of another person
because of his position in the organization has position power
,
while
an individual who derives his influence from his personality or relation-
ships with his followers has personal power" (Hersey and Blanchard, 1972,
p. 92). Power to control or influence others resides in control over
the things they value (Janda, 1960, p. 354). In other words, to the
extent that the person (group) sees change as relevant to the achieve-
ment of his own goals he will be motivated to accept another s influence.
Identification ; Identification is said to occur when an individual
(group) accepts influence in order to establish or maintain a satisfying
self-defining relationship to the other. The basis of motivation is
social acceptance and the source of the leader's power is his attractive
ness (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 33). To the extent that organizational
members aspire to be like the leader, his power is based on his
control
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over means to that end (meanings, norms, ways of seeing things or
acting). In the case study of the University President's role in
the development of an administrative team we saw that the President
sought to establish new norms for what would be acceptable "team"
behavior. Perhaps most visibly in regards to the development of
an administrative team the President served as a role model. Through
frequent personal interaction, he created relationships, especially
among his assistants, in which conformity to certain ways of doing
things was relevant to the accomplishment of their own goals, l.e.
to maintaining the reciprocal relationship and social acceptance.
In comparison to the former President, the new President tended to
rely more on his personal power and on his willingness to be seen as
open, accessible, and informal (see Chapter IV - Assessment of Setting).
Internalization : Internalization is said to occur when an
individual (group) accepts influence in order to maintain the congruence
of his actions and beliefs with his value system. The source of the
leader’s power is his credibility, expertness, and trustworthiness
(Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 33). In the case studies of the Presi-
dent's role in the development of a University long range plan and in
the implementation of the budget review process, we saw that the
President sought to establish new meanings for the problems facing
the organization and new levels of aspiration. Many of his unfreezing
strategies were designed "to reorganize the person's means-ends frame-
work and his conception of the paths toward maximization of his
values
I
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(Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 33). Similarly the President tried to
assure members of the University community that the adoption of an
affirmative action program would not "jeopardize principles of academic
freedom and professional competence; and that, in fact, the need for
an affirmative action program was related to the acknowledged goals
of the University. To the extent the President's reasons for anyone
of these change processes were credible, members would probably accept
the need to change. In other words access or control over information
is one source of the organizational leader's personal power.
A second source of personal power for the organizational leader
when the individual or group is motivated to maintain a congruence be-
tween his actions and his values is expertness. We have already seen
how the Long Range Planning Task Force members recognized the President's
expertise in planning and changing. They spent hundreds of hours working
on the task of developing a long range plan despite ambiguous expecta-
tions and unresolved problems. The author would contend it was because of
the power the President's reputation held for them. Similarly, recogni-
tion of the President’s expertness in organizational development probably
contributed to his staff’s willingness to attend team-building sessions.
Compliance : Compliance is said to occur when influence from
another person (group) is accepted in order to gain a favorable reaction
from the other or to avoid a specific punishment or disapproval. The
source of the leader's power is his ability to control organizational
resources on which goal achievement depends (Kelman and Warwick, 1973 ,
p. 33). His control may depend on either position or personal
power.
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With position power the organizational leader has legitimate authority
to control the rewards and punishments associated with changing or not
changing. If the leader’s authority is based on his persohal power,
he controls such psychological resources as recognition and appreciation
for work done. In the case study of the development of an affirmative
action plan we saw that the organizational leader may have to rely on
both legitimate personal and position power to secure the compliance
of organizational members to what is required, i.e., to implement and
incorporate change.
We have seen how as the individual’s (group's) base of motivation
changes, the source of the organizational leader's power also changes.
In initiating change and overcoming resistance (unfreezing existing
attitudes, expectancies and behaviors among organizational members),
it would seem that the organizational leader would seek to build his
personal power (his credibility, expertness or attractiveness) in order
to tap members’ needs for acceptance and congruence. It could be
argued that while it would still be important to use strategies of
identification and internalization during implementation, (i.e., by
creating new meanings and by acting as a role model) , that the organiza-
tional leader would also seek to increase and use his position power
to create compatible organizational arrangements and to reward new
behaviors. In a situation in which the organizational leader has
charismatic power his control arises from "certain exceptional qualities
of his personality" (peronal power) rather than from "a system of roles,
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rules and procedures" i.e., traditional or rational authority (position
power) (Eisenstadt
, 1968, p. xix) . By definition, charismatic leader-
ship, based as it is on personal power, disequilibr izes and contributes
to unfreezing existing attitudes, expectancies, and behaviors among
organizational members.
A Special Case: The Charismatic Leader as Unfreezer
One of the explanations offered earlier for the failure of the
organizational leader’s implementation strategies had to do with the
view he might hold of himself as a catalyst for, rather than as an
implementor of, change. Within Eisenstadt’ s discussion of Max Weber’s
concepts of charisma and institution building, 4 are the seeds for under-
standing how an organizational leader, especially one who sees himself
as a charismatic leader, comes to see himself more as a catalyst or
initiator and less as an implementor of change. Eisenstadt ' s essay also
explains how the organizational leader builds his control over varied
sources of power especially those aspects of his personal power such as
his credibility, expertness, and attractiveness through charismatic
leadership and how organizational members may come to reject the charis-
matic leader's symbols and meanings (acceptance of which is the basis
of his power over them) if supportive institutional frameworks are not
created as part of the process of institution—building
.
In general, the purpose of this section is to explore the
nature
of charismatic leadership; more specifically, to show how the
University
President's actions in the cases that have been reviewed in
this research
4
S. N. Eisenstadt, Charisma and Institution Buildingj
—
Max Weber an
_
d
_
Modern Sociology , 1968, pp. ix-lvi)
.
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tended to augment his personal power and how his failure to take certain
actions to maintain his power and to implement the change he had initi-
ated may be explained, in part, by his reliance on the unfreezing
capabilities of his charisma. First, what did Weber mean by the term
"charismatic leadership"?
Weber describes charisma as "a certain quality of an individual
personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and
treated as if he were connected to some very central feature of man's
existence" (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. xviii) . Social systems with charis-
matic leaders are characterized by members’ "intense personal response
to the leader to the extent that recognition represents duty or obliga-
tion" (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. xix) . Charismatically-led social systems
also tend to be characterized by "the denial of what is sacred, or
traditional, or routine in the organization in order to get at the very
core or essence of the organization’s being" (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. xix).
Organizational members’ acceptance of the charismatic leader is due to
their need for order. They respond to his charismatic reformulation
and ordering of the organization's goals and to his provision of new
symbols and meanings. "A central aspect of any process of social
transformation is the recrystallization of the centers of any society -
not only of the rates of access to such centers but of the very content
and the definition of the central charismatic symbols and of the modes
of participation in them (Eisenstadt, 1968, pp. xlv-xlvi) . In turn,
"the very quest for participation in a meaningful order may be related to
processes of change and transformation" (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. xlii)
.
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Given these definitions for charisma, it is fairly easy to
show from a review of the four case analyses how the organizational
leader acted in ways that might be labelled as charismatic and how
his actions brought about characteristic responses on the part of
organizational members. In a case study of the development of a
University long range plan we saw "how the University President
shared his expectations for the future and for what the University
could become: a well-managed urban university, a center for con-
tinuing education, and a center for administrative training, among
other things. He shared his vision of making it an outstanding urban
university. He created new paradigms for the way things would work"
(Chapter V). One of the behaviors the President was expert at was
asking questions and expanding the meanings of things. For example,
one of the President’s strategies in implementing the budget-review/
resource allocation process was to try to convince members of the
University community of the benefits and opportunities within the
1973-74 budget by asking questions and relating budget review process
to the need for program evaluation. Both in the case study of the
development of an administrative team and in the development of the
long range plan we saw how the President relied on his credibility
and expertness in initiating change. In each of the four cases we
saw how members of the University community looked to the President
as a role model. In terms of the model that has been proposed
for
the role performance of the organizational leader, it has
been shown
how the University President in all four cases intervened to unfreeze
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existing attitudes, expectancies, and behaviors on the part of organiza-
tional members chiefly by heightening members’ sensitivity to problems,
establishing new needs and levels of aspiration and making the organiza-
tion. more open to its environment; by creating a collective sense of
’we're all in this together’ as well as a sense of rising expectations;
and by creating new symbols for members’ experiences in regards to the
proposed changes. In Chapter IV we saw how the University President
tried to create new meanings for his own role as a leader and new norms
of informality, visibility, and openness in his relationships with
persons and groups within the University community.
Certainly, conditions in the University were r5.pe for a charis-
matic leader. Eisenstadt wrote that predispositions for charismatic
leadership become articulated in certain definite types of social
situations
:
a) those in which some transition from one
institutional sphere to another takes place;
b) situations in which subsystems (of the
organization) have to be directly connected
with the central values and activities of
the society; c) situations in which people
are faced with a choice among various roles;
and d) situations in which the routine of a
given role or group is endangered or dis-
rupted (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. xxviii)
.
In all such cases the individual is placed
in potentially ambiguous, undefined, and
conflicting situation in which his identity
and status image and continuity of the
perception of others actions are endangered.
The common denominator of these various
situations is that people or groups partici-
pating in them experience some shattering of
the existing social and cultural order to
which they are bound. Hence in such situations
they become more sensitive to those symbols
or
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messages which attempt to symbolize such
order, and more ready to respond to people
who are able to present to them new symbols
which could give meaning to their experi-
ences, to prescribe the proper norms of
behavior, to relate the individual to
collective identification, and to reassure
him of his status and of his place in a
given collectivity (Eisenstadt, 1968,
p . xxviii)
.
If we look at the functions he outlined for himself in the
administrative reorganization, clearly the President’s own view of
his role as an organizational leader was that he should present
"organizational members with new symbols which could give meaning
to their experiences."
The most important functions of leadership
are infusing new values and goals, planning
for the future and anticipating coming things,
raising the fundamental questions most of us
take for granted
,
heightening awareness of
external problems that may pose important
choices for the organization, providing
perspectives about where the institution
is, has come, and where it expects to go. . .
(Bennis, 2/15/73, p. 72).
Basically my conception of leadership is that
it is the act of explicating and calling forth
in others a consciousness of issues, principles,
ideas, directions, and objectives and of moving
those others to act in ways that reflect their
increased knowledge and heightened awareness
(Bennis, 3/7/73, p. 3).
His terms routine/non-routine were even similar to Weber’s con-
cepts of the ordinary/charismatic (see Saturday Review, 12/9/72).
What was routine (management/implementation) was delegated to the two
Executive Vice Presidents within the Office of the President
as a result
of the reorganization: the President himself kept
the non-routine
functions
.
.
,
<
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In sum, most of the President's leadership behaviors relied
more on his charisma or ability to define new meanings and symbols
than on his legitimate authority to control and use organizational
resources. But as Eisenstadt has written the ordinary and the
charismatic are continuously interwoven in the process of institution
building (or organizational change)
.
In the crystallization of institutional frame-
works a crucial part is played by those people
who evince a special capacity to set up broad
orientations, to propound new norms, and to
articulate new goals. The crystallization of
such norms seemingly provides some sort of
response to a felt need for some general
stability and order and attests to the ability
to provide some broader meaning to specific
needs which may arise in different situations.
Hence, the capacity to create and crystallize
such broader symbolic orientations and norms,
to articulate various goals, to establish
organizational frameworks, and to mobilize
the resources necessary for all these purposes
is a basic aspect of the flow of institution
building in any society (Eisenstadt, 1968,
p . xxxix)
.
Eisenstadt concludes that charisma is not only the possession of
some extraordinary, exhilarating qualities, but also the ability to re-
order and reorganize the symbolic and cognitive order inherent in such
broad orientations and goals and the ability to reorder the institutional
framework in which these orientations become embodied (Eisenstadt, 1968,
p. xi) . The distinction that Eisenstadt is making between symbolic
and institutional order is similar to the distinction that has been made
in this research between initiation and implementation. His
conclusion
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is that charisma is as much the ability to establish an institutional
framework as it is to create broad symbolic meanings. Analysis of
four case studies of the role performance of the organizational leader
have shown that although the organizational leader may act in ways
that effectively unfreeze organizational members’ existing attitudes
and behaviors, other interventions are required on his part to estab-
lish and maintain the conditions for successful implementation and
incorporation. Other themes within Weber's writings might be used
to explain why the University President's actions never led to changes
in the way the organization functioned even though he was seemingly
effective in creating new norms and meanings for the organization.
It might be that although the University President conceived
his role to be that of the "charismatic leader" - to infuse new values
and goals - it is possible that the faculty never perceived those
values and goals as being connected to the core purposes of the
University. In a letter to the President, one vice provost wrote,
Several special editions of Candid Campus last
year were devoted to such things as affirmative
action, the reorganization, etc. These are of
course terribly important, and the faculty
should be virtually interested in them, but
alas they are not, probably because of the
remoteness of the faculty as a whole from
the activity. The visibility report, although
extremely laudable, deals to a very great
extent with matters which many faculty would
consider to quite peripheral to their activi-
ties. Although you have provided dramatic
and perceptive and enlightened leadership,
many of the faculty do not see that leadership
as contiguous enough to their own activities.
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Some faculty members and students, although initially recep-
tive to the new President and to his leadership style, may have come
over time to recognize their different interests. In other cases
they may have expected the President to act in certain ways to resolve
the problems they encountered in attempting to implement his ideas and
have become disillusioned when those actions were not forthcoming. In
other cases, for example, the development of a long range plan, we saw
how the deans had a problem perceiving a task force, a temporary system,
as the institutional "center" for long range planning. Eisenstadt
observed
,
Whatever the success of the attempt of any institu-
tional entrepreneurs to establish and legitimize
common norms in terms of common values and symbols,
these norms are probably never fully accepted by the
entire society . Most groups tend to exhibit some
autonomy in terms of their attitudes toward these
norms and in terms of their willingness or ability
to provide the resources demanded by the given
institutionalized system. For very long periods
of time a great majority of the members of a given
society or parts thereof may be identified to some
degree with the values and norms of the given
system and willing to provide it with the resources
it needs; however, other tendencies also develop.
Some groups may be greatly opposed to the very
premises of the institut ionization of a given
system, may share its values and symbols only to
a very small extent , and may accept these norms
only as the least among evils and as binding on
them only in a very limited sense. Others may
share these values and symbols and accept the
norms to a greater degree, but may look on them-
selves as the more truthful depositories of these
same values. They may oppose the concrete levels
at which the symbols are institutionalized by the
elite in power
,
and may attempt to interpret them
in different ways. Others may develop new inter-
pretations of existing symbols and norms and strive
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for a change in the very bases of the institu-
tional order. Hence, any institutional system
is never fully ’homogeneous 1 in the sense of
being fully accepted or accepted to the same
degree by all those participants in it . These
different orientations to the central symbolic
spheres may all become foce of conflict and of
potential institutional change [Emphasis, the
author's] (Eisenstadt, 1968, pp. xliii-xliv).
A second explanation offered by Eisenstadt for why the University
President's strategies may have failed to provide new meanings is that
there is a growing tendency toward specialization and differentiation
in our society, especially in institutions of higher education. Increasing
specialization is often accompanied by increasing bureaucratization. We
have seen in Chapter IV how in universities in general there is a tendency
toward conservatism and tradition. Given this decentralization it is
possible that no administrator, whether he is a charismatic leader or
not, in any institution of higher education can be perceived as central
to the purposes of the institution.
A third explanation is based on the assumption that the charismatic
leader's power depends on his control of access to and participation in
the symbolic "center"5 of the institution. However, for faculty members
in a university the center for them is not the President's office but
rather their departments, or even more likely, their individual profes-
sional interests. When an organizational leader loses control of the
ability to define what is or is not central to the institution, might
5Edward Shils defines the center as "a phenomenon of the realm
of
values and beliefs. It is the center for the order of
symbols of values
and beliefs which govern the society. The center is also
a Phenomenon
of the realm of action. It is a structure of activities ,
of _ roles and
persons. It is within these roles that the values and
beliefs which are
central are embodied and propounded" (Eisenstadt, 1968, p.
xxx)
.
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naturally begin to rely more heavily on strategies of unfreezing to
convince organizational members of the need to change, to overcome
their resistance to change, and to involve those who will be affected
by the proposed changes in planning and decision-making.
But, if the organizational leader is to be only the unfreezer,
the material in Chapters V-VIII still underscores the need for someone
within the organization to resolve the problems encountered during imple-
mentation and to establish and maintain those conditions within the
organization that are facilitative of change. In what ways might the
organizational leader extend his power so that others within the organiza-
tion act in ways to create those conditions which insure successful
implementation and incorporation.
Extensions of the Organizational Leader’s Power
One of the ways in which the organizational leader can extend
his power is to delegate responsibility for implementation to other
formal leaders within the organization. We have seen how the Uni-
versity President in the case study of the development of an adminis-
trative team perceived that he was a more effective catalyst of change
and that certain role constraints and demands on his time prevented him
from being an effective implementor. With the administrative reorganiza-
tion and the implementation of an "office of" concept, he sought to share
his authority with two Executive Vice Presidents who would essentially
be responsible for the implementation and incorporation of
such things
as the budget, long range planning, and affirmative
action. More
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effective use might also be made of the deans to legitimize change.
The implementation of an affirmative action program, for example,
rested on the extent to which the deans reallocated existing
resources within their units and changed certain organizational
arrangements - such as hiring policies, tenure and promotion
practices, etc.
A second way in which the organizational leader might extend
his power is through a more effective and concentrated use of informal
organizational leaders, although there may be some doubt as to whether
or not informal leaders can control and provide the kinds of organiza-
tional resources the persons implementing change seem to need (Proposi-
tions 27
,
28
,
and 29 ). But since "people's attitudes and opinions are
greatly influenced by group norms and values and by word-of-mouth
collaboration or refutation of information, it is at least essential
for the organizational leader to shape his messages in accord with
relevant group norms as well as to enlist/persuade informal leaders
to support proposed organizational changes" (Maloney and Schonfeld,
1973
,
p. 201 ). Informal leaders if for nothing else can be used to
sanction or legitimize proposed changes (Propositions 2, 3, and 18).
"The President is only now meeting with the editorial Boards of the
newspapers when newspapers can legitimize anything you want them to.
The President has to work more closely with people, informal groups,
downtown and on the inside who can legitimize what he was , one dean
said. In other cases informal leaders who identify with the proposed
change can serve as role models (Proposition 24). Informal leaders
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who are convinced of the need to change can provide opportunities in
informal settings for organizational members to test the new behaviors
that are required of them (Propositions 22 and 25). In turn, social
and informational support for the proposed change may develop (Proposi-
tions 27 and 29)
.
There is probably a need for the organizational leader (s) to deal
separately with each of the informal groups within the organization in
regards to the proposed change. "I think we should confront faculty
leadership with the problem of visibility and let them make suggestions
about how to deal with it. For example, maybe we need a "visibility
committee" made up entirely of faculty members. Having students,
administrators, or community representatives would simply support the
already existent feeling that the faculty have as a separate entity
that is being submerged in the interest of a kind of "people's educa-
tional front" (a vice provost). But to the extent that the ideas of
informal leaders are solicited and become part of what is being proposed,
the leader’s power (his credibility and probably the recognition of his
legitimate authority)
,
as well as the probability of successful imple-
mentation and incorporation of change, is increased.
Practical Implications of the Study
Let us now turn to a discussion of implications of this study
for university administrators concerned with the management of
organizational change in their institutions. This section is divided
into two parts: 1) a recapitulation of the major conclusions from the
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case analyses about the role of the University President in initiating,
implementing, and incorporating organizational change and 2) observa-
tions and questions about the structure of the university presidency
in general. It is hoped that these conclusions and observations might
be useful to other university administrators attempting to implement
processes of organizational change that are similar to those described
in this research.
Conclusions
An analysis of the role performance of the University President
in four cases of organizational change showed that although he inter-
vened in ways that may have effectively unfrozen members’ existing
attitudes and behaviors, his implementation strategies for the most
part failed to create those conditions he would facilitate change
on the part of organizational members. In other words creating those
conditions which are necessary for the successful initiation of
organizational change does not insure the successful implementation
of change. In addition to overcoming initial resistance to change
and convincing organizational members of the need to change, the
University President may also need to:
1) overcome emergent resistance to the changes he has intro-
duced ;
2) establish and use feedback mechanisms to uncover and
resolve problems as they arise;
3) establish a secure climate where members have the oppor-
tunity to experiment with and test new behaviors;
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A) change certain organizational arrangements so that they are
compatible with what is being proposed;
5) provide appropriate support, reinforcements, and rewards to
maintain subordinate willingness to carry out implementation;
6) establish and maintain workable relationships with those
important formal and informal leaders;
7) monitor organizational members’ performance in coping with
and integrating the proposed changes; and
8) insulate the University from other demands to the greatest
extent possible during the refreezing period.
In at least one case, the development of an affirmative action
plan, it was shown that these roles for the university president could
not be delegated if successful implementation and incorporation were to
occur. Rather the University Presidential personally needed to be
involved in the entire course of the change process.
Observations
As a result of this study it is also possible to observe that
the university president may not have been able to make certain inter-
ventions for a number of reasons that are linked to his position or
role in the University. These blocks include: 1) other demands on
the president’s time, energy, and resources; 2) various social,
structural, and economic constraints in the University as an organiza-
tion; and 3) constraints inherent in the president’s role as the
organizational leader.
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Some of the unique organizational characteristics of uni-
versities were discussed in Chapter IV. They include a lack of
consensus about the goals and purposes of the university, the
traditions of academic freedom and professional autonomy, and a
tendency towards conservation and maintenance of the status quo.
As well, the university is dependent on and accountable to a wide
range of external groups in its environment whose pressures on
the university keep changing.
External groups perceive the president to hold power because
he is the president and because they are applying a familiar model
of organizational hierarchy to the university. The reality of the
situation is that his authority is splintered and situational. In
spite of the tremendous and often overwhelming convergence of prob-
lems on the university president’s office, he cannot expect implicit
acceptance of his authority based on his organizational position.
As well, many of the pressures on the president's office are
apparently contradictory. In a period of unprecedented financial
stringency in higher education, the full burden is on the President
to cut expenses, while continuing to support innovation and new pro-
grams (as long as those new programs don’t interfere with existing
programs as we have seen in the case study of the bud get -review/
resource allocation process). He is expected to hold tuition rates
down and provide more financial aid, while allowing increased enroll-
ments and a wider diversity of offerings; to improve standards
without
affecting existing programs; and to improve services without
increasing
employment (Simonides, 1971, p. 1). In the case analysis of
the development
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of an affirmative action plan we saw how conflicting pressures on
the President prevented him from taking certain actions that may
have facilitated the implementation and incorporation of the affirma-
tive action program (see Chapter VI)
. In other cases we have seen
how overwhelming demands on the President’s time, energy, and resources
may have prevented him from making necessary interventions (see
Chapter V - on the development of a University long range plan).
Given these limits of time and power and structure, perhaps
there are limits to the ability of the university president to effect
organizational change. Perhaps we need to conclude as considered in
Chapter VIII that one person cannot be responsible for all the actions
that have been proposed in this research for the organizational leader.
Possibly the university presidency needs to be restructured to include
other individuals who would be responsible for certain phases of the
change process, persons who would be perceived by organizational members
to share presidential authority so that actions on the part of any one
of them would be sufficient to create the conditions the propositions
for the role performance of the organizational leader say are necessary
for the successful initiation, implementation, and incorporation of
change. These considerations are raised almost as questions. Certainly
it is not within the scope of this research to comment on the viability
of such a restructuring in regards to the implementation of organiza-
tional change. However, that might be one of the directions for further
research on the role of the organizational leader and organizational
change.
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Research Implications of the Study
The Need for Replication Studies
This case study was designed to examine the role performance
of the university president in light of some tentative proposition
drawn from the literature on attitude change, leadership, and organiza-
tional behavior about the role performance of the organizational leader
in successfully initiating, implementing, and incorporating long-term
organizational change. Since the necessary range of variation in the
organizational leader’s role may not have occurred in one setting,
investigations of many more successful and unsuccessful implementation
efforts need to be conducted to ascertain the validity of the explanatory
scheme that has been proposed. Replication studies will need to be
conducted and their results carefully analyzed before judgements about
the generality or limitations of propositions can be made. It may also
be instructive to replicate the study in a setting in which the organiza-
tional leader is aware of the propositions and intentionally intervenes
to meet the conditions specified as important for initiation, imple-
mentation, and incorporation. Such a study would get away from the
tendency to make the data confirm to the model, that is, from looking
at the leader’s interventions to see what objective they meet.
The Need for Conditional Studies
There is also a need for studies which vary one or more of the
variables with which this study was concerned. For example, does the
kind of change being implemented have any consequences for the
kinds of
problems that arise during the period o* attempted implementation
and
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consequently for the role performance of the organizational leader?
There is also a need to consider the possible impact of organizational
variables, such as the influence of the external environment on imple-
mentation. For example, two of the propositions that are proposed for
refreezing are:
Proposition 32: An objective of the strategies
of the organizational leader may he to maintain
continuity at some levels of the organization
while change takes place at other levels.
Proposition 33: An objective of the strategies
of the organizational leaders may he to insulate
the organization from conflicting or competing
ideas and to give organizational members time to
assimilate and integrate new behaviors.
They indicate that there might be times in the life of an organization
when any kind of change cannot be successfully initiated. Or there
might be times when it is more important for the organizational leader
to concentrate on his interface roles with the external environment than
on the internal implementation of change (see Mintzberg, 1973, p. 122).
It would be important, as one kind of conditional study, to design a
study in which various situational variables that give rise to, or account
for, certain behaviors on the part of the organizational leader are
brought more to the front. In this study there may have been factors
about the President's extensive external role that might have caused
him to take or not to take certain actions the reasons for which were
not shared or if shared, not fully understood.
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It might also be interesting to design a study of the imple-
mentation of any one of the change processes that have been examined
in a university setting - let’s say the development of an affirmative
action plan - in another organization in order to compare the role
performance of organizational leaders in different settings. One
concern the author has is that the organizational leader's role may
have been exaggerated by this research. It would also be interesting
to apply the set of propositions to other persons within an organiza-
tion who are initiating changes and then to study the role of the
organizational leader under those conditions.
The Need to Refine the Theory
Having worked with the set of propositions for the role perform-
ance of the organizational leader in analyzing four case studies of the
role performance of the University President, even at this point some
suggestions about how it might be improved, that further research could
corroborate can be made. In the first place the entire study would
have been strengthened if some sort of operational definition of the
degree of implementation had been evolved, in other words, some sort
of way of determining whether or not changes that were proposed and
initiated were actually being implemented. Secondly, each of the
propositions needs to be reviewed for functionality and operationality
.
For example, it was difficult to identify leader behaviors that opera-
tionalized Proposition 25: An objective of the strategies of the organi-
zational leader may be to encourage experimentation and risk-taking on
the part of organizational members in regards to the proposed change.
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It might also be interesting to devise some sort of weighting
scheme for the propositions in order to explore the question of
whether or not implementation goes more easily or more successfully
depending on the strategies used during the period of attempted
initiation. Partially because the model that has been proposed is
somewhat normative in the direction of members’ participation in
planning and decision making, it was assumed that the model was
sequential and that the organizational leader had to create the
conditions for initiation before implementation and for implementa-
tion before incorporation. But as a result of study of the budget-
review/resource allocation process, the sequential nature of the model
might also be doubted. In further research it might be interesting
to vary the sequence in which the conditions are met.
One of the major limitations of the research is the limited
time period covered in the study. In the first place the successes
of many crucial aspects of the change process cannot be -iudged on
the basis of the short time period involved in that an action may
have delayed consequences or may produce overt compliance while
bringing about other latent changes so that individuals will respond
in the future to influence attempts in a different manner (Cartwright,
1965, p. 25). Secondly, the implications and unintended conseauences
of a leader's change strategies must be viewed over a longer time.
One of the reasons for not making statements about effectiveness,
apart
from the fact that operational goals were not always
defined in the
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change processes that were studied, is that many of the changes had
only been initiated and had not reached the stages of attempted
implementation and incorporation. For example, in the case study
of the development of an administrative team whether or not the transi-
tion to an "office of" concept will be accomplished is vet to be seen.
There is certainly a need for longer studies in the future to avoid
some of the Problems mentioned above.
It is the author’s hope that studies of the types that have
been suggested will be undertaken and will contribute to the develop-
ment of a theory of the role performance of the organizational leader
in effecting organizational change.
APPENDIX A
LONG-RANGE PLANNING: A CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY
July 31, 1970
Recommendations of a Presidential Task Force to President Walter
Langsam. The Task Force recommends that a blue ribbon committee be
appointed to examine the goals, educational needs, and resources of
the University of Cincinnati and to develop a comprehensive statement
on the direction of the University. A second Task Force recommendation
urges the President to help the faculty understand and appreciate the
total goals of the University.
May, 1971
The report of the University Senate Committee on "Roles and
Missions of the University" is published.
September 1, 1971
Warren Bennis becomes President of the University of Cincinnati.
September 16, 1971
The University Senate Budget and Priorities and Long Range Planning
Committees are charged, in part, to 1) study the process by which the
budget is developed; 2) to make recommendations on University priorities:
3) to be concerned with the academic, physical, fiscal and social planning
of the University, and 4) to examine the role of research in higher edu-
cation and the future of the two-year colleges.
Commentary: These charges demonstrate at least
the University Senate’s recognition of the need
to plan, if not to change, at the time of Bennis'
inaugurat ion .
^
September, 1971
The Ohio Board of Regents sends their "Higher Education
Program
for 1973-1975” to all university presidents in the State.
Commentaries are included after some of the entries in the
chrono
logical summary that follows. Commentaries were used
in this case and
others that follow to give clarifying information or to
share tic in
reactions to an event and to its implications for events
that followed.
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Commentary: This statement is important in
that it documents how changing enrollment
patterns in higher education will dictate
new policy directions in the seventies and
the need for a clearer sense of institu-
tional mission. For the University of
Cincinnati it becomes an external mandate
to plan since no new graduate programs
will be approved by the Ohio Board of
Regents without a comprehensive plan.
October 1, 1971
Bennis* newsletter to the University community.
Commentary: In this newsletter Bennis tries
to identify with the emotions he has sensed
in the University "with the feelings of
eagerness and expectancy that has been
released after a period of uncertainty
and waiting." Bennis seemingly wants to
involve the University community in
planning; he defers to their knowledge
of the uniquenesses of the University of
Cincinnati. "Working with and augmenting
the executive function must be organiza-
tional structure that encourages partici-
pation and provides for initiative and
review. . .that gives weight to the
opinions and values of the whole University
community." The definition of "whole"
University community is expanded to
include "the public, alumni, and parents
equally, perhaps more importantly."
October 24, 1971
Administrative Retreat at French Lick.
October 25, 1971
Bennis asks the Vice President for Research and Development to
summarize statements made at French Lick and to write a rationale for
a University long range planning process. The Newman Task Force Report
on Higher Education had been shared at French Lick, "We have found
that
institutions under financial pressure often respond only by cutting
expenditures in easiest ways rather than making choices according to
the relative merits of a program or the most cost-effective
approac es
to teaching. That thinking; a ready example of a new goal
for the^
University, Bennis’ "urban university"; and a sense that
the state-
mandated planning - programming - budgeting system <”?s > nt , s
be a long range planning vehicle formed the basis o.
the
rationale
.
371
Commentary: Several Important assumptions
wtire made in this document that were never
discussed or questioned. It was assumed
1) that the planning process would be
participatory, and 2) that the University
Senators at French Lick would provide the
leadership and impart a sense of urgency
which would lead to University Senate
endorsement and action. "The success of
long range planning is directly related
to the enthusiasm and support it receives
from levels of the institution and to the
degree of understanding and participation
it receives from all levels." 3) Dates
were set: a planning process be be worked
out by January 1, 1972; a plan by September
1, 1972, that were never realistically
examined
.
October 27, 1971
Memo //I a Presidential assistant to the University Senate. Drawing
from the Vice President’s memo, he reiterates the objectives of a long
range planning process and attests to the need for a long range plan and
to the high priority Bennis has given to PPBS and long range Dlanning.
Commentary: This memo created two expecta-
tions in the University Senate that eventually
came to be held by the University community
as a whole: 1) that the plan would be done
by September 1, 1972, and 2) that planning
is essentially an executive responsibility
(an expectation which makes the administra-
tion blameworthy if a plan is not forth-
coming) . "The success of long range planning
depends on executive sunport, which is clearly
available, and. . .on widespread commitment
to the planning process." Although ostensibly
Bennis' assistant sought University Senate
endorsement for the concept of long range
planning the wording of his memo is ambiguous
enough so that it is unclear what kind of
specific response he wanted from the Senate.
October 27, 1971
Memo #2 a Presidential assistant to the University Senate. This
memo is essentially a summary of tasks the University Senate might
under-
take that had emerged from discussions at French Lick. The eleven
tasks
he outlined included program evaluation, a resource Study
of the University,
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a review of the 1971 Ohio Board of Regents' Master Plan, and the
monitoring of a yet to be started long range planning process
criteria such as "reality of involvement, scope, and
thoroughness of internal and external linkages."
Commentary: At this point there is no
coordination in the University's approach
to planning. Bennis' assistant has
picked up some of the loose ends and
suggestions coming from French Lick
but no one had been given responsibility
to think out the entire planning process.
October 28, 1971
Bennis' statement to the University faculty. Bennis uses extracts
from the Vice President's memo to establish a need for planning in the
University: he refers to the Board of Regents' Master Plan and to the
Newman Report, as well as his goals to make the University of Cincinnati
a well-managed urban university, to clarify decision-making processes,
and to better match program needs with resources. The Januarv-September
timetable is reiterated. He closes with a statement about what he thinks
long range planning might accomplish "Long range planning is value-laden
and value-judgements must be made, as must role choices for the univer-
sity. Quality as well as quantity decisions must be faced."
November 22, 1971
A Presidential assistant recommends that responsibility for
planning be assigned to someone with line responsibility. In the mean-
time other memos are urging Bennis to pull together the offices of
institutional studies, physical planning, and computer resources and
not to delay any longer in appointing a planning coordinator.
December 8, 1971
Bennis' letter to Millett, the Chancellor of Higher Education in
Ohio. Bennis makes several proposals to Millett and requests planning
grant money. The letter is full of ideas about directions for the Uni-
versity to move in and is eventually widely circulated by Bennis to
deans and other administrators.
December 14, 1971
A member of the Institute for Research and Training in Higher
Education meets with the President and his assistants. He is later
named Long Range Planning Task Force coordinator.
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December 16, 1971
The College of Arts and Sciences independently forms a faculty
long range planning committee to look at the college's curricula,
structure, and budget in relation to priorities of the College and
the University.
The Task Force coordinator is given the directorship of the
Institute, tenure, and additional staff in exchange for becoming the
"temporary" Long Range Planning Task Force coordinator (until January,
1973) . Each of the Presidential assistants commits from 10-50% of his
time to planning. Over Christmas break the coordinator is to outline
"the role of the Task Force, his reporting relationship to the President,
and the thrust of the planning process."
Second meeting between the President and the Director of the
Institute to barter on the terms of their agreement.
Several drafts of the announcement of a Long Range Planning Task
Force are written. Task Force membership had not been named at this
point, nor had the Task Force co-chairmen.
Commentary: A January 4 draft acknowledges
several internal and external impetus for
planning: from pressures of inflation and
changing enrollments to the University
Senate's May, 1971 statement on "University
Roles and Missions." Certain expectations
are set for the role of the coordinator (to
identify resources and to assist the units
in planning) and for the units in the
planning process: 1) the planning process
would involve wide participation and 2) units
will be asked to assess strengths and weak-
nesses and to consult with other units on
their goals and plans
.
December 17, 1971
December 21, 1971
Early January, 1972
January 7, 1972
The coordinator proposes a planning
Force on environmental factors. A list of
By mid-January Task Force appointments are
council to advise the Task
resource groups is compiled,
made ; the idea of a planning
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council is abandoned; and the two academic Vice Presidents, the Provost
and the Vice President for the Medical Center, are named co-chairmen
of the Task Force.
Commentary: A lot of the coordinator's
energy goes into the draft and redrafts
of this announcement and into decisions
as to how Task Force members will be
chosen.
January 11, 1972
The President meets with the vice presidents and vice provosts.
He outlines his criteria for successful long range planning: that the
decision-making process be made clearer as a result of planning and
that planning involve those who will have to implement the plan. At
this meeting the co-chairmenship is announced for the first time. On
the same day, 1/11/72, Bennis writes the on-going PPBS committee and
asks them to continue working on 1) budgeting, 2) a management -informat ion
system, and 3) college and departmental profiles.
January 14, 1972
Press release on long range planning at the University of Cincinnati.
January 18, 1972
The President talks to deans on long range planning. He asks for
the "deans cooperation and support which will be essential in making
sufficient internal resources available for planning." He shares some
of his goals for the University - and projects how he would like to
compare the University of Cincinnati to other universities in a few
years
.
January 21, 1972
The structure of the Long Range Planning Task Force organization
and its relationship to the central administration are still being con-
sidered .
January 21, 1972
Bennis makes these notes about his first six months in
Cincinnati
"The organization of the University lacks coherence: there
is a chasm
between administrators and faculty. My goals are to develop
a
£
lann^"
evaluation process that will lead to a four year plan bv
September, 1972
and a useful, accurate information system. Planning
must involve con
sideration of the following questions:
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1) What will be the principal forces acting on the University in terms
of population pressures, economic growth, technological change,
and manpower requirements in the next few years?
2) What changes can and should be anticipated in the University as a
community - in life style and in the working relationships between
faculty and students?
3) What changes will result from what the University learns through
research and and teaching?
4) How can the University best serve the community?
5) How can education be changed to serve constituents beyond the age
of 25?"
Commentary: These are kinds of questions
Bennis was asking himself as planning was
initiated at the University of Cincinnati
in January of 1972. However, his prospectus
was not shared with the Long Range Planning
Task Force co-chairmen or coordinator.
January 22, 1972
Board of Directors' discussion on long range planning: Bennis'
statement on long range planning is released and later reprinted in
Candid Campus, 2/9/72.
Commentary: Again, in a public statement,
Bennis assigns long range planning a high
priority in terms of what he wants his
administration to accomplish. "Its'
importance is indicated by two vice presi-
dents serving as co-chairmen." He urges
members of the University community to
participate in planning at the unit level.
February 2, 1972
The Long Range Planning Task Force coordinator meets with University
Senate's Budget and Priorities and Long Range Planning Committees.
February 7, 1972
Correspondence between the Arts and Sciences' Planning Committee
which had been organized since December and the Task Force coordinator.
February 7, 1972
The Task Force Coordinator and co-chairmen meet to discuss what
they need to do before the first Task Force meeting on March 1,
1972.
They agree that a September long range plan should be
broader xn scope
than resources permit. The decision is made to ask the
units to plan
without budgetary constraints or considerations.
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Commentary: Both of those decisions have far-
reaching (though perhaps unforeseen) implica-
tions for the way in which the Task Force would
function and its long-term effectiveness.
These decisions were not discussed with the
President (see 2/9/72).
February 9, 1972
Candid Campus story on long range planning. The January-September
timetable is announced publicly and Bennis' January 22nd statement on
long range planning is reprinted. On the same day, the President writes
one of the deans, "Although the nature of faculty and student participa-
tion in unit planning is for the unit to decide, I expect a unit's long
range plan to contain a thorough analysis of what the unit does well, an
identification of the unit's most crucial needs, and consideration of
how resources might be used more effectively."
February 10, 1972
Correspondence between a faculty member and the chairmen of the
University Senate (carboning the Task Force co-chairmen and coordinator)
.
The Senate chairman clarifies the Task Force's and Senate's roles in
long range planning as he understands them: the Task Force is charged
with developing a planning process and the University Senate's role is
to monitor that process and to react to a plan once it is written.
February 22, 1972
Co-chairmen's letter to Task Force members - setting out the co-
chairmen's expectations for the 3/1/72 Task Force meeting. "Its purpose
will be to discuss external constraints on the University, namelv the
Regents' expectations for a planning - programming - budgeting-system
and for a plan for graduate education." There is no indication that
the President received a copy of this letter since there is no copy in
his files and a carbon is not indicated on the original.
March 1, 1972
First Task Force Meeting. The Task Force discusses external
factors placing demands on the University to plan (which have been sum-
marized in various paragraphs above) and the difficulties they envisioned
the Task Force will have in specifying and helping units relate to each
other and to the community. Decisions are made to set un a library
at
IRTHE (The Institute for Research and Teaching in Higher Education)
an
to see what other kinds of planning are happening in the
University.
Following some discussion, it is generally decided that an
effective
plan would:
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"1) Identify the University’s future choices;
2) Identify what the University does best;
3) Identify areas of duplication and explore consolidation of
programs
;
4) Identify areas of strength that need staffing, financing, or
further development;
5) Identify ways to better organize the University’s efforts;
6) Identify new directions and areas of development;
7) Identify areas to be phased out;
and that the Task Force would:
1) Consider expanding or discontinuing programs;
2) Consider community and State relationships as well as relation-
ships with other universities;
3) Consult with other groups;
4) Link planning to a program-planning-budgeting system;
5) Need to develop guidelines for a planning process:
6) Attempt to link past and current planning efforts to this planning
process.”
A letter went out from the co-chairmen to Task Force members
following this meeting summarizing these decisions and tasks.
Commentary: Both the tone of the letter
and the tone of the meeting indicated that
most Task Force members needed to be con-
vinced about the goals and priority of
this long range planning effort. The
strategy the coordinator and co-chairmen
used to convince them was to involve them
in conceptualizing the "tasks" of the
Task Force and in decision-making. In
essence this strategy forced the Task
Force to retrace the thinking that the
co-chairmen and coordinator had gone
through since January. There is no
indication in the documents that the
tasks that had been agreed upon (above)
were assigned to Task Force members or
that Task Force members understood what
the next steps would be. Bennis did not
meet with the Task Force or the co-chairmen
after this meeting to review the decisions
that had been made.
March 10 - 17 , 1972
The coordinator writes a memo further
range planning while the Task Force drafts a
Guidelines for Units." He continues to work
clarifying the need for long
document called "Planning
on developing program/unit
categories
.
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March 20, 1972
Second Task Force meeting to discuss the
Guidelines
.
Preliminary Planning
March 21. 1972
Co-chairmen's letter to the units asking them to review the
planning guidelines and to indicate problems they anticipate, to
designate a planning coordinator for the unit, and to begin reviewing
the current activities of the units, the needs being met, the resources
used, etc. . .
"
March 30, 1972
Units' reactions to the preliminary guidelines are sent back to
the Task Force. Unit heads express concern about what will be done with
the plans. They are, in general, skeptical about the relationship be-
tween long range planning and PPBS.
April 3, 1972
A memo from the Task Force coordinator to the co-chairmen analyzing
the units' responses to the preliminary guidelines. Several problem areas
are identified:
"1) The irreconcilable conflict between a short timetable and the need
to collect data, consult, plan and recycle the plan:
2) The lack of clarity about the role of the Task Force and their power
to make decisions as well as confusion about how planning is related
to the budget and to PPBS;
3) Concern with how to coordinate planning with other units:
4) The need for more fully-describable program categories;
5) The felt need for overall University goals and priority statements.
The deans suggest that the Long Range Planning Task Force:
1) Do training for the deans and department heads:
2) Provide opportunities and encouragement for groups to go and observe
other groups planning; and
3) Place preliminary working papers in a convenient location to permit
those who are planning to observe the developing efforts of others.
Commentary: At this junction it is important
to point out some important patterns that were
being established in the way the Task Force
would relate to the units. Since concerns
listed above came to the Task Force's attention
one by one from individual units, the Task
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Force was forced to respond individually
to each unit. Simply from a logistics
point of view it became impossible to
make speedy responses to units with seven-
teen Task Force members and forty-five
units. In addition to that problem many
of the questions the units were raising
were complex and required more dialogue
than had occurred in initiating a planning
process on where the University was heading,
on what planning was going to mean for the
University, and on what choices would be
made, when, etc. Consequently, often nothing
was done to allay the problems units identi-
fied in trying to plan.
April 4, 1972
Meeting between the co-chairmen and coordinator. The coordinator
raises questions about priorities and directions for the Task Force. He
concerns he feels to spend more time with the co-chairmen, to
clarify the planning process, and to figure out ways to involve Task
Force members more substantially in planning.
April 4, 1972
Task Force meeting to review the units’ reactions to the planning
guidelines
.
Commentary: The attention of the Task Force
seemed to be on rewriting the guidelines rather
than on interacting with those units who had
raised questions.
April 6, 1972
The Provost’s meeting with deans - long range planning is one of
many agenda items. The Provost announces that the timetable for unit
submitting plans will remain unchanged despite the deans’ concerns and
that by April 17 a long range planning packet will be distributed which
would contain descriptions and examples of various planning processes.
Other questions the deans had raised about planning are left unanswered.
April 17, 1972
The final Planning Process Guidelines are sent out - in the packet
the goals of long range planning are again reviewed, the timetable is
reprinted along with a list of Task Force members’ names and phone
numbers, and Task Force consultation is offered to units that request it.
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April 20, 1972
A memo from an assistant to the Vice President for Business to
Bennis proposing a reorganization of planning and budgeting. The co-
ordinator in response sends a letter to Bennis reviewing some of the
tacit understandings he felt he had with Bennis when he accepted the
coordinator's role and how these considerations led to the appointment
of a coordinator, a Task Force with faculty representation, and to the
appointment of the two academic Vice Presidents as co-chairmen.
Commentary: This incident is included in the
chronology because it is representative of
the kind of one-shot influence Bennis is
susceptible to and of the tremendous ambiguity
that persists even after agreements have
supposedly been reached and decisions have
been made. Further the anecdote is illustra-
tive of how the time and energy of the Task
Force leaders were continually diverted away
from tasks at hand.
April 21, 1972
Long Range Planning Task Force meeting with the deans. A discus-
sion group format is used to raise issues the Task Force needed to con-
sider and to identify areas where units needed planning assistance.
Some of the same concerns raised on March 30th are brought up again.
In addition the deans raise questions about the form their plans should
take, the kind of approval a unit plan needs from its unit before it is
submitted, and the kinds of assistance and feedback units can expect
from the Task Force. These concerns are recorded, but another meeting
is not scheduled.
April 25, 1972
Bennis xeroxes and sends copies of the University of Illinois'
report on program evaluation to the deans and Long Range Planning Task
Force members (only eight days after deans had received the Task Force
Guidelines)
.
April 27
,
197 2
A note from the coordinator to Bennis saying he feels a need to
meet more regularly with Bennis on long range planning. No written
response from Bennis.
May 3, 1972
Task Force meeting: simulation for Task Force members on how to
review unit plans
.
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May 15, 1972
Small units’ plans are due: Task Force meeting to formulate an
outline for reviewing plans: the Task Force will review and critique
a plan, meet with the unit to explore issues or problems; the unit will
then revise the plan and make recommendations to the Task Force.
Commentary: At this point several Task
Force members realized that plans the Task
Force would receive would be of differential
quality since criteria for what a "good
plan" was had not been set.
May 16, 1972
Task Force co-chairmen and coordinator meet with Bennis and
several Presidential assistants on the progress of long range planning.
The discussion centers on issues like the coordination of long range
planning with PPBS. There is no resolution as to how or when they
will be coordinated (see 10/17/72 and 10/25/72).
Commentary: Task Force co-chairmen seemed
reluctant to ask Bennis some of the hard
questions they had been asked and were
wrestling with; instead, they gave him a
flowchart and then timetable that showed
planning proceeding right along on schedule.
May 23, 1972
Meeting between the co-chairmen and coordinator to discuss
strategies for dealing with late plans and for reviewing plans.
May 26, 1972
The coordinator's "aide memoire." "To do long range planning
right," he writes, "with broad participation you need 1) time,
2) resources and training possibilities, and 3) a healthy organization
with trust and open communication - all of which are in short suDply.
June 7, 1972
A Candid Campus story on long range planning creates community
expectations for a plan to emerge over the summer and for extensive
dialogue between the Task Force and others on campus over the
next tew
months. On the same day, the co-chairmen share with unit
heads the
review procedures for unit plans they have agreed upon.
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June 9, 1972
President Bennis suggests the name of an outside consultant
for the Long Range Planning Task Force.
June 15, 1972
A Presidential assistant writes the coordinator about Bennis'
meeting with the assistant and associate dean (see 6/20/72).
June 15, 1972
Correspondence, the Coordinator to the co-chairmen. He
anticipates only a skeletal plan from the College of Arts and Sciences
since "there is a high level of defensiveness and resistance to planning
in that unit due to pressing short-term budget problems."
June 19, 1972
Memo, the coordinator to the President's office about the lack
of communication between the units and the Task Force and between the
President’s office and the Task Force. The coordinator has seen a memo
that the President wrote to one of his assistants on the criticisms of
long range planning he had learned from his meeting with the assistant
and associate deans. In response the coordinator documents the frequent
communications the Task Force has had with the deans all spring at Friday
deans' meetings.
Commentary: This incident shows Bennis' lack
of confidence in the Long Range Planning Task
Force; his dissatisfaction, however, comes out
in memos he writes to his own assistants. In
turn, the Task Force coordinator responds through
the assistants (see below, 6/20/72).
June 19, 1972
Guidelines for reviewing unit plans are sent to Task Force members.
June 20, 1972
The coordinator’s response to an assistant in the President s
office - he contends that members of the Task Force have been available
to consult at the request of units: "Given that all units have
received
about the same input from the Long Range Planning Task Force, the
quality
of the plans received, which has differed, must say something
about the
units, e.g. that the planning task is more or less complex
depending on
the unit; that some units have better planning capabilities
than others,
that some units are willing to work harder than others;
that some units
are less defensive than others; or that some units are
more overworked
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than others. Even units doing good plans have felt resentment to
the time pressures and extra work."
Commentary: Throughout his response, the
coordinator alludes to feelings that he is
being criticized and not rewarded.
June 24, 1972
Meeting between the President, the two co-chairmen, and co-
ordinator. A meeting between the Task Force and the President is
planned for July 19, 1972. The format of the overall plan is dis-
cussed which would prioritize University problems and generate
program evaluation criteria. Bennis shifts the discussion, before
reaching closure on these issues however, to questions about the
general morale and momentum of the Task Force.
June 26, 1972
A meeting takes place between the co-chairmen and the coordinator
to consider the President's suggestions on the tone and format of the
final report and on the use of outside consultant-reviewers. On the
latter, they decide to use outsiders to review the plan once it is
written, as a whole in September.
June 28, 1972
A second meeting between the President, the two co-chairmen, and
coordinator is held in which Bennis' interest in long range planning
focusing on program evaluation is the major topic of discussion.
July 12-13, 1972
Strategy sessions in preparation for the marathon July 17-19 and
for the Arts and Sciences subgroup review meeting on July 14 , 1972.
July 14, 1972
Meeting between the Task Force and the Arts and Sciences planning
committee to talk about the plan from the College of Arts and Sciences.
July 17-19, 1972
Long range planning marathon. The Task Force meets in marathon
sessions to review subgroup critiques of unit plans and to make recom-
mendations for an overall University plan.
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July 19, 1972
Task Force review session with President Bennis at the end of
the marathon.
August 1, 1972
A memorandum from a Presidential assistant to the President
summarizing a report on the "inventory of management and institutional
planning processes at the University of Cincinnati compiled by long
range planning coordinator and the PPBS committee. The memorandum
reinforces the expectation of a September 1st long range plan contrary
to what the President had heard at the July marathon.
August 4, 1972
The coordinator writes a story on long range planning for the
September issue of Candid Campus. "After September 1, discussion of
the implications and integration of unit plans for and with a University
plan will take place as well as discussion of how to continue the 1972-
73 planning process."
August 5, 1972
The coordinator writes handwritten notes to Task Force members
thanking them for their efforts and a position paper on the University
of Cincinnati’s future prospects.
August 7, 1972
The two co-chairmen and coordinator meet to revise the outline
for a preliminary long range plan.
August 16, 1972
Next steps in the planning process are outlined which include
the
use of advisory councils in units, a review of unit plans, a
meshing o
long range planning with PPBS, the identification of a more
permanent
long range planning structure, and a recycling of the planning
process.
Commentary: Interestingly, this memorandum
does not include a deadline for when the Uni-
versity long range plan will be submitted
,
although it does suggest that outside con-
sultants will be used to review the plan in
the fall and that the University community
will engage in some sort of goal setting
activity in the fall and winter. The Task
Force does not meet as a group from July
19th
until September 26th.
385
August 28, 1972
The Chairman of the Board of Directors requests an informal
board meeting on long range planning for 9/20/72. The message is
conveyed through Bennis to the Task Force.
Early September 1972
Bennis makes a speech on planning at Indiana University.
September 11, 1972
In a letter to the President, the coordinator writes that the
Arts and Science Long Range Planning committee is determined to be
protective of what the Cbllege is right now and to argue strongly
for maintaining all the College programs.
September 12, 1972
A vice provost volunteers to review the long range plan for the
President and to coordinate the academic side of its implementation.
September 18, 1972
Not having a plan to submit, Task Force leaders consider a number
of options including 1) making a number of immediate recommendations to
the President which were discussed at the July marathon and 2) giving
statistical feedback to the units i.e. projected FTES' (full-time
equivalent students) etc.
September 20, 1972
Board meeting on long range planning - the co-chairmen emphasize
that the objective for the first cycle of planning has been "learning."
September 26, 1972
Long Range Planning Task Force meeting to discuss how to write
the long range plan. Several unanswered questions keep coming up as
to where the report would be distributed and as to the kinds of recom-
mendations the Task Force can or should make. A suggestion is made to
feedback to the units some immediately implementable recommendations,
but it is not acted upon. It is agreed to shoot for a November deadline
for a document which would pull together and summarize unit plans and for
a spring report which would concentrate on "more global issues.
Commentary: These decisions are not discussed
with President Bennis.
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September 29, 1972
Long range planning is discussed at the Friday afternoon deans'
meeting
.
October 3, 1972
The vice presidents meet and discuss appointing the vice provost
(see 9/12/72) to write the University long range plan. No decision is
reached
.
October 17, 1972
Bennis announces that the deans will be asked to relate PFBS to
their long range plans (see 10/25/72) ; Task Force members receive working
copies of several chapters of a long range plan.
October 20, 1972
Long Range Planning Task Force meeting to discuss drafts of
chapters for the long range plan. Bennis has asked the Task Force to
come up with a statement of University goals. During this meeting the
Task Force tries to decide whether it can continue to synthesize unit
reports and do a goals statement; and if not, which is more important
to do.
Commentary: There is some reluctance among
committee members to do a goals statement.
There is a sense of being cross-pressured.
The Task Force feels that it needs to respond
to Bennis' request, at the same time that it
feels it needs to get back to the units.
But, if it were to go back to the units, would
it be to give the Task Force's perspective on
the unit's problems, to make some sort of
statement as to the unit's standing in rela-
tionship to other units, or to request an
updating of the unit's plan? One of the co-
chairmen blocks going back to the units
until the Task Force can attach criteria,
guidelines, and fiscal projections to the
units' plans. At the end of the meeting
there is consensus on a timetable and a way
of proceeding: By December 1, a preliminary
plan would be written that would include a
statement of goals; throughout the spring
there would be community—wide discussion and
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priority setting; by late spring, units
would be asked (with more knowledge about
University goals) to recycle their plans
and to come up with criteria to evaluate
progress toward their own as well as Uni-
versity priorities. As far as the author
can tell these decisions were not dis-
cussed with the President.
October 20. 1972
The President meets with his assistants to discuss long range
planning.
Commentary: Bennis definitely seems to
want short term program evaluation, recom-
mendations of program cuts, and statement
of priorities to come from the Long Range
Planning Task Force.
Mid-October, 1972
Bennis is always forwarding birth, enrollment and population
trend studies to the Long Range Planning Task Force as well as Alterna-
tive Approaches to Graduate Education material. In October he also
requests that the co-chairmen prepare a progress report on long range
planning for the 10/31/72 all University faculty meeting (a report
that was later preempted in favor of making a budget presentation)
.
October 25, 1972
Long Range Planning Task Force meeting to work on drafts of
chapters and the priorities and goal statement. There is again dis-
cussion about how long range planning will mesh with PPBS program
categories and it is decided that a long range plan will be released
as a Task Force statement without extensive consultation with other
groups, i.e. the PPBS committee. Questions about the goals statement
such as how to write it and how to contextualize it in terms of where
higher education is moving in the 70’s - are also discussed.
Commentary: Much of the discussion in this
meeting focuses on comments the President
had made to the University Senate about the
Long Range Planning Task Force not working
and a need the Task Force feels to inform
the President about how much work they
actually have been doing. Two questions that
persistently come up are 1) how will a long
range plan be used outside the University
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community? and 2) how will a long range
plan relate to the budget?
October 20 - November 6, 1972
Task Force subgroup work - developing specific recommendationsfor given units and identifying University wide issues.
October 26, 1972
A letter from the coordinator to the President prior to Bennis'
10/27 meeting with the deans. The coordinator raises several questions
that the President might have to answer in his meeting with the deans:
questions as to why the September 1 deadline wasn't met, as to how
proceed without feedback on the unit's plan, etc.
October 27, 1972
The President meets with the deans. The deans feel that more
important long range planning is going on in the budget review process
then in long range planning. They are unclear about how their long
range plans will relate to immediate budget decisions.
Commentary: Without more dialogue between the
Task Force leaders and the President, Bennis
himself is in no position to answer these ques-
tions or to convince the deans about how much
work the Task Force has accomplished.
October 30, 1972
The coordinator briefs the President on the Task Force's accom-
plishments for 10/31 faculty speech. What the coordinator tries to
say is that planning is a long-term process and not a substitute for
short-term planning and decision-making. They are intandem processes.
What the Task Force will publish will help the University think about
directions and alternatives and identify choices.
Commentary: The President does most of the
talking - he asks a series of questions that
get at what he has in mind for the Task Force
to produce such as "What would it do to fund
raising if we dropped football?" (He wants
criteria development to help him understand
the consequences of presidential interventions.)
"What criteria can we use to evaluate non-
academic units?" (He wants criteria for
program evaluation, if not program evaluation
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itself.) He wants long range planning
coordinated with PPBS by March 1 - and
logistical feedback given to units on
how much time they are spending in rela-
tion to goals they say they have. Bennis
asks what the long range plan will look
like since "the media is the message."
Bennis promises another meeting; it is
never scheduled.
November 6, 1972
Long Range Planning Task Force meeting to discuss the reports of
the subgroups. There is a debate as to whether or not the Task Force
should attach their recommendations to summaries of unit plans. There
is also a problem of how to handle those areas for which no plan has
been written for one reason or another (Arts and Science, the Office
of Metropolitan Affairs, continuing education, etc.).
November 15, 1972
President Bennis brings in an outside consultant to gain an
administrative perspective on long range planning. The consultant
sees his role is to create movement in the system by asking the right
questions
.
November 21, 1972
Parts of an introductory chapter of a long range plan are written.
November 22, 1972
Long Range Planning Task Force meeting to continue working on
synthesizing unit plans and the introductory chapter. Some substantive
revisions and editing takes place; the Task Force also discusses the
need to change rewards in the University to promote collaboration and
interdisciplinary research and teaching.
Commentary: The Task Force is faced with
the problem of wanting to keep going in the
direction it set for itself, independent of
the immediate budget crisis and in spite of
pressures from the deans for feedback before
their budget presentations.
November 28, 1972
A consultant’s draft to the President prelecting
the impact of
Nixon’s domestic policies on higher education and the
University o
Cincinnati in particular. No copy to the Long Range
Planning Task Force.
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Commentary: It is important to mention this
paper because it is against these recommenda-
tions that the President will measure the
Task Force's validity, skill, and success-
fulness in specifying future directions for
the University.
December 1, 1972
The co-chairmen send out copies of three preliminary chapters to
unit directors for comments.
Commentary: The President reads the three
chapters over Christmas
December 19, 1972
The President writes the co-chairmen requesting a status report
on long range planning. He says he understands that there have been
delays and that other pressures interfere with their spending time on
long range planning. The President also writes the coordinator asking
him to spell out the next steps of the long range planning process.
He reiterates an offer of outside consultants.
January 10, 1973
The President writes the head of the University of Cincinnti
Placement Office asking for projections to 1980 on the future employment
opportunities for University of Cincinnati graduates.
January 12, 1973 '
The Provost's response to the Presidents 12/19 letter. The
Provost explains that the Task Force has had difficulty in making
recommendations in the College of Arts and Sciences because there
hasn't been a plan from that unit," but that some preliminary chapters
have gone back to unit heads for response. He suggests that councils
be established to work out detailed recommendations and implementation
in each area.
January 13, 1973
The President writes the chairman of a national task force on
Alternative Approaches to Graduate Education and suggests that if the
Long Range Planning Task Force could monitor trends in higher education
nationally, they could make really valuable recommendations to the
University.
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January 16, 1972
The Provost and the President see an architect consultant in
San Francisco, about his recommendations on restructuring the College
of Design, Art and Architecture at the University of Cincinnati.
January 16 - 17, 1972
Administrative Retreat - long range planning is one of the topics
discussed. The Provost reports that timing has been a real problem,
that the Arts and Science plan is not done, and that budget cuts are
being made that are incongruent with long range planning recommendations,
but that the biggest flaw of all is that the plan is not tied to external
social trends. The Provost admits that the writing has not been dele-
gated. The President and the Provost agree on the following action steps
at the retreat
:
1) that a report be made as soon as possible to the campus comunity
to reaffirm the long range planning process;
2) that the Provost conference with the dean and department heads in
Arts and Sciences;
3) that a new coordinator for long range planning be appointed as
soon as possible.
January 17, 1972
The Provost follows up the retreat with a letter to the President
in which he makes these points about long range planning:
"1) There is a need for a public statement of objectives and progress to
tell the campus community we have not been entirely dormant or irre-
sponsible;
2) That peer group pressures has to be exerted in Arts and Sciences to
get a plan from that college;
3) That advisory councils need to be appointed (see 1/12/73);
4) That long range planning needs to mesh with PPBS and budget review
planning
; .
5) That the Task Force needs to follow up with their request
tor
comments on the preliminary chapters;
6) That a new coordinator needs to be found, and ...
7) That in the spring a retreat might be held to discuss
the implications
of the long range plan that would be written by that time.
Commentary: It is important to note that
some of these steps overlapped with those
agreed at the retreat; others were new.
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January 19, 1973
The President meets with his assistants to rehash the adminis-
trative retreat. He says that he thinks he will never see a long rangeplan and that processes like Long Range Planning do not have their owninitiative. "I have to keep pumping them up," he says.
January 31, 1973
At a vice presidents' meeting it is suggested that the Long
Range Planning Task Force present a list of programs that might be
cut in projecting the 1973-74 budget.
February - March, 1973
The President announces parts of an administrative reorganiza-
tion; he also sends out a parody on long range planning to Task Force
members
.
Commentary: Some Task Force members are
surprised by the reorganization that came
about independent of a long range plan.
February 20, 1973
Excerpts from comments made at a vice presidents' meeting with
President Bennis: "Long range planning is needed on a program basis
by cost and priority from the top-down in 1974-75." "Long range
planning is not possible in a state which can only budget for two
years at a time."
Commentary: There seemed to be a lot of skepti-
cism about the feasibility of a participatory
long range planning process at this point -
widespread participation being the major premise
under which this effort was undertaken.
February 20, 1973
The Provost writes the President asking for help with Arts and
Sciences and for Bennis' approval of the advisory councils he'd suggested
1/12/73 and 1/17/73. The Provost argues that there has been substantial
impact from long range planning even if there is no plan. Program
evaluation is not the responsibility of the Long Range Planning Task
Force. It is also not a budget cutting group." He urges the President
to be realistic in what he expects from a task force. He offers to cull
a number of tangible recommendations and suggestions from existing docu-
ments if that is what Bennis wants (see 9/18/72).
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February 26, 1973
The President writes the Provost, expressing displeasure at
the lack of specificity in the Provost’s 2/20 letter about where
long range planning was going. Bennis makes four or five procedural
recommendations and then several substantive ones. Long excerpts are
taken from his letter below since it represents one of his strongest
interventions into long range planning. He recommends:
"1) that a new coordinator be appointed; 2) that outside consultants
be used; 3) a meeting with Arts and Sciences [even though he says he
has no idea what their problems are] ; and 4) a March 13th date for a
final plan and a published timetable." "Whatever the process is, and
however important it is, it must lead to a product which can be read,
discussed, and ultimately influenced by our academic community."
Substantively he recommends: 1) That external factors be taken into
consideration. "To my knowledge no attention has been paid to external
factors affecting the University of Cincinnati. We have to have some
clarification of those factors before we can understand the future."
2) That program evaluation needs to be tackled. "What we need to dis-
cover in more depth and detail and precision are those criteria and
programs that our leadership finds least significant and most signi-
ficant." In this regard Bennis asks both of the academic Vice Presi-
dents to project how they would cut or spend an additional million
dollars if it were given to them. 3) That the Task Force write an
integrating statement and compile a list of priorities for the final
plan. (He sees that as the task of the two co-chairmen and coordinator.)
March 8
,
1973
Some friendly correspondence between the Provost and the Dean
of the College of Arts and Sciences; the Provost offers to meet with
the Arts and Sciences planning committee. The coordinator also sub-
mits an outline of a proposed June, 1973, long range plan and a time-
table to the University Senate Long Range Planning committee.
March 9, 1973
The University Senate Long Range Planning committee meets to
consider its relationship to the Task Force and the future of long range
planning. A few days later this committee publishes the criteria it
has developed for evaluating academic programs.
April 30, 1973
Part of the Long Range Planning Task Force holds a day long
workshop on long range planning. They discuss the future of
the Long
Range Planning Task Force, a review process for the plan
and what some
of the substantive recommendations they might make would
e. e
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Provost and about half of the Task Force feels that the most Important
and not
U
the
n
acM ^
F°rCe make 18 the process i£ has established
hand rL p a ps 0r recommendat Ions It will make. On the otherthe President expects specific recommendations. The workshop sortof ends in a stalemate with Task Force members reluctant to volunteer
or work that has to be done. The two co-chairmen are called to a
meeting in the President's office at noon.
May 2, 1973
The Provost and President Bennis discuss how they might hold
up the Arts and Sciences budget until Arts and Sciences submits a
long range plan, but the Provost feels that it is impossible to coerce
Arts and Sciences.
May 15, 1973
The Provost makes a report to the vice presidents and the President
on long range planning. Bennis announces that a set of University priori-
ties he has been working on will independently be announced May 17th in
his speech to the University faculty.
May 17, 1973
Bennis' speech to the University faculty.
June 18, 1973
The co-chairmen and coordinator meet with the deans and the
President. Long range planning is one of several topics that is
reported on. Bennis acknowledges that in the future he needs to meet
with deans more often so that he can emphasize priorities like long
range planning.
June 30, 1973
The Provost prepares an update on the status of long range
planning for an administrative retreat at Kings' Island. "No compre-
hensive plan has been received from the College of Arts and Sciences,
but the Task Force has decided to go ahead and complete an initial
plan by September 1, 1973. Plans will then be implemented and revised
if necessary." The Provost questions who should be given responsibility
for implementation.
Commentary: Bennis' response is to talk
about a book on the planning process and to
want to stage a series of Saturday morning
conferences on parts of the plan. It
appears as if he plans to widely distribute
copies of the 9/1 plan.
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September, 1973
The Preliminary Report on All University Long Range Planning
is published.
APPENDIX B
THE LONG RANGE PLANNING TASK FORCE'S
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF LONG RANGE PLANNING
Ensuring the Future of Long Range Planning,
The Long Range Planning Task Force was created by President
Bennis to initiate what was anticipated to be a continuing University-
wide planning process with periodic review and modification. While
the present Task Force anticipates its discharge sometime during this
academic year, we are concerned about the future of the planning process .
Ways must be found to build that process into the very fabric of the
University. The current plan — much of which was generated in 1972
and is already dated by fall 1973 — must be revised and updated this
fall and winter. Thereafter, major revisions will be needed every two
to five years to facilitate reexamination and revision of University
goals and priorities as external conditions change and as the University’s
own sense of mission evolves. In times of exceptionally rapid change
or transition, this process may be needed more frequently. Likewise,
units will need to update and revise their plans frequently to assure
their continued viability and to maintain the closest possible linkage
between their activities and the overall University mission. Moreover,
the University’s progress toward the objectives of the plan should be
measured and reported to the University community on a regular
basis.
Areas of recalcitrance or failure should be identified and
receive
special attention during the next round of planning.
Finally, the
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planning process should be coordinated as closely as possible with
the budgetary (resource allocation) process.
Our specific recommendations are presented under two ma-jor
headings: 1) Steps in the revision of the Preliminary Plan during
the fall and winter of 1973-74, and 2) Continuing steps in the
planning process.
A. Steps in the Revision of the
Preliminary Plan During the Fall and Winter
of 1973-74
1 . Implementation of the preliminary recommendations should begin
at once, even though a revised plan will not be issued until later in the
1973-74 academic year . Indeed, many recommendations made in the summer
of 1972 have already been, or will soon be, implemented.
2. The Preliminary Plan should be discussed widely during fall
of 1973 and revised for publication in spring of 1974 .
3. Student, faculty % staff and community members should be
encouraged to read and comment upon the Preliminary Plan as i t relate_s_
to University-wide affairs. Moreover, they should be encouraged
to
comment upon and participate in the updating of plans in their
constituent
units .
4.
There should be wide discussion of the University goals
and
_
objectives, and University-wide issues and recommendations
presented in
the Preliminary Plan . Seminars, workshops, and hearings
sponsored by the
President’s Office in cooperation with the Task
Force should seek the
ideas and comments of such focal bodies as
the Board, the newly formed
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Academic Council, and governance groups as well as representatives
of the community. These discussions should result in revised state-
ments of University goals and objectives, University-wide issues and
recommendations, and University priorities which are as operational
and specific as possible.
5 * In early September, 1973, units should be advised of the
need to update their 1972 plans by February 1, 197
A
. Moreover
,
they
should be asked to indicate what steps have been taken to carry out
original plans, what additional steps are contemplated during the
year, and what assistance they desire from central administration,
governance groups, the Task Force, etc., to facilitate the updating
of plans at the unit level.
6 . Each unit (other than the very small units) should establish,
not later than the spring of 1974, a long range planning committee which
will have the responsibility for reviewing, recommending Implementation
of, and updating the relevant portions of the University’s long range
plan
.
(Some units already have such committees — for example, the
College of Design, Architecture and Art, the University College and
others
.
)
7 . When the revised University plan is released in the spring
of 1974, it should probably appear in loose-leaf form, so that annual
addenda can be used to supplement or replace pertinent pages in the
1974 plan . If not all copies are in loose-leaf format, at least the
'Working" copies — those of the unit directors and other administrators
chiefly concerned about planning — should be so bound.
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8. After the presentation of the revised plan, the Long Range
Planning Task Force should be discharged, unless any work remains on
the original round of planning .
B. Continuing Steps In Planning
1 . The President’s Office must have residing within It, primary
responsibility for leading and coordinating the University-wide planning
function . In terms of the recent administrative reorganization, the
appropriate location in the President's Office appears to be the Office
of the Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs. This office should
have adequate time and professional staff to facilitate the implementa-
tion of the plan, to consult with units in their planning efforts, and
to coordinate the planning process on a continuous basis. It should
have an advisory group or task force to assist and guide its efforts.
This office should maintain frequent contacts with the planning committees
and planning officers of each of the major units so that periodic updating
of the University plan will be a relatively logical and predictable pro-
cess. It would be the responsibility of this office to deliver, once
a year, a supplemental planning report to the President. The
President
in turn should prepare an annual "State of the University" message
articulating priorities, indicating new conditions affecting
the Uni-
versity, and anticipating changes in direction and emphasis.
2. The revised plans from "A" above should be the
basis for
budgetary allocations for the 1975-77 biennium, a
process beginning In
the spring of 197 A.
AGO
a. Each unit seeking a budget allocation should document
its request based on a comprehensive long range plan for the unit
and indications of how its plan contributes to the attainment of
overall University goals.
b. Each unit should articulate its priorities by program
area within its plan. Clarity of alternatives would permit choices
to be related to available levels of funding in yearly and biennial
budget processes.
3 . The next major cycle of University-wide planning (following
the publication of the revised plan in spring, 1974) should take place
,
at the latest, during fall and winter 1975-76 . The resultant plans
would become the basis for the budgetary allocations in the 1977-79
biennium, a process beginning in the spring of 1976.
4 . Each unit should be expected to maintain a comprehensive long
range plan for its activities . This should be reviewed and updated
annually. In 1975, this process should be completed and the plan sub-
mitted to the Office of the President by no later than July 1, 1975.
This prerequisite step will permit University-wide planning to proceed
as outlined in ”3" above. Major recasting of unit plans should occur
every two years in the case of smaller units and probably at a somewhat
longer interval for larger units except where circumstances warrant
more frequent recasting.
5.
a system of rewards must be developed for units which
evidence strong commitment to planning, implement the ir plans
effectively^,
and dpmnnstrate relevant relationships between their
activities and the
overall goals of the University .
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6 . Enrollment projections should be maintained for each unit
and program . They should be updated annually and extended five to
ten years into the future.
7 . Income and expense projections should be maintained for
each unit and program . They should be updated annually and extended
five years or two biennia into the future.
8 . Planning guidelines should be modified to include resource
tables indicating staff, facilities, equipment, and funds needed for
attainment of plans .
appendix c
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: A CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY
October 25, 1971
Administrative Retreat at French Lick.
Commentary: The need for an internal
affirmative action program for minorities
is identified. "The philosophy of this
administration is to work over a three
to four year period of time toward equit-
able faculty and student roles for minori-
ties and women." It is decided to "1) ask
the University Senate to develop a plan
for an affirmative action program and to
study the need for new educational programs
and services; 2) commit the University to
raise money for minority student programs,
counselling, and financial aid: 3) to hire
more minority and women faculty and adminis-
trative staff; and 4) to actively recruit
more minority students."
November, 1971
A consultant-*- is brought in by the President "to look at the
University as it relates to minorities and women and to look at the
resources of the community and those of the University and to make
recommendations on how to involve more women and minorities in the
University to bring about a more effective use of resources."
December 8, 1971
Revised order #4, Department of Labor in which the obligations
of contractors and subcontractors re: affirmative action are detailed.
January 22, 1972
The President appoints the Director of the Office of Resources
Development and a black Associate Vice President for Community Relations.
The Office of Resource Development is to work with the University Senate
in developing an affirmative action plan for the University and:
1) to develop programs around new human resources;
2) to provide staff assistance to the President’s Council on minority
affairs and women;
*A black woman, later appointed Director of the Office of Resource
Development at the University of Cincinnati.
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3) to review, advise, and monitor affirmative action programs:
) to prepare proposals for funding special programs: and
5) to develop programs between the University and the community.
March 3, 1972
The Director’s appointment begins.
April 11, 1972
Correspondence between the President and the vice presidents.
The President asks the vice presidents to maintain records and comply
with the spirit of affirmative action in making appointments in this
area.
May 8, 1972
The University Senate reports on the Status of Women and Minority
Affirmative Action.
June 7, 1972
Correspondence, the President to the Chairman of the University
Senate; instead of two committees the President will appoint one com-
mission with committees on women and minorities. The University Senate’s
timetable is moved back two months.
June 7, 1972
Correspondence, the President to the Director and the Provost re:
a modification of the University Senate’s recommendations on the Uni-
versity’s policies on child care. The Provost and the Director are to
implement or assist those who wish to implement child care programs
that require minimal expenditures such as cooperative programs; to
provide legal advice etc. Eventually the President hopes child care
programs will be a research and resource center for the University.
June 7, 1972
Correspondence, the President to the Provost. The President asks
the Provost to assume responsibility for a number of recommendations in
the reports of the subcommittees on the Status of Women and Minority
Affirmative Action. He asks the Provost to convene a small committee to
study Michigan State University’s Anti-Discrimination Tribunal so that
by 8/31/72 the University of Cincinnati will have established grievance
procedures for cases alleging discrimination. The Provost is also asked
to study recommendations for student assistance and tutoring programs,
curriculum changes, the use of part-time faculty and career counselling.
June 12, 1972
Correspondence, the President to the governance group leaders.
He accepts the recommendations of the Report of the Committee on the
Status of Women re: women and governance in the University and asks
the governance groups to develop an affirmative action plan for com-
mittee representation.
June 16, 1972
A vice provost in reviewing the Director of the Office of Resource
Development’s draft of the University’s Policy Statement on Affirmative
Action (cc: the President) writes: "I can anticipate great resistance
and argument over the assignment to affirmative action coordinators of
the responsibility for determining what ’qualified applicant' means. . ."
June 19, 1972
Correspondence, the President to the Director and vice presidents
asking them to review the draft statement on Affirmative Action which has
been developed from recommendations of the University Senate. Responsi-
bilities for implementation and the following timetable are included in
the draft:
By 8/31 - affirmative action coordinators will be designated, a reporting
and auditing system established, and grievance procedures
established;
By 9/30 - the Office of Resource Development will publish an analysis
of areas of under-utilization and areas of low minority and
female student enrollment re: Revised order /*4:
By 10/31 - the Office of Resource Development will establish a svstem to
identify potentially qualified applicants and complete a review
of the policies and procedures of the Personnel Office to assure
compliance with Federal laws. By this date the President will
also have appointed the Affirmative Action Commission.
By 11/4 - each unit will develop goals and timetables for effective
utilization of minorities and women which will be incorporated
into their long range plans and reviewed by the appropriate
dean and vice president.
June 21, 1972
Correspondence from the Faculty Council on Jewish Affairs recom
mending that the Affirmative Action policy statement make it clear "there
is no attempt to advocate or support reverse discrimination" and that
"criteria for employment and responsibility for monitoring must_ be
shared
by the affirmative action coordinators with suitable academic
personne
in the departments and colleges.
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June 23. 1972
Correspondence, the Director of the Office of Resource Develon-
e™:„t :n
v
affi™:ti
dent
M
r Business - Reviews rwisi°ns °fstat men o irma ve action re: contract compliance (cc: Bennis).
June 27, 1972
Correspondence, the Provost - Response to the President's 6/7letter. The Provost agrees to work with the Director on the implementa-tion of a child care policy.
June 29, 1972
Correspondence from the Faculty Council on Jewish Affairs to the
President: a report on Affirmative Action.
July 6, 1972
Correspondence between the President's Office and the Personnel
Office on the maternity leave policy.
July 7, 1972
The President appoints a committee to develop the charge, member-
ship, etc., of an Affirmative Action Commission. "The Commission will
serve as a reviewing body for the University's affirmative action plan
and as a body to which I and others can direct special studies, and
materials for comment."
July 15, 1972
Correspondence, the President to the Vice President for Business -
Bennis wants the vice presidents to meet to discuss the Director of the
Office of Resource Development's role and to review the "final" affirma-
tive action plan. The President's letter is excerpted: "Because of the
sensitivity and importance of such a plan shouldn't other groups be brought
in to discuss it? I am thinking especially of the deans. I know that
many of them have left already, but I am concerned that such an important
document be received without any prior discussion by those individuals
who have to implement the plan. This document is far more important,
far more subject to distortion, apprehension, etc., it seems to me, than
possibly any other policy statement that this office will transmit
during this coming year."
July 20, 1972
Correspondence, the Director to the Vice President for Business -
a review of his responses to the affirmative action statement. Many of
his revisions and recommendations are accepted and incorporated.
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July 31, 1972
t *
cuirr 6spond6nce , the President in response to the Faculty Council
on Jewish Affairs concerns about the formulation of the University's
affirmative action program. The President writes, "The objective of
affirmative action is diversification, not discrimination. I agree that
recruitment and selection must reflect professional peer group
-judgement
- subject to assistant and monitoring by the Office of Resource Develop-
ment and the Commission on Affirmative Action. The role of the Affirma-
tive Action coordinators in each college is to be facilitative rather
than directive, coordinative rather than adjudicative. They will insure
that the locus of responsibility rests with the colleges and departments,
We must work closely together in this endeavor. The spirit of collabora-
tion reflected in your recent statement is vital."
September 1, 1972
Correspondence, the Provost to the President, the vice presidents,
and the Director of the Office of Resource Development re: the creation
of a University anti-discriminatory tribunal. He submits a draft for
consultation. The President sends a copy of this correspondence to the
Director of Personnel.
September 12, 1972
Correspondence, the Director to the Provost (cc: the President)
re: the draft of an affirmative action policy statement for the University
of Cincinnati. "It was agreed early in the summer that a draft of the
7/20 statement on Affirmative Action would be provided to all deans and
directors for comment prior to any release by the President's Office in
order to incorporate any salient point raised and discussed by those
persons upon whom implementation will heavily rely." The Director of
the Office of Resource Development urges the deans to review the proposal
by no later than 10/13. Timetables will have to be changed, since the
President has requested a report on where the University's affirmative
action program is in relation to programs of other universities, and since
the Director wants to begin as soon as possible to discuss the process of
implementation with the deans and department heads.
September 29, 1972
The Director attends the Friday-af ternoon deans and unit directors
meeting. The deans seem to want to have her address specific implications
for specific colleges and departments. She replies that these conferences
will not be possible until January.
October, 1972
HEW's Guidelines for Higher Education are published.
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October 2. 1972
le
^
ter
> the vice President for Business asks the Director ofthe Office of Resource Development when she will make presentations tothe various vice presidential areas agreed upon several months beforein a vice presidents’ meeting.
October 3, 1972
The Director reports that her meeting with the deans has taken
place and that she will meet very soon with the Hospital and Medical
College steering committees. She suggests four dates to work with
the vice presidents and their staffs; on the same day the President
reports to the Board of Directors on the progress of Affirmative
Action listing new appointments of women and minorities and announces
the beginning of a management information system, etc. That night,
October 3, the President and the Director have dinner together.
October 17, 1972
Affirmative Action is discussed at the President’s Advisory
Council (Category II) meeting.
October 1972
Bernice Sandler from the Association of American Colleges,
Project on the Status and Education of Women, is invited to speak to
the vice presidents, deans and presidential assistants about affirmative
action at the Current Perspectives in Higher Education Lecture Series.
October 23, 1972
Correspondence, the Director to the President re: the policy state
ment on Affirmative Action which has been reviewed by the vice presidents
deans, AAUP, and Medical College steering committee, and the President's
Advisory Council. The Director recommends reprinting the statement in
Candid Campus and the publication of a special document to include all
the information needed by the vice presidents, deans, and affirmative
action coordinators to implement Affirmative Action.
October 27, 1972
The President writes a cover letter to the University’s Policy
Statement on Affirmative Action but publication in Candid Campus is
delayed until December 4 for a number of reasons.
October 30, 1972
The Director meets with the President to report on the progress
of affirmative action in the Medical College etc. Bennis does not like
the image of affirmative action as a mechanism of social change. The
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Director proposes to hold hearings on the status of women at the Uni-
versity of Cincinnati in the spring; the President wants the Director
to bring in funding for University of Cincinnati-sponsored conferences
&ftd for her to emphasize what has already been done in the area of
affirmative action.
October 31, 1972
The Director forwards copies of the Medical College steering
committee's comments on the Policy Statement on Affirmative Action to
the President's assistants (cc; the President). She also reports
that she has met with department chairmen in the Medical College.
November 2, 1972
The Director writes to the Committee to establish the process,
charge, and membership for the Commission on Affirmative Action. She
suggests that the role of the Commission be 1) to review the University's
Affirmative Action plan prior to submission to HEW; 2) to review the
units' affirmative action implementation plans; 3) to review studies of
areas of under-utilization of women and minorities in the University:
4) to recommend policy considerations to the President for action; and
5) to support and assist the Office of Resource Development.
November 3, 1972
The Director wants salary equity review for women to be part of
the 1973-74 budget review process.
November 7, 1972
Correspondence, the President to the Committee on the Affirmative
Action Commission. He would like the Commission to report to the Director
of Resource Development although he would make some Presidential appoint-
ments. He also cautions the committee, that the Director s role in the
Commission as proposed might be too vague, too broad and inclusive, and
needs to be looked at carefully.
November 22, 1972
An affirmative action workshop on institutional racism is held for
Presidential assistants.
November 22, 1972
Correspondence, the Committee on the Affirmative Action Commission
to the President - A conference between the Committee and
the President
to resolve the questions of whom the commission should
renort to and the
Commission’s chairmanship is recommended. A final proposal on
the Com
mission will be ready in three to four weeks.
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November 29, 1972
In a letter to the President, the Director presents a case for
the Affirmative Action Commission to report to the President. "The
sensitivities around the whole notion of affirmative action both on
campus and in the community need a lot more reassurance in terms of
your continued commitment - as I also do - and leadership re:
affirmative action than would be the case, if this Commission reported
to me or anyone else. This certainly has political overtones for you -
and there must be pressures on you to soft-pedal this whole area, but
the penalties for doing so are so great that I cannot conceive of our
not being able to deal with all the various communities and their
concerns
November 29, 1972
The Director, the President, and the chairman of the committee
that wrote the charge to the Affirmative Action Commission meet to
discuss the chairmanship. They disagree on the function of the com-
mission which is to review, recommend, and initiate policy. The
Director says the Commission will only review implementation plans.
The President does not want the Commission to be a way to short-
circuit the bureaucracy when his goal is to make the bureaucracy more
responsive. The President adds to the Commission’s charge to work
with the President to identify those aspects of the community which
seem to provoke repetitive grievances for minorities and women, while
the Director is to deal with matters of institutional racism and sexism.
The role of the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal is discussed and the
Director asks for more resources for xeroxing.
December 4, 1972
The University’s Policy Statement on Affirmative Action is
reprinted in Candid Campus; no implementation dates are included
(see Appendix B)
.
December 4, 1972
Correspondence, the chairman of the Committee to write Affirma-
tive Action Commission charge to the President (no cc) . There are two
new parts to the charge in addition to reviewing the University's
Affirmative Action Plan, reviewing units’ implementation plans, and
recommending policy considerations for review and action.
.
They are:
1) To provide a mechanism for the smooth flow of information on
the
status of women and minorities and on the implementation of
Affirmative Action and
2) To work with the President to identify clearly those
areas of university
concerns and life in which there appears to be repetitive
instances of
alleged racism and sexism.
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December 4, 1972
The Director’s summary of her Report to the President on the
status of women and blacks re: participation in the committee struc-
ture of the University of Cincinnati, 1972-73. The Director recom-
mends increasing black participation on all committees in the University.
December 5, 1972
The Affirmative Action policy statement is discussed at the
President's Advisory Council meeting (Category II) along with the
issue of the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
December 7, 1972
Correspondence, the President to the Director thanking her for
her work on women and minorities' participation on various University
committees. "Your study will be useful in creating the climate of
change we all want."
December 12, 1972
Fifteen minute meeting between the President and the Director of
the Office of Resource Development.
December 29, 1972
The Director's summary of A Report to the President on the Status
of blacks and women re: representation in administrative positions at
the University of Cincinnati, 1972-73.
January 4, 1973
An administrative intern in the Provost's office suggests that
a committee should be appointed to review the entire draft of the Anti
Discrimination Tribunal charge and to formulate a workable draft to
be presented to the President and the University community for imple-
mentation.
January 8, 1973
Correspondence, the chairman of the committee to write the charge
for the Affirmative Action Commission to the President. He
submits the
final report on the commission and suggests his committee
review t e
Anti-Discrimination material too. The Presidents asks one of his
assistants to begin contacting the people he will appoint
to the
Commission.
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January 18
T 1973
Correspondence, a top administrator recommends actions for the
resident to take in regards to making Affirmative Action Comission
appointments and suggests that an announcement of the Commission's
structure be reprinted in Candid Campus.
January 24, 1973
The organizational plan for the Affirmative Action Comission
appears in Candid Campus. "The University of Cincinnati is a community
in transition, one in which a necessary condition of success in the
seventies is the development and implementation of an effective affirma-
tive action program leading to increased numbers, visibility, and
participation of minorities and women at every level."
February 6, 1973
A report on affirmative action is given at the President's
Advisory Council meeting.
February 7, 1973
Correspondence, the Director of the Office of Resource Develop-
ment to the vice presidents, deans, and unit directors re: The Policy
Statement on Affirmative Action. The Director reiterates that the
first step in implementation is the appointment of affirmative action
coordinators in each unit by February 16, 1973. Workshops will then
be scheduled to discuss the development of unit affirmative action
plans and recruitment procedures. Meetings will be held with co-
ordinators to increase the communication network at the University of
Cincinnati and to provide support to coordinators as they get going.
The Director asks that a chart on current affirmative action laws and
regulations be circulated to all faculty and staff members in each unit.
February 8, 1973
An American Association of University Professors (AAUP) resolu-
tion on affirmative action is submitted to the President - charging that
the December 4th Candid Campus Statement on Affirmative Action is not
in compliance with federal regulations in their opinion, i.e., that a
comprehensive analysis of units in regards to the underutilization of
women and minorities be undertaken and that detailed goals and time-
tables be specified.
February 8, 1973
Correspondence, The Director of Resource Development to the
President re: the AAUP resolution on Affirmative Action. The Director
defends what she has been doing as "building relationships and a firm
base of support before unleashing a barrage of directives." She writes
A 12
"1) The policy statement was very late - but we all agreed that it
was best to hold it over the summer and discuss it further with all
of the deans on both the main campus and in the Medical Center after
they had had a chance to look at it in order to make sure we were
moving ahead with at least as much support as could be garnered at
the time; 2) Order #4 has been distributed [she documents when and
where] ; 3) There has been advising and consulting going on informally
with department chairmen, deans, and others with regard to using
different organizations and media sources to reach more women and
minorities in recruiting." A draft of a reply for the President to
the AAUP chapter is included in which the delay is explained. The
Director asserts that a data gathering and reporting system is being
worked on to review and analyze the utilization of women and minori-
ties and that action at the college/unit level has been underway for
some time (a process intimately tied to budget review and development
she contends). She reports that the Office of Resource Development
has been providing information to deans, vice presidents, etc., on
new sources for contacts for women and minority applicants. Finally,
she suggests that the President reply publicly to the AAUP’s accusa-
tions in Candid Campus and the News Record.
February 9, 1973
The Dean of the College of Education to the Director of Resource
Development (cc: Bennis) . The Dean calls her participation in the
United Black Faculty Association’s (UBFA) investigation of the College
of Education, "a conflict of interest."
Commentary: The UBFA conducted an investigation
of racism on the part of faculty and staff in
the College of Education. It had asked that all
promotions be held up in the College of Education
until its report to the President was completed.
February 13, 1973
Correspondence, The Director of Resource Development to the Dean
of the College of Education (cc: the President and the Provost) re:
the UBFA Executive Committee Review of the College of Education.
The
Director justifies her participation by saying that the charge of er
office is "to effectively change the way in which minorities and
women
are related to, involved with, and affected by this University.
February 14, 1973
Correspondence, the President to the AAUP. Bennis explains
that
the December 4th Candid Campus Statement on
Affirmative Action was an
outline of a commitment for a 7/31/73 plan for
Affirmative Action. He
writes, "An Institutional commitment to Affirmative
Action invo ves
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people and their feelings much more than words on paper. As essential
and clear and explicit as statements undoubtedly are, we will not
accomplish very much in this terribly sensitive area unless the members
of the University community develop an understanding and a commitment
to affirmative action over a period of time. What we have been trying
to do, chiefly through the Office of Resource Development, is to work
informally with units and individuals to achieve that understanding and
commitment
.
February 16, 1973
The Office of Resource Development sends the deans and unit
directors a copy of the summary HEW Guidelines and tells them where
to write for the Guidelines themselves.
February 16, 1973
Correspondence, the Dean of the College of Education to the
Director of Resource Development. He continues to see her role in the
UBFA investigation as a "conflict of roles."
February 16, 1973
Correspondence, the Director to the vice presidents, deans, and
governance leaders (cc: the President) re: a review of college, unit,
and departmental grievance procedures. In accordance with HEW Guide-
lines for the implementation of affirmative action in higher education,
the Director requests copies of unit grievance procedures. Once the
procedures are reviewed, a report will be prepared to be reviewed by
the deans and the President’s Advisory Council. The ultimate goal of
the review, she adds, would be a summary of the institution's grievance
procedures available to all present and prospective employees of the
University. In the same letter, the Director clarifies the role of the
Anti-Discrimination Tribunal: it will cover allegations of discrimina-
tion that cannot be settled at any other level.
February 18, 1973
Correspondence, The AAUP to the President requesting a meeting
with him on Affirmative Action.
February 23, 1973
Correspondence, the President to the AAUP — He declines to meet
with AAUP members and instead recommends they meet first with the
Provost, the Director, or the University's legal counsel on essentially
"what are policy and legal questions."
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February 23, 1973
A Summary/Analysis of Enrollment of Blacks atCincinnati is published.
the University of
February 27
T
1973
Correspondence, the AAUP to the Director of Resource Develop-
ment requesting a meeting with her to discuss 1) what they see is
a contradiction in the President’s 2/14/73 letter about the role of
the Affirmative Action Commission and what he said 1/24/73 in Candid
Campus and 2) their reservations about the date when an affirmative
action plan is expected (June, 1973), "when most faculty would be
away and lose a chance to review it."
February 27, 1973
Correspondence, the Director to the Vice Presidents - re: a
reporting and monitoring system for appointments.
February 27, 1973
The Director of Resource Development compiles an Affirmative
Action Handbook for all University units.
March 1, 1973
University salary comparison data by male/female in the Provost's
area is released and an Affirmative Action workshop for affirmative
action coordinators is held.
March 3, 1973
An Affirmative Action coordinators' meeting is held to discuss
government Order #4 (DOL) . The Provost defends the Director from AAUP
charges. On the same day the Director writes the vice presidents, deans,
and affirmative action coordinators re: a timetable for the completion
of an affirmative action plan. "By 4/30 - unit plans will be developed
and reviewed; by 5/31 - a plan for the University will be written: by
June 30 - the Commission on Affirmative Action will have reviewed the
University plan; and by 7/1/73 the plan will be sent to HEW.
Early March, 1973
Members of the Affirmative Action Commission are appointed and
announced
.
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March 5, 1973
f
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tor receives clarification that two separate plans:one for minorities and one for women are not required, (cc : thePresident and the AAUP.)
March 8 and 16. 1973
The Director meets with the deans and unit directors to discuss
the Affirmative Action Handbook.
March 9, 1973
There are complaints about undergraduate representation on
the Affirmative Action commission; the Director writes student govern-
ment leaders about the choice of an undergraduate student.
March 10, 1973
A Non-Academic Affirmative Action Coordinators' meeting is held.
March 20, 1973
The Director of Resource Development sends all deans, affirmative
action coordinators, and department chairmen a copy of Jinny Goldstein's
article on affirmative action - "Equal Employment Rights for Women in
Academia .
"
March 21, 1973
Correspondence, The Director of the Office of Resource Development
to the Task Force appointed to review Faculty Facts - asking them to
review Faculty Facts for compliance of the University's personnel poli-
cies and procedures with Federal regulations. "Changes must occur to
ensure that all of our employees know what the new rules of the game
are and how they can be implemented." In a postscript to the President,
the Director says she has also prepared a long-overdue packet of infor-
mation on affirmative action for a State Senator who had requested it.
March 22, 1973
Correspondence, the President to the Director to the President.
The President follows up on the Director’s meeting the AAUP and apolo-
gizes for the mistake on the role of the Affirmative Action Commission.
The Director says she needs dollar amounts in the budget before plans
for salary equity can go ahead. The AAUP is disappointed that salary
equity has not occurred to date.
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March 23, 1973
Reports to the President on the Participation of Blacks and
Women in the Committee Structure and in Administrative Positions at
the University of Cincinnati.
March 23, 1973
Correspondence, the Director to the President - submitting the
Report of the "Wednesday Group" on the Governance Mechanisms of the
University of Cincinnati. This group has compiled a list of recom-
mendations as to what other actions the President might have taken in
response to the Black Students’ 33 grievances in lieu of a task force.
The Director says "that this statement has implications for the
administrative process and the effective involvement of minorities
and women in the University. We have made suggestions about holding
individuals and groups accountable."
March 26, 1973
The President, the Director of Resource Development, and the
chairman of the Affirmative Action Commission meet to discuss the
first meeting of the Commission 4/5/73. The President will come but
he has to leave early; he balks at a full-time secretary when the
Commission’s budget is discussed; he wants the Affirmative Action
Commission to eventually explore the University's relationship with
the city in regards to Affirmative Action. On the same day an AAUP
committee writes the President complaining about the few number of
women faculty members appointed to the Commission. The Director
also makes a statement about affirmative action and salary equity
at the open budget hearings that are held.
March 29, 1973
Affirmative Action workshop for affirmative action coordinators
and departmental secretaries to review the HEW guidelines and to
distribute departmental profile data that needs to be corrected.
March 30, 1973
Correspondence, the Director of Resource Development to the
vice presidents and deans ret Appointment Activity Forms. She explains
how information about applicant flow on all open positions will need
to be reported. This information will then be reviewed as one means
of evaluating the effectiveness of affirmative action. "The forms
will be approved by the appropriate vice president or dean and audited
by the Office of Resource Development.
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March, 1973
The President asks the Provost about affirmative action on the
Research Council i.e., the funding of minority proposals.
April 2, 1973
Correspondence, the President to the AAUP re: the membership
of the Affirmative Action Commission. He explains how the two sub-
committees of the Commission will expand the involvement of women
and minorities.
April 5, 1973
Departmental secretaries meeting on affirmative action; also a
draft of the structure and charge to the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal
is completed.
April 5, 1973
The Affirmative Action Commission meets. The President sets a
cultural and historical perspective on assimilation but says nothing
about the relationship of the Commission to the President’s office.
April 6, 1973
Correspondence, the Director of Resource Development to the
President re: Women’s concerns. The Director shares her notes from
a discussion with women’s groups about women’s concerns that will
form the substance of a list of demands to be submitted to the
President 4/15/73. The concerns include the confidentiality of
files, child care, women’s studies, the funding of women’s groups;
the funding of programs for women, the counselling office, counselling
for continuing education, and financial aid.
April 12, 1973
The Director hands out a form to deans in the deans' meeting on
which to keep track of training opportunities for the people they work
with. The deans complain about all the time the forms will take.
April 12, 1973
The President and the Director of Resource Development meet with
the chairman of the women’s groups on a list of grievances.
April 15, 1973
Women's groups submit a letter citing areas where change is needed.
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April 16, 1973
The Director of Resource Development forwards a policy state-
ment on child care (from the Office of the President) to the University
Senate for endorsement without the President’s approval and ignoring
the vice presidents’ request for it to be delayed. A child care
council is recommended
.
April 23, 1973
Correspondence, the Director of Resource Development to the
Vice Presidents and deans re: the Appointment Activity Form. A
revision in the way the forms will operate is made at the President’s
suggestion i.e. if the Office of Resource Development has any questions
it will channel them through the dean or vice presidents.
April 24, 1973
Correspondence, the Director of Resource Development to the
President about involving members of the black community in social
events.
April 26, 1973
Consultant Report on Personnel Department. The consultant
expresses concern that affirmative action needs to be worked through
regular procedures and offices which have to take affirmative
responsibility for the recruitment and training of minorities and
women. ”A special grievance procedure for affirmative action
discrimination cases, for example, suggests non-discrimination
and affirmative action are someone else’s responsibility.” The
consultant recommends Affirmative Action activities be delegated
to the Personnel Department; as it is, he sees potential conflict
between the Office of Resource Development and the Personnel Depart-
ment .
April 27, 1973
An Affirmative Action workshop is held.
April 28, 1973
The President meets with black leaders at his house.
April 30, 1973
At a vice presidents' meeting the President says he doesn't
want to make a plea for salary equity for women in his speech May 17th
to the University faculty.
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May 1, 1973
A State Senator lobbies for more staff for the Office of
Resource Development; the President writes the Chancellor for Higher
Education in Ohio and documents the steps the University has taken
in the area of affirmative action; on 5/1/73 the Director also sub-
mits her report on the Office of Resource Development and Affirmative
Action, The First Fifteen Months", which the President had requested.
Two of the most important criteria she lays out for the implementa-
tion of affirmative action are:
1) involvement - that every unit develop its own plan and be responsible
for reporting and monitoring recruitment, hiring, training, transfers
and promotions.
2) observability - that the perspectives of minorities and women are
included in decision-making.
The Director acknowledges the tension, uncertainty, and ambiguity around
her office and in periods of change in general. She lists her areas of
responsibility and what she feels has been accomplished and those areas
which need to be strengthened. The areas that need to be strengthened are:
"1) Direct communication and feedback between the President and the
Director of Resource Development. . .more of it;
2) A support system for the development of an increasingly effective
Office of Resource Development;
3) Continual vigilance on the part of the Office of the President and
the Office of Resource Development around "negativism’ and ’noise
in the system’ that should be checked out by both Offices before
it is reinforced (negatively) or discarded as not important to
agreed-upon goals, process, and action;
4) Legitimization of the Office of Resource Development by inclusion
in. . .[decision-making]. Discussions of issues that may have
impact on the performance of the Office of Resource Development
or the performance of other units who need policy and information
input from the Office of Resource Development must include the
Office of Resource Development;
5) Open recognition of the difficulties of establishing an office
such as the Office of Resource Development and providing legitimate
policy support for it;
6) Willingness of administrators to confront difficult issues, analyze^
their impact on current activities, make decisions and move on. . .
(Two other general recommendations follow which need not be included here.)
A long range plan for the Office is appended to her report.
Commentary: This lengthy quotation is included
because it is indicative of the needs the
Director had to be included in decision-making
in the President’s office and for support and
reaffirmation. The lack of communication between
her and the President is apparent from reading
between the lines.
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May 4. 1973
The President says that "the Director has alienated the people
she will need to implement affirmative action" but is not more specificthan that; on that same day he requests the Director recommend candi-dates and names of resource persons the President's Office should con-
tact for recommendations and advice in the search for a Provost andGraduate Dean.
May 14. 1973
The Affirmative Action Commission meets to review the HEW guide-
lines and agrees that one goal of the Commission is "to pinpoint general
areas of decision-making where it is important for affirmative action
to gain influence.
. .such as Medical School admissions."
May 14. 1973
Correspondence, the Director of Resource Development to the
President. "She complains her report was unacknowledged and she wants
to be involved in policy development, advising, and decision-making in
the President's office."
May 15, 1973
The University Senate deliberates on the implications of the child
care council. The President has not seen this proposal.
May 15, 1973
The President replies to the women's grievances letter (4/15).
He says he thought their letter was a thoughtful and comprehensive
approach to stating the needs of women in the University. He replies:
1) he cannot however implement the committee appointments or grievance
counsel recommendations;
2) that the recruitment of more women students is a goal of his;
3) that the University budget reflects a financial commitment to
affirmative action through the funding of an Office of Resource
Development and in the Provost's recommendations to the deans
to include positive steps to correct inequities as part of their
salary decisions for 1973-74; and
4) that he has asked the Director and the Provost to implement the
child care council (see 4/16 and 5/15) among other things.
May 17, 1973
Affirmative Action meeting for department heads. The guest speaker
is Chester Gray, Regional Director of EEOC.
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May 19
, 1973
The Women s Coalition to the President. Women's groups are not
satisfied with the President's responses (5/15/73) nor do they want
the Director of Resource Development to be asked to leave the University.
May 21, 1973
The Director documents what happened in regard to the proposal
on the child care council.
May 21, 1973
The Director of Resource Development asks the Director of
Personnel for some information on personnel procedures for her 7/1/73
Report to HEW; on this same day she send the President, vice presidents,
deans, and affirmative action coordinators a copy of a test case in
affirmative action, Griggs vs. the Duke Power Company.
May 24, 1973
The Director of Resource Development asks the Vice President
for Management and Finance for a report on all federal grants and
contracts the University has received in a three-year period.
May 24, 1973
The Director of Personnel to the Director of Resource Development:
"The personnel policies of the University have been and are in line with
all federal regulations and laws."
May 25, 1973
The deans discuss whether affirmative action procedures were
followed in the search for a new Provost.
May 29, 1973
The President approves the child care council; says that the
Director for Resource Development doesn't realize what she does to bring
on problems.
June 5, 1973
Correspondence, the Director to the President - she asks him to
prepare an Appointment Activity Record for the Provostial position
he
has lust filled; on the same day, she also send out copies
of three
articles by Bernice Sandler from the Chronicle of Higher
Educat on o
all deans, vice presidents and affirmative action coordinators.
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June 6, 1973
The President meets with the Director of the Office of Resource
Development
.
June 6-8, 1973
The Director intervenes in an alleged case of discrimination
in the Development Office.
June 11, 1973
The Director sends a memorandum on Title 9 of the Educational
Amendments of 1972 on admissions to the President, vice presidents,
deans, and affirmative action coordinators.
June 12, 1973
The President consults with representatives of the Women’s Coalition
and the University Senate on his decision to ask for the resignation of
the Director of the Office of Resource Development. He says that he has
already consulted extensively with individuals and groups outside the
University.
June 13, 1973
The President meets with chairman of the Affirmative Action Com-
mission on the resignation/firing of the Director of Resource Development.
June 18, 1973
Affirmative Action workshop with Odessa Fellows from the Office
of Civil Rights as the guest speaker.
June 19, 1973
Meeting between the President and the Director of the Office of
Resource Development.
June 28, 1973
Instructions on Affirmative Action Forms are sent out to deans
and department heads.
July 1, 1973
The Director of Resource Development finishes a plan for HEW.
(The vice presidents decide later not to submit this document as
the
University's plan and request an extension from HEW.)
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Special edition
A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BENNIS
To: Members of the University Community
Because of the collective efforts of the University
Senate, the Office of Resource Development, and the
conscientious labors of many deans, department heads,
faculty, staff, and students, I am presenting to the
University Community this Policy Statement on
Affirmative Action. This statement, if followed in good
faith, may serve to provide greater opportunities for those
whose talents have not been effectively utilized in the
past.
Atfirmative action is a new concept designed to achieve
I
the cherished ideal of equality of opportunity. It does not
j
suggest that we should today follow a program of dis-
crimination to repay the costs of the discrimination of
! yesterday. But the Affirmative Action Statement does
suggest that each individual must be given an equal chance
to establish his or her eligibility to enter into, or advance
within, the University Community.
This Policy Statement does not constitute a rigid code,
but is the first step in an evolving policy. This policy will
constantly be re-examined in the light of experience. Re-
presentatives in each college will be working with Ms.
Rickman in a continual reassessment of the program.
We can take considerable pride in the work accomplish-
ed so far in the area of affirmative action. I am confident
that with a spirit of goodwill and cooperation we can
continue to build on the momentum which we have now
established.
POLICY STATEMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
POLICY
The University of Cincinnati reaffirms its policy that
(liscrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin or sex will not be practiced in any of its
ictivities. Furthermore, where past or present
liscrimination continues to have an adverse effect upon
members of minority groups and women, the University
vill take affirmative action to eliminate that effect.
LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES
n order to implement this policy, the University
ecognized the following objectives:
.
It is the objective of the University to utilize women
and minority group employees in all fields and on all
levels of employment in proportion to the availability
of minority group members and women in the
population of a reasonable recruitment area for each
position. Furthermore, in any case in which the
proportion of available women or minority group
members is below the percentage of women or
minority group members, respectively, in the labor
market of the recruitment area and in which the
academic preparation required for qualification is a
function of the University, the University will take
affirmative action to ensure that the number of women
and minority group members is increased substantially.
The minimum goal of each academic unit shall be to
have a percentage of women faculty equal to the
percentage of women nationally receiving the highest
regular degree in the discipline in the past five years.
2
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lvers,ty
,S cognizant of the relationship between
hrgher education in many fields in which minority
groups and women are currently under-represented
ue to the effects of past and present discrimination!
In order to help eliminate those effects, it is the
objective of the. University of Cincinnati to develop
such programs as will eventually graduate in each of its
colleges a number of women and minority groups
students which is reflective of the population of the
national and local area served by the University. This
effort must not entail any diminution of academic
standards.
3.
In all dealings with external bodies and agencies, both
public and private, the University of Cincinnati will
seek to obtain adequate assurance of current
compliance with all applicable equal employment
requirements.
If-T ?!
American Council on Education Bulletin
,
lgHer Educatl°n and National Affairs, dated Octo-
ber 6, 1972.)
c. A University procedure to resolve grievances alleging
discrimination because of race, color, religion, na-
tional origins or sex will be established. Such pro-
cedure shall not apply where an existing and exclu-
sive grievance mechanism already exists, (e.g., labor
union)
2.
The Director of Resource Development shall publish an
analysis of problem areas which satisfies the require-
ments of Revised Order No. 4. It shall include the iden-
tification of areas of under-utilization of women* and
minority group members* by job classification and or-
ganizational unit, as well as areas which have a low rate
of minority and female student enrollment and gradua-
tion.
4.
In all dealings where the University of Cincinnati is the
supplier of services and/or goods to the Federal
Government or to an agency that is federally assisted,
the University is also subject to the equal opportunity
requirements of the laws of the State of Ohio and the
United States. The term “services” as used in this
section includes, but is not limited to, the following
services: utility, construction, transportation, research,
insurance and fund depository.
(SPECIAL NOTE: A government contract, even
nominally entitled “grant” but involving a benefit to
the Federal Government, would be subject to the
Executive Order 1 1246.)
3.
a. A system shall be devised for identifying potential
applicants for employment who are women or mi-
nority group members and disseminating tins infor-
mation to the appropriate University offices.
b. A complete re-examination of the policies and pro-
cedures of the Personnel Office to assure compli-
ance with new requirements of Federal Law shall be
conducted with the assistance of the Director of
Resource Development.
c. A Commission on Affirmative Action shall be ap-
pointed by the President. This commission will have
a committee on women and a committee on minori-
ties.
5.
The University will take affirmative action to ensure
that the Equal Employment Opportunity clause now
included in all purchase orders is enforced.
. IMPLEMENTATION
1
.
The following steps shall be completed:
a. Each college dean and other comparable administra-
tive official as appropriate shall designate an affirm-
ative action coordinator who is a member of the
administrative staff or faculty of the college. Where
appropriate, the designees shall include women and
members of minority groups.
4.
a. Each college dean, vice president, vice provost and
other comparable administrative official as appropri-
ate shall carefully consider and develop goals and
timetables for the effective utilization of minorities
and women. In the formulation of these goals and
timetables, the following considerations should be
observed:
1. Goals and timetables should be determined by
considering the results which can be reasonably
expected from “putting forth every good faith
effort”** to eliminate problem areas and attain
the objectives set forth above.
b. The Director of Resource Development, with the
assistance of affirmative action coordinators and
other appropriate administrators, shall establish an
internal review, audit and reporting system which
satisfies the requirements of “Revised Order No. 4”
of the Department of Labor.
See Appendix C, a summary of the HEW Guidelines,
for Affirmative Action Plans for Higher Education
2. The unit’s goals and timetables should reflect and
be integrated into its long-range plan.
3. Goals should be significant, measurable and at-
tainable.
4. Goals should be specific for planned results with
•both categories include minority women
••Revised Order No. 4
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timetables for completion.
5. Goals should not be rigid and inflexible quotas
but should set targets that are reasonably attain-
able.
6. In establishing timetables, the anticipated ex-
pansion, contraction and turnover of employees
should be considered.
7. Goals, timetables and affirmative action commit-
ments must be designed to correct any identified
deficiency, or adequate cause for not designing a
goal must be demonstrated.
8. A unit will not be evaluated solely on the basis of
whether goals and timetables are met but also on
the extent to which it attempts, in good faith,
to meet its goals and timetables and to attain the
objectives of the University discussed above.
9. The use of goals is not intended and should not
be used to discriminate against any persons on
the basis of race, color, religion, national origin
or sex.
(For further clarification, see Appendix B for a
Statement on the Distinction between Goals and
Quotas.)
(Note: Consult Appendix A, outlining the appro-
priate responding units and the appropriate unit
from which the affirmative action coordinator
should be appointed.)
b. Departmental goals and timetables shall be submit-
ted to deans, vice presidents, vice provosts and the
Director of Resource Development for comments
and review.
Goals and timetables will be reviewed by the Presi-
dent’s Commission on Affirmative Action, which may
advise the appropriate vice president of the possible
need for strengthening the plans in a specific area
under his jurisdiction. It is expected that this will occur
infrequently and that the University’s objectives may
be reached by cooperative endeavor.
Completed goals and timetables will be publicized
widely both within the University and externally.
The status of goals, timetables and affirmative action
programs will be reviewed yearly by departments,
deans, vice presidents, vice provosts, the Director of
Resource Development and the President’s Commission
on Affirmative Action.
D. RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION
1. Vice presidents, vice provosts, department heads, direc-
tors and other line officials have the following responsi-
bilities:
a. Assisting President and Director of Resource Devel-
opment in the identification of problem areas.
b. Formulation and implementation of goals with
timetables for completion.
c. Periodic review of all personnel, purchasing, and
contracting functions to assure that University poli-
cy is being followed.
d. Ensuring that effort is made in good faith to meet
goals and timetables.
e. Eliminating salary inequities which evidence discri-
mination based on race and/or sex.
f. Persons responsible for hiring in areas in which mi-
nority group members or women are ^under-utilized
should make every reasonable effort to identify and
recruit female and minority group candidates and
should record these efforts.
g. In any case in which reappointment of a minority or
female faculty member is considered and rejected,
the appropriate academic unit will be prepared, at
the request of the affected individual, to detail the
reasons for such decision.
h. In any case in which the promotion of a minority or
female faculty member is considered within the de-
partment and/or college, but is subsequently reject-
ed, the responsible academic officer shall be pre-
pared, at the request of the affected individual, to
detail the reasons for such decision.
2. The Director of Resource Development shall have the
following responsibilities in the implementation of this
affirmative action policy:
a. Recommending policy statements, affirmative ac-
tion programs, internal and external communication
techniques.
b. Assisting the president, vice presidents, vice pro-
vosts, deans, department heads, directors and other
line officials in the identification of problem areas.
c. Assisting vice presidents, vice provosts, department
heads, directors and other line officials in arriving at
solutions to problems.
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d. Designing and implementing internal information
systems.
e. Serving as a liaison between the University and en-
forcement agencies, minority organizations, wo-
men s organizations, and community action groups
concerned with employment opportunity for mi-
norities and women.
f. Keeping the University informed on the latest devel-
opments in the affirmative action, contract compli-
ance and equal opportunity areas.
g. Developing a system for identifying potential appli-
cants for employment who are women or minority
group members and for disseminating this informa-
tion to the appropriate University offices.
h. Providing information, advice, training and support
to affirmative action coordinators.
i. With the assistance of affirmative action coordina-
tors and other appropriate administrators, establish-
ing an internal review, audit, and reporting system
which satisfies the requirements of Revised Order
No 4 of the Department of Labor.
3. Aitirmative Action Coordinators will have the fol-
lowing responsibilities:
a. Assisting in the accumulation and dissemination of
relevant information.
b. Assisting vice presidents, vice provosts, deans, de-
partment heads. Director of Resource Development,
unit directors and other line officials in the identifi-
cation of problem areas.
c. Assisting in the formulation of goals and t metables.
d. Undertaking a careful review of hiring criteria to
make certain the requirements are really necessary
* -/job performance.
e. To review hiring, retention tenure, and promotion
criteria to ensure that qualified candidates are not
excluded from consideration.
f. To define ways and means of helping to increase the
available pool of candidates.
g. To conduct periodic reviews of progress and suggest
to the vice president, vice provost, dean, department
head, director or other line official (whichever is
appropriate to each individual affirmative action co-
ordinator) possible re-evaluation or corrective ac-
tion.
h. To work with vice presidents, vice provosts, depart-
ment heads, directors and other line officials to en-
sure achievement of goals for both academic and
support staff.
APPENDIX A
Campus Units for Purpose
of Communications
Regarding Affirmative Action
Ombudsman
Deidra Hair
Resource Development
Geraldine Rickman
University Media Services
Roger Fransecky
College of Community Services
Lawrence Hawkins
College of Law
Edward Mearns
Graduate Community Planning
Kenneth Corey
Tri-County Academic Center
Richard Pulliam
Community Psych. Institute
Leonard Oseas
Institute of Environmental Health
Raymond R. Suskind
Institute of Governmental Research
W. Donald Heisel
Institute of Human Relations
Spencer A. Leiterman
Institute of Metropolitan Studies
Ralph V. Smith
Institute for Res. & Trg. in
Higher Educ.
Charles K. Bolton
Institute for Social Interaction Res.
Clovis Shepherd
Institute of Space Sciences
Ronald L. Huston
Institute for Study of United States
Foreign Policy
Dieter Dux
Institutional Studies
Tom Innis
Institute for Urban Information
Systems
Endfred J. Lundberg
College-Conservatory of Music
Jack Watson
Evening College
Frank Neuffer
Ohio College of Applied Sciences
John Spille
Office of Professional Development
Philip Marvin
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Office of the Vice Provost for
Undergraduate Studies
H. David Lipsich
Office of the Vice Provost for
Graduate Studies
Robert H. Wessel
Office of the Vice Provost for
University Branches and Community
and Technical Programs
Hilmar C. Krueger
Vice President and Provost for
Academic Affairs
Robert M. O’Neil
College of Arts and Sciences
Campbell Crockett
College of Business Administration
Albert Simone
College of Design, Architecture
and Art
Harold Rice
Summer School
Thomas Wagner
University Libraries
Robert A. Miller (Library Consultant)
College of Medicine
Clifford Grulee
College of Education and Home Economics
Hendrik Gideonse
College of Engineering
Cornelius Wandmacher
General Hospital
Rodger E. Mendenhall
Holmes Hospital
Gunnar Hage
Office of Executive Vice President
and Vice President for Business Affairs
Ralph C. Bursiek
Vice Provost of Student Affairs
William R. Nester
Vice Provost for Admissions Records
Garland G. Parker
Office of Vice President for
Public Affairs
Frank T. Purdy
College of Nursing and Health
Ruth Dalrymple
College of Pharmacy
Arthur Glasser
Raymond Walters General &
Technical College
Ernest Muntz
University College
Joseph Samuels
Office of Vice President for Research
and Development
William G. Baetz
Vice President and Director of the
Medical Center
Edward A. Gall
Otfice of the Vice President for
Special Affairs
George Rieveschl, Jr,
APPENDIX B
Statement on the Distinction
Between Goals and Quotas
by
J. Stanley Pottinger
Director of HEW’s Office for Civil Rights
The Office for Civil Rights in the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare is aware of increasing concern that
HEW is requiring quotas for the hiring of women and minori-
ties at colleges and universities. We wish to reassure those
who are concerned, in the strongest possible terms, that we
are not requiring quotas. Indeed, we abhor them: many of
the members of this office have themselves been the victims
of racial, ethnic or sex quotas in the past.
Colleges and universities holding Federal contracts are
subject to Executive Order 11246, as amended, which re-
quires affirmative action to overcome and prevent employ-
ment discrimination based on race, color, national origin,
religion or sex. Regulations under the executive order issued
by the Department of Labor require, among other things,
that contractors establish goals and timetables for hiring and
promotion of women and minorities.
Goals are not quotas, and the difference is not a matter of
semantics. Each word has a specific and different meaning in
the field of employment compliance.
Quotas, on the one hand, are numerical levels of employ-
ment that must be met if the employer is not to be found in
violation of the law. They are rigid requirements and their
effect is to compel employment decisions to fultill them,
regardless of qualifications, regardless of a good taith ettort
to fulfill them and regardless of the availability of capable
applicants.
Goals, on the other hand, signify a different concept and
employment practice. If, for example, an institution has been
deficient in training, upgrading, promoting, or otherwise
treating employees without regard to race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, goals are projected levels ot hiring
that say what an employer can do if he really tries. By estab-
lishing goals, the employer commits himself to a good taith
effort that is most likely to produce results.
Unlike quotas, goals are not the sole or even the primary
measurement of a university’s compliance. Good taith e t torts
remain the standard set by Executive Order 1 1246; goals are
a barometer of good faith performance. If a university tails
428short of its goals that in itself does not result in noncompli-
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The guidelines^ deal in particular with affirmative action planshich are required as evidence of nondiscrimination. These plans aredefined in the guidelines as follows:
“Affirmative action requires the contractor to do more than
ensure employment neutrality with regard to race, color, religion sex
and national origin. As the phrase implies, affirmative action requires
the employer to make additional efforts to recruit, employ andpromote qualified members of groups formerly excluded, even if that
exclusion cannot be traced to particular discriminatory actions on the
part of the employer. The premise of the affirmative action concept
o the executive order is that unless positive action is undertaken to
overcome the effects of systematic institutional forms of exclusion
and discrimination, a benign neutrality in employment practices will
tend to perpetuate the status quo ante indefinitely.”
At present, private institutions are required to maintain written
affirmative action plans, while public institutions are not. The public
institutions, nevertheless, are required to take affirmative action to
ensure nondiscrimination. In this connection, the Labor Department
announced in the Federal Register Oct. 4 that it intends to amend its
regulations to require public institutions, as well as private ones, to
have written plans. (The Labor Department is responsible for
enforcing the executive order barring discrimination in employment
but has delegated this authority, as far as higher education is
concerned, to HEW.) The Labor Department asked interested parties
to file comments within 30 days.
J. Stanley Pottinger, director of HEW’s Office for Civil Rights,
emphasized at a news conference that the guidelines, in preparation
for more than a year, do not represent new rules, regulations or laws,
but articulate existing rules and regulations as they apply specifically
to higher education institutions. He said the academic community
warranted special guidelines because its administration is more
diffused than in the commercial and business community.
Pottinger announced that an advisory committee to the Office for
Civil Rights will be appointed soon to see that the guidelines continue
to provide colleges and universities with necessary direction and
assistance. He also said his office will name an “ombudsman” to serve
as a trouble-shooter on complaints.
The guidelines require goals and timetables for achieving
non-discrimination as part of affirmative action plans, but state that
rigid quotas are neither required nor permitted. The guidelines define
kgoals as “projected levels of achievement resulting from an analysis by
the contractor of its deficiencies, and of what it can reasonably do to
remedy them, given the availability of qualified minorities and
women and the expected turnover in its work force.”
The guidelines further state that “the affirmative action concept
idoes not require that a university employ or promote any persons
who are unqualified. The concept does require, however, that any
standards or criteria which have had the effect of excluding women
and minorities be eliminated, unless the contractor can demonstrate
that such criteria are conditions of successful performance in the
particular position involved.”
Copies of the 17-page guidelines are being sent to presidents of all
follcges and universities holding Federal contracts. Additional copies
ire available from the Office for Civil Rights in regional HEW offices
»r from: Public Information Office, Office for Civil Rights,
department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Washington, D.C.
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Recru.tment-ln both academic and nonacademic areas
universities must recruit women and minority persons as actively asthey have recruited white males.
U nondiscri^na.ory applicant pool has been
established through recruitment, the process ot selection from thatpool must also carefully follow procedures des.gned to ensure
nondiscrimination. In all cases, standards and criteria lor
employment should be made reasonably explicit, and should he
accessible to all employees and applicants.
Anti-nepotism Policies- Policies or practices which prohibit orhunt the simultaneous employment of two members of the same
amily and which have an adverse impact upon one se\ or the other
are in violation ot the Executive Order.
Placement, Job Classification, and Assignment Where there are no
va id or substantial differences in duties or qualifications between
ditterent job classifications, and where persons in the classifications
are segregated by race, color, religion, sex or national origin, those
separate classifications must be eliminated or merged.
Promotion
-A contractor’s policies and practices on promotion
should be made reasonably explicit, and administered lo ensure that
women and minorities are not at a disadvantage.
Termination-Where action to terminate has a disproportionate
ettect upon women or minorities and the employer is unable to
demonstrate reasons tor the decision to terminate unrelated to race,
religion, color, national origin or sex, such actions arc discriminatory
Conditions of Work—A university employer must ensure
non-discrimination in all terms and conditions ol employment,
including work assignments, educational and training opportunities,
research opportunities, use ot facilities, and opportunities to serve on
committees or decision-making bodies.
Rights and Benefits-Salary-The Executive Order requires that
universities adhere carelully to the concept ot equal [ray lor equal
work
. . . Evidence of discrimination that would require back pay as a
remedy will be reterred to the appropriate Federal enforcement
agency if the Office tor Civil Rights is not able to negotiate a volun-
tary settlement with a university.
Leave Policies-A university contractor must not discriminate
against employees in its leave policies, including paid and unpaid leave
for educational or professional purposes, sick leave, annual leave, tem-
porary disability, and leave for purposes of personal necessity
Pregnancy and childbearing must be considered as a justification ol a
leave of absence for a female employee regardless of marital status,
for a reasonable length of time, and for reinstatement following child-
birth without loss of seniority or accrued benefits.
Fringe Benefits-The university should carefully examine its fringe
benefit programs for possible discriminatory effects. Lor example, it
it unlawful for an employer to establish a retirement or pension plan
which establishes different optional or mandatory retirement ages for
men and for women.
The Office for Civil Rights said it will refer individual complaints
of discrimination to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
which, under a 1972 law, has authority to investigate individual
complaints of discrimination against academic as well as nonacademic
employees of higher education institutions. The OCR will continue to
investigate class complaints, groups of individual complaints or other
information “which indicates possible institutional patterns of
discrimination.”
The OCR urged colleges and universities to make public their
affirmative action plans, and notified them that plans which it accepts
are subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.
APPENDIX E
1. All statistical data for academic full-time employees of the
University is based on data for 9/1/71 and 9/1/72. It was not
possible to go further back in time to obtain comparative data
since the University record system was not full developed in
1970. Information for 9/1/73 will be contained in the six-
month update.
2. Comprehensive analyses of over /underutilization of minorities
and women are not necessary in light of the statistical informa-
tion contained in this report. Several things are evident on
their face:
a. Minorities are grossly underutilized in every category of
employment except service workers [see EEO-1 reports] .
b. Black females are concentrated [ 77 %] in two occupational
categories: Office and Clerical and Service Workers.
c. Black males are concentrated [73%] in two categories:
Professional and service workers.
d. White females are concentrated in two categories: [over 60%
]
Professional and Office and Clerical.
3. In the academic ranks, the following must be considered:
a. As of 9/1/72, black full-time faculty constituted 2.7% of
the total faculty [19 black males, 18 black females].
b. As of 9/1/72, white female full-time faculty constituted
18.9% of the total full-time faculty [257 white females].
c. As of 9/1/72, white males constituted 75.5% of the total
full-time faculty [1028 white males]
.
4. In the student ranks, the following must be considered:
a. Out of a total student enrollment [full- and part-time] as of
February 5, 1973: [Enrollment = 36,133]
1) 8.0% or 2902 were black [male and female]
2) 82.0% or 29,618 were white [male and female]
3) 10.0% were ’’other", including foreign students.
b. White women constitute 29.9% of total student enrollment
Black women constitute 4.2% of total student enrollment
Black men constitute 3.8% of total student enrollment
White men constitute 52.1% of total student enrollment
Others [includes American Indians, orientals, Spanish Surname
and foreign students] = 10% of total student enrollment.
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c * women constitute 37.8% of total student enrollment
[full and part-time] [13,640 out of total of 36,133]
All men constitute 62.2% of total student enrollment
[22,493 out of total of 36,133]
• Professional school enrollment [law, pharmacy, medicine, nursing
and health]
.
Out of 871 graduate students in these four colleges:
-40 are black, of whom 9 are black females [ 4.6%]
-135 are white female [15.5%]
APPENDIX F
THE BUDGET-REVIEW/RESOURCE ALLOCATION
PROCESS: A CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY
February 18, 1972
A Presidential assistant to the vice presidents, vice provosts
and chairmen of the governance groups’ Budget and Priorities Committees
(cc: Bennis)
. "The inescapable circumstance of criticallv inadequate
fiscal resources in a period of both change and uncertainty necessitates
an allocation process which focuses upon University-wide priorities and
allocation criteria." This memorandum proposes a budgetary decision
process beginning at the unit level as well as criteria for priorities.
"The extent to which a budget is approved should depend in part on the
thoroughness with which the analysis is presented. More importantly is
the consonance of unit priorities with college, area, and University
priorities, as judged in the process of successive reviews."
Commentary: This memorandum was discussed at
a meeting February 22, 1972. It is representa-
tive of other memoranda all of which assume a
participatory budget process in 1973-74 involving
program evaluation in light of University-wide
priorities
.
May 17, 1972
Correspondence, the President to the Budget and Finance Committee
of the Board of Directors re: Achieving a balanced budget for the Uni-
versity of Cincinnati. "Because the only substantial flexibility the
University possesses in this area [of the budget] relates to years after
1972-73 any plan designed to meet current critical needs should focus
on that period and not on the present." The President documents and
explains the factors contributing to an inevitable imbalance in the
1972-73 operating budget - as a result of legislative actions, the
absence of critical and rational resource allocation decisions during
the late 60’ s, uncontrollable inflationary increases, a
critical nee
to increase the level of support for the University Library,
and t e
inflexibility of a major component of the operating budget - aca emic
salaries. The President outlines an approach to the 1973-74
budget
using departmental and college data presently available:
it would
entail an item by item review of all college and departmental
budgets,
a more systematic and tightly controlled promotion
and tenure process
a task-analysis review by an outside consulting
firm, m sum,
review of flexible budget items. The President says
with the£>,: booming
long range plan some priority reallocation may be
possible.
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recommends a review of the administrative structure, a review of areaswhere there is duplication or competition, and the possibility oflarger classes and increased teaching loads. He reprints an articlefrom the Chronicle of Higher Education "Finding New Dollars in OldBudgets" for the Board.
September 8, 1972
Financial summary of the University of Cincinnati for 1971-72
is discussed at the meeting of the Board of Directors (in December,
1971, when the State Legislature passed the appropriation bill, the
University of Cincinnati did not receive 1.5 million dollars it had
expected in State subsidy; in addition, there were fewer graduate
and part-time enrollments than had been anticipated and consequently
reduced student fee income). One-half million dollars was borrowed
r
rom reserves to cover expenditures. A report on the 1972-73 budget
is also discussed at this meeting for which a 1.4 million dollar
deficit is projected.
September 15, 1972
Correspondence, the Vice President for Business to the President
and all vice presidents - projected income and expenditures for 1972-
73, 1973-74, and 1974-75.
September 16, 1972
Vice presidents’ meeting with the President. With a 4-7 million
dollar debt projected, the vice presidents recommend several strategies:
1) non-reappointments, 2) early retirement, 3) increasing faculty
teaching loads, and 4) program evaluation. By October 15 the Provost
and the Vice President of the Medical Center will submit a list of weak,
non-urban oriented departments, including intercollegiate athletics.
After 10/15 Bennis will appoint a faculty committee to advise the
President on recommended budget cuts.
September 20, 1972
Report, the President to the Board of Directors at their informal
meeting. The President reviews budget problems and says that he has
asked the Provost and the Vice President of the Medical College to make
up a list of programs in priority order with the idea of eliminating
marginal problems.
Late September 1972
A Washington office is opened to provide information on various
sources of federal support for research, training, and special projects
and to provide information on new trends in federal funding for University
programs. The office will also serve as the University’s liaison to
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educational associations, governmental agencies, and east-coast
alumni
.
October 3, 1972
Vice presidents’ meeting with the President - Discussion of using
the President’s October 31st faculty speech to make a maior presenta-
tion on the budget to the faculty.
October 3, 1972
The President discusses the financial situation with the University
Board of Directors - he projects additional expenditures beyond the con-
tinuation budget of 1973-74. It is announced that the University has
opened a Washington office to develop funding possibilities. Bennis'
three part budget strategy is 1) to develop new sources of income:
2) to study all activities and expenditures for more effective resource
allocations; and 3) to reevaluate priorities and programs.
October 4, 1972
The President in a meeting with his assistants savs he lacks
control over the budget. He controls less than two percent of budget
and is accountable for all of it.
October 9, 1972
Correspondence from the Provost to a department head reveals that
there is some resistance among department heads about across-the-board
cutting when departmental profiles, enrollment projections, and external
pressures vary from department to department.
October 13, 1972
Vice presidents’ meeting to share priority ratings of commitments
in their areas and to formulate priority ratings for the University
budget - those items are designated A, B, C, D. The President is
copied with a summary of the meeting. On the same day the President
requests the percentages of "faculty with tenure" by department since
1965.
October 20, 1972
Assistants’ meeting with the President - they share with
him
the vice presidents' decision to ask all areas to project cuts
of 6
percent for 1973-74.
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October 24, 1972
Vice presidents’ meeting without the President to decide
on a decision-making process for the 1973-74 budget. The vice
presidents are concerned about how PPBS will interrelate to their
budget decisions. It is recommended that the PPBS committee work
closely with the vice presidents on a cost-analysis of urograms
and on developing departmental profiles. They agree that a manage-
ment information system is needed so that informed program cuts can
be made: there are references to the President's wanting a olanning-
programming-budgeting system. The Provost recommends that the vice
presidents modify the PPBS program evaluation guidelines.
October 24, 1972
Meeting between the President, Provost, and Vice President of
the Medical Center - Bennis says he wants all vice presidents to use
the 6-9% budget cutting procedure including the Vice President of the
Medical Center. The Vice President of the Medical Center argues that
it needs to be treated differently than other colleges and departments.
October 25, 1972
The President appoints a Commission to evaluate the inter-
collegiate athletic program at the University of Cincinnati in light
of institutional priorities and resources.
October 27, 1972
The President meets with the deans - The President says he
doesn't want to say much about the budget but announces: 1) that it
will reflect the University priorities; 2) that all colleges will be
asked to review programs but that there will be no across-the-board
cutting; 3) that academic programs will have priority over non-academic
programs; and 4) that on November 14 there will be a presentation on
the budget for the entire campus.
October 30, 1972
The PBBS committee proposes a list of budget assumptions for
1972-73 and a timetable for budget decisions for discussion at the
10/21 vice presidents’ meeting.
October 31, 1972
Vice presidents' meeting with the President - Bennis gives credence
to all units' doing 6-9% projections but listens to reasons why the
Medical Center should be an exception since programs with general
funds
support are the ones without external sources of support.
The programs
with University support are educational and service programs.
A decision
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is not made as to whether the Medical Center should be treated as an
exception. The President and the vice presidents review the PPBS
budget assumptions. The President says that there are no incentives
for faculty members in the University to cut costs or to go out and
secure additional funding. In fact there are counter incentives built
in - departments which overspend are not penalized, and peonle who
stay within their budgets lose the balance of unsoent monies on
June 30th each year.
October 31, 1972
Bennis' speech to the University faculty - The President tries
to set a perspective for the critical budget situation the University
and all institutions of higher education face as a result of infla-
tionary costs, unprecedented growth in the 60' s, declining enrollments,
etc. "The situation is bad, and could get worse. It is clear that
budget reductions are required." He explains what each of the vice
presidents is doing to review the budget and to identify possible 6-9%
cuts. He assures the faculty that under no circumstances will there
be indiscriminate across-the-board cutting. Furthermore, the budget
review process is related to PPBS and to the need for program evalua-
tion, "which will require the active cooperation and initiative of
participants in each program." "I will look first to the non-academic
programs for budget cuts, improvements in efficiency, and reductions
in staff. My office and those of the vice presidents will be the first
to begin the process of self-evaluation and serious cost-cutting."
Bennis documents the efforts he and others are making to develop new
sources of income through the Development Office, the Regents, the
Legislature and the Governor. In addition, the President announces
the slide presentation on the budget scheduled for November 14. "I
will expect the University Senate and the Faculty Senate to participate
again in the process leading to the difficult decisions that will be
necessary this year." At the end of the meeting two resolutions are
passed calling for no tenured positions to be eliminated in coping
with the financial needs of the University and that automatic cost-of-
living increases be allocated annually.
October 31, 1972
Correspondence, the President to the vice presidents. I am
asking each of you to design processes of program evaluation, including
cost analysis and the assessment of quality, which can be used for
arriving at rational decisions for the 1974-75 budget." The President
sends them the AAUP Guidelines on Financial Exigency and the University
of Illinois Program Evaluation Report. "Your proposals for a
process
of program evaluation should include recommendations on methods
for
gaining legitimization of the process. The AAUP Guidelines call
for
early faculty involvement. There should be similar involvement
o
middle-level administrative personnel in decisions relating to non-
academic programs. I hope that faculty members and other members
of
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the campus community will be able to see the results of their own
efforts and see the value of critical and careful analysis." The
resident lists some questions having to do with program evaluation
and asks the vice presidents to submit a suggestion for a deadline
for their proposals, for their eventual recommendations, and for
the time when he should announce major program cuts and/or program
eliminations. "It will be necessary to design a mechanism for the
involvement of others in my process of reaching decisions on your
recommendations. This might involve a joint University Senate-
Faculty Senate Committee, or a Presidential task force, or other
devices you might propose. What suggestions do you have?"
November 1, 1972
The President holds a news conference on the budget because the
press had misunderstood and misrepresented some of the figures that
had been given in his 10/31 faculty speech. Candid Campus reprints
Bennis' speech.
November 7, 1972
Vice presidents’ meeting on the budget without the President -
The vice presidents discuss the budget guidelines, the timetable for
the University and Faculty Senates' review, and the Provost's decision
to use an advisory budget review commission in his area in reviewing
the deans’ 6-9% budget presentations. Some of the vice presidents
raise objections to using representative commissions to review budget
decisions. The vice presidents agree to prioritize budget cuts among
themselves before submitting a proposed budget recommendation to the
governance committees. The Provost sees that the President will have
to be firm with the Senates in saying that nn recommendations will be
accepted from them unless it is within continuation budget minus the
four million dollar deficit; and that no cost of living increases will
be accepted unless monies can be located. It is decided that cuts in
1972-73 will come from unused appropriations in each vice presidential
area.
November 8, 1972
The Presidents' report to the University of Cincinnati Board
of Directors - "Each academic dean has been asked to develop options
by which reductions can be made over a three-year period. The
President links deficit budgeting to the need to work more closely
and share resources with other institutions of higher education.
He announces a consortia agreement with a neighboring private college.
He also announces a new corporate fund drive through the Development
Office and the appointment of a new Vice President for Management
and Finance.
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November 9, 1972
The President speaks to the Faculty Senate about the budget
review process and decision-making in his administration in generalAfter the President leaves the meeting the Senators question one ofhis assistants further on increased administrative costs - such asthe costs for a new vice president - and on faculty involvement indecision-making.
November 11, 1972
Correspondence, a faculty member to the President - arguing
that the assumptions behind certain budget decisions need to be
shared with the faculty.
November 15, 1972
The Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences to the President -
sending him a copy of a letter from the Chairman of the English Depart-
ment - which describes "an atmosphere of continuous uncertainty and
despair.
. .We do not need a new budget commission, or yet more
participation in the decision-making process. Nor do we need more
long range planning uncertainty and short term chaos. I personally
am increasingly exhausted and frustrated," he writes.
November 15, 1972
Candid Campus Story on "Vital Budget Briefings Announced" for
November 21 and 22. The President is quoted as saying, "I think this
is perhaps the most vital thing we have to discuss in the weeks ahead.
Given the present financial circumstances, the next two to three years
will be most significant for our own and all universities. . .we can
use the period ahead as an opportunity to improve our education and
our research aims. The outcome will be partly dependent on the commit-
ment of the faculty and administration to work together. This collabora-
tion will depend on all of us acquainting ourselves with relevant in-
formation. I am determined that we disseminate as much information as
possible on this subject, even if it requires a dozen meetings. Once
acquainted with the facts, I hope that our faculty and administrative
staff will generate some of the imaginative ideas that will be required
to deal with our financial condition."
November 20, 1972
Correspondence, the Provost to the President - the letter contains
a series of answers to recurrent questions on the budget. The President
reviews the list of questions and answers and pencils in other arguments.
The questions asked most frequently include the following:
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1) Why do some colleges receive smaller allocations than they earnthrough subsidy and tuition?
2) Why is the administration asking each college to reduce its budgetby the same amount when actual needs, enrollments, quality, etc
vary greatly?
3) How can the University begin such serious financial trouble when
the receipt of 9 - 1/2 million in grants and contracts was recently
announced?
4) Why can’t the University use reserves to balance the budget as it
has done in the past?
5) Are non-tenured faculty positions being eliminated in order to
meet the projected deficit?
6) Is the University making vigorous efforts to increase income?
7) Has any decision been made about salary increases for 1973-74?
8) How heavily does the University subsidize intercollegiate athletics
and how long will that subsidy continue?
9) How much has the budget for the administration increased in the
past few years?
10) If income will increase for 1973-74 then why are academic areas being
asked to plan reductions?
11) Does the commitment to build a major urban university mean deemphasis
of research, scholarship and graduate education?
November 21, 22, 1972
Graphic-slide Budget Presentations to the faculty. A 4.6 million
dollar deficit is projected if the University of Cincinnati pays back
its loan, absorbs new expenditures, and fulfills its commitments to
Colleges, etc. The projection is based on the assumption of no signifi-
cant increase in income from either enrollment, the city, or State.
The Provost outlines what the University is doing through the Develop-
ment Office, through lobbying at the State level, etc. He then outlines
the budget process in which each vice president is asking the deans of
colleges and unit directors to indicate the implications/consequences
of 6-9% cuts in their budgets - so that in the end priority decisions
can be made between colleges. In the question and answer period the
Provost emphasizes the use of rational criteria in cutting and expanding
programs
.
November 22, 1972
Correspondence, the Provost to the President re: the President s
10/31 letter. (The President copies all the vice presidents and Presi-
dential assistants.) The Provost outlines the budget review process
that will be followed in his area. His advisory commission will have
quantitative input from college and departmental profiles, college-by
college profit and loss figures, statewide comparisons for many depart-
ments, and other statistical material. However, he writes The long
range planning task force is still some distance from generating^ the
kinds of qualitative inputs which would best serve this process. The
Provost also recommends involving the University and Faculty Senates
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In the budget-review process as soon as possible. In the final section
o his letter he says that neither total elimination of programs nor
even severe reductions of any institutional programs are possible for
November 29, 1972
Candid Campus Story - ''University of Cincinnati's Financial
Dilemma Outlined."
November 30, 1972
Vice presidents’ meeting with the President. The Provost
explains why he has shifted his budget hearings back to January;
the President puts pressure on the Vice President of the Medical
Center to find out more about Medical College budgeting: he dis-
cusses the alternatives he’s been considering in several cases
where administrative appointments are no longer needed and the
individual may or may not return to teaching; above all the
President says he wants to avoid ad hoc budget decisions.
December 1, 1972
AAUP resolution on faculty participation in the decision process
- they urge that each dean submit a statement describing the nature and
extent of faculty participation in his college. Both the Provost and
the President respond to assure their commitment to faculty involvement
throughout the entire budget-making process.
December 1, 1972
The Provost shares his commission's proposed criteria for the
evaluation of the deans' 1973-74 budget proposals.
December 4, 1972
The President meets with the Provost on the budget.
December 6, 1972
Candid Campus column on "Budget Questions and Answers."
December 8, 1972
Candid Campus article "Bennis addresses the Board on State Funding
and column on "Budget Questions and Answers."
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December 19, 1972
Correspondence, the President to the Vice President for Business
Administration - asking him to develop a review process whereby academicdeans might review the budgets of non-academic areas (service and support
areas)
.
January 2, 1973
Correspondence, a dean to the President, on how Bennis' use of
ad hoc committees maximizes and duplicates work.
January 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 1973
Deans' budget presentations to the Provost's review commission.
There is relatively little debate on the recommendations: the Provost
sees that budget decisions will stalemate at the vice presidential level.
January 9, 1973
Vice presidents' meeting with the President - the vice presidents
discuss the deans' proposal to review the costs of administrative ser-
vices charged to the units. The President wants the deans to meet with
the Vice President for Management and Finance and wants a dean appointed
to each vice presidential review commission. Other budget questions
such as the remission of tuition to city employees and the overhead
policy on research grants are discussed.
January 11, 1973
The President meets with the Provost on the budget.
January 11, 1973
The President at Faculty Senate Meeting reports on his activities
in Columbus with the Governor and the Legislature. The Faculty Senate
Budget and Priorities Committee criticizes the Provost's marathon budget
review session.
January 23, 1973
Vice presidents' meeting with the President to review the budget
timetable from the PPBS committee. The President says that he still
doesn't have information on program cuts. "I don't have any idea of
your laundry list of cuts." (See 10/31/72.) The President says that
he doesn't want to be in a position to have to reconcile the University
Senate's and Faculty Senate’s plans; he wants to avoid that crossfire
and have the vice presidents instead reconcile the Senates proposals.
441
January 24, 1973
Candid Campus Story in which cuts in administrative spending
are pledged.
January 31
,
1973
Vice presidents’ meeting with the President. Bennis says he
wants a flow chart of the budget-review process published with a
narrative explanation of each step attached. One vice president
says that he sees Bennis as reluctant to delegate authority/responsibility
for decision-making and that maybe there is too much participation
in the budget-review process planned. The vice presidents' roles
in the decision-making process in regards to the budget seems con-
flictful - are their recommendations going to the Senates individually
or in concert and then how will the vice presidents’ recommendations
be reconciled with governance groups recommendations in the next step
of the process (see 1/23/73). Among the vice presidents there seems
to be disagreement about what constitutes communication and what
constitutes participation and which is needed. The President is
arguing for communication. He says he is willing to make "tough cuts"
on a program basis since there will never be any consensus in the
University as to which programs should be cut. However those decisions
still have to be based on program evaluation criteria which he has not
seen developed. A decision is made to appoint an ad hoc group to
assemble and review the data on certain "weak" departments.
January 31, 1973
Candid Campus Story on Nixon’s Budget and the University.
February 1, 1973
PPBS committee’s revised draft of the 1973-74 budget assumptions
and timetable. A narrative for each step in the process is appended.
February 2, 1973
The Provost briefs the deans on the budget-review process. The
deans, he says, will have the authority to make cuts in their own areas
with guidance from the President and vice presidents.
February 2, 1973
Correspondence, the President to his ad hoc advisory group. He
appoints this group as a small advisory task force to help him in
pre-
paring the kinds of questions and discriminations that will be
necessary
in preparing 1973-74 budget. "Additionally, he hopes this
group will
^
help him be in a position to make programmatic reductions by
1974 /b.
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February 2, 1973
The Provost's Report - Dealing with a Deficit Future - a
Preliminary Report on the Budget Review Process for 1973-74
. The
Provost's budget review commission decided to review only one year
of the biennium budget at a time (contrary to the President's
expectations). A special case for the academic sector is also
presented; a number of specific recommendations are included at
the end of this report. They include:
"1) We urge the prompt development of a management -informat ion
system that will ask a wider range of questions about units
and provide more detailed answers.
2) We need comparative data from comparable institutions.
3) We need a closer relationship between budgeting and long range
planning than was possible this year simply because a plan was
not complete.
4) We need a mechanism for regular program evaluation.
5) We need greater incentives for savings and cost reductions.
6) We need greater control by instructional units over supporting
services
.
7) We need to develop and use lower cost instructional services.
8) We need a mechanism for authorizing the filling of academic
and non-academic positions."
These recommendations among others for specific unit allocations
comprised the Provost’s budget document.
February 6, 1973
Statement to the University Board of Directors - on the need
for more support for higher education from the State.
February 6, 1973
At the President's Advisory Council meeting a question is raised
about how program evaluation criteria will be part of the budget process
this year. The consensus seems to be that it is unrealistic to expect
program evaluation as part of this year's budgetary process. The
President however underscores the need to decentralize administrative
services
.
February 7, 1973
Candid Campus Story in which the President again explains the
University's specific financial problems. He says, "University
presidents must take some responsibility for the lack of public un
er “
standing about the needs of higher education and that I am
100 percen
in favor of this kind of budget review process, painful
and frustrating
as it is."
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February 8, 1973
The Faculty Senate passes a resolution calling for an auto-
matic three percent cost-of-living salary supplement, recommends a
freeze on hiring, and discusses the costs of the intercollegiate
football program.
February 9, 1973
Vice presidents’ meeting without the President on the budget -
they decide to ask the Vice President for Management and Finance to
review each vice president’s budget individually to come up with a
format expressing costs and revenues that is comparable for each
vice presidential area.
February 13, 1973
Vice presidential budget review - an all day meeting. The income
assumptions are reviewed and a balanced budget is projected with a six
percent reduction in general fund expenditures if no salary raises are
awarded. The governance groups will be asked to identify where salary
increases can come from in the budget. The Vice President for Manage-
ment and Finance announces that the University did not borrow on its
reserves in 1972-73. Each of the vice presidents presents budget-cut
recommendations in their own areas.
February 14, 1973
Candid Campus Story on a "Report from Columbus."
February 14, 1973
Correspondence, the President to the Vice President for Manage-
ment and Finance. The President is counting on the Vice President to
help him with an overall look at the budget. He asks again about
publication of the budget process timetable in Candid Campus.
February 15, 1973
The Vice presidents and Presidential assistants meet to review
the budget without the President. The President’s office budget has
not been reviewed and it is decided it would be important to model a
six percent cut there. The vice presidents agree that they will need
to announce that they are not cutting programmatically this year.
February 16, 1973
The Council of Vice Presidents’ Budget Recommendations are
prepared. In a cover letter the Vice President for Management
and
Finance urges the broadest possible input from faculty, students,
a
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governance leaders to the President for the development of his final
recommendations to the Board of Directors. The vice presidents’
recommendations do not provide funds for salary and wage increasesin 1973-74. This document is not distributed until early March.
February 17, 1973
The President meets with the Vice President for Management and
Finance on the budget.
February 20, 1973
Vice presidents’ meeting with the President - Bennis urges the
Vice President for Management and Finance to get the budget review
process published as soon as possible. The Vice President reports
that a disagreement between the Senates on whether or not to hold
joint hearings is delaying the publication. The President has eight
pages of questions on the budget for the Vice President and his ad
hoc advisory group.
February 21, 1973
Correspondence, the President to his ad hoc advisory group - A
list of questions that he feels need to be answered and materials he
needs before final decisions can be made on the 1973-74 budget is
requested. They include 1) costing out the reorganization; 2) a
program-by-program description of costs in the media centers; 3) the
costs for developing a management information system; 4) a program
budget from Student Affairs; 5) administrative costs in the Provost's
office, in the deans’ offices, and in the Athletic Department; 6) the
amount and percentage of external funds brought in and/or expended by
each unit; 7) a department-by-department analysis of expenditures in
Arts and Sciences and Design, Art, and Architecture; 8) a long range
plan; 9) a summary of monies spent by Institutional Studies and the
institutes; 10) an explanation of certain academic programs’ functions
and 11) additional cuts in the President’s contingency fund and in the
President’s office, etc. ’’What I am most disappointed in, frankly, is
that we have not received, as requested, program evaluations from all
the units on our campus. I realize that all the talking I have done
has gotten us virtually nowhere. We must figure out a way to do this,
provide help to those units who do not know how to do this, and to
make certain that we get program budgeting, evaluation, and cost
analysis as soon as possible. I’m relying on you [the Vice President
for Management and Finance] to develop the mechanism for this and on
you [the Executive Vice President] to implement this.
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February 26, 1973
Correspondence, the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences
to the President. He complains, "The budget process takes too long(9-12 months) and decisions that are reached in March used to be
reached in November or December." The Provost responds for the
President 4/10/73.
February 27, 1973
Advisory group meeting without the President to review the budget.
The Vice President for Management and Finance pronoses that the budget
document be sent to the Senates without money for salary increases
identified but with the statement that salary increases are a priority
if more money can be found. It is decided not to announce that there
is no 1972-73 deficit and that there has been no borrowing.
February 29, 1973
Correspondence, the Deans of Arts and Sciences to the Provost
describing the impossibility and frustration he feels at the prospect
of cutting departmental budgets or instructorships in Arts and Sciences.
He calls it a "corrosive process."
March 1, 1973
Correspondence, the Executive Vice President to the President -
Re: the recommendations of the ad hoc budgetgroup. The group requests
the President ask the Provost to detail certain line item budget items
and that he ask the University Senate to develop qualitative criteria
for program evaluation. Other actions recommended at a later date
involve the use of external consultants.
March 1, 1973
Ad hoc budget advisory group meeting with the President. The
group discusses the timing of the President's interventions in the
budget-making process - definitely not before the governance groups'
review. They then review priority items the ad hoc group had identi-
fied. The President says he wants program reviews of weak departments
in all vice presidential areas - which the Vice President for Manage-
ment and Finance says is impossible because qualitative criteria have
not been developed. The President also wants to know how much (what
percentage) of the Provost’s costs are non-instructional , non-academic
vs. academic, instructional.
March 2, 1973
Correspondence, the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences to
the President, re: the climate in his College because of
two consecutive
years of budget cuts and the uncertainty about filling open
positions.
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March 5, 1973
The Council of Vice Presidents’ Summary Budget Recommendations
to the President shows a balanced budget five percent below that of a
continuation budget. This document is sent to both the governance
groups' Budget and Priorities Committees.
March 5, 1973
Special edition of Candid Campus on the deliberations in the
Legislature on the higher education part of the State budget. The
President asks everyone in the University community to become involved
.
There is a chronological summary of Bennis’ lobbying activities. In
addition the University’s Washington office reports that the University
of Cincinnati could lose up to sixty externally-funded Programs.
March 8, 1973
University Senate meeting to compare the vice presidents' recom-
mendations with the Advisory Commissions’ recommendations (see January
4-10).
March 8, 1973
Correspondence > the Provost to the President briefing him for his
meeting with the Dean of Arts and Sciences on the budget. "The College
of Arts and Sciences has presented no schedule of priorities at any time.
No attempt was made at the College level to differentiate between depart-
ments in terms of either ability or desirability of making such cuts."
The Provost also documents workload and secretarial service inequities
in the College and reviews the recommendations he made about Arts and
Sciences in February.
March 9, 1973
The President meets with the Arts and Sciences department heads.
March 9, 1973
The Provost’s meeting with the deans at which he shares his 2/2/73
budget document with them for the first time minus the 15 pages detailing
specific unit recommendations (see 3/16/73). The deans are concerned
about how they can make input into the budget-review process.
March 13, 1973
Vice presidents’ meeting without the President on the budget
the Provost remarks that because the budget process is late and has gone
slowly it cuts down on the possibility of filling open positions but
it
also cuts down on a unit's flexibilitv to make recommended cuts.
March 14, 1973
Correspondence, the President to the Vice President for Manage-
ment and Finance. "In order to prepare ourselves for urogram evaluation
that we will have to do on receiving the final budgets, will someone dig
up the following information for me for the last five years: 1) Percentage
of tenured faculty per college, per department since 1968; 2) the number
of faculty increases per college, ner department - in persons and dollars
expended; 3) percentage increase in costs for union employee, non-salaried
employees, staff, and faculty: 4) percentages spent on instructional
costs since 1968; 5) percentages spent on administrative costs since
1968; 6) a breakdown of costs in each of the vice presidential areas
since 1968, in order to identify trends and those sectors which have
been the most inflationary and most expansionary."
The information on increases in tenured faculty and general expenses
is available by 3/26/73 and is handed out to the President’s ad hoc budget
group 4/5/73.
March 14, 1973
Correspondence, a dean to the President, re: suggestions for
further budget cuts in non-institutional areas. "The nriorities have
not yet been stated so that each of us can know where we are and within
what frame of reference we can expect to work for a little while."
March 14, 1^73
Candid Campus Story on the President's testimony before the House
and Senate.
March 14, 1973
Arts and Sciences College emergency faculty meeting on the budget.
March 15, 1973
Correspondence, the Vice Provost for Student Affairs to the
President and the Provost protesting the arbitrary additional cuts
in
his area that the Council of Vice Presidents recommended.
March 16, 1973
Correspondence, the Dean of Education to the Provost, re:
the
rationale behind the recommendations in the Provost s area
-
protesting
the fact that the Provost’s analysis of allocations to
t e m vi u
units was not shared with the deans.
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Week of March 9, 1973
Faculty Senate Budget and Priorities Committee meetings.
University Senate Budget hearings to discuss information boot-legged into the Committee on the discrepancies betweeu the Provost's
recommendations and the Advisory Commission’s recommendations (see
January, 1973).
March 21, 1973
Correspondence, the Dean of the College Conservatory of Music
to the President - protesting the proposed budget cuts in his area.
The College Conservatory of Music Faculty later passes a resolution
in support of his memorandum and copies are sent to the University of
Cincinnati Board of Directors.
March 22, 1973
Correspondence, the President to the Faculty Senate. He says
that he will continue to try to identify funds for faculty salary
increases
.
March 22, 1973
Correspondence, a department head to the Dean of Arts and
Sciences (cc: Bennis)
. In comparison to other colleges in the State
"There is no provision in the University of Cincinnati's budget for
salary increases." "The budget procedure here, especially the length
of the procedures, only adds to deteriorating faculty spirit and morale."
March 26 - 30, 1973
University Senate Budget and Priorities Committee meetings
with each vice president individually.
March 26, 1973
Open Budget Hearing.
March 26, 1973
Candid Campus report on a review of the budget process. Certain
assumptions were used to develop next year's budget including 1) that it
is the objective of the budget process to make budget allocations on a
program basis and to avoid across-the-board budget cuts, and 2) that
governance groups' recommendations are only advisory to the President
and therefore not all of them will necessarily be accepted.
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March 26. 1973
anS°^
eSP°nden
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the President t0 the Vice President for Manage-ment d France. The President wants a rough estimate of the percentageincreases and dollar amounts the University will undergo in the nextbiennium solely on the basis of inflation. A budget schedule for nextyear also needs to be set up that will include cost-analysis information,program evaluation, and information on certain externalities (externalfunding, financial aid, employment opportunities for graduates, etc.)
for each discipline. "Finally we need to have for each unit, prioritiesbased on long-range planning and overall University priorities which I
will hope to have developed by the end of this academic year." "Thus
what I am aiming for is a budget procedure and decision process which
will be based on four core concerns: 1) priorities for each unit and
their relationship to University wide priorities: 2) PPBS and other
cost information; 3) the effects of externalities on the discipline
under question; and 4) program evaluation. I think it should be made
clear to everybody concerned that unless these data are gathered in a
more or less uniform and systematic way I will have to exclude that
particular unit from any serious budgetary increases."
March 26, 1973
Correspondence, the President to the Executive Vice President
asking him to get information on the comparative costs of affirmative
action programs at other State universities in response to questions
from the University Senate Budget and Priorities Committee.
March 27, 1973
A joint meeting of the University and Faculty Senate Budget and
Priorities Committees with the Vice Presidents. The Provost says to
this joint committee - "There are parts of the budget over which the
President has unilateral control - the responsibility of this Committee
is to give him a University sense on which hard decisions to make."
The Provost defends his February 2nd budget document as an attempt to
contextualize budget decisions not to set out long range planning
goals. Someone comments that the faculty and the President share a
sense of frustration, overload, and the same fears of levelling as a
result of budget process.
March 27, 1973
Vice presidents' meeting with the President. It is decided that
the vice presidents are individually going to reconcile their recommenda-
tions with the recommendations of the Senates’ Budget and Planning Com-
mittees. The President says that his budget recommendations will probably
differ from those of the Council of Vice Presidents in that he is going
to do some program evaluation according to the criteria he set out 3/26/73.
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the Dean ° f the College of Arts ands ) or explicit departmental priorities and differ-
entiated anocationjs on the basis of need, not merit, at this point.
e President asks the Provost to convene a program evaluation task
orce. He asks the Provost and Vice President of the Medical Center
to project what they would do with a million dollars to cut or spend.
March 28, 1973
The Faculty Senate Budget and Priorities Committee's Report on
the 1973-74 University Budget (cc: Bennis)
. The Faculty Senate
Committee feels that it has been excluded from full and meaningful
participation in the budget process and that the budget appears to
be based on assumptions which the faculty had no part in stating
and which have not been made totally explicit. In addition, "We
are not convinced that the income picture for the future is as
pessimistic as is assumed."
March 29, 1973
Correspondence, the President to the Provost. He asks the
Provost to set up an ad hoc group on program evaluation incorporating
the four criteria he set out on 3/26/73.
March 29, 1973
Report of the University Senate Budget and Priorities Committee
to the President which states that the highest priority on available
funds should be given to faculty and staff salary adjustments. The
report also recommends no student fee or tuition increases and the
elimination of inequities for women's salaries within the colleges.
March 30, 1973
Correspondence, the President to a Faculty member in the College
Conservatory of Music reassuring him of his commitment to the College.
"Partly because of a lack of lead time (we did not really discover the
magnitude of the probable deficit until it was too late to make major
choices for next year) and partly because the long range planning
process is not yet complete, we could not bring the priority judge-
ments to bear on the allocation process as I might have hoped." "I am
also keenly aware that because of limited options and short lead time,
what we do for next year cannot wholly reflect our ideas and priorities,
to some extent we must do what is feasible rather than what would be
desirable.
"
March 31, 1973
The President meets with several faculty members on the future of
graduate education at the University of Cincinnati. One participant
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commented afterward that, "for the most part, people’s energy and
attention was on the budget."
April 2, 1973
Correspondence the Provost to the President - sharing his
revised recommendations for the 1973-74 budget. "First, the fiscal
problem we face has been publicized and people have become far more
aware of the University’s plight to a far higher degree than would
have occurred if the solutions had been solely administrative.
Second, the review process has measurably increased the accountability
of the line administrative officers — to share information, to explain
decisions and choices, to justify activities and services, etc. Third,
the very process of involving substantial numbers of people has an
independent value in a presumably democratic institution which (like
all large universities) has a tradition of limited involvement and
participation. Fourth, the non-administrative participants did make
substantial specific contributions — both through information not
available to administrators and through suggestions and recommenda-
tions that might otherwise not have come to light. Fifth, in my own
case at least, the very task of preparing for meetings with reviewing
groups helped me considerably to sort out issues, priorities, and
options to a degree that lesser catalysts might not have required.
Preparation for these sessions was a demanding and challenging experi-
ence." "The point of all this is simply that the depression of higher
education is a national condition which affects almost all institutions
in greater or lesser degrees. . .opportunities must come about not
through expansion (as in the 1960 ’s) but through redirection." His
recommendations for each academic unit’s allocations are included in
this document
.
April 3, 1973
Ad hoc advisory committee meeting without the President. The
role the committee sees for itself is: 1) to provide staff assistance
to the President as he reviews the budget documents; 2) to provide
information on program evaluation criteria and summary information on
"weak" departments where it is available and feasible: 3) to review
the budget documents and point out differences in the recommendations
of various advisory groups. One presidential assistant reports that
"Bennis wants a two-year budget announced in six weeks and wants to make
at least one major program cut. He wants to base the 1973-74 budget
decisions on what will happen in the 2nd year of the biennium and on
long range considerations." The Vice President for Management
and
Finance considers it impossible to make rational, equitable
decisions
for a two-year budget at this point.
April 3, 1973
Vice presidents' meeting without the President on
the budget
review process. Bennis vents to meet with the two
governance groups
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groups to discuss their recommendations in detail before cuts are
announced. The vice presidents see that they need to respond in
wr ^^-n8 to the Senate recommendations. The program evaluation
group is reviewing the Senates’ reports for the President. The
President also sees that some administrative services have to be
decentralized because of pressures in that direction from the deans.
The President's rationale for two-year cuts is that "If cuts are
made on a priority basis to reach six percent - you are making
decisions with implications for two years." The President doesn't
recognize that cuts are not being made on a priority basis this
year but only in areas which can be cut. The Vice President for
Management and Finance says the President will not have sufficient
program evaluation information or information on externalatles by
June in order to make two-year budget decisions. It is learned
that there will be at least three weeks more delay on the budget
because of Bennis' trip to Mexico.
April 4, 1973
Candid Campus Story on the budget process.
April 4, 1973
Meeting between the President, Executive Vice President, and the
Presidential assistants. "I want to justify the percentage of cuts to
each college. What we have now is a bland compromise between the strong
and the weak - we have taken no decisive measures. Can't we do some-
thing symbolic - we need to act with imagination and boldness."
April 5, 1973
The President meets with the Dean of the College Conservatory
of Music and an agreement is reached that he will not follow the Council
of Vice Presidents' Summary Budget Recommendations for that College.
April 5, 1973
Ad hoc budget advisory group meeting without the President. A
Presidential assistant shares Bennis' feeling that the University cannot
make cuts this year that it is going to have to reverse next year. The
Provost sees that with Bennis’ interventions that they are his efforts
is get the deans to set unit priorities will be undermined. This group
once again reviews the cuts proposed in the vice presidential areas and
continues to debate the feasibility of making decisions on the 1974-75
as well as on the 1973-74 budget by June. The Provost's argument is
that he cannot discriminate between colleges until he gets guidelines
about allocations between vice presidential areas for 1974-75
- he also
wants the 1973-74 allocations announced by mid-April, not June.
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April 9, 1973
President s office meeting - The President says he wants to
announce an overhead policy on research, the general assumptions forthe 1974-75 budget, and salary increases for 1973-74 in his May 17th
speech to the faculty. He makes some suggestions about an incentive
plan for savings to be initiated at the University.
April 10, 1973
At the President's Advisory Council (PAC) meeting the President
announces his idea to do a two-year budget.
April 10, 1973
Correspondence, the Provost to the Dean of Arts and Sciences
(cc: Bennis)
. "The greatly expanded range of participation made it
partially worth the pains, troubles and delays. The data gathering
and evaluation we have done in the last several months will make it
easier to project the 1974-75 budget.
April 11, 1973
Ad hoc budget advisory group meeting without the President. One
Presidential assistant reports that the deans are getting more and more
anxious with the delay. This group suggests the President announce the
1973-74 allocations now as well as 4-5% merit salary increases for
faculty. The Provost sees that the announcement of salary increases
will take the pressure off the deans to cut their budgets by 4-1/2%
which is necessary to achieve a balanced budget. The problem the
ad hoc group agrees will be to get the President to separate the
two budget years.
April 13, 1973
Ad hoc budget advisory meeting with the President. Two options
are identified: 1) announce unit allocations to deans and department
heads now and get them to project program implications for 1973-74
(some deans will say that that is impossible to do) or 2) wait until
mid-May and announce two-year budget allocations on an intuitive,
informal basis (because program evaluation judgements will not be
available in time). The Provost advocates a delay in order to develop
more detailed explanations for unit allocations but does not respond
to the question of separating the two budgets. The President argues
for using "best informed judgements" to identify weak areas in the
University. The President advocates a three-day retreat to set priori-
ties and make programmatic decisions. He articulates the idea that it
is easier to cut this year because cuts are more justifiable since
money is scarce. Bennis sees himself as a "goad" - and expresses his
disappointment in the staff’s incrementalism and skepticism. I want
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to make outrageous statements because none of you do." Bennis how-
ever does not want to get involved now in budget decisions becausehe doesn t want to get locked in and because he sees himself as the
only intemperate force against all the temperate forces." In the
week Bennis is gone it is agreed that the staff will get together
whatever qualitative data it can and if that week shows that program
decisions cannot be made, the budget for one year will be announced
as is. The President himself is unsure of his availability for a
retreat on the budget - but recommends that a decision-making process
be thought out that includes the deans, whom he has just met with.
April 16, 1973
Correspondence, the President to the Dean of Arts and Sciences
- reacting to the budget priorities Arts and Sciences set 3/30/73 in
response to the Provost’s requests.
April 18, 1973
Candid Campus story announces that budget decisions have been
delayed; the cover story reports on the Faculty Senate’s recommended
budget changes.
April 24, 1973
The Vice President for Management and Finance to the program
evaluation task force - ad hoc budget advisory grout) re: program
evaluation and progress towards budget allocations for a two-year
period
:
1) A comprehensive list of units to be evaluated has been developed;
2) A format for collection of information concerning each unit has
been developed;
3) An "easiest case" was selected for review at a 4/25/73 meeting with
the President.
The options this group has are:
1) To proceed with the development of information for all units along
the lines of the easiest case model;
2) To proceed with the 1973-74 allocations but place certain units on
notice that they are subject to reduction or elimination in 1974-75.
The units will be asked to submit information on their behalf as part
of the analysis; or
3) To meet with each dean having a unit on the list and ask his assistance
and selective input in an evaluation process during the next 2-3 months.
April 25, 1973
Candid Campus story on the House Vote on HB86 - approving a 5/
increase for University of Cincinnati. Bennis urges University faculty
members and students to call the State Senators.
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April 25, 1973
Budget review meeting (the President comes very late)
. The
Provost has felt that he needs to do all the program evaluation work
on weak departments while the Vice President for Management and
Finance sees that his office or the President's assistants could
help and that the President may need to intervene. [The ad hoc
group suggests that the deans be asked to come up with policies on
steady-state staffing, cost-savings, and early retirement. The
Provost says a qualitative analysis could be ready by September -
the President is pushing to do qualitative evaluation in the next
two weeks.] The President’s idea is to announce a contingency
continuation budget now and a two-year budget in September - in
the interim he would meet with all of the deans individually.
April 26, 1973
Correspondence, the Vice President for Management and Finance
to the President re: inflationary conditions at the University of
Cincinnati which are not out of line with general economic conditions.
April 27, 1973
Correspondence, the Vice President for Management and Finance
to the ad hoc advisory group. He recommends that 1973-74 appropria-
tions be announced by May 17 on the basis of the preliminary budget
summary reviewed by the task force and that over the summer the
Provost continue to develop information on the programs that were
identified with the help of outside consultants and a staff team
of analysts.
April 27, 1973
The President at the Friday afternoon deans' meeting. He says
that by May 17 he should be able to announce the percentage for faculty
salary increases and a decision on student fees and tuition and that
by June 1st he'll announce the 1973—74 budget, though he would still
like to announce the 1974-75 budget by that date, too, which he says
may still be possible. Bennis sets the expectation he will talk
individually with most of the deans and that by June he will say some-
thing about intra-college allocations, especially in those areas in
which he has had experience.
April 30, 1973
Vice presidents' and assistants' meeting with the President.
The President announces that he will publicly announce no student
fee
increases and 4% faculty merit salary increases this week.
Questions
of timing vis-a-vis the Legislature’s actions are considered.
The
.
President sees that his role with the Legislature is to make
compan
sons between the University of Cincinnati and other
universities on how
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salary increases were achieved - "by 5% program cutting after a
all of his M
Pr°ce^." The President says that he will spend
l?Jh L l me U he neX x m0nths °n 1} the bud 8et > 2) the May
lll vl l
y 3) °n an annual reP°rt - He designates
for thZ°l t
Exfutive Vice President as active Presidentsat period. Bennis says that he is concerned that he may
release a budget that does not reflect the priorities and valueshe has in mind for the University of Cincinnati.
May 2, 1973
Confidential memorandum, the Vice President for Management
and Finance to the ad hoc advisory group. He recommends that the
group suggest to the President that he meet with the deans in late
May to share with them their 1973-74 budget allocations and again
in August to share with them the final 1974-75 allocations.
May 2, 1973
Vice presidents’ meeting with the President on the budget. The
President asks for advice on how to explain where the 4.5% salary in-
crease is coming from. The Vice President for Management and Finance
responds that it comes from unexpected new income.
Commentary: The ad hoc group is beginning to
convince the President that he cannot announce
a two-year budget because of the Provost’s
informal commitment to the deans, because of
AAUP regulations, and because the Senates have
only reviewed a one-year budget. Certain vice
presidents are totally excluded from meetings
between this group and the President.
May 2, 1973
Candid Campus story on Bennis' recommendations to the Board on
no student fee increases and a4.5% faculty and administrative salary
increase for 1973-74. "The President said additional funds for the
increases will be allocated to deans and unit directors and that the
final decision on how the money will be used will be up to them although
he strongly recommended against across-the-board raises." "For several
months we have been engaged in a process of rigorous self-evaluation.
Our objectives have been to achieve a balanced budget for the next
biennium and to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of our many
programs. The budget process has provided us with a substantial oppor-
tunity to examine our goals and assumptions and to make some assumptions
about our priorities for the next two years." That same day there is
correspondence from the Provost and Vice President of the Medical Center
to the deans and unit directors giving them guidelines for the distribu-
tion of salary increases.
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May 3, 1973
.. /
^°
rrefP°ndence » a faculty member's prediction to the President
that 4.5/ salary Increases will be distributed across the board, not
on merit. At least one other faculty member writes the President
about how salary increases are being distributed to which the Presi-
ent replies that he strongly recommended increases be distributed on
merit. He writes, "Many other members of the University community
and I have devoted a major share of our time since last fall to an
attempt to influence the State budget — perhaps so much time, in fact,
that important academic matters have not received enough of our atten-
tion. We have been successful — we did make a significant impact on
the Legislature and on the Board of Regents — but not successful
enough for salary increases to be what we would have honed."
May 7, 1973
Meeting between the President and the Vice President for Manage-
ment and Finance on the ad hoc advisory group’s recommendations. The
recommendations assume a Management and Finance analysis of selected
programs, a governance group report on institutional priorities using
the long range plan (which is incomplete) and departmental reports on
departmental priorities, including a ranking of programs in priority
order and the projected implications of 3, 6, and 9% cuts, by July.
A list of criteria to be used by the Management and Finance evaluation
group in evaluating selected programs is appended. The President is
just finding out that no money from University reserves was borrowed:
he considers borrowing some to establish a President’s discretionary
fund for innovative programs. The Vice President for Management and
Finance urges the President to give out the allocations soon. The
President wants the Vice President to ask the deans to rank order cuts
within their colleges within certain percentages by the time he meets
with them individually. The President is also iust finding out that
there is a discrepancy between the announced and real deficits for 1973-
74 and that it was not announced earlier in order to keep the pressure
on. The. President thinks the vice presidents should cut another million
and a half so that credibility is not a problem. He is concerned about
governance group participation in the 1974-75 budget review process given
the proposed timetable. He wants information on administrative costs in
academic areas, on duplicative departments; he wants to know what monies
are brought in from which sources and where they go. The President wants
to meet with the deans individually as well as with the governance group
leaders before a public announcement is made about the 1973-74 budget in
order to influence departmental allocations. The President also lists
those cuts that he feels need to be made smaller or larger.
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May 15, 1973
Correspondence, the President to the academic deans and vice
provosts asking to meet with each of them before the 1973-74 budget
goes to the Board of Directors for approval in June. "In preparation
for our meeting I would like to know how you would use the projected
1973-74 budget figure for your unit which was proposed by the vice
presidents in their March 5th Summary Budget Recommendations. Assuming
that figure would become your 1973-74 allocation, how would it be
distributed among your departments and other units; which would receive
cuts; and which, if any, would receive increases?" P.S. "I was unable
to make up a two-year budget for a lot of reasons, some of them having
to do with governance procedures, but I intend to have the 1974-75
budget information to you no later than mid-August, hopefully earlier."
May 15, 1973
Vice presidents’ meeting with the President - one of the agenda
items is the budget. The President shares some of the concerns he
expressed to the Vice President for Management and Finance in their
meeting May 7, 1973.
May 15, 1973
The Vice President for Management and Finance prepares summary
sheets on possible ways to reduce the budgets in each college.
May 17, 1973
Bennis' speech to the University faculty - in which he explains
the reasons for salary increases and less severe cuts than had been
expected. Faculty salary increases were achieved, the President says,
through cuts in non-academic areas of 7% and because of successful
lobbying activities in Columbus. The President outlines ten priorities
for the University in the next year(s).
May 20, 1973
Meeting between the President and the Vice President for Manage-
ment and Finance on the budget. The President is critical
of his staff s
seeming inability to get back to relevant constituent
groups on the
budget - such as to the Senates on their budget
recommendations. He
wants the 1974-75 budget process reprinted in Candid
Campus by ..une .
The Vice President for Management and Finance outlines
the budget
assumptions and the changes he has made which the Resident
suggested
May 7th, which total 4.5% - again the President is
worrled
J^°
u *
credibility if a 6% cut isn't shown. The President
recommends cutting
administrative areas more now and restoring cuts late
^
i income co
in. Other cuts are identified and revised
in the course of the meet g
at the President’s initiative.
458
May 21, 1973
An explanation Reasons for required budget cut percentage
of 6% being revised to 4.5% is written."
May 21, 1973
Correspondence, the Provost to the President summarizing his
budget recommendations of February 2. "While that report did not
detail college recommendations at the departmental level, I gather
you wish to seek this information directly from the deans. From the
outset it has been my belief that such choices must be made by the
deans within the context or framework of an overall unit allocation."
May 22, 1973
Vice presidents’ meeting - a good deal of discussion centers
on why the President is meeting with the deans instead of with the
appropriate vice president and whether or not the vice presidents
should not be present for at least part of those meetings. The Vice
President for Management and Finance explains that the President is
meeting with the deans because 1) he hasn’t met with them on anything
and wants to see how they’d handle the cuts he is proposing, and 2)
because he wants to make changes in the Provostial area without creating
an adversary/advocate relationship between the dean and the vice presi-
dents. The vice presidents are worried about the kinds of commitments
the President might make in these meetings without regard as to where
the money will come from.
May 22, 1973
The President meets with Faculty Senate leaders. He shares his
objections to the Faculty Senate report that argued that all adminis-
trative areas should be cut irregardless if they brought in money and
that no academic area should be cut.
May 23, 1973
Correspondence, the Provost to the President supplying him with
background material on the termination of two programs in the College
of Education which caused a great deal of community backlash. The budget
decision process in the college is reviewed.
May 24, 1973
Correspondence, the Vice President for Management and Finance to
the Provost (cc: Bennis, all vice presidents) on the meetings the Presi
dent will have with the deans.
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May 29
, 1973
Meeting between the President, Provost, and Vice President
for Management and Finance to review the changes the President made
in the budget on May 20.
May 29-31, 1973
The President meets with the deans and later summarizes his
agreements with them in letters which are also sent to the Vice
President for Management and Finance and the Provost: in a letter
to the Dean of the College of Design, Art, and Architecture, the
President says that he hopes to devise an incentive plan whereby
part of the income a college generates would go back to the unit;
in a letter to the Dean of the College of Engineering the President
clarifies the authority of the dean to make budget reduction deci-
sions in collaboration with the Provost which he as President would
not expect to change; and in a letter to the Dean of the College of
Medicine the President agrees to meet with the department directors
of the Medical College in regards to their criticisms of the 1973-74
budget-making process.
June 4, 1973
The President takes the 1973-74 provisional budget to the
Board
.
June 7, 1973
Correspondence, the Vice President for Management and Finance to
the President re: contingent expenditures in the 1973-74 budget and
the necessity for making it a provisional budget.
June 15, 1973
Correspondence, the President to a faculty member in the College
of Education explaining that an increased cut in Education was due to
projected decreases in enrollment.
June 19, 1973
The President meets with the directors of the departments in
the
College of Medicine.
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Board approves reorganization plan
I. Rationale for Reorganization
1. It is clear that the financial
problems we face are neither
transient nor short term.
2. We cannot simply hope that our
problems will be solved for us by
Columbus or Washington or a
benevolent donor-although we
shall continue to press our case
urgently upon all three potential
sources.
3. We must learn not only to live
within reduced resources, but to
change, improve, and undertake
new departures within existing
allocations.
4. To do necessary new things, we
must give up some things we are
doing now.
5. In the ’60’s, institutions improved
through addition and expansion; in
the ’70’s and ’80’s we will have to
learn how to improve through
substitution and contraction.
6. We must be increasingly precise
about our purposes and objectives
and must budget carefully our
resources in pursuit of those
purposes and objectives. We must
plan in a more realistic way than
ever before. (At the same time, we
must avoid a singular “accountant
mind-set” as the sole arbiter of our
educational activities. That men-
tality will be imposed upon us,
however, only if we fail to plan
and manage our own affairs with
prudence and efficiency.)
7. As institutions we must not only
learn to manage change with
reduced resources but to maintain
our vitality and creativity in a
public environment which chal-
lenges our effectiveness and ques-
tions our purposes.
8. Careful planning must be more
fully integrated into the budgeting
process so that our aspirations
become converted into realistic
programs. In this process, we need
to be especially sensitive to acad-
emic concerns and to assure the
primacy of educational considera-
tions in determining the Univer-
sity’s future.
9. As we determine our directions
from within through careful plan-
ning and budgeting, we need to be
increasingly aware of the social,
economic, and cultural forces like-
ly to have an impact upon the
future development of the Univer-
sity. We need to understand more
fully the complex forces now
shaping the future environment
that we might better respond to,
adapt to, or help shape those
forces.
10.
No organizational chart can take
the place of personal leadership
and initiative, of reciprocal loyali-
ties and shared purposes. If those
human qualities are present, we
cannot fail in our objectives. If
they are not, no administrative
change can make up for their lack.
II. Summary of the Recommendations
for Reorganization
The major recommendations of the
reorganization plan are outlined below.
Although it is clear that the plan does
not provide the optimum structure that
might be designed for the University of
Cincinnati, it will move us ahead
significantly toward that goal. The
proposed new administrative organi-
zation should be regarded as a practical
compromise between the present struc-
ture and an ultimate, ideal structure,
and as an important step in the progress
toward the ideal. While the reorgani-
zation involves the creation of some
new administrative posts, others are
eliminated and the net result is a
decrease in the number of administra-
tive officers, made possible by the
efficiencies of the new organization.
1. Clarification of the role and
function of the Provost for Academic
Affairs. The title of the Vice President
and Provost for Academic Affairs will
be simplified to Provost for Academic
Affairs, but this officer will retain vice
presidential status and he will continue
to report directly to the Office of the
President.
The responsibilities of the office of
the Provost will become more manage-
able through the shifting of the Library
and some responsibility for graduate
education and research away from this
office. Two positions, those of the Vice
Provost for Graduate Studies and the
Vice Provost and Director of Educa-
tional Innovation, will be eliminated
when the present incumbents return to
full-time teaching; a third, the Vice
Provost for University Branches and
Community and Technical Programs,
will be eliminated when the present
incumbent retires. The position of Vice
Provost for Undergraduate Studies will
be replaced by a Vice Provost for
Academic Affairs, and this officer will
serve the Provost in a staff rather than a
line capacity. The College Deans (except
Medicine, Nursing and Health and
Pharmacy) will report directly to the
Continued on next page
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Provost, and thus an important am-
biguity in the existing Provost-Vice
Provostal structure will be eliminated.
2. Discontinuation of the Office of
the Vice President for Public Affairs.
This position will not be filled when the
incumbent retires on June 30, 1973.
Those offices and persons reporting to
him will be assigned to other officers,
with considerable savings in admini-
strative costs.
3. Formation of an Information and
Planning System. Several effective in-
struments for data collection and
analysis now exist within the University
but function under three Vice Pres-
idents without coordination: Institu-
tional Studies, the PPBS Task Force, the
planning and systems offices, and the
computer facilities. These will be
gathered into a single office of In-
formation and Planning Systems which
will serve as an essential tool for budget
development, academic planning, pro-
gram evaluation, and policy analysis.
Responsibility for this new office will
appropriately rest with the Vice Pres-
ident for Management and Finance.
4. Creation of Presidential Advisory
Councils for facilitating and making
visible the decision process. The Vice
Presidents and the Provost, along with a
few other senior administrative officers,
will be organized into Presidential
advisory councils whose function will be
to make recommendations to the Office
of the President on major policy
matters. One of these groups, the
President’s Advisory Council, has al-
ready been fully defined. This Council,
whose membership includes faculty and
student governance leaders, will serve
the important additional functions of
making the decision-making process
more visible to the campus community
and extending the process down into all
segments of the community.
5. Creation of a new position:
University Dean for Graduate Education
and Research. The University Dean will
have responsibility for graduate studies
and research, and thus will be able to
provide a natural alliance for those two
endeavors which does not exist in the
present structure. Since the Dean will
have university-wide responsibility,
there will be coordination and articu-
lation between the Clifton campus and
the Medical Center which have not been
possible in the existing structure. The
Office of the University Dean will also
provide a means for shifting part of the
heavy administrative burden away from
the Provost for Academic Affairs.
6.
Consolidation of the Office of the
President. Ralph Bursiek will assume the
title of Executive Vice President and
Secretary of the Board of Directors, and
a new position of Executive Vice
President for Academic Affairs will be
created. The President, the two Execu-
tive Vice Presidents, and the Presidential
Assistants will form an organic team
using the talents of all in a concerted
effort. The role of the two Executive
Vice Presidents and the organic charac-
ter of the Office are of central
importance to the entire reorganization.
III. A Pattern For Reorganization
1. A Conception of the University
and a Philosophy for its Admini-
stration
It is my view that great universities
are built upon great colleges created by
distinguished deans who have the
freedom, independence, and resources
to attract and hold the ablest faculties
in their time. At the same time the
Deans are accountable for their steward-
ship to the larger university of which
they are a part. In this period of
reduced resources their role is made
more difficult and yet is of pivotal
imporiance to the University’s future
for it is the Deans, working with
Department Heads, who must evoke the
creativity essential to advancing our
educational purposes.
A primary function of university
leadership is to weave the constituent
colleges into an intelligible fabric which
strengthens and reinforces them, while
seeking resources to nourish and know-
ledge to guide them. The basic function
of administration is to provide services
which counsel, facilitate, and serve
rather than obstruct, irritate, or con-
strain.
It is the philosophy and policy of my
administration to decentralize certain
administrative and selected services. A
great deal of consultation with all
persons affected must be undertaken
before implementation. Admittedly wc
have not made much progress in this
direction to date, but 1 am firmly
committed to the achievement of this
objective by 1975. To my knowledge,
no university has ever achieved this goal,
but that is no reason why we should not
seriously try to do it. At the same time
we shall seek to integrate the
educational purposes of the colleges in
those fundamentals which commonly
serve the needs of man-to achieve a
uni-versity from diverse and selectively
autonomous parts.
It is my intent that the offices of the
University presently engaged in the
provision of admininislrative services
will become, in time, much smaller units
engaged in planning, advisory, and
consulting services to the colleges. They
are to be on tap, not on top.
To begin to achieve this conception
and to implement this philosophy
requires a clarification of structure, an
improvement in management capahilty,
and an emphasis on planning for change.
2. The Skeletal Form. Recommended
Structures
In analyzing the University structure,
it became evident that several alter-
native structural models would be
possible, even desirable. After extensive
discussion and debate, and weighing the
advantages and disadvantages of several
possible plans, I have selected the best
possible model for reorganization, and I
am recommending this model for your
consideration. The two following pages
indicate first the present structure of
our central administration, and then the
model for reorganization which 1 am
asking you to consider.
A. Office of the President. Basic to all
the alternatives we have analyzed and
considered is the conception of the
Office of the President which will
include the President; the Executive
Vice President and Secretary of the
Board of Directors; the Executive Vice
President for Academic Affairs; the
Presidential Assistants; and the secre-
tarial staff.
We conceive this Office, and we hope
you will perceive it, to be an “organic”
creature of interdependent parts. While
for cultural and essentially bureaucratic
reasons each of us has a special title, it is
not my intention to create several layers
of authority which one must penetrate
in order to get a decision. Rather my
intention is that the Office of the
President should act in a concerted way
so that the President is not involved in
every detailed decision. Over time it will
become clear who in the Office is
responsible for what function.
The Principal functions of the Office
of the President are:
1
.
Leadership:
a) Orchestrating inside and outside
b) Presenting perspective of where we
are, where we are going
c) Maintaining an awareness of re-
levant outside forces, obstacles,
and opportunities which impinge
on the University
d) Making key personnel appoint-
ments and review of all appoint-
ments of professional staff
e) Communicating
f) Raising fundamental questions
Basically my conception of leadership
is that it is the act of explicating and
calling forth in others a consciousness of
issues, principles, ideas, directions and
objectives, and of moving those others
to act in ways that reflect their
increased knowledge and heightened
awareness.
2. Developing an overall planning
process, and establishing and
implementing the plan
3. Relating to external consti-
tuencies: alumni, city, state,
federal, educational establish-
ment, parents
4. Working closely with our
Directors and Regents
5. Maintaining fiscal responsibility
6. Helping facilitate new academic
programs
7. Engaging in careful evaluation
and assessment of all key
administrative personnel
8. Keeping in relativley good
touch with all major internal
constituencies
9. Raising funds
i
10. Continuing to “keep learning”
11. Ceremonials
B. The Executive Vice President and
Secretary of the Board of Directors.
Ralph Bursiek will be assigned this title,
and he will continue in his role as
trusted and respected second in com-
mand. His duties also will remain
essentially the same as those he now
perfroms, with perhaps some much-
needed clarification resulting from the
reorganization and definition of other
administrative offices. A description of
the role and duties of the Executive
Vice President and Secretary of the
Board of Directors is outlined in
Appendix A.
C. The Executive Vice President for
Academic Affairs. It has become clear
that the many concerns which must be
dealt with by the Office of the President
are multiplying almost daily. The
President and Executive Vice President
are called upon more and more
frequently to devote their time and
energy to external concerns: the Board;
the local community; local, state, and
federal governments; the alumni; poten-
tial funding sources. In order to lead
and direct these activities while at the
same time maintaining the viability of
the internal affairs of the University, a
new position of Executive Vice Presi-
dent for Academic Affairs will be
created. This person will serve within
the Office of the President as coor-
dinator of internal affairs, with special
emphasis on academic programs and
related issues. A detailed job description
for this new position is specified in
Appendix B.
D. The Provost for Academic Affairs.
The reorganization of the Provost’s
office and a clarification of this role are
essential parts of the entire reorganiza-
tion. Responsibility for the Library will
be shifted from this office, as will at
least partial responsibility for graduate
education and research through the
creation of the position of University
Dean.
Two positions, those of the Vice
Provost for Graduate Studies and the
Vice Provost and Director of Education-
al Innovation, will be eliminated when
the present incumbents return to
lull-time teaching; a third, that of the
Vice Provost lor University Branches
and Community and Technical Pro-
grams, will be eliminated when the
incumbent retires. Two Vice Provosts,
those for Student Affairs and lor
Admissions and Records, will retain
their present titles and their line
relationship to the Provost. The sixth
Vice Provost position, Vice Provost for
Undergraduate Studies, will be replaced
by the position of Vice Provost for
Academic Affairs, a staff position
within the office of the Provost. Except
for the two Vice Provosts with specific
line functions, it is intended that the
staff members in the office of the
Provost will function together in an
organic team effort, similar to that of
the Presidential team. The College
Deans except for those of the College of
Medicine, Nursing and Health and
Pharmacy will report directly to the
Provost and not to or through his
associates. A detailed description of the
role and functions of the Provost for
Academic Affairs is included in Ap-
pendix C.
E. University Dean for Graduate
Education and Research. The position
of Vice Provost for Graduate Studies
will be abolished, and the new position
of University Dean for Graduate Educa-
tion and Research will be created. This
person will report directly to the Office
of the President. In this location the
Dean may better serve both the Medical
Center and the Clifton campus. He will
function as Chairman of the Research
Council and will chair the Graduate
Faculty and Graduate Council. A job
description for this post is attached in
Appendix D.
F. Vice Provost and Director of
Educational Innovation. This office is
abolished on the ground that education-
al innovation and reform will be so
essential to our survival as an institution
that this function must become a daily
and essential concern of each of us.
G. The Office of the Vice President
for Public Affairs. After June 30, 1973.
this office will not be tilled tor the
foreseeable future. Present incumbents
of offices reporting to this office will
Continued on page 6
UC
CENTRAL
ADMINISTRATION:
1972-73
STRUCTURE
463
Vice
Provost
for
Vice
Provost
for
Vice
Provost
for
Vice
Provost
for
University
Branches
Vice
Provost
for
Vice
Provost
for
Graduate
Studies
Admissions
and
Records
Undergraduate
Studies
and
Community
and
Student
Affairs
Educational
Innovation
Technical
Programs
UC
CENTRAL
ADMINISTRATION:
REORGANIZATION
464
i
1.
College
Deans
(except
Medicine,
Nursing
and
Health
and
Pharmacy)
report
directly
to
the
Provost
for
Academic
Affairs.
2.
Vice
Provost
for
Academic
Affairs
serves
in
a
staff
role
in
the
Office
of
the
Provost
for
Academic
Affairs.
3.
This
office
will
exist
only
until
the
present
incumbent
retires.
465
Continued from page 3
report to the Office of the President, at
least until other assignments are made.
H. Information and Planning System.
The University of Cincinnati is in urgent
need of a central data-collection, data
processing, and policy analysis agency.
This office could close the “data gap”
on our campus, raise our general level of
debate on the state of higher education,
and provide the necessary statistical
analyses for long-range planning. Many
of the elements necessary to construct
this agency already exist here: Institu-
tional Studies, the PPBS Task Force, the
planning and systems offices, and the
computer facilities. However, these
offices now report to three Vice
Presidents and there is no mechanism
for coordination of their activities. The
Vice President for Management and
Finance will be given responsibility for
gathering together the appropriate exist-
ing offices into a new Information and
Planning System which will report to
him. This Office will serve as an
effective tool for budget development,
academic planning, program evaluation,
and policy analysis.
3.
Blood in the Veins — A Process for
Interrelating the Parts.
In order to facilitate decision-making
in the new administrative structure and
in order to make a clear distinction
between those policies and decisions
which are academic in nature and those
which are not, two new presidential
advisory groups will be formed. The
membership of the two groups will
consist primarily of the Provost and the
Vice Presidents, with both Executive
Vice Presidents serving on both coun-
cils.
The Academic Council will be
concerned entirely with issues that
touch on the basic teaching and research
functions c r the university, and its
chairman will be the Executive Vice
President for Academic Affairs. Its
remaining members will be the Provost
for Academic Affairs, the Vice President
and Director of the Medical Center,
Vice President for Metropolitan Affairs,
the University Dean for Graduate
Education and Research, and selected
Vice Provosts and College Deans.
The Administrative Council will be
responsible for those issues which,
although vital to the operation of the
university, are not directly connected
with academic affairs. The chairman of
this council will be the Executive Vice
President and Secretary of the Board of
Directors and the other members will be
the Vice President for Development, the
Vice President for Management and
Finance, the Vice President for Metro-
politan Affairs, the Vice President for
Special Projects, and selected Vice
Provosts.
At times, and on some issues, there is
no easy distinction between academic
and administrative matters, in which
case a question would be referred to the
President’s Advisory Council, described
below. This would be infrequent,
however, since I have gone through
previous agendas of meetings over
several months and find I can quite
clearly make such distinctions.
The decision-making process at the
Presidential level should involve not
only the Provost and the Vice Presidents
and the members of the President’s
office. There is a need to formulate a
process for the development of recom-
mendations to the President’s office
which is visible to the University
communtiy. In order to meet this goal,
a President’s Advisory Council, has
already been formed.
The purposes of the Council are to
make recommendations to the Presi-
dent’s office for decisions on major
policy and operational matters; to serve
in a review and resource capacity; to
serve as a group to review and give
advice on major academic and admini-
strative decisions, especially on those
which cut across academic and admini-
strative lines; to serve as a final
recommending locus for certain de-
cisions; to serve as a forum for ideas,
communication, and information; and
to serve as a reaction and pulse-reading
group. The Council has held one
meeting, and monthly meetings are
planned for the future, with the
President serving as chairman.
The present membership of the
Council consists of the Provost and the
Vice Presidents, the Vice Provosts,
President s assistants, live academic
deans, the Chairman of the Faculty, the
Chairman of the University Senate, one
graduate student recommended by the
three graduate student associations, the
Student Body President and Vice
President, the Administrator of General
Hospital, and the Director of Informa-
tion. The membership of all three
Councils will be adjusted appropriately
to relied the reorganization of the
university central administration.
4.
Flesh Upon the Bones Who’s Who
No reorganization comes alive until
real persons are seen in the proposed
positions, for that is what gives meaning
and vitality to the process. To under-
take the major responsibilities we have
outlined for the two Executive Vice
Presidents will require the talents of the
best we have -and we are fortunate
indeed to have the competence and
experience of Ralph Bursiek to fill one
of those positions, the Executive Vice
President and Secretary of the Board o!
Directors. The post of Executive Vice
President for Adademic Affairs will
require a unique combination of acad-
emic interests and stature along with
administrative skill, and 1 believe that
Robert O’Neil possesses these qualities
and should be asked to assume this new
role. An advisory committee will ot
course be formed to make a specific
recommendation for this new position.
If Mr. O’Neil is, in fact, designated
for the new Executive Vice Presidency,
this move will create a vacancy in the
position of Provost for Academic
Affairs. An advisory committee for the
selection of a person to fill this
important office will also be appointed.
Finally, an advisory committee for
the review and recommendation of
candidates for the new position of
University Dean for Graduate Education
and Research will be organized and
asked to begin its essential task as
quickly as possible.
5.
Costs
A major cost involved in any
substantial change in organizational
structure is change itself: good men and
women take on new roles and titles.
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devote time and effort to learning and
developing their new roles, and ex-
perience a natural insecurity in being
assigned new responsibilities; com-
mittees are required to identify the best
candidates for the various new posi-
tions; faculty and other members of the
university community must learn new
relationships and reporting functions.
These costs are certainly balanced by
the efficiencies of the reorganization: a
new office of the University Dean with
clear responsibility for campus-wide
graduate education and graduate edu-
cation and research; consolidation of
the Office of the President; consoli-
dation of information sources and
information reporting under the Vice
President for Management and Finance;
a clarification of the functions and
structure of the office of the Provost for
Academic Affairs; the elimination of at
least two positions at the Vice-Provostal
level.
No budgetary increases for central
administration are anticipated to result
from the reorganization. In fact, a
preliminary projection indicates that
there will be some budgetary reduction
for salaries of central administrative
officers and their staffs during 1973-74,
compared to the costs involved in the
present structure. These costs can be
expected to decrease even more in
succeeding years, as the reorganization
is carried through future stages of
refinement.
Appendix A; The Executive Vice
President and Secretary of the
Board of Directors
This is a full-time major position within
the Office of the President. The incumbent
will preside over the institution when the
President is absent. He will provide general
advice and counsel on all University matters,
especially on questions of budgeting and
community relations. He will serve as the
chief coordinator of and link to the Board of
Directors, and will work closely with the
President on all external financial matters,
including overall coordination for whatever
“campaigns” and liaison efforts that are
necessary. He will be responsible for the
I
relationships between the General Hospital
and the medical resources of the Center. He
will be in charge of all decisions on new
ii buildings. He and the Executive Vice
President for Academic Affairs will have
r responsibility within the Office of the
t
President on all issues that relate to
management and the budget of the Univer-
sity.
Sudden issues and unexpected problems
will be his responsibility as will the role of
general troubleshooter for the Office of the
President.
Reporting to the Executive Vice President,
immediately upon the effective date of
retirement of the incumbent Vice President
for Public Affairs, will be those offices
previously reporting to the latter until a
deployment of these functions is recommend-
ed. It is expected that the University Counsel
will report to the Executive Vice President in
any case.
Appendix B; The Executive Vice
President for Academic Affairs
The major responsibility of the Executive
Vice President for Academic Affairs will be to
coordinate and orchestrate all internal affairs
of the University with the President. He will
function as a staff officer within the Office of
the President, and with few exceptions not as
a direct line officer. He will be responsible for
responding to the initiatives of the colleges,
interacting with their proposals, and relating
institutional aspirations to the external
realities, assuring in the process the primacy
of academic concerns as we struggle purpose-
fully to manage change within scarce
resources.
While reporting functions will be directed
to the Office of the President and not to
particular members of that team, the
Executive Vice President will have special
concern for the activities of the following
officers: University Dean for Graduate Educa-
tion and Research, Librarian, Director of
information, Director of Resource Develop-
ment, and governance officers. He will
articulate budget, space, and personnel with
academic programs, implement the budget
review process, and correlate the University
governance structure with its executive
structure. He will provide integrative thinking
toward the formulation of patterns of
University organization and the creation of
new academic structures that respond to
needs (both within and without the Univer-
sity) for interdisciplinary cooperation in
educational, research, and service acitivities.
In summary, he will be the principal staff
officer for internal affairs of the University,
with special responsibility for planning,
policy, and decision-making for academic
programs.
Appendix C: The Provost
for Academic Affairs
The Provost for Academic Affairs is the
chief academic officer for the Clifton campus
and the two-year colleges-that is, he has
general administrative responsibility for all
colleges except those in the Medical Center.
That responsibility includes such functions as
superintendence of all academic personnel
decisions initial hiring, reappointment or
non-reappointment, promotion, grant of
tenure, and the recommendation of emeritus
status upon retirement. The Provost chairs
every search committee for a college dean-
ship, and appoints two members of that
committee. Recommendations for appoint-
ment of department heads, coordinators and
chairmen, must be transmitted to the
President by and with approval of the Provost
for Academic Affairs. Budgets for all
non-medical units must be approved by the
Provost, along with any transfers of funds
between budget categories.
At least equally important is the role of
educational leadership which the Provost fills.
Since this office has ultimate responsibility
for all personnel and fiscal actions on the
main campus, the function of shaping and
applying policy through those decisions is
essential. The priorities of the office should
reflect recommendations of the Long Range
Planning Task Force, and should serve to
implement statements of University mission
by the President and the Board of Directors.
Hence the Provost must endorse the goals
of the institution and further their imple-
mentations.
The Provost for Academic Affairs bears a
special responsibility for students. Since the
Division of Student Affairs is a major segment
of his office, a close relationship between
curricular and co-curricular activities is
assured. Responsibility for the office of the
Vice Provost for Admissions and Records also
enhances that relationship, and facilitates
close liaison among related service and
supporting functions.
Finally, the Provost is a key member of the
top-level administrative council which advises
the President on major policy matters. He
must work closely with the Vice Presidents
both on special matters of joint interest and
on matters of general university-wide concern.
While most of the responsibilities of the office
are of a line character, the special relationship
with the Office of the President is at times an
almost staff relationship.
Despite the size, complexity, and diversity
of the University, the Provost for Academic
Affairs must be responsive to individual needs
of faculty, students, and staff members. When
a person feels that justice has not been
obtained or an adequate explanation secured
at the college, departmental, or divisional
level, then ultimate recourse should be to the
Provost. He must always be willing to listen
and, in critical cases, to intervene even at the
risk of bypassing formal channels.
Appendix D: The University
Dean for Graduate Education
and Research
The University Dean will assume the
central role in all graduate programs through-
out the University, with the exception ot the
professional programs leading to the MD and
.11) degrees. It will be the Dean’s function
to
coordinate such programs, to provide central
SOME REORGANIZA TION QUESTIONS ANSWERED
Q. Why was this reorganization necessary?
A. There have been some important and
confusing ambiguities in reporting
functions-a common problem in any large
organization with diverse responsibilities. We
are striving to emphasize the competencies of
people in the right roles. We need to use
human resources more appropriately and we
need to have a more efficient data base.
The reorganization will make clear the
reporting functions; it should make for a
much more efficient organization; and it will
relieve certain overloaded offices of
management and operational problems. It is
also designed to strengthen the ties between
the Clifton campus and the Medical Center
and to aid immensely the total coordination
of graduate education and research.
Q. Is this reorganization really an excuse
to reshuffle people?
A. All organization charts have to take
into account people. Unless it does, it is
guaranteed to fail. So, to a certain extent, this
reorganization attempts to re-position some
people into organizational functions that they
Continued
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administrative services, to help define and
maintain standards, to serve as the advocate
for graduate education at the University, and
to exercise leadership in strengthening
existing programs and initiating new ones.
The University Dean’s role will necessitate
close consultation with the deans of colleges
containing graduate programs. Further, the
Dean will be advised in these tasks by the
Graduate Council, an elected body represent-
ing the graduate faculty of the University.
The Dean will therefore chair meetings of this
Graduate Council, as well as meetings of the
all-University graduate faculty. The intimate
relationship between graduate education and
research further mandates that the University
Dean will also chair the University Research
Council, and will coordinate the admini-
stration of academic aspects of research. The
Dean’s budget will enable him to participate,
in consultation with the college deans, in the
distribution of funds for graduate and
research assistantships and fellowships. He
will be consulted by the Provost and the Vice
President and Director of the Medical Center
on decisions regarding promotion, appoint-
ment, and reappointment of members of the
Graduate Faculty, and will have responsi-
bility, with the advice of the University
Research Council, for the distribution of
research support money. The Dean’s office
will also have an enabling function and will
provide leadership especially for those
programs which cut across conventional
departmental or college lines. Because these
activities relate to all colleges of the
University, the University Dean will report
directly to the tiffice of the President.
seem most talented to fulfill. As T.S. Eliot
once said (referring to the Technocrats,)
“These men design systems where no man
need be going.”
On the other hand, the structure itself is an
improvement which I hope will create more
clarity, more effectiveness and, ultimately,
lead to a better education.
Q. Why are two Executive Vice Presidents
needed?
A. The Office of the President has long
needed a person of academic status to assist in
the whole area of academic planning and the
overload therefrom in a time of rapid change.
This is intended to greatly enhance the
emphasis placed by the President’s office on
academic affairs.
At the same time, the Office of the
President needs an executive of proven ability
to direct administrative affairs. The overload
in this office has reached staggering
proportions, making it impossible to render
unto academe the needs thereof and render
unto the rest of the University the day-to-day
administrative necessities.
The appointment of these two Executive
Vice Presidents, not unprecedented by any
means, is intended to provide experienced
direction for internal affairs while also
concentrating on such imperative external
matters as fund-raising.
Under the reorganization plan, the two
Executive Vice Presidents, the President and
Presidential assistants will work as a
composite “Office of the President.” This will
make the President more personally accessible
as needs arise than has been possible up to
now.
Under this arrangement, the Provost and
the Vice President for Medical Affairs will
report directlto the Office of the President,
thus tying the entire University operation
much closer together.
Q. How much is this reorganization to
cost?
A. There will actually be a net savings in
administrative costs. Two positions will be
eliminated this year and a third next year.
And there is no net increase in the number of
Vice Presidents.
Q. Explain the role of the University
Dean?
A. We need a coherent voice for research
and graduate education that will embrace
both campuses. The University Dean will not
have direct line responsibility; for instance,
the Dean does not hire or fire faculty
members or control curriculum. However, the
University Dean will have a great deal of
influence on all matters having to do with
graduate education and research. Reporting to
the Office of the President will provide the
Dean and the President with ready access to
each other on general academic policy.
The role of the University Dean shares a
common dilemma with all graduate Deans
throughout this country. It is an anomalous
role. It is a role which relies heavily on the
ability of the graduate Dean to stimulate, lead
and influence through strong collegial ties.
The Dean should be the conscience for the
role of graduate education and research on
this campus.
Q. Has there been consultation with
University interests on this plan?
A. For several months, consultations with
faculty, students and staff have been in
progress. Many points in the plan have come
out of these meetings, which have been very
valuable.
Q. Under this plan, it seems that all Vice-
Presidents are given equal power; yet,
academic concerns should be primary. Why is
this?
A. In fact, the vast majority of funds
spent at UC are under control of the Provost
and the Vice President for the Medical Center,
both academic Vice Presidents. Advisory
Councils have been established specifically to
deal with academic concerns. There should be
no feeling at all that non-academic Vice
Presidents are obtaining excessive authority.
Q. Why will the library people report to
the Office of the President rather than to an
academic office?
A. The library is meant to be a
University-wide facility, interdisciplinary to
the fullest extent. It would not be appropriate
to have the librarian report to the University
Dean since the library’s function is also
undergraduate. Nor should the librarian
report to the Provost since the library has
extensive College of Medicine applications. It
is appropriate for the librarian to report to
the Office of the President since this
underscores the priority status of the library
and its interdisciplinary functions.
Q. There were a number of occasions
when you used the phrase “Office of the
President” or “Office of the Vice President"
or “Office of the Provost.” How is that
different from just calling that Provost or
President?
A. The idea of the office of the President,
for example, is to emphasize the need for
collaborative and staff assistance to the
President. For example, the Executive Vice
President for Academic Affairs does not
create a dual provost system. The Provost
does not report to the Executive Vice
President for Academic Affairs. Nor does the
Vice President for Management and Finance
report to the Executive Vice President and
Secretary to the Board of Directors. The idea
of the Office is to establish within each
administrative office the administrative
imperative to create some division ot labor
without interfering with the basic principles
that the buck stops here. In short, the
concept of the Office of the President can in
no way abdicate any of his responsibility.
Q. To whom do the College and Personnel
Deans report?
A. The Academic Deans report directly to
the Provost. However, it should be pointed
out that this excludes the three Medical
Center Deans, who report to the Vice
President and Director of the Medical Center.
In the short run the five two-year College
Deans and the Dean of the College ol
Community Services report to the Provost
through Vice Provost Krueger. As far as the
Personnel Deans are concerned, there is no
change. They will continue to report to Vice
Provost Nester. The Director of Admissions
and the Registrar will continue to report
to
the Vice Provost for Admissions and Records.
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